By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY
Executive Summary
- Even though Burkina Faso as well as other G5 member countries have not completely collapsed and failed in the classical sense of it, they may be regarded as case studies of extremely weak or fragile states with economic poverty to boot. The very purpose of governance is defeated in this context and as a result of this defeat, the various regimes in these countries hardly command respect in the international community except to be used as cannon fodder for achieving certain strategic aims by the superpowers. These countries have no State ability to maneuver in the labyrinth of geopolitics by the superpowers nor can they command loud voice for their countries’ best interests. They are kicked around like soccer, regarded as bargaining chips or pawns in the negotiating table or chessboard of the superpowers.
- The G5 countries are largely regarded by other superpowers as the exclusive sphere of French neo-imperialism. Hence the lack of moderation in the overt French imperialist rascality and atrocities in these countries. The interference or interventions by other superpowers have thus been minimal concomitantly allowing France to get away with all its crimes in these countries. These countries are French fiefdoms. This is not the old narrative of how European powers impoverished and underdeveloped Africa, according to Frantz Fanon, but a new meta-narrative of how they continue to exploit, under-develop and destabilize Africa – contrary to what IMF, World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions would claim that these African countries are making progress. France has further impoverished these countries economically, weakened their state machines strategically and socially and culturally emasculated them and their ability to think and act independently – without reference to or fear of what Paris would do to them. It is the most tragic turn of events in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the lives of these former French colonies in Africa. It is the most outrageous and modern wickedness in international relations between a former colonial power and her former colonies.
- The G5 Sahel Security Initiative (with Operation Barkhane as its arrowhead) exclusively established, sponsored and promoted by France has been a resounding failure after eight years and several billions of dollars committed to it as already admitted by French authorities. The member countries gained nothing from it. They were not able to either stabilize themselves in power with it or use it as a vehicle for economic development. They were not able to use it to help one another. It has been a wasteful exercise in military and intelligence diplomacy. Indeed, Operation Barkhane has been part and parcel of regime and political instability in the member countries while Islamic Jihadism and terrorism are now permanent features of the crisis rocking these countries.
- Operation Barkhane in the last eight years or thereabout should be considered part and parcel of the evolution of the G5 member states – from being benign to their current repressive characters – not only in terms of activities carried out by French soldiers of Operation Barkhane overtly and covertly but also in their military advisories to the member states and the concomitant pogroms committed by them – often nicely put as violation of human rights of the citizens. It has been a disastrous phase in the evolutionary growth of the member states in which thousands have needlessly lost their lives without justice dispensation and with little or no economic progress to showcase.
- Burkina Faso is one the poorest countries in the world. This is despite the fact it has one of the richest mining sectors in Africa. Burkina Faso has the fourth or fifth largest deposit of gold in Africa. It also has zinc, manganese, vanadium, among other solid minerals in large commercial quantity. Unfortunately, Burkina Faso has not been able to turn its solid minerals into wealth that could help lift it out of poverty. However, largely mooted in public discourse is the link between mining in Burkina Faso (both legal and illegal mining) and the explosion of insurgency in the country in the last 6 years. While the mining sector represent hope for economic development and nation building, it has also generated despair by being turned into channel for generating illicit financial flows for the insurgents who are engaged in illegal mining that has not been properly documented.
The Story
On December 8, 2021, Burkina Faso President Roch Kabore fired his Prime Minister amid an escalating security crisis that has killed thousands and led to street protests calling for his ouster.1 Kabore has been under pressure to make changes and has already reshuffled his army leadership. His announcement to fire Prime Minister Christophe Dabire appears to be an extension of the same purge.2 Burkina Faso is at the heart of an Islamist insurgency that has also hit large parts of neighbouring Mali and Niger that sit in the arid Sahel region that borders the southern edge of the Sahara.3 Despite efforts by former colonial ruler France and other regional armies, attacks continue unabated, leaving local communities vulnerable.4 Burkina Faso, one of West Africa’s poorest nations, has been beset by attacks carried out by groups linked to al Qaeda and Islamic State since 2016, killing civilians and forcing more than 1 million people to flee.5 Anger has spilled over since al Qaeda-affiliated militants killed 49 military police officers and four civilians in November, the worst attack on the military in recent memory.6
The attack was one of the worst on the military in recent memory and sparked protests calling for a new prime minister.7 The government’s secretary general read out a decree on public television that officially terminated the prime minister’s term.8 According to Burkina Faso law, the resignation of a prime minister also requires the resignation of the entire government. But the outgoing government will remain in a caretaker capacity until a new one is formed, according to the government’s secretary general Stephane Wenceslas Sanou. President Kabore first appointed Dabire in early 2019, and again in 2021, after the president was re-elected for the second and last term.9
A week before the forced resignation of the Prime Minister, the entire cabinet and by implication, the collapse of the government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, was in the “war-weakened” Burkina Faso to warn that “if insecurity in Burkina Faso keeps up, the West African nation could spiral into a humanitarian and human rights “catastrophe,”10 ”as it attempts to tackle a jihadi insurgency linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group”.11
During her four-day trip, Bachelet visited the hard-hit Sahel region and spoke to key players, including President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, religious leaders, civil society groups and victims of human rights abuses. “Burkina Faso is in the grip of not one but several major, intersecting crises,” she said. “I stressed with President Kabore, it is essential that all perpetrators of such human rights violations and abuses be brought to justice, regardless of their affiliation.”12 Bachelet’s visit comes as accusations of human rights abuses by the security forces and jihadis are increasing. [In late November 2021] at least 15 people were allegedly killed by the army in the southwest, according to civil society groups.13
Human Rights Watch said it’s investigating allegations that at least 18 women were raped by jihadis in the town of Dablo, said Corinne Dufka, the group’s West Africa director. “Burkina Faso has been rocked by atrocities by jihadis and pro-government forces alike in violence which has killed hundreds, decimated entire villages, and left untold broken lives in its wake,” said Dufka, urging that Bachelet’s visit bring this suffering into focus and pressure all armed groups to stop waging war on civilians.14
As security decreases, the security forces will likely resort to more aggressive and extrajudicial tactics to try and stem the problem, which will lead to a vicious cycle of distrust and the inability to control the situation, said Laith Alkhouri, CEO of Intelonyx Intelligence Advisory, which provides intelligence analysis. “Should reports of human rights abuses go unchecked, it will lead to further distrust in the government’s ability to address security concerns.”15
Residents are growing increasingly frustrated at the government’s inability to stem the violence. Protesters threw rocks and security forces fired tear gas during a protest last week calling for the president’s resignation. More protests are planned.16
Bachelet said Burkina Faso has a tradition of ensuring the peaceful coexistence of its people and called on the government to create a space for meaningful dialogue and for parties to air grievances. While the government has launched investigations into allegations of human rights abuses by the security forces, no one has been convicted.17
Meanwhile, civilians who accuse the army of killing or disappearing their relatives are asking the government to stop the abuse. “They are arresting and executing anybody and I am against it, even if he is a terrorist,” said Hamadou Diallo, who has not seen his nephew since the nephew was taken by the army two years ago outside of the town of Dori. “If someone is not armed and they arrest him, they can judge and sentence him.”18
[As a result of the collapse of the government] Burkina Faso is [now] facing a political vacuum [and uncertain future] in the face of an escalating security crisis that has killed thousands and led to street protests.19
The announcement followed an ultimatum set by the opposition, which has pledged to continue street protests should there be no change in leadership. Opposition groups had called for Kabore’s resignation over the security crisis. Critics say the dismissal of Dabire is an attempt at deflecting responsibility. Last month, on the eve of anti-government demonstrations, Kabore had stressed the need for a “stronger” cabinet over the growing threat of violence.20
[Christophe] Dabire was previously Burkina Faso’s representative at the eight-nation West African Economic and Monetary Union. In the 1990s, he had served as minister to ex-President Blaise Compaore, partly while Kabore himself was prime minister. Dabire was appointed prime minister as part of a reshuffle in early 2019 coinciding with a rising wave of attacks in the country. He remained in the post after Kabore was re-elected for his second term in January 2021.21
Many countries of the Sahel have been struggling with extreme climate shifts that result in recurring droughts with devastating effects on the already vulnerable populations living in the underdeveloped region. In recent years, parts of western Sahel have also been in the international spotlight due to a “fireball of conflict” that involves multiple armed groups, military campaigns by national armies and international partners as well as local militias. In Burkina Faso, an impoverished country of some 20 million people, attacks carried out by armed groups linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda have displaced more than one million people.22
After leaving his post, Dabire called on citizens to “support the president … and the new executive that will be put in place”. “I remain convinced that through united action we will be able to meet the challenges our country and our people are facing,” he wrote in a post on Facebook.23
But moving back to the last few months, in April two Spanish filmmakers and the Irish president of a conservation non-governmental organization (NGO) were murdered in Burkina Faso near the border with Benin on April 26. Roberto Fraile and David Beriain were in Burkina Faso working on a documentary about poaching. They were accompanied by Rory Young, a Zambia-born Irish citizen who headed Chengeta Wildlife, an NGO devoted to training local residents to counter wildlife poaching; Chengeta reports it trained ninety rangers and other personnel in Africa last year.24
Though details are unclear, it appears that the victims were part of a convoy of forty that was attacked. Six others were injured and a Burkinabe soldier is missing. The fate of the rest is unreported, making it likely that they survived at least the initial attack, though contact with the group was lost. Media reports are situating the murders in the context of the upsurge of jihadi activity across the country. Perhaps. But the eastern region where the attack took place, situated on the border with Niger and Benin—rather than the “Three Borders” region shared with Niger and Mali, a more longstanding jihadi hotspot—is also characterized by criminal gangs often involved in poaching, robbery, and kidnapping. That the attack was motivated by criminals protecting poaching cannot be dismissed. Jihadi groups and criminal gangs would often appear to overlap; both make use of kidnapping.25
That the three Europeans were murdered rather than held for ransom is curious. In the Sahel, Europeans from rich democracies are prime targets. Public pressure to secure the release of kidnapping victims encourages European governments (or other entities) to pay enormous ransoms. Whoever the perpetrators, the three tragic murders are emblematic of the accelerating breakdown of security in the Sahel.26
In early June, jihadist militants in Burkina Faso raided homes and the local market in Solhan, a village close to the border with Niger. By sunrise, they had killed at least 160 civilians in what local officials said was the country’s worst terrorist attack in years.27
Though particularly shocking for its scale, the attack is the latest expression of an ongoing and escalating conflict. Since 2016, Burkina Faso has been home to a jihadist insurrection that has thrown the country into an “unprecedented humanitarian crisis,” according to the United Nations, and displaced more than 1 million people—a number that has increased by a factor of 10 since 2019. This, despite the fact that international partners, including the European Union and the United States, have dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to security assistance for Burkina Faso in recent years. As violence continued to escalate, the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank, called in February for a policy rethink, warning that “adding more financial or military resources will not reverse the deterioration of security” in the Sahel.28
Burkina Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries and its armed forces are ill-equipped to tackle highly mobile jihadists. Attacks targeting civilians and soldiers are increasingly frequent, and the vast majority takes place in the north and east, spreading from neighbouring Mali. In mid-November, at least 57 people, 53 of them gendarmes, were killed in an attack on a police post in the country’s north. In late November, around 10 people were hurt when the security forces using teargas dispersed a rally in the capital Ouagadougou protesting at Kabore’s security policies. A French military convoy on its way to Niger and then on to Mali was blocked for several days, caught up in the protests in Burkina Faso, where locals blamed the French forces for not doing enough. France has 5,100 troops in the Sahel under its Barkhane operation, which spans five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. While it has killed many top jihadist leaders, violence has continued to intensify and spread in the region. On 10 June, President Emmanuel Macron announced a major drawdown of France’s military presence in the Sahel, where forces have been battling jihadist insurgents for nearly a decade.29
In short, Burkina Faso has become a bedlam of insecurity signposted by killings from Islamic Jihadist fighters and government security forces. Worst of all is that innocent civilians are caught up in the crossfires, making them collateral damage to a conflict between two combatants they know nothing about. What the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Chief, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, did not dare to say during her visit to the country was that Burkina Faso stands at the edge of complete collapse through State implosion if the ongoing insurgency against the Burkinabe State by the Islamic Jihadist fighters does not stop in time. In such a situation there would be no President to fire a Prime Minister as the Presidency itself would be kicked out and taken over by the Islamic Jihadists as it has already happened in Afghanistan. The danger is present and clear that Islamic Jihadism wants a bridgehead in sub-Sahara Africa and Burkina Faso may as well provide that bridgehead. The French-led G5 Sahel Security Initiative (Operation Barkhane) would not be able to stop this precisely the way the Americans could not prevent the Talibans from taking over Afghanistan right under their very noses and military firepower. If Burkina Faso falls into the hands of the Islamic Jihadists, then the whole of West Africa, including Nigeria, stands the risks of explosion. It is both a boomerang and domino effect.
A New Prime Minister
In a manner akin to changing dirty napkins, on December 11, 2021, President Kabore announced the appointment of a new Prime Minister following the sacking of Christophe Dabire. The new Prime Minister is Lassina Zerbo, the former head of a top nuclear watchdog based in Vienna, Austria. Facing the growing threat of jihadist insurgents, President Kabore appealed for help from all. “Our defence and security forces, as well as our volunteers for the defence of the country, need our support. This is why I am appealing to all the sons and daughters of our nation to contribute to the war effort, each according to his or her means. Our government will receive the necessary instructions for the establishment of a mechanism for the collection and transparent management of contributions”, appealed the President.30
The six-year-old campaign of violence has claimed around 2,000 lives and forced 1.4 million people from their homes. “In the face of this legitimate anger generated by the heavy human toll of terrorism, and in view of the number of internally displaced persons, I invite the people of Burkina Faso to make no mistake about their adversary or their enemy. As supreme commander of the armed forces, I will never be caught short in our common will to defeat the forces of evil that use our territory to commit the most abominable trades and crimes”, promised President Kabore.31
According to AFP, at least 13 Burkina Faso defence volunteers were killed in an attack in the north of the country on Thursday. The peak of the deadly violence came on November 14 when 57 people, 53 of them police officers, were killed in the north of the country.32
Zerbo, a 58-year-old geophysicist and the former head of a top nuclear watchdog, is to take office in the face of growing popular dissatisfaction over a deteriorating security crisis that has gripped Burkina Faso for years. “The president … decrees: Lassina Zerbo is named prime minister,” government spokesman Stephane Wenceslas Sanou said, reading the decree on television. Zerbo was executive secretary of the Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) from 2013 until August. He is relatively unknown to most Burkinabes but has gained some recognition abroad for his efforts towards banning nuclear explosive testing.33
Opposition and civil society groups have repeatedly expressed their discontent with the government’s management of the security crisis, taking to the streets to demand Kabore step down. In late November, 10 people were hurt, including a child and two journalists, when police used tear gas to disperse hundreds of protesters in the capital, Ouagadougou.34
Burkina Faso is at the heart of a conflict that has swept through large parts of the arid Sahel region, killing thousands of people, forcing millions more from their homes and leaving an immense humanitarian crisis in its wake. Despite efforts by regional armies and former colonial ruler France, attacks by armed groups linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda continue unabated, leaving local communities vulnerable. In Burkina Faso, the peak of the violence came last month when dozens of people, mostly gendarmes, were killed in the country’s north.35
Two weeks before they were attacked, the gendarmes had warned headquarters that they were running short of supplies and were having to trap animals to eat. They had been waiting in vain for several days for a relief force when they came under attack from hundreds of fighters on pick-up trucks and motorcycles, according to accounts of the battle. Before the new prime minister was named, on Friday night, Kabore had called all Burkinabes to rally to overcome “terrorism”. “I make a call, to all daughters and sons of our nation, to support the war effort, each according to their abilities,” he said, without providing more details. Late on Thursday, the armies of Burkina Faso and neighbouring Niger said they had killed about 100 “terrorists” in a joint military operation against armed groups on the border between November 25 and December 9. They had also dismantled two bases, one on either side of the frontier, they said in a joint statement.36, 37
Blood, Tears and Sorrow
As if changing or sacking Prime Ministers is the panacea to the raging insurgency, barely two weeks after the appointment of the new Prime Minister, the Jihadist fighters launched a deadly terror attack on Burkinabe soldiers in an ambush killing 41 of them on December 26, 2021. It was one of the saddest days in Burkina Faso. The Government subsequently declared two days of national mourning in honour of the fallen soldiers.
Burkina Faso’s government declared two days of mourning starting on Sunday after 41 people died in an attack by suspected jihadists in the north[ern] part of the country]. “The search mission in the area of an ambush by armed terrorist groups… has established a toll of 41 bodies. The president decrees national mourning of 48 hours,” said a government statement issued on Saturday evening.38
The government said the dead included members of an official self-defense force known as the Volunteers for the Defence of the Motherland (VDP), set up to support the army. Volunteers receive 14 days of training and are then sent out on patrols and surveillance missions, equipped with light arms. Among the victims of Thursday’s attack was Ladji Yoro, considered a leader of the VDP in Burkina Faso, the statement said. “The identification of the victims is still underway,” said the government statement. According to local media, the ambush targeted a convoy of traders escorted by VDP near Ouahigouya, a town not far from the Mali border. The attack was the deadliest since mid-November when 57 people, including 53 gendarmes, were killed.39
Like its neighbours Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso has been caught up in a spiral of violence since 2015, attributed to armed jihadist groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State militant group. The fighting has left at least 2,000 people dead and 1.4 million displaced.40
While no group has yet claimed responsibility for Thursday’s attack, a number of armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the so-called “Islamic State” have been fighting government forces in the Sahel region. Burkina Faso has also been hit by terror attacks in recent years perpetrated by these militant groups.41
The shared border region between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali has been the center of deadly jihadi attacks by IS and al-Qaeda affiliates for years The attacks have claimed thousands of lives and forced more than a million people to flee their homes. The government has been struggling to address the security crisis. Earlier this month Christophe Dabire announced his resignation as prime minister following another attack in November that killed 49 military officers and at least four civilians. That attack was considered one of the worst in recent memory and sparked protests calling for President Roch Marc Christian Kabore to step down.42, 43
[In a manner akin to shedding crocodile tears], France condemned in the strongest possible terms the attack carried out in Northern Burkina Faso, in the vicinity of You, on December 23, which left several dozen civilians dead. It extends its condolences to the families of the victims and to the people of Burkina Faso. Together with all the partners in the Coalition for the Sahel, France stands with the authorities of Burkina Faso to combat terrorism.44
Turkey [also] condemned the deadly terror attack in Burkina Faso. “We are deeply saddened to receive today [on Dec. 26] the news that 41 Burkinabe volunteers in the army and civilians lost their lives during a terrorist attack in the Loroum/You Region,” the ministry’s statement said. “We strongly condemn this heinous terrorist attack. We extend our sincere condolences to the relatives of the victims and to the friendly and brotherly people and Government of Burkina Faso,” it added.45
Without mincing words, it is very apparent that changing Prime Ministers is definitely not the answer or solution to the raging insurgency in the country. President Roch Christian Kabore got it all wrong thinking and believing that changing Prime Ministers is the solution to the raging security crisis facing Burkina Faso in the last six years – without examining himself and what he might have most probably done or got wrong in his assessment of the changing security environment in the Sahel region with particular reference to Burkina Faso.
Changing Prime Ministers, without looking inward into the Presidency itself is diversionary from the significant failure of governance that has been chalked up since he was elected President of the country. It is looking in the wrong political direction by making scapegoats of Prime Ministers who probably have limited control over the vectors of military establishment and its ability to face and defeat the insurgency thrown up by Islamic Jihadism in recent years – since the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces.
It is difficult to call the latest victims of the terror attack on December 26 soldiers. This is because they are members of Volunteers for the Defence of the Motherland (VDP), set up to support the army and who received only two-week training and were then sent out on patrols and surveillance missions, equipped with light arms. It is akin to sending sheep into the arms of hungry wolves. One can only guess what would be their fates.
The problem facing Burkinabe State in this broad context is not the individual ability of the Prime Ministers to manage and control the escalating insecurity in the country but a matter or question of failure of the Burkinabe security system in coping with modern insurgency of Sahelian typology. This will be examined exhaustively below.
Added to the tragedy facing Burkina Faso is the apparent failure of the foreign military assistance from France in particular and the United States in helping the Burkinabe military to stem the rising tidal wave of insurgency and campaign of terror against Burkina Faso. The decision of French authorities to draw down on their troops stationed in Burkina Faso is a direct admission of this colossal failure. Thus the intervention of the French-packaged G5 Sahel Security Initiative and particularly Operation Barkhane over the last few years has been a resounding failure.
Background
The current troubles with Burkina Faso started in late 2014 with the downfall of President Blaise Compaore who ruled the country with iron fist for twenty seven years. It can be argued here that his downfall caused the nuts and bolts that have hitherto held the Burkinabe security system, and by extension the larger sociopolitical ecosystem, together to become loosened and caused the entire state machinery to become extremely weakened. His iron fist rule, without any known significant achievement, led to massive protests that caused him crashing out of power in the most disgraceful manner. He fled to Ivory Coast for his personal safety.
In 2014, popular uprisings removed Compaoré from power. Following his removal, the Burkina Faso Regiment of Presidential Security (French: Régiment de la Sécurité Présidentielle, RSP), [that] was loyal to Compaoré, carried out a coup in 2015 against the transitional government. Although the coup failed, the RSP was dissolved, weakening the state security apparatus and allowing terrorist organizations to increase their operations domestically. The RSP included about 1,300 soldiers and had received training from the U.S. and France in counterterrorism practices. Following its dissolution, this technical expertise and manpower was no longer available to contribute to security efforts. For comparison, Burkina Faso’s entire Armed Forces currently has approximately 11,200 personnel − the RSP thus constituted about 10% of Burkina Faso’s army.46
More recently, human rights organizations have also accused the security forces of carrying out “atrocities…leaving scores dead and forcing tens of thousands of villagers to flee their homes.” Some argue that the human rights abuses conducted by the security forces in the name of counterterrorism undermines their effectiveness at preventing terrorist attacks, because abuses make locals less likely to collaborate with security forces against terrorist organizations.47
In response to the increased terrorist threat, in November 2016, Burkina Faso decided to withdraw its soldiers from United Nations peacekeeping in Sudan to refocus military efforts on fighting terrorism domestically and to help reinforce existing security forces.48
Prior to 2015, there were no recorded terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso. However, the country experienced seven coups during this time period, the most of any African country. Additionally, there were some reports that terrorist financing and fund-raising were taking place domestically.49
Some argue that then-President Blaise Compaoré, who was in power from 1987 to 2014, partnered with terrorist organizations. While most research suggests that partnerships between Compaoré and terrorist organizations did exist, the exact nature of these agreements remains unverified. In particular, some reports show that Compaoré brokered an agreement with Tuareg rebel groups in Mali associated with al-Qaeda. In trade for operating in Burkina Faso, the Tuareg groups and associated terrorist organizations allegedly agreed not to carry out attacks within the country.50
In addition, Compaoré allowed Special Forces from France and the U.S. to operate in Burkina Faso, serving as a key partner for counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. Such partnerships led to descriptions of Burkina Faso as “West Africa’s linchpin” by the media. Linchpin states signify “crucial but endangered allies” in “creating a global anti-terror regime.”51
During this time period [2015 to 2018], attacks in Burkina Faso increased both in number and fatality rate. Such incidents garnered international attention, especially including three major terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou in 2016, 2017, and 2018. According to Joe Penney, this spike in activity can perhaps be attributed to the current government’s discontinuation of Compaoré’s practice of negotiating with terrorist organizations. Another more referenced cause is the weakened Burkina Faso security apparatus.52
Beginning in December 2018, there was a spike in terrorist activity in Burkina Faso. Over a two-month period, there were eight terror attacks, killing over thirty people altogether. In response to a terror attack near the border with Mali on December 27, 2018 that killed ten gendarmes, the Burkina Faso government declared a state of emergency in several Northern provinces. The state of emergency began on January 1, 2019 and included the following fourteen provinces.53
Several different terrorist organizations have claimed responsibility for attacks in Burkina Faso. Most attacks are carried out by foreign-based organizations, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, usually from neighboring Mali. Such organizations tend to focus on religious extremism and anti-Western sentiment. However, some organizations also target Burkina Faso because of communal frustration over the lack of economic development. In particular, terrorist organizations are able to recruit people in Burkina Faso, due to disillusionment about the stagnating economy.54
Prior to 2017, most attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is the North African branch of al-Qaeda (AQ), based in Mali. AQIM has conducted attacks all over the Sahel. For example, AQIM and its affiliate, al-Mourabitoun, claimed responsibility for the 2016 Ouagadougou attacks. These two organizations had merged one month earlier in December 2015, although they previously had a contentious relationship. Following the merger, many expected the danger posed by AQIM to the region to increase.55
In March 2017, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) formed from the merger of AQIM, Ansar al-Dine, and al-Mourabitoun. JNIM remains under the control of AQIM/AQ and is based in Mali. Since its formation, JNIM has carried out several attacks in Burkina Faso. For example, JNIM claimed responsibility for the 2018 Ouagadougou attacks. JNIM’s creation was particularly interesting because it signaled AQ’s adaptability. AQ perhaps expected JNIM to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in the Sahel. JNIM poses a particularly serious threat because it has a wide set of capabilities including high fatality rates, targeting foreigners (from Western nations), striking armed targets, and coordinating several attacks at once.56
Other AQ affiliates that have participated in terrorist activity in Burkina Faso include: Ansar-ul-Islam lil-Ichad wal Jihad (IRSAD), which is led by a radicalized Burkina Faso preacher, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a breakaway group from al-Mourabitoun that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/IS), Macina Liberation Front, a Mali organization that has worked with AQIM, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a breakaway group from AQIM.57
ISIL activity in Burkina Faso has been limited as compared to AQIM activity. Its main affiliate near Burkina Faso, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) formed in May 2015 from a breakaway faction of al-Mourabitoun that pledged allegiance to IS. ISGS has conducted at least two attacks in Burkina Faso. On September 1, 2016, ISGS attacked a gendarmerie and, on October 12, 2016, it attacked a police outpost. Both incidents occurred in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso.58
Another affiliate of the Islamic State, Boko Haram is also believed to operate in Burkina Faso. Boko Haram is a terrorist organization based in nearby Nigeria. Some suspect this organization of smuggling weapons and money through Burkina Faso. Additionally, a witness to a terrorist attack on August 23, 2015 in the Oursi province of Burkina Faso claimed that the terrorists had expressed allegiance to Boko Haram.59
Burkina Faso’s president declared three days of national mourning from Thursday after suspected jihadists killed 47 people, including 30 civilians, in the latest attack in the north of the country. The assault on Wednesday near the northern town of Gorgadji left 14 soldiers and three militia volunteers dead, as well as the 30 civilians, the communications ministry said. The soldiers and militia had been “guarding civilians setting off for Arbinda,” another town in northern Burkina. In an ensuing gun battle, security forces killed 58 “terrorists” and put the rest to flight, according to the government. Nineteen people were also wounded, it said.60 The area is in the notorious “three-border” zone where Burkina Faso meets Mali and Niger, a focus of the jihadist violence in the wider Sahel region of West Africa. It was the third major attack on Burkinabe soldiers in the past two weeks. The attack on 4 August, near the Niger border, killed 30 people, including 11 civilians.61
Burkina Faso has since 2015 been battling increasingly frequent and deadly attacks by jihadist groups affiliated with the Islamic State group and Al-Qaeda. In early June, gunmen killed at least 132 people, including children, in the northeast village of Solhan, marking Burkina’s deadliest attack in the history of the insurgency. Raids and ambushes have been concentrated in the north and east close to the borders with Mali and Niger, both of which have also faced deadly violence by jihadists. These attacks along with inter-communal violence have left more than 1,400 people dead and forced 1.3 million to flee their homes, according to official estimates.62
In early November, 2021, an attack by suspected jihadists killed 10 people in the north of Burkina Faso near the Niger border, according to military officials, while four others were kidnapped. The killings, called “executions” by the military official, who declined to be named, took place on Monday around the village of Dambam as people were heading to market. Another official told AFP newswire “most of the victims were murdered in a cowardly manner, their throats slit” and vehicle set on fire. The “terrorists set up a checkpoint on the road between Dambam and Markoye and intercepted all those heading to the market,” said a local official, targeting people on foot, bicycle, and in cars. Troops were deployed to the area to look for the kidnapped villagers.63
Authorities in the area said that armed groups have been making their way at the end of October into a number of communities in the restive tri-border region that contains Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Markoye is in this area, on the Burkinabé side, host of a popular livestock market on Mondays. Armed groups had already kidnapped a number of people, stole livestock, and looted communities, according to the official. This attack is just the latest in an ongoing cycle of violence since the insurgency in neighbouring Mali traveled past Burkina Faso’s borders in 2015. Last August, 30 people were killed in attacks around the Markoye area, including 11 civilians, 15 soldiers and four army colleagues.64
Burkina Faso’s government says it has killed dozens of “terrorists” and arrested hundreds of suspects in joint operations along its borders with neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. From 21 to 27 November, a total of almost 6,000 soldiers from all four countries were deployed against jihadists in a mission dubbed “Goundalgou 4.”65
Speaking on Tuesday, Burkinabé security minister Maxime Kone said that following joint patrols, lockdowns and searches of specific areas, the troops “arrested 300 suspects, several of them wanted.” Firearms, large quantities of ammunition and almost 150 vehicles and motorbikes, as well as significant quantities of narcotics, were reportedly seized. In Burkina Faso itself, Kone said five “terrorist bases” were destroyed and “around 30 terrorists neutralised in clashes” near the border with Côte d’Ivoire.66 Burkina Faso mounted three similar operations with its neighbours in 2018-2019, cooperating with one other country at a time “in areas facing the emergence of armed terrorist groups like Boko Haram, the Group to Support Islam and Muslims and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,” Kone added.67
Jihadist attacks have grown increasingly regular and deadly in Burkina Faso since 2015. At least nine gendarmes and around 10 civilians were killed on 21 November in an attack blamed on jihadists. A week before, at least 57 people, 53 of them gendarmes, were killed in an attack on a police post in the north of the country.68
Authorities in Chad have announced the recall of 600 troops, half its contingent, from the multinational G5 Sahel force. The joint military presence, supported by France, has attempted with difficulty to curb an upsurge in deadly jihadist violence in the three-border region of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. “This is a strategic redeployment to better adapt to the organisation of the terrorists,” spokesman Abderaman Koulamallah told AFP.69
Chad’s 1,200-strong contingent was deployed there to fight the jihadists, part of a force to which all five of the Sahel region countries — which also includes Mauritania — have contributed since 2017. “That still leaves around 600 soldiers on the ground,” said Koulamallah. He said the redeployment had been planned for some time and in cooperation with the G5. “Regarding the situation on the ground, we need a mobile force, hence the withdrawal of some of our forces with heavy weapons,” he said. Chad’s commitment to fighting the jihadists remained intact, insisted Koulamallah.70
France is not also left out in this withdrawal syndrome as a result of frustration in defeating the Islamic jihadists.
The three-border region along with central Mali, are the areas hardest hit by the jihadists, who have killed thousands of people, soldiers and civilians. The latest jihadist attack, against a village in Niger’s part of the border region, claimed at least 10 lives on Saturday, while over 40 people were killed in northern Burkina Faso on Thursday. France, also heavily involved in the Sahel, recently announced it was cutting its military presence in the region from around 5,000 to between 2,500 and 3,000 troops. Paris had long been calling for a greater Chadian contribution before their soldiers arrived in February. The French Ministry of Defence confirmed that the decision “was taken in full consultation” with both the G5 and the Sahel coalition, including France. “It is a question of having a force that is lighter, more reactive and easier to support, while retaining the means of combat best suited to the enemy,” he said. A Malian source at the Ministry of Defence, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Chad had told Mali of “this readjustment” and that the process of withdrawing the soldiers was “well-coordinated”.71
Complicating the situation in the three-border region is the intercommunal violence there, with several rival armed groups active. The jihadist groups operating there include a number aligned with Al-Qaeda or with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). They play on the local community tensions to recruit fighters to their forces as well as offering protection in return for payment. And as well as the jihadist insurgency, Chad’s military rulers face a challenge from armed opposition groups. Earlier this month, Chad’s self-styled Military Council (CMT), invited armed resistance groups to take part in an “inclusive national dialogue”. Chad’s junta is led by the son of president Idriss Deby Itno, who died in April fighting rebels in the north. The 37-year-old Mahamat Idriss Deby has consolidated nearly all powers around himself and 14 generals who were close to his father.72
Seeing clearly the colossal failure of Operation Barkhane, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted a summit with his counterparts from Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – the G5 Sahel – in early July 2021 with a view to discussing the implications of the imminent reduction of numbers and eventual departure of French troops from the troubled region.73
For most of the past decade, France has been the dominant military power in the fight against Islamic jihadists in the Sahel region. [The previous month, June,] President Macron announced that the Barkhane operation, which has been involved in peace-keeping, policing and direct combat against the sub-Saharan zone’s various islamist groups, will soon see a reduction of troop numbers from the current level of 5,100 men. [As a result of this] French regional bases will be closed as troop numbers decline. And the fight against islamic terrorism will be undertaken by a broader alliance of troops from Europe.74
The French Defence Minister, Florence Parly, admits that the precise military future of the Sahel region remains to be defined. “We are not yet in a position to announce the general principles of the territorial reorganisation,” she recently told a press conference. “This change is not, however, the end of French commitment in the region, or does it means we are slowing down our efforts against terrorism,” the minister stressed.75
What is currently known is that Barkhane troop numbers will be reduced by half, to 2,500, by 2023. The élite commando units in the operation known as “Sabre” will remain active in the region, with the job of pursuing jihadist leaders. Civilian and local army losses to jihadist attacks remain at an unacceptably high level, according to the French army chief-of-staff, General François Lecointre. “Islamic terrorism continues to spread, to establish local bases, to reach a wider population,” France’s top soldier said last month. “It’s a worrying development.”76
Adding to those worries is the unstable political climate in at least two of the G5 nations. Chad recently lost Idriss Déby Itno, the man who ruled the country for three decades, in combat against northern rebels. He has since been replaced by his son, himself part of the military. Mali has seen two military coups in nine months, and is currently ruled by the soldier who, earlier this summer, arrested both the president and prime minister.77
General Lecointre has admitted to a French Senate commission that political instability in both Mali and Chad has complicated French operations in the Sahel. “The security situation remains unresolved,” he told the French upper house, “but that is as much a political problem as it is a military one.”78
Interestingly, Dabire would not be the first Prime Minister under President Kabore to resign along with his entire cabinet. On January 18, 2019, Prime Minister Paul Kaba Thieba and his entire cabinet also resigned. It was actually after the exit Thieba that Dabire was appointed Prime Minister. This frequent change (not through election or other unconstitutional means) shows the depth of the instability that has been rocking the Burkinabe State since the disgraceful exit of Blaise Compaore-led dictatorship and the inability to discharge its duties as the arbiter of all conflicts in the Burkinabe society.
[On January 18, 2019] the Prime Minister of Burkina Faso, Paul Kaba Thieba, resigned from office along with his entire cabinet. No reason was given for the move, which was announced in a televised statement by the country’s president. Mr. Thieba, a former economist, had held the position since January 2016 when he was nominated by President Roch Marc Christian Kabore.79
His government has faced growing pressure over a rise in the number of kidnappings and jihadist attacks. Recent high-profile disappearances of foreign nationals have led to direct calls for Mr. Thieba’s resignation, as well as that of his defence and security ministers.80
Burkina Faso, a poor land-locked nation in Africa’s Sahel region, has seen a surge in Islamist militant activity in recent years. There have been deadly attacks on a cafe and the French embassy in the country’s capital, Ouagadougou. Several northern provinces in its border regions have been under a state of emergency since 31 December.81
President Kabore chose experienced economist Thieba as prime minister in January 2016. However, in recent months several political opponents have been calling for his resignation and that of ministers in charge of security and defence.82
Burkina Faso lies in the heart of the vast Sahel region, which is struggling with a bloody Islamist insurgency. The region turned into a hotbed of violent extremism and lawlessness after chaos engulfed Libya in 2011. An Islamist insurgency began in northern Mali, while Boko Haram rose in northern Nigeria. Jihadist raids began in northern Burkina Faso in 2015 before spreading to the east, near the border with Togo and Benin.83
Burkina Faso is in Africa’s Sahel region — the semi-arid strip that runs the width of the continent and separates the Sahara desert from the savannah — where much of western defence aid to the continent is focused.84
The largely lawless, sparsely populated areas between major cities in the region have become breeding grounds for deadly insurgent groups, notably al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In 2016, the group perpetrated an attack on a Ouagadougou hotel popular with the French military and expatriates that killed 29 and signalled an era of increased insecurity in Burkina Faso. More recent attacks have sparked ethnic violence that has killed dozens.85
The landlocked former French colony is among the world’s poorest countries, despite significant gold deposits, and has a long history of military coups since independence in 1960 — the most recent attempt was in 2015.86
It is very obvious that the foundation or seeds of the current security imbroglio was laid or planted during the reign of Blaise Compaore especially his alleged negotiation with terrorist organizations ostensibly to give him a breathing space. Compaore should be called to publicly account for his role in compromising the Burkinabe State with the terrorist organizations. The onus is on him to discharge this weighty allegation.
Thus the fall of Prime Minister Christophe Dabire, like a rotten fruit from the tree during a storming period and not through a palace coup was as a result of the impotence of Burkinabe State to arrest the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso. Burkinabe State has gradually become weakened over the last few years based on the onslaught of the Islamic Jihadist fighters. Also not out of contextual consideration is the fact that G5 Sahel Security Initiative (Operation Barkhane) has been a resounding failure. This has even been tacitly acknowledged by the French highest authorities. What would replace Operation Barkhane is still not yet firmed up by the French Military.
It is important at this point to state without fear or favour that no G5 country has ever been at peace with itself since the G5 Sahel Security Initiative (Operation Barkhane) was established and introduced into these countries. The G5 Sahel Security Initiative escalated the already existing crisis in these countries. There has been no political stability or economic progress. Indeed, the opposite is the exact situation – from Mauritania to Burkina Faso, from Niger to Chad and from Chad to Mali. G5 Sahel Security Initiative has not been able to achieve any of its stated objectives in any of the member countries. Its most colossal failure has been its inability to achieve its so-called counter-terrorism objectives despite the billions of dollars that have been poured into these endeavors. Terrorist attacks have proliferated in these countries more than ever. Despite the failure of the Initiative, the member countries are much more under the jackboot of French neo-imperialism, of its foreign military and intelligence diplomacy than ever, unable to free themselves from this yoke of modern but nuanced slavery.
If the billions of dollars hitherto poured into this fruitless and useless effort have been diverted and deployed into economic development projects, then the conditions precedent to insurgent rebellion would not have arisen in the first place, or would not have find a fertile soil to sprout and become the Frankenstein monster that it is today. This again speaks directly to the warped ideological worldview and mindset of the various ruling cliques in these countries, their misplaced priorities and misdirected objectives – all which veered off the security and welfare of the citizens but selfishly directed with unquantifiable energy towards regime stability, its security, power, privileges and illicit enrichment. In the final analysis, these regimes work against themselves, against their overall aims by betraying their own people and exposing them to the stupefying toxic ideology of insurgent rebellion orchestrated by Islamic Jihadism and other hybrid ideologies.
From the above, it can be argued that failure of governance under Blaise Compaore-led dictatorship, the weak-kneed security apparatus, the coup de ’tats that occurred after the fall of Compaorean dictatorship, the weak economy, the emergent antagonisms among the various ethnic groups in the country, the emergent religious cleavages after many decades of living in harmony, the unfavourable regional environment especially the upheaval of the Arab Spring, the Libyan Civil War, the crisis in Mali, the Boko Haram insurgency and ISWAP campaign of terror in Nigeria, and the meddlesomeness of the superpowers (United States and most especially France) provide the contextual circumstances that kick-started Islamic Jihadism in Burkina Faso from 2015 till date.
Since 2015 to date, it has been bloodshed from all sides, tears and sorrow in Burkina Faso.
Statement of the Problem
Ever since Captain Thomas Sankara was brutally murdered in a bloody coup de ’tat and eliminated by Blaise Campaore and his band of military thugs in 1987, Burkina Faso has never been a settled and peaceful country but backward and waiting to explode. The explosion finally took place after twenty seven years of iron-fisted rule of Blaise Compaore.
Apart from the historic burden of colonialism which Burkina Faso has not been able to discharge over the decades, Burkina Faso is now contemporaneously caught between three Devils. The first is the weakness or fragility of the Burkinabe State itself – weakened by frequent military coups, dictatorships and fragile democratic rule since its political independence from France in the early 60s. The second is the emergence assortment of Islamic jihadist groups and fighters trying to overthrow the Burkinabe State and establish an Islamic State or Caliphate as a bridgehead to other neighbouring countries including Nigeria. The third is the establishment and promotion of G5 Sahel Security Initiative spearheaded by France with Operation Barkhane as the military arrowhead as the solution to the emergent scenario of insecurity in Burkina Faso post-Compaorean era.
The crisis of the Burkinabe State is mostly rooted in its fragility over the years despite the authoritarian rule of President Blaise Compaore contrary to the assertions in some quarters that Burkinabe State was a strong state during the rule of Blaise Compaore. The fact that there was no seismic crisis during the time of Compaore does not mean that the State was strong under him. On the contrary, stress factors were already embedded in the State structures during his twenty-seven year reign. The State has been gradually weakened by its inner rot over the arch of time mainly through the failure of governance and extensive corruption during the reign of Compaore, causing the State institutions to function at sub-optimal level. It is interesting to note that the strength of a State is not necessarily measured by its ability to put down or repress internal dissent but its capacity to prevent those factors and conditions that cause internal security crisis or its capacity to face external aggressive attacks and survive.
In this context, the Burkinabe State has not demonstrated this capacity in any direction especially controlling the influence of external forces such Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Al Qae’da, Islamic State for West African Province, etc. Burkinabe State has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt its complete inability to put down or put out Islamic Jihadism that sprouted from its own soil and actively supported by the external forces such as mentioned above. Even though it has not faced any direct external aggression from any known quarter, its internal weakness has shown logically the inability to defend its territorial integrity if it is attacked by external forces. Its internal weaknesses are visible for all to see – even with the alliance with the French-orchestrated G5 Sahel Security Initiative.
It is on this premise that one is justifiably worried that Burkina Faso stands at the brink of collapse and a strong push from any quarter can easily tip it over the edge. As can be seen from the overall objectives of its 2004 National Defense Policy, it is obvious that they do not capture the fundamental threats currently facing the Burkinabe State. This is why this Defense Policy needs to be reviewed and restructured to bring it into alignment with the latest security reality facing Burkina Faso.
Burkinabe State is not in way made stronger by the presence of foreign troops on its soil on counter-terrorism mission or any other publicly stated objective. The military advisories and trainings received from either the United States or France or any other country and international actors did not increased the capacity of the Burkinabe State to defend itself against attacks and assaults from violent non-state actors such as the Islamic Jihadists. On the contrary, it does seem that these foreign military assistances only increased the capacity of the Burkinabe State through the military to inflict further violence on its own citizens under the cover of fighting terror. This is what has led to various reported cases of egregious violations of human rights of innocent citizens caught in the crossfires between the Burkinabe State and the terror groups – those violations caused by the Burkinabe military. The sole responsibility of any military is first and foremost to protect its citizens from both internal and external attacks and aggressions. The Burkinabe State has failed essentially on this score – thus causing doubts to be cast on its ability to defend the people in the first instance.
Worse of all is the fact that these violations are carried with full impunity, without calling and bringing the culprits to public accountability and justice.
Some of the security threats facing Burkina Faso include but not limited to the following: violent extremism and terrorism, inter-communal clashes, trans-border crimes, climate change, and corruption and financial crimes.
But the key question is why has the State’s response fallen short and even seen to be contributing to the deteriorating security environment? According to Émile Ouédraogo, [f]or two decades she has been experiencing daunting and evolving security challenges caused by socio-economic and political crisis in a regional context marked by violent extremism and terrorism. Burkina Faso went through a year of socio-political turmoil in 2014. A popular insurrection occurred on October 30-31, 2014 when the deposed President Blaise Compaoré, who has been ruling the country for 27 years, decided to change Article 37 of the Constitution, whose provisions prevented him from running for a third term. After one year of a tumultuous transition period, transparent and fair elections were organized and Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former Prime Minister and Speaker of the National Assembly, was elected President. He inherited from weakened and undermined government institutions without coherent and responsive security strategies, which exposed the country to several terrorist’s attacks and led to an upsurge of insecurity in both urban and rural areas. It’s in this context that Burkina Faso is trying to develop her national security strategy.87
The 2015 revised Constitution of Burkina Faso stipulates in its articles 10 and 36 that the President of Faso is the guarantor for national independence, territorial integrity and the continuity of the State. He is the Commander in Chief and chairs the Supreme Defense Council. The National Defense Policy of April 2004 defines the role and responsibilities of the Supreme Defense Council. This policy paper is still considered to date (by default) as the country’s national security strategy Document. It defines national defense as “all the principles and practices implemented by the entire Burkinabe community to protect its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens.” National Defense in this context refers to all the institutions participating to domestic and external protection of the country. It is worth noting that no official document or policy guidance exists in Burkina Faso defining a vision and the core values to be defended or protected, even though it stands as the core objective of any national security strategy/policy. Under the 2004 Defense Policy, Burkina Faso’s strategic interests are defined as follows:
- Vital interests: The people and territory of Burkina Faso and the freedom to exert its sovereignty. These interests underpin the existence of the country and are in no case negotiable.
- Strategic interests: Sub-regional and regional security, and the fight against terrorism and cross-border crimes.88
The general organization and articulation of national security in Burkina Faso is framed by laws such as Act N° 74-60/AN establishing the National Army, Act N° 26/94/ADP on General Organization of National Defense, Act N° 32 on Internal Security, and Decrees such as Decree N°2004-146/PRES/PM on Defense Policy, Decree N° 2010-335/PRES/PM/SECU on Internal Security Strategy, Decree N° 2015-1149/CNT establishing the National Security and Defense Council. The forthcoming national security strategy will be built on this existing legal and normative framework which will necessarily be reviewed and improved.89
The National Internal Security Strategy: In 2005, the Government of Burkina Faso decided to create a ministry fully dedicated to the fight against the rising insecurity in the country after observing poor service delivery by the State security services in protecting the population and their property. An appropriate new approach in line with the Country Defense Policy was therefore required. This approach was outlined under the form of a National Internal Security Strategy document, consisting of four (4) headings including an overview of Internal Security Stakeholders, a conceptual Approach to Security in Burkina Faso, challenges and threats to Internal Security, and strategic directions of the Internal Security Strategic Guidelines. The document was drafted through inter-departmental working level consultation including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Water and Forestry. The first draft was validated during a workshop where the civil society and social sciences researchers were invited. The final product was submitted to the Government who reviewed and adopted it.90
Émile Ouédraogo further criticized the conceptual approach to security in Burkina Faso viz that it was not composite in nature, vision, coherence, and lacked actionable plans, etc.
In terms of vision Quedraogo said that there was a “narrow vision of both documents” resulting in “fragmentary strategy approaches. The two approaches are state-oriented in practice despite references to human security in the documents. “There is also a gap between internal and external threats: because of the transnational and trans-border dimension of threats for a landlocked country like Burkina Faso,” requiring “a bridge between domestic and external threats instead of addressing them separately. They are two sides of the same coin.”91
There is also “lack of coherence between both policy papers, including lack of a common and broad vision resulting from the lack of coherence between the Defense Policy Paper and the National Internal Security Strategy. This also includes lack of action plans because both policy papers were developed without action plans for the implementation. There are no follow-up and review mechanisms because both documents did not make arrangements for follow-up and review mechanisms. Today’s security context in Burkina Faso has completely changed and still, strategies remained unchanged.92
Involving non-State actors and balancing openness and secrecy: State security actors, especially military personnel, are still reluctant to have open discussion on security issues with other components of the society. Using the pretense of secrecy, they still want to have a full grip and total monopoly of debates regarding security. Non-State actors need to be fully involved in the development of the forthcoming policy document. Goals and values could be discussed publicly while leaving operational aspects restricted.93
Budgetary Considerations: There was also no causal link between the two strategies and their budgets. Therefore, it looked difficult to align security needs with available resources. Without the appropriate finance, both strategies could not be fully implemented.94
In order to address the above-mentioned challenges, the government in place decided to hold a national forum on security in Ouagadougou from 24 to 27 October 2017 with the clear objective of reforming the overall security sector.95
It is obvious that with the above lacunas observed national security and defence policy papers it is possible to have security system and forces in place to face and defeat the various emergent rebellious groups in the country. There is no articulation and appreciation of what these insurgent groups stand for beyond the conventional clichés of tagging them “terror” groups bent on overthrowing the State. Where exactly did the terror groups come from? They all emerged from within the Burkinabe society that has suffered economic and social setbacks (in short failure of governance) under the dictatorship of President Blaise Compaore for almost three decades.
According to Michelle Gavin of the US-based Council on Foreign Relations, the root of crisis of the Burkinabe State is the rot at the core of state institutions that was enabled by Compaoré’s style of rule or that has enabled dictatorship of Compaorean typology to survive for so long in the political history of Burkina Faso and also a dictatorial style inherited by the democratic government of President Roch Marc Christian Kabore.
As a result of this Burkina Faso has been “ in trouble” ever since, signposted, for instance, with “the shocking ambush of a Canadian mining company’s convoy earlier this month” (November 2019) as “part of a relentless series of deadly attacks perpetrated both by terrorist organizations and by domestic criminal groups that has claimed hundreds of lives, forced nearly half a million people from their homes, and gravely shaken domestic and international confidence in the country’s security services.”96
But it was not so long ago that Burkina Faso was inspiring champions of democracy and setting an example for civil society movements around the world. Fed up with 27 years of Blaise Compaoré’s corrupt presidency, and angered by his attempt to extend it, in 2014 citizens rose up in an extraordinary movement to insist on a change not just in leadership, but in the way that the country was governed. Balai Citoyen (Citizens’ Broom) did not just want Compaoré to step down. They called for an urgent focus on addressing poverty, creating opportunity for young Burkinabe, and building more resilient and unbiased state systems of accountability.97
So how did the situation turn from one full of hope for positive change to today’s atmosphere of crisis [and nightmare]? Many African leaders argue that the messy fallout from the West’s 2011 Libya intervention is to blame for the crisis in Burkina Faso, and indeed Libya’s instability has been devastating to security across the Sahel. It is also true that Compaoré often preferred to make accommodations with violent movements terrorizing neighboring states rather than oppose them. But Burkina’s insecurity today is also a direct result of the rot at the core of state institutions that was enabled by Compaoré’s style of rule. For years, opposition was demonized and state security was personalized, with funding and support funneled to those closest to the strongman at the top. When that system, which had become increasingly unstable over time, toppled, the fallout entailed the fragmentation of intelligence capacities, tension and underperformance among defense forces, and ongoing mistrust among security elites.98
As the international community debates how best to help stabilize Burkina Faso, policymakers should also reflect on the toxic legacy of the Compaoré era. Turning a blind eye to autocrats who can keep a lid on violence (at least the kind that is not state-sanctioned) is deeply short-sighted because no one leader’s self-serving system lasts forever. The security sector reforms required after decades of such a system are painful and slow, and building trust and communication among those left to pick up the pieces can be equally difficult. These weaknesses are easy for terrorists and criminals to exploit, and the violence can make it even harder to get governance reforms and service delivery right. Disorder and insecurity are surely the enemies of the kinds of changes the people of Burkina Faso had hoped for. But it was the old way of maintaining order that has made this problem so hard to solve.99
Thus the teleological or ontological root of the security crisis currently rocking Burkina Faso can be immediately traced to the failure of governance under Blaise Campaore dictatorship that lasted for almost three decades. Thus too, there can be seen three elephants or lions fighting in the same room for the soul of Burkina Faso: the weak-kneed Burkinabe State, French neo-imperialism, and Islamic Jihadism in this taxonomic order.
The failure of governance in the Sahel region over the decades has had its devastating consequences for all the countries concerned. In other words, the failure of governance in each of these countries has its specific impacts on each of the countries escalated by their individual internal conditions or dynamic interplay of antagonistic forces opposed to each other in these countries. Burkinabe State has spread its own specific pandemic virus to neighbouring countries namely: Mali, Ivory Coast, Ghana, according to John Campbell – including Niger and Nigeria – in which the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso is now a concern for all in the region including the international community. Burkina Faso is fast becoming the weakest link in the chain of the Sahel countries beset by escalating security crisis. This is one of the domino effects of the security and political crisis in Burkina Faso, not to talk of economic and humanitarian crisis.
Interestingly, what was largely missing in the reports and literatures reviewed for this article is the remote influence exercised by the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia in 2011. The Arab Spring was largely considered not to have blown towards south of Sahel but mainly towards the East Africa and Middle East. However, this was only seemingly so. Arab Spring precedes the fall of Blaise Compaore-led dictatorship in October/November 2014, thus helping to open up the democratic space in Burkina Faso. Balai Citoyen (Citizens’ Broom) was the effect of the Arab Spring in Burkina Faso. Balai Citoyen found and took its political and social courage from the Arab Spring. It was this Balai Citoyen that exposed the rottenness and weakness (the Achilles Heel) of the Burkinabe State under Compaorean dictatorship.
The confluence of political, institutional, and societal breakdown, the murderous activity of militias and radical jihadist groups, the predation of criminal networks (often allied with other groups), corrupt and unresponsive government, and the coronavirus has produced a perfect storm of human misery in the small West African state of Burkina Faso. Burkina, with a population less about 20 million, is described as one of the world’s poorest countries in normal times, which these are not. Burkina may be only the first of poor West African states already reeling from poverty, marginalized territories, and insurrection to be pushed over the edge into societal disintegration. Mali could be next. Jihadis are also beginning to threaten Ivory Coast and Ghana.100
Before the coronavirus arrived, Burkina faced growing fighting among rival jihadi terrorists that the share goal of the destruction of the state, rival political and ethnic militias, political groups associated with the business community, remnants of the networks of former dictator Blaise Compaore, deposed in 2014, and the state security services. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), fatalities caused by violence against civilians and in battles between armed actors has dramatically increased since 2018, and 2020 is on pace to surpass the highs set in 2019. Such violence killed over 250 people in 2018, over 2,000 in 2019, and 871 in the first four months of 2020. About 800,000 Burkinabes had fled their homes as of March 2020, according to the UN, or about 4 percent of the population. The French anti-jihadi Operation Barkhane is allied to the Ougadougou government, which commands little legitimacy in much of the country. Some from Burkina have described the breakdown of the country’s social fabric as “incivisme,” and the breakdown of personal security as “insecurite.”101
Meanwhile, jihadi groups, seeing their moment, are moving against the government and their rivals, and criminal networks are flourishing.102
The Macron government in Paris appears to remain committed to the Ouagadougou government. France seeks with some success to increase the engagement of some of its European Union partners, and has pushed back against Trump administration proposals to reduce the U.S. military presence in the Sahel. Though small in number, U.S. forces provide logistical and intelligence support to the French. However, in France, comparisons are being drawn between Burkina Faso and Afghanistan, with growing concern as to how France can extract itself. But French withdrawal and the likely subsequent collapse of the Ouagadougou government risks the domination of the state by anti-Western jihadis that France regards as part of its “near abroad.”103
Unfortunately, whether France withdraws its troops from the Sahel region or not, it is obvious the Burkinabe State, including the Malian and Nigerien States are no longer in position to really defend themselves against the escalating security crisis signposted by the onslaught of the Islamic Jihadists in the region. France has been operating the Sahel region since 2013 without actual successes recorded. France has not even been able to maintain regime stability in the region or offer economic succor to the countries ravaged by internal conflicts. The G5 Sahel countries are some of the poorest in the world, exploited and fleeced to the bones by the same France. Mali, Niger, Chad have had their experiential shares of regime instability and change in the last one year. There have been coup attempts in Niger while Nigeria is also threatened by the Frankenstein monsters of Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and herdsmen killers.
The governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are ill-equipped to confront the worsening security crisis in the region. Their approach to these challenges has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst. In contrast to its counterparts in Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s political class is doing the bare minimum to respond to the conflict. Though the government faces some domestic pressure to address insecurity, it may believe there is an unacceptable political cost to doing more. The international community should work to reshape Mali’s domestic political calculus to promote a more robust response. It should continue its security partnerships, especially with Burkina Faso and Niger, to address capacity shortfalls and reduce incidents of human rights violations.104
Counterterrorism efforts in Burkina Faso are two-fold. First, domestic efforts involve mobilizing the military to prevent terrorist attacks. Second, international efforts involve improving security, preventing terrorist economic activities, and partnerships with Western countries.105
Burkina Faso’s President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré has described counterterrorism as a “national priority.” Efforts to fight terrorism include placing more security forces throughout Burkina Faso, creating specialized task forces, and organizing raids targeting terrorists.106
Regarding increasing security forces in Burkina Faso, President Kaboré planned to remove soldiers deployed as peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan by July 2017 to refocus manpower on domestic terrorism issues. The government also requested in 2016 that Burkina Faso soldiers that were part of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Mali be deployed to areas close to its own border. Nonetheless, media reports in 2019 showed that Burkina Faso forces outside the country were often better trained than domestic units.107
The government also created specialized military units dedicated to fighting terrorism. In January 2013, the Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT) was created as a joint Army-Gendarmerie-Police counterterrorism task force. GFAT has since grown from 500 troops to 1,600 troops that specialize in targeting terrorism activity.108
From 2018 onward, the military has also been conducting more raids against terrorist networks in northern areas of Burkina Faso, but such raids are often correlated with alleged human rights abuses. For example, on February 4, 2019, the Army claimed to have fought and killed 146 terrorists near the border with Mali, but human rights groups suggested that there was no evidence that the people targeted were terrorists and described the incident as a “summary execution.”109
Such human rights abuses dampen counterterrorism efforts because they make locals less likely to collaborate with security forces against terrorist organizations. Worries over security force violence might also contribute to the ambiguous or favorable attitudes that about 30% of Burkina Faso people have towards terrorist groups like the Islamic State. Although Burkina Faso puts significant effort into counterterrorism efforts, some of these efforts might thus be hindered by security force violence.110
On 9 April 2020, security forces of Burkina Faso executed 31 unarmed men on the day of their arrest by the security forces. They were killed within a few hours of their arrest.111
International counterterrorism efforts in Burkina Faso involve regional cooperation to improve physical and economic security, as well as partnerships with Western countries.112
The Sahelian Context
As already indicated above, focusing exclusively on the internal conditions precedent to the upsurge of insecurity in Burkina Faso will inevitably miss the larger picture or tapestry of conflict and violence that have become the lot of the G5 Sahel countries in recent years. In short, the deteriorating situation in Burkina Faso must be placed squarely within the broad context of the Sahel region that has gone banana in the last two decades or so – since the September 11 2001 Al Qae’da attack on the United States and the concomitant declaration of global war on terror by the United States and her European allies which include France, the former colonial master of Burkina Faso. This parameter of understanding is necessary to avoid desultory analysis of chain events that led to the upheavals or explosion of conflict and violence in Burkina Faso – a desultory analysis that can be sensed from media reportage on the ongoing crisis especially to cover up the roles of foreign powers and actors in deepening and/or escalating the crisis.
A good starting point in the analysis of the unfolding events in Burkina Faso is the consideration of nature of the violence. There are two major aspects of the unfolding violence in Burkina Faso. The first is the attacks by the insurgents while the second is by government security forces. Both are sides of the same coin. But often times, attacks by the insurgents receive the wider publicity than the violence committed by government security forces.
On March 22, 2019, Human Rights Watch released a 56-page report titled “‘We Found Their Bodies Later that Day’: Atrocities by Armed Islamists and Security Forces in Burkina Faso’s Sahel Region,” which documented over 40 killings by armed Islamist groups, mostly of people suspected of collaborating with the government, and the execution by Burkinabè security forces of over 115 men accused of supporting or harboring the armed Islamists. The Burkinabè government has promised to investigate the allegations. Key international actors, including the United Nations Security Council, which is visiting Burkina Faso in late March, should urge the government to follow through on this commitment. “Scores of people have been murdered in what amounts to a dramatic deterioration in the rights situation in northern Burkina Faso,” said Corinne Dufka, Sahel director at Human Rights Watch. “Villagers are living in fear as both armed Islamists and government forces have demonstrated utter disregard for human life.”113 [These gory] atrocities by Islamist armed groups in Burkina Faso’s northern Sahel Region and by security forces during counterterrorism operations have left scores dead and created widespread fear and displacement. The violence has forced tens of thousands of villagers to flee since early 2019.114
Human Rights Watch interviewed 92 victims and witnesses to the abuses, as well as community leaders, government officials, and security analysts, among others. The abuses documented occurred in 32 villages in the Sahel region, from mid-2018 until February 2019. The research builds on Human Rights Watch research in Burkina Faso from 2018.115
Beginning in 2016, armed Islamist groups linked to both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have attacked army bases, police, and gendarme posts, and purely civilian targets in Burkina Faso. While the violence and insecurity have spread throughout the country, the epicenter remains the northern Sahel region, which borders Mali and Niger.116
Witnesses described the alleged killing by armed Islamists of 42 civilians, apparently because of their actual or suspected ties to the government, or for supporting the formation of a self-defense group. Most of the victims were from the ethnic Foulse or Bella communities. Witnesses said the Islamists had abducted and intimidated local leaders, pillaged livestock, and commandeered ambulances. They also said the Islamists had forbade villagers from celebrating marriages and baptisms and, at times, women from socializing or selling in markets.117
One villager said that armed Islamists opened fire inside his home, killing three members of his family and wounding two others, during a January assault on the village of Gasseliki that left 12 people dead. “They kicked the door in, went room to room and found us hiding,” he said. “Then they opened fire in a hail of bullets killing three men.” Another witness described the Islamists’ killing of nine men, including two brothers, during a January 27 attack on Sikiré village. “People are dominated by fear,” a local farmer said. “No man over 18 dares sleep in his house anymore for fear of being kidnapped or worse.” Many villagers described large-scale looting of livestock, undermining the livelihoods of entire villages.118
Witnesses also described 19 incidents in which Burkina Faso security forces allegedly summarily executed a total of 116 men. They said that all but a few of these incidents involved a detachment of about 100 gendarmes based in the town of Arbinda since late August.119
All of the victims were last seen in the custody of government security forces, and when their bodies were later found, the majority had been shot in the head or chest. Most were from the Peuhl ethnic group. Witnesses described large operations involving dozens of security force members traveling on motorcycles and vehicles and, in several cases, operating small drones.120
Witnesses provided lists of the victims and maps indicating where the bodies of the men were found and where they were buried. “We found Hamadoun, 72-years-old…under a tree with both knees and his forehead on the ground,” said a man who searched for nine men detained by security forces in February and later buried their bodies. “It seemed like he’d asked to pray before being shot.”121
A witness to the security forces’ October detention of 14 men who were later found dead said, “They ripped their turbans to bind their eyes and hands, ordering them into the truck. Minutes after they left, we heard gunfire and said, ‘Oh God, our people are dead.’”122
Villagers consistently decried being caught between armed Islamists’ threats to execute those who collaborated with the government, and the security forces, who expected them to provide intelligence about the presence of armed groups and meted out collective punishment when they didn’t. “The killing is driving people straight into the arms of the jihadists and guaranteeing that this problem will go on for many years to come,” a civil society leader said.123
On March 8, Human Rights Watch sent a letter detailing its major findings and recommendations to the Burkinabè government. On March 18, the defense minister responded on behalf of the government, promising to investigate the alleged abuses.124, 125
Commenting on the report, John Campbell drew a parallel between Burkina Faso and Nigeria.
The Burkinabe security services’ murder—for that is what it is—of civilians is tragically reminiscent of the early days of the Boko Haram insurrection in northeast Nigeria. Ever since, abuses by Nigerian security services have been a driver of Boko Haram recruitment. The fear must be that this pattern will reproduce itself in Burkina Faso. To break the cycle, the Burkinabe authorities must conduct a credible investigation—something most observers conclude the Nigerians have failed to do—and bring the perpetrators to justice.126
U.S. military assistance is typically contingent on respect for human rights. In February, for example, the U.S. military cut some military aid to Cameroon over human rights abuses associated with operations against the separatist movement in the west. Not only are these abuses counterproductive, it makes it more difficult for France, the United States, and other Western countries to support Burkina Faso in their struggle against jihadist terrorist groups.127
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on May 10 that French military forces rescued four hostages in Burkina Faso held by Islamist militants. Two were French, one was American, and one was South Korean. The operation cost the lives of two French soldiers.128
Burkina Faso is now subject to Islamist attacks similar to those in Mali. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has congratulated groups operating in Burkina Faso for swearing allegiance to the Islamic State. In an official statement, the French government thanked Burkina Faso and Benin for there “perfect cooperation;” presumably those two countries also played a role in the rescue. The French minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, in a twitter statement praised the “valuable support of our American allies.” However, she provided no details about what that support was.129
Whatever the American involvement was, it is unlikely that there were American casualties. France has by far the largest military contingent in West Africa, some 4,500. The United States has been involved in training of the Burkinabe military, so the total number of U.S. troops present is likely small. In comparison with the uproar over the October 2017 death of four American soldiers in Tongo Tongo, Niger, the French public response to these recent military casualties has been muted. The French commonly regard the former French colonies in West Africa, such as Burkina Faso, as Europe’s “near abroad,” and French public opinion is generally supportive of French military operations in the region, so long as they are small.130
Islamist terrorist groups in northeast Burkina Faso are following a strategy of violence reminiscent in some ways of Boko Haram’s early days in Nigeria. The groups are attacking Protestant and Catholic churches, killing pastors, priests, and congregants, and also teachers in secular schools. In a May 12 attack on the town of Dablo in northern Burkina Faso, “gunmen” killed a Catholic priest and five congregants, burned the church and places serving alcohol, and looted other commercial establishments. The attackers numbered about twenty. On May 10, apparently in a separate incident, militants killed five teachers.131
Similarities to Boko Haram include targeting Christians and teachers in secular schools. The theological basis of both appears to be a similar, extremist variant of Salafist Islamic now thought to be associated with the Islamic State. Based on that theology is a similar hostility to all things western and secular. Like in Nigeria’s northeast, government authority in northern Burkina Faso has been weak following the 2014 ouster of long-time strongman Blaise Compaore. But unlike Boko Haram, the terrorists in Burkina Faso do not appear to have a charismatic leader with a media presence like Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau. Furthermore, Burkina Faso has in France a close ally that is prepared to intervene when needed, as it recently did to rescue four hostages.132
The extent and nature of the groups’ ties in both countries to outside terror networks in not completely clear. Boko Haram appears to be largely indigenous, with little or no tactical and strategic coordination with the Islamic State or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), despite similar rhetoric and apparent communication. Though in Burkina Faso there appear to be links with Islamist groups in Mali, details are sparse.133
West Africa is facing a growing threat from Islamist extremist groups. Many of these groups originated in Mali but have since spilled over its borders, with jihadis establishing themselves in the north and east of Burkina Faso. The country has become a desirable haven for many groups because of the security vacuum that has defined the country following the deposition of longtime strongman Blaise Compaore. The presence of these groups, including Ansaroul Islam, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen, has precipitated a rise in interethnic and interreligious tensions in a country that has for years been characterized by peaceful coexistence.134
Burkina Faso’s inability to clamp down on many of the extremist groups operating inside its borders has allowed such groups to use the country as a launch pad for attacks in coastal West African countries, most notably Benin. Burkina Faso borders Pendjari National Park in Benin’s northwest. This forest has become the site of several incursions by jihadis, who have attacked communities and tourists in the area. The situation has become so dire in the north that both France and the United States have issued travel warnings for Pendjari and the surrounding areas. Such incursions by Islamist groups come at a time of political fragility in Benin, following its controversial legislative elections in April. The protests and general sense of insecurity that have gripped the country in the last few months could provide fertile ground to extremist groups looking to gain a foothold in the country. Officials fear that jihadis have also infiltrated Togo and Ghana.135
Currently, the most comprehensive effort to combat Islamist terrorism and intercommunal violence in the region is the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a security partnership between five states in the Sahel and supported by France. Unfortunately, the G5 has faced funding shortfalls, preventing it from quickly and effectively responding to threats as they arise.136
For most of the past decade, coastal West Africa has been spared the Islamist violence that has dominated the Sahel. It hosts some of the continent’s most stable democracies, including Senegal, Ghana, and Benin. The region has also become a hotspot of foreign investment, attracting interest from the West as well as China and Turkey. The presence of Islamist groups, along with ongoing issues such as corruption and drug trafficking, threatens to upend all of this.137
If foreign aids including military training and assistance are the panacea to internal security crisis as being currently encountered by the G5 Sahel countries, then the mount received so far should have bailed out these countries out of their security predicaments. But this has never been the case as lessons of history from other security crisis-ridden countries have shown in the classic examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc, in recent years. In most cases, these even escalate the crisis by increasing the predilection for more violence and corruption in the battle for supremacy or hegemony.
For instance, the United States military was hardly out of Afghanistan when the Talibans took over within 48 hours and subjected the poor country to further miseries despite the huge investment (both military and non-military) that the United States have made over the decade-long war in Afghanistan. Thousands, including the President, fled the country to Europe and elsewhere. The same experiences can be extrapolated from Iraq.
On the other hand, in the case of the G5 Sahel countries as well as many other African countries, there are no concrete evidences (proven beyond reasonable doubts) of how these foreign aids were administered in judicious and/or transparent manners. There are often no record of public accountability of the expenditures derived from these foreign aids and assistance. In the case of military hard-wares or soft-wares, there are no evidences to show how these have helped in resolving the ensuing security crisis or tilt the balance of power in favour of the recipient states. In most cases on the contrary, the balance of terror has hold sway between the States and their insurgent opponents the latter who also received aids and assistance from many non-state international actors (terrorist organizations) and who deploy asymmetric methodologies of warfare in their confrontation and battle against the States.
A typical example of this type of scenario is Nigeria that purchased and deployed Super Tucano combat aircrafts in 2021 against the various insurgent groups threatening to dismember the country. The availability of the aircrafts in the arsenal of the Nigerian military has not tilted the balance of power or terror in favour of the Nigerian State that could lead to total victory in the war against these insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers – all based in northern part of the country. These insurgent groups continue to operate with virtual impunity and there seems to be no end to the killings in that part of the country at least for now. That is the futility of the epistemic belief in foreign military assistance as the panacea to the extant security crisis in the country.
The Sahel region has gradually become a cauldron of conflicts, violence, environmental problems of all sorts and deaths over the last two decades or so essentially because of the failure of governance in the countries concerned. It has become a fertile and breeding ground for ideologies of Islamic fundamentalism and jihadism and other hybrid ideologies and the opportunities for the superpowers to come and meddle. It is probably the last frontier of battlespace for coalitions of jihadist forces seeking to overthrow the governments supported by Western powers.
The preponderant conditions in the Sahel region are not in any way favourable to the individual member countries essentially because the extant conditions in each of the countries feed and fuel the crisis in all the countries. This is why the situation may be justifiably regarded as hopeless because of the evident hydra-headed nature of the crisis in the region and in each member country.
The Burning Heart
The story of the security crisis in Burkina Faso cannot be completed without reference to mining sector in the country that has partly served as the mainstay of the economy. But the story of the Burkinabe mining sector is that of a burning or bleeding heart of a nation, generating both hopes and despairs at the same time. The mining sector, like in many other African countries generate hopes of wealth to lift the citizens out of soul-shattering poverty and diseases, elevate the country into an advance economic status – through judicious management of the revenue generated from the mining sector. But the reality on ground in Burkina Faso, as well as many other African countries is that of a tragedy borne out of a predatory state structure that lack the ability to turn its natural resources into wealth through gross mismanagement and corrupt tendencies.
Thus there are two major prisms through which the mining sector in Burkina Faso can be viewed and seen as reported in the mainstream media. The first is the reportage extolling the role that has been played by the mining sector in the overall economic development of Burkina Faso. This reportage also include optimism about the further role the sector could play in helping to bring the country out of the mire of poverty. The second prism is what mismanagement of wealth so generated and illegal mining has contributed to the escalation of insecurity in recent times in the country. The emergent insecurity is not as a result of illegal mining but how the latter has contributed to the escalation of the former. This nuanced distinction is very important to underscore the confusion that has come to reign in understanding the nexus between the two phenomena.
Burkina Faso is one the many lucky African countries to have abundance of natural mineral resources underneath its territorial soil with which it can deployed to bring about inclusive economic development for the country. But Burkina Faso has not been able to bring about this required economic development as signposted by the fact that Burkina Faso remains today one of the poorest countries on earth. What are the causative factors of this conundrum?
Burkina Faso is reputed to be the fifth largest producer of gold in Africa with Ghana topping the list followed by South Africa, Sudan and Mali.138 Some writers claimed it is the fourth largest producer.
1. Ghana – 142.4 tonnes: One of the Dark Continent’s top gold mining countries, Ghana grabbed the top spot from South Africa after mining more than 142 metric tonnes of the precious metal in 2019. While traditional companies and artisanal miners contributing to Ghana’s gold production, some of the largest include Kinross Gold (Chirano mine), Newmont Goldcorp (Akyem and Ahafo mines), AngloGold Ashanti (Obuasi and Iduapriem mines), Gold Fields (works the Tarkwa gold mine) and Asanko Gold (Asanko mine). The minerals mined in Ghana account for 37% of the country’s total exports, with gold comprising 90% of total mineral exports. Miningglobal.com estimates Ghana’s gold reserves to be 1, 000 metric tonnes.139
2. South Africa – 118.2 tonnes: Declining gold ore grades in South Africa over the past eight decades have seen the country lose its African top spot to Ghana. In 2019, gold production fell to 118 metric tonnes from 137 metric tonnes in the previous year. The Witwatersrand Basin, an underground geological formation in South Africa, holds one of the largest gold placer deposits in the world. Top gold mines in the country include South Deep (the largest gold mine in the world in terms of reserves and currently owned by Harmony Gold), Mponeng (operated by AngloGold Ashanti and the deepest mine in the world) and Driefontein (owned by Sibanye-Stillwater). South Africa’s oldest mine, Kromdraai, is a currently a huge tourist attraction. Despite diminishing gold reserves, South Africa is still estimated to possess 6,000 metric tonnes (second-largest in the world), according to 2018 MiningGlobal data.140
3. Sudan – 76.6 tonnes: The north-east African country of Sudan comes third in this list with gold production of more than 76 metric tonnes in 2019. This was, however, a big drop from the 93 tonnes produced the previous year and the 107 tonnes in 2017. The Sudanese government, however, claims annual gold production in the range of 120-200 tonnes. For years one of Africa’s top gold producing countries, Sudanese gold is found in the Eriab region of the Nuba mountains, along the alluvial regions of the Nile River and quartz vein formations in Obaidiya, Blue Nile region and North Kurdufan. Africa’s third-largest country by area, Sudan’s gold mines include Hassai gold mine (owned by Sudan’s Ariab Mining Company and Canada’s La Mancha Resources) and Block 14 open pit mine project (operated by Canada’s Orca Gold).141
4. Mali – 71.1 tonnes: The north-west African country of Mali produced more than 71 metric tonnes of gold in 2019, a sizeable jump from the 61.2 tonnes in 2018 — placing it fourth in our list of the continent’s top gold producers. Mali’s gold mining operations not only involve large mining companies, but also artisanal miners, who have also produced a sizeable chunk of gold and made a significant contribution to the country’s economy. Its gold mines include Morila (managed by Government of Mali, AngloGold Ashanti and Barrick Gold), Sadiola (managed by Government of Mali, AngloGold Ashanti and LamGold), Loulo-Gounkoto (managed by Barrick Gold) and Yatela (managed by Government of Mali, AngloGold Ashanti and LamGold). Mali is estimated to have 800 metric tonnes of gold reserves, according to Norwegian website: eiti.org.142
5. Burkina Faso – 62 tonnes: Burkina Faso’s 62 metric tonnes of gold produced in 2019 places it in fifth position in our list. Said to have one of the most dynamic mining sectors in West Africa, Burkina Faso‘s other major resources are copper, zinc, limestone, manganese and phosphate. The country’s gold mines include Kalsaka (operated by Banlaw Africa Limited), Youga (jointly operated by Government of Burkina Faso and Etruscan Resource), Karma (operated by Endeavour Mining), Mana (operated by Semafo), Yaramoko (operated by Roxgold), Taparko-Boroum (owned and operated by Société des Mines de Taparko SA), Essakane (operated by IAMGOLD), and Inata (jointly operated by the Government of Burkina Faso and Avocet). Burkina Faso’s gold reserves are estimated to be about 154 metric tonnes, according to eiti.org.143
According to Lauren Van Metre and Homere Mutoro, Burkina Faso is rich in mineral resources; its deposits of gold, zinc, copper and manganese are found in an arc that spans the country’s southeast to its northwest regions. It is a globally-ranked producer of gold – both industrial and artisan-mined – with more than one million Burkinabe citizens employed in this sector.144
In 2008, a multinational mining corporation leased mining rights in Kalsaka (a commune in northwest Burkina Faso). The corporation prohibited artisanal miners from accessing their former sites, and farmers from their agricultural lands. A community member noted: “The only thing that we receive in return from mining exploitation in our zone, is the gaping holes, the polluted rivers, the dust which causes diseases, the forced evictions from our land to allow mining exploitation to proceed. We don’t know to whom we are going to refer to face this injustice. Our voice is not heard, our complaints are not handled and nobody is hearing us.”145
When large mining firms open sizeable extraction sites, they often displace artisanal mining and cut off local community members from their previous jobs in the sector, disrupting local economies and political dynamics. They frequently drive up prices and fail to generate promised local business and employment opportunities in support of their mining operations. Women who supplement family income with gold panning are disparately affected by these changes. They lose access to capital, and are also left alone to care for children when men must seek employment elsewhere.146
In 2008, the national government in Ouagadougou joined the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which oversees the global standard to promote open and accountable management of extractive resources. EITI validates commitments to good governance practices and regularly produces a country scorecard. To comply with EITI regulations, the government established a national multi-stakeholder group to manage the implementation of EITI guidelines and policies. It began collecting and publishing data on the management and activities of the sector in order to support a public debate on how to improve mining governance.147
In 2014-2015, the government engaged in a flurry of reforms, creating a National Mining Commission and a new mining code. The Code encouraged mining companies to create environmental and social impact plans that incorporated local input and commitments to employ local businesses. It also established a basket fund for local governments from taxation on mining profits and a government transfer of a percentage of its collected royalties on mining concessions to remediate the industry’s harmful local impacts. This included funding through local budgets for environmental rehabilitation and clean-up, improved security at artisanal mining sites and compensation for economic displacement.148
Unfortunately, there were significant delays with the implementation of these reforms and communities affected were not initially consulted.149
According to Extractive International Transparency Initiative, the mining sector in Burkina Faso is considered one of the most dynamic in West Africa. The development of the mining sector was made possible through intensified investment, the opening of industrial mines and an evolution of the legal and regulatory framework for the sector. The main resources are gold, zinc, copper, manganese, phosphate and limestone. Traces of diamonds, bauxite, nickel and vanadium have been recorded in various geological formations. However, gold remains the most exploited ore in Burkina Faso.150
Since 2007, Burkina Faso has experienced a surge in production in gold, ranking the country as the fourth largest gold producer in Africa. Despite recent political turmoil, including the fall of President Blaise Compaore, Burkina Faso published its 2012 EITI Report in December 2014. The report includes a description of a controversial competitive bidding process.151
An international call for tender had been issued for the Tambao project, one of the largest manganese deposits in the region. This was subsequently cancelled and eventually the license was awarded through a sole select tender to the TIMIS group. This led to a legal dispute between the government and two other companies (Groupe VILLAR MIR S.L.L. and Générale Nice Ressources- Africa S.A.). Accounting records showed that US $10 million signature bonus was deposited into a government account titled “Special investments programmes”.152
Signature bonuses are not foreseen as revenue stream by the country’s laws. The report recommends that laws are passed to govern this type of payment in terms of how the amount is established and the income administrated.153
Key figures of the report show a slight decrease in production while revenue rose from US $236 million to US $371 million. This 57% rise is largely due to an increase in tax rate and increase in customs duties related to the mining sector. The report of 2012 also includes more reporting companies (26 companies from 18 in 2011). One can also find information about the beneficiaries of corporate social payments, and a license register for all companies operating in the mining sector.154
EITI Report [published in April 2016] showed that Burkina Faso’s gold production reached nearly 33 tons in 2013, up 9% from the previous year, and over 20 times the country’s total gold production in 2006.155 This massive increase in production has made Burkina Faso Africa’s fourth largest producer of gold. The rapid expansion of Burkina Faso’s industrial and artisanal mining sector in recent years has led to a dramatic shift in the country’s economy, which presents opportunities and challenges. According to government statistics, the number of people directly involved in artisanal mining is estimated at 1 million.156
Whilst the main bulk of production comes from industrial mining (accounting for almost 99% of total output according to official figures), production from the artisanal mining is also significant, though poorly documented.157 Declared production from artisanal mining was 0.5 tons in 2013, but undeclared production was estimated as at least 8.8 tons according to a report by the Berne Declaration, a NGO investigating the sources of Switzerland’s gold. The study alleges that almost all of the gold produced by artisanal miners slips through the country’s borders undetected. In 2013, the NGO reported that approximately seven tons of gold left the country undeclared and was exported to Switzerland via Togo. Additionally, the EITI Report revealed that only 37 of the certified 63 trading houses declared their revenues to the Office of Mines and Geology.158
Massive protests forced President Blaise Compaoré to resign from office in October 2014 after 27 years in power. A transition government led by President Michel Kafando was appointed and tasked with the mandate of organising elections and facilitating the handover of power in one year.159
The temporary government managed to introduce some reforms, including the adoption of a new mining code by parliament in June 2015. The Code reaffirms Burkina Faso’s adherence to the EITI and makes it mandatory for all agreements and contracts between the government and mining companies to be published in the country’s official Gazette. It also calls for the establishment of various funds including one for environmental rehabilitation, improved security at artisanal mining sites and for the prohibition of the use of toxic chemical products. This wide sweeping reform was signed into law by the interim President in July 2015. Soon after however, there was a failed military coup to overthrow the transition government. Despite this setback, the transition government handed over power to the democratically elected President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in December 2015.160, 161
Gold Mining often plays a significant role in Burkina Faso’s economy. Burkina Faso has become Africa’s 4th biggest producer of gold in 2012. Production of mineral commodities is limited to cement, dolomite, gold, granite, marble, phosphate rock, pumice, other volcanic materials, and salt.162
As of 2006, companies exploring for gold in Burkina Faso include Goldrush Resources, Gryphon Minerals Ltd, Orbis Gold Limited and Golden Rim Resources (2010) of Australia, Cluff Gold plc and Randgold Resources Ltd. of the United Kingdom, and Canadian companies Channel Resources Ltd., Etruscan Resources, Goldbelt Resources Ltd., High River Gold Mines Ltd., Orezone Gold Corporation., Riverstone Resources Inc., and Societe Semafo. Etruscan also explores in Burkina Faso for copper.163
In 2012, there were hundreds of gold mines in Burkina Faso, most of them small-scale. Burkina Faso is the 3rd biggest site for gold exploration in Africa and 4th biggest gold producer in Africa. West African gold is not as high grade as gold from South Africa.164
Gold mining in Burkina Faso continues to grow rapidly, with more than fifteen major discoveries made since 2006. With this have come increasing amounts of merger and acquisition activity and more explorers flocking to the region. (Ibid) In 2017 junior mining company Nexus Gold began district-scale exploration of the Niangouela and Bouboulou gold concessions, which are located within the Boromo greenstone belt of north-central Burkina Faso. The belt is host to several active gold mines.165
According to the Ministry of Finance, gold has become the top export commodity. In 2011, it earned Burkina Faso 127 billion CFA (US$247 million). Between 2007 and 2011, it brought in 440 billion CFA, accounting for 64.7 percent of all exports and 8 percent of GDP. Production rose from 23 tonnes in 2010 to 32 tonnes in 2011. Gold mines are spread across the country’s northern, western, southwestern and central regions.166
[However], Child slavery is commonplace in the gold industry.167 A recent report from publication All Africa revealed that the recent boom in the country’s gold mining industry in the last three years has made the country one of Africa’s leading producers and also asserted that it was luring a whole generation into the sector for work. Children as young as six were reported to have left school in order to work in the mines – mainly artisanal ones where they crush stones, sieve dust and transport water around the site. Children are even visiting mines on their days off from school, influenced by their parents who have made money there.168
Burkina Faso’s gold industry employs slave laborers and does not spare children. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor reported that gold mining becoming an even more fruitful industry, it has resulted in “an increased number of children working in gold mines and thousands of students leaving school.”169
A December 2014 report further corroborates the fact that child labor and forced labor are common practices in Burkina Faso’s mining industry. The mentioned DOL report contains a List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor and Burkina Faso is listed among 74 other countries where such labor conditions have been observed.170
Zinc is another solid mineral found in large commercial quantity in Burkina Faso.
Aim Resources Ltd. (AIM) of Australia continued with the development of the Perkoa zinc deposit, which is located about 120 km west of Ouagadougou. In December 2005, Snowden Mining Industry Consultants completed a bankable feasibility study for Perkoa. Production was expected to be about 130,000 t/yr of concentrate at a grade of 53% zinc. Overall zinc recovery to concentrate was projected to be 93%, and contained zinc production, to average 68,000 t/yr; zinc concentrates would be transported by railway to the port of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire and by road to the port of Tema in Ghana. The first shipment of zinc concentrate was expected to be delivered in 2008. In its 2006 annual report, AIM announced that it had signed letters of intent with Louis Dreyfus Commodities Metals Suisse S.A., Votorantim Metais of Brazil, and Switzerland-based Xstrata plc to finalize offtake agreements for the production of zinc concentrates from Perkoa. Xstrata planned to process Perkoa concentrates through either the San Juan de Nieva zinc smelter in Spain or the Nordenham zinc smelter in Germany. According to AIM company reports, the government had upgraded the road that leads to the mine and had constructed a dam that would provide water for the project. As of yearend, measured and indicated mineral resources at Perkoa were estimated to be 6.72 Mt at grades of 16.4% zinc and 35.4 g/t silver at a 5% zinc cutoff grade.171
In February 2006, Semafo awarded the engineering, procurement, and construction contract for the development of the Mana gold mine to Genviar Consulting Group Inc. According to the company’s 2006 annual report, measured resources were estimated to be about 2.1 Mt at a grade of 1.99 g/t gold and indicated resources were estimated to be 2.5 Mt at a grade of 2.03 g/t gold. Average production, which was expected to begin in late 2007, was estimated to be about 3,900 kg/yr of gold for the first 3 years and about 3,000 kg/yr for the remaining life of the mine. The company approved a $3.5 million budget for the project for 2007.172
A new zinc mine in west Africa is due to start up in mid-2012, just as some of the world’s largest deposits are winding down, creating the first window in years for new suppliers in a chronically over-supplied market.173
The Glencore International-controlled Perkoa zinc mine in Burkina Faso will start shipments of concentrate by June 2012, rapidly building to an annual rate of 90,000 tonnes contained metal, joint venture partner Blackthorn Resources said. (Ibid) Blackthorn Managing Director Scott Lowe said startup of the mine, following an A$80 million cash injection by Glencore, would track the closure of bigger zinc mines in Australia and North America, which is threatening to create a supply gap for the metal.174
For now, analysts believe there is an oversupply of zinc of between a half million and 750,000 tonnes, if global demand remains at around 13.5 million tonnes. “Glencore took the reins in December and they have been managing the project ever since,” Lowe told Reuters. “We’re expecting that the zinc mine will be commissioned with the first concentrate coming though in mid-2012.”175 Zinc is used chiefly in galvanising steel for use in bridge and road construction as well as auto-making.176 Landlocked Burkina Faso has emerged as Africa’s fourth -largest gold producer but has yet to establish a base metals mining industry.177
According to an IMF report published in May 2008, [a]lthough Burkina Faso has significant potential for mining manganese, bauxite, copper, nickel, zinc, limestone, and gold, mining accounts for only a small amount of Burkina Faso’s GDP. However, the mining industry is expected to become increasingly important to the economy; several gold mines are being developed and mineral exploration is intensifying. Since the mining code was revised in 2003, the number of exploration permits has increased to 443, against 353 between 1990 and 2002.178
Gold mining could have a positive impact on public finances through higher revenue in the form of taxes on industrial and commercial profits; taxes levied on behalf of employees; priority royalties paid to the state; and dividends paid to shareholders, including the state. However, this source of income is unstable because it depends on trends in gold production and international prices.179
The authorities have been promoting artisan mining as an activity that helps increase the incomes of poor people, especially in the dry season. Artisan mining essentially applies to gold. It mobilizes some 200,000 people who work in more than 200 sites throughout the country, with some sites accommodating up to 20,000 people at a time. Artisan mining makes little or no use of power equipment. Miners extract gold-bearing ores using simple hand tools, pulverize them using mortar and pestle, and wash the powder to pick out flakes of gold. Women are often active in the mining camps both workers and suppliers of food and other services. Between 1986 and 2005, according to official data, this activity yielded 15,576 kg of gold exports, slightly higher than industrial production. Official data show annual production of 190 kg of artisan gold in 2005, but the World Bank estimates that this may represent only 10–15 percent of actual production and exports. Measures to promote artisan mining include production and use of affordable equipment, improving land tenure systems, training miners on the technical characteristics of sites and mining methods, and improving social conditions at the sites.180
Health and safety conditions in artisan sites are dismal. The state tried to organize and supervise the sector through a capacity-building project, PRE-CAGEME (National Mining Sector and Environmental Management Capacity Building Project). PRE-CAGEME, which ran from 1998 to 2004, promoted the development of small-scale mines and supported local companies designing and manufacturing user-friendly processing equipment for use without applying chemical products like mercury. Small-scale mines, mainly locally owned, use motorized equipment and other small power tools to extract and process mineral ores, which increases production and lowers costs compared to manual production. Mechanization allows the miner to go deeper, beyond alluvial deposits. Operation of the equipment requires technical and mechanical skills that are locally available, although in short supply. It is easier for the government to monitor operations and provide technical extension Services to small-scale than to artisan mines.181
The only industrial gold mine in the 1980s and 1990s was Poura, operated by the parastatal Société de recherches et d’Exploitations Minières du Burkina. Its Output fell dramatically in the 1990s, and Poura suspended operations in 1998 due to low gold prices and managerial problems. Since then artisan production has become the only source of gold.182
Burkina Faso’s gold reserves are estimated at more than 6 million ounces and industrial production was expected to begin in 2007. Six companies have obtained exploitation permits and two of them are starting production: Taparko, developed by Canada’s High River Gold Mines, and Youga, developed by the Burkina Mining Company with the Canadian Company Etruscan as a majority owner. The mines are expected to produce between 20 and 35 tons a year over a seven- to eight-year lifespan.183
Another four gold mines are expected to start production in 2008 or later: Kalsaka, developed by Kalsaka Mining, a joint venture between British and Burkinabè companies; Mana, developed by the Canadian company Semafo); Inata Belahourou, licensed by Canadian Goldbelt Resources; and Guiro-Diouga, owned by STREMCO with British interests. Together they could produce some 65–70 tons/year for seven to eight years.184
Though the Essakan mine developed by Canadian Orezone Resources Inc. and South African Gold Fields Ltd., which hosts the largest known gold resource in the country, has not yet requested an exploitation permit, production there could begin in 2009 and exports in 2010. Technical studies on other deposits could further boost gold exports after 2010.185
Low manganese prices and the lack of railway transport resulted in suspension of operations at the Tambao mine in 1998. A manganese mine in Kiéré is expected to start construction in 2008. An Australian company has been developing the Perkoa zinc deposit in the western part of the country and plans to start production in early 2008. The project is expected to add some US$90 million to Burkina Faso’s export earnings. A Canadian enterprise has been evaluating copper deposits in the south. The deposit at Kodjari produces 3,000 tons of phosphate annually, which are ground and used as fertilizer in Burkina Faso. Recent work by the BUMIGEB (Bureau of Mines and Geology of Burkina Faso) has identified several areas for uranium mineralization.186
Since the mid-1990s the authorities have instituted a number of reforms to modernize the environment for mining investment. A new Ministry of Mines, Quarries and Energy was created in 1995. The regulatory mandates of the BUMIGEB and the state-owned buying office, the CBMP (Comptoir Burkinabè des Metaux Precieux), were revised to make them more supportive of private sector activities. In 1996 the government abolished the CBMP’s monopoly and issued regulations for the operations of private gold buying agencies. The CBMP was liquidated in 2006.187
A mining code was adopted in 1997 to make exploration and exploitation of mineral resources more attractive. In 2003 the National Assembly revised it significantly and a new law was adopted to encourage mining prospecting and formalize semi mechanized small-scale operations to enhance the mining sector’s contribution to Burkina Faso’s Poverty Reduction Strategy.188
The mining code establishes that mineral resources are the property of the state, with mineral rights to be granted by the Ministry of Mines, Quarries, and Energy. It gives domestic and foreign firms the same rights and obligations. The state guarantees the right of ownership, freedom of management, free transfer of capital and returns, and stability of agreements made according to the law.189
The mining code provides for three types of permits: exploration (three years, renewable twice); industrial operation of mines; and semi mechanized small-scale operations. For industrial operations, after the initial permit (20 years for large mines, 10 years for small), permits are renewable for consecutive periods of five years until the deposit is depleted. Small-scale operations are granted a five-year permit, renewable for period of three years.190
The code distinguishes between exploration and exploitation, with the latter stage including a construction and an operation period. At the exploitation stage, the applicant for a permit must grant the state a 10 percent free ownership share in the mining company.191
In the exploration stage holders of a permit or authorization are given customs and tax concessions. The custom concessions give the right to a duty of just 5 percent on equipment, spare parts, raw materials, consumables, fuel, and lubricants and also allow for temporary admission. Tax concessions consist of full exemption from VAT on goods and services, the industrial and commercial tax (BIC), the professional minimum flat rate tax (IMFPIC), and the employers’ and apprenticeship tax (TPA).192
During the operations phase permit holders are exempted from the professional minimum flat-rate tax (IMFPIC), the employers’ and apprenticeship tax (TPA), and property in mortmain tax. These exemptions are valid for the lesser of seven years or one half the mine’s life. Permit holders also benefit from the right to a reduced customs duty of 7.5 percent on equipment, spare parts, raw materials, consumables, fuel, and lubricants. The VAT is subject to a refund system. A withholding tax of 7.5 percent and a company tax of 25 percent apply. The company tax takes into account exploration expenditure, a loss carry-forward for five years, provisions for site rehabilitation and deposit reconstitution, and accelerated depreciation for new equipment. Holders are also exempt from registration fees when increasing capital.193
Industrial mining represents a major new source of foreign exchange and government revenue that requires transparent management and accountability to ensure that the revenues contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction. If good governance is encouraged in the sector, revenues can be an important engine for long-term economic and social development. For these reasons, the authorities are considering the participation of Burkina Faso in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.194
The Burkinabè authorities still need to tackle obstacles that make for an unfavorable environment for attracting foreign investment in mining. Among them are inconsistent and arbitrary interpretation of the mining code by tax and custom officials, red tape in processing applications for permits, and delays in reimbursing VAT rebates. Rigidities in the Labor Code negatively affect mining companies, which need access to temporary employment in the exploration phase. Burkina Faso has considerable gold reserves to increase its exports and revenues; it would do well to ensure that its mining policies are sound and stable in their application.195
In 2016 the Global Environment Facility (GEF) approved the Global Opportunities for Long-term Development (GOLD) of the Artisanal Small-scale Gold Mining sector programme to help artisanal gold miners eliminate the use of mercury in gold mining, and reduce harmful risks to their health and the environment. As part of the GOLD programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) has launched the preparatory phase of a five-year project in Burkina Faso.196
The project will officially begin in early 2018 and will focus on strengthening policy to support formalization of the sector, introduce a gold-buying scheme, build the capacity of national specialists on mercury-free technologies and formalization, and raise awareness and share knowledge in Burkina Faso’s artisanal small-scale gold mining sector.197
Artisanal small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is a major source of income for a large part of the population in Burkina Faso. It is estimated that between 600,000 and one million people are directly and/or indirectly involved in the sector, producing approximately 27 tonnes of gold per year in more than 200 legal mine sites (and several hundred informal sites), making Burkina Faso the fourth largest gold producer in Africa.198
As is the case in many other countries where ASGM takes place, the vast majority of artisanal miners in Burkina Faso use mercury to extract gold from ore. While there are cleaner and safer alternative practices and technologies, artisanal miners often ignore the threats that mercury poses to human health and lack the capacity, funds, and incentives to adopt good mining practices. Mercury releases in Burkina Faso are some of the highest levels in Africa. It is estimated that small-scale miners use approximately 35 tons of mercury each year.199
The project preparatory phase launch event in Ouagadougou on 24 February 2017 was attended by more than 40 people, including representatives of Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Environment, Green Economy and Climate Change, and Ministry of Mines and Quarries, the United States Department of State, and the US embassies in Ghana and Burkina Faso, as well as representatives of women’s and miners associations, and of the Artisanal Gold Council.200
Jerome Stucki, the UNIDO project manager, led a consultative and interactive session during the launch. He emphasized that ‘’the Burkinabe project is innovative in taking an integrated, whole value chain approach to eliminate mercury use in the ASGM sector. The intervention strategy aims to introduce enforceable policies, regulations, formalization and training in Burkina Faso. For long-term environmental, health and social benefits, the establishment of financing mechanism for the ASGM sector will facilitate future investment in mercury-free technologies.”201
UNIDO has been working on the reduction of mercury use in the Burkina Faso ASGM sector since 2011. Other projects include the Minamata Convention Initial Assessment (MIA) and the development of a National Action Plan for the ASGM sector. (The Minamata Convention on Mercury is a global treaty to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of mercury.)202
Through the GOLD programme, the GEF will provide funds in eight countries with a sizable gold mining sector and where many artisanal miners still rely on mercury for gold extraction (Burkina Faso, Colombia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, Mongolia and the Philippines). GEF funding for the GOLD initiative amounts to US$45.2 million, and is expected to attract co-financing of more than US$135 million from government budgets, international financing institutions and private companies.203
With these funds, governments can support the artisanal and small-scale sector by creating policies and market incentives, and connecting them to international markets and supply chains that favour gold which uses less (or no) mercury in its extraction processes.204
‘They have taken everything from us: our land, our jobs, our health, our peace and our hope.’
In 2000, the mineral sector played a minor role in Burkina Faso’s economy, which was dominated by agriculture and services. The gross domestic product (GDP), which was based on purchasing power parity in 1999, was $12.4 billion. In 1999, exports were $255 million led by cotton, which accounted for more than one-half of total exports and gold. Burkina Faso’s population as of July 2000 was estimated to be 11.9 million. Burkina Faso produced gold, manganese, marble, pumice, and salt.205
The Government agency responsible for mining is the Ministère de l’Énergie et Mines. In 1997, the Government adopted a new mining code with two primary objectives—to standardize all the legal measures that are used to regulate the mining sector and to amend those parts of the previous legislation that had proved inadequate and hindered future mining development. Other provisions of the 1997 mining code are as follows: to prevent the state from holding sole ownership of a mining title, to ensure that an exploration permit confers the automatic right for the holder to apply for a mining permit for deposits discovered within the area concerned, to require a mining permit holder to begin production within 2 years of the permit being granted, and to retain a 10% free-carried state interest in the project.206
The Poura gold mine closed in 1999 despite completion of that had been financed by the European Union. The Mining Minister said that the mine had to be closed owing to low gold prices. The mine was owned by Sahelian Goldfields, Inc. of Canada and had a remaining resource of 450,000 metric tons (t) at a grade of more than 12 grams per metric ton (g/t) gold.207
Numerous other mining companies had gold interests in Burkina Faso in 2000. Among them were Ashanti Goldfields Co. Ltd. of Ghana, Channel Resources Ltd. of Canada, Cluff and was expected to be producing around 50,000 kg/yr of gold by 2006. Mali’s economy was dominated by agriculture in 2000, which accounted for about 47% of the GDP; the GDP based on purchasing power parity in 1999 was $8.5 billion. In 1999, exports, which were led by cotton, gold, and livestock, totaled $640 million. Mali’s population as of July 2000 was estimated to be 10.7 million. Principal mining output in 2000 included diamond and gold. Mineral exploration interest was focused on diamond, gold, and oil.208
The Government agency responsible for mining is the Mining plc of the United Kingdom, Coronation International Mining Corp. of Canada, Delta Gold Ltd. of Australia, Echo Bay Mines Ltd. of the United States, High River Gold Mines Ltd. of Canada, Orezone Resources, Inc. of Canada, Placer Dome Inc. of Canada, Randgold Resources Ltd. of South Africa, Ranger Minerals Ltd. of Australia, Repadre Capital Corp. of Canada, Resolute Mining Ltd. of Australia, and Semafo Inc. of Canada. Artisanal workers produce around 1,000 kilograms per year (kg/yr) of gold.209
In 1999, Billiton plc of the United Kingdom sold to Metorex Ltd. of South Africa its 90% holding in the Perkoa zinc deposit, which is located in western Burkina Faso; the Government of Burkina Faso owned the remaining 10%. Perkoa is a highgrade zinc ore deposit still in development with resources of 7 million metric tons (Mt) at a grade of 17.6% zinc at a cutoff grade of 10% zinc. Planned production levels are 60,000 metric tons per year (t/yr) of zinc with an estimated mine life of 15 years. In 2000, Metorex Ltd. was seeking investment in infrastructure needs, such as water supply, roads, and power; the deposit is located within 30 kilometers (km) of an already existing railway line.210
According to Djibril Gueye, Burkina Faso have rich and diversified mineral resources, which are still relatively untapped. The artisanal small-scale mining sector mainly deals with gold and construction materials.211
Artisanal gold mining began in the late 1980s, in the aftermath of serious droughts which led to great poverty, especially in rural areas. During this period rural populations began to seek and exploit gold deposits in order to survive. However, these activities were disorganised, resulted in the destruction of the environment and often caused serious accidents in the field.212
As a result of these problems the state has begun to regulate and monitor small-scale gold mining activities more closely. It provides basic safety training to gold miners and has introduced measures to help establish more cost-effective small-scale operations. It has also tried to take steps to help preserve the environment from deforestation and chemical contamination.213
Such initiatives have given the state more control over national gold production and have enabled gold miners to be better organised and able to exploit and sell gold to state-run companies such as the Burkinabe Precious Metals Counter (CBMP).214
Today, artisanal gold mining is far more than just a survival activity. Rather, gold produced by artisanal mining is Burkina Faso’s third largest export.215
Although the people of Burkina Faso have always mined construction materials for building purposes, it was only when the fall in the price of gold began to have a detrimental impact on the artisanal gold mining industry that the state became more involved in the artisanal mining of construction materials, with a particular emphasis on initiatives to help combat poverty.216
The approach that the Burkinabe state has taken towards organising the small-scale mining industry can certainly be seen as an example of good practice in the sub-region. However, much more still needs to be done in order to reverse the recent decrease in artisanal mining productivity and adequately address the problems relating to health and safety in mining sites and environmental devastation.217
The main objective for the future should be to enable artisanal miners and Burkinabe business people to evolve from artisanal activities to more organised and cost-effective mechanised small-scale mining operations. At present, however, artisanal miners do not have the means and business people are hesitant to get involved in such operations, being more used to low-risk investments which offer immediate results.218
Whether such an objective can be achieved therefore depends on the capacity of the state to establish financing mechanisms through local banks and other financial institutions to help artisanal miners. It may be that the issue of financing small-scale mining may be best addressed within the context of larger initiatives aimed at combating poverty in Burkina Faso219
Gold mining has both a long history as well as a recent boom in Burkina Faso. In the form of artisanal mining, locally known as orpaillage, it began long before colonisation. Industrial mining, however, is a new phenomenon: since 2007, 15 industrial mines have opened. Currently, in 2019, eleven gold mines and one zinc mine are in operation, and exploration and exploitation licenses for industrial mining have been issued for almost half of the surface of the country. While mining companies and the government promise jobs and ‘development’, what is the actual experience of the people living close to the mines? The research group GLOCON (Global Change – Local Conflicts) has released their most recent Country Report which puts the views of those affected by the industrial mines in Burkina Faso at the centre of the analysis. The analysis reveals that the perspective of the people living close the mines differs from the one of the companies and government. While there are few advantages, mainly certain investment in infrastructure, there are many negative impacts, including the devastating loss of livelihood.220
The most relevant negative impact of industrial mines concerns the loss of livelihoods. Burkina Faso’s rural population mainly depends on subsistence agriculture and livestock farming. Artisanal gold mining is another important source of income. A new mine is installed on land that was previously used for farming, cattle herding or artisanal mining. Many residents are impeded from pursuing their former livelihood activities as they have lost their fields and/or are denied the possibility to engage in artisanal mining.221
The expropriation of people from their land for the purpose of mining is legally possible in Burkina Faso, and mining companies are obliged to compensate the residents for their loss. But despite international standards which recommend providing substitute cultivation areas, land is nearly always compensated by payments. While these should serve as an investment in alternative income generating activities, they are more often used for the daily needs as it is difficult to establish alternative livelihoods, and many people state that the loss of land for agriculture and herding leads to poverty. Also, the construction and production phase of a mine and the effects on the environment and living conditions of the people last much longer than the actual compensation payments.222
Since orpaillage is generally prohibited on mining concession areas, the local population is deprived of yet another important source of income. Even though the mining management as well as government officials makes promises regarding employment opportunities in the industrial mines, people strongly express their dissatisfaction with the few positions being created and that non-locals are advantaged in being employed by the mine. Unemployment and poverty, sometimes even hunger are the consequences of the combination of the loss of livelihoods and the lacking compensation and employment options by the mining operators.223
Thousands of households are relocated to newly constructed villages for the benefit of the construction or extension of a mine. Problems of the resettlement process include a lack of transparency and information, disruption of the social structure by the new arrangement of the houses in the villages, and longer distances for the daily routines of the residents.224
Another concern is related to damaging effects and increasing health problems. The work of the mine includes dynamite blasts in order to crush the gold containing rock. These provoke ground motion and bring dust and rocks into the village, which leads to increased respiratory illnesses. Furthermore, the detonations cause damage to the houses, even the newly built ones, and produce a lot of noise and even a feeling of ‘earthquakes.’ Residents also complain about pollution due to the use of toxic products or waste left close to the village. Furthermore, defunct tailing dams or the spillover of chemical products contaminates the groundwater.225
The reallocation of land and the damaging effects of the mines also impact cultural sites such as graves or religious sites that become inaccessible or are threatened by the mine operations. This has led to conflicts, for example around the Karma mine, where dynamite blasts are viewed as a threat to the nearby Ramatoulaye Mosque, an important site of pilgrimage.226
Even though according to Burkinabé law, mining companies need to obtain the consent of the local population regarding the plans to construct a mine in their vicinity and the potential repercussions on their lives and environment, many residents in the neighbourhood of the mines claim not to have been informed. Apart from the lack of prior information they also complain about unfulfilled promises. Often, the mine management attempts to counter the negative impacts of the mine by promising infrastructure developments and employment during the construction process as well as later in the mine. However, these promises do not materialise for the vast majority of the population.227
When residents stand up for their rights, they often experience repression by state authorities and operators. Repression includes unlawful dismissals of those who unionise. Demonstrations and roadblocks are countered with physical violence by police or special security forces and protesters are arbitrarily arrested.228
Generally, residents feel that the mining companies are taking from them without giving enough back. Many people are under the impression that the mine management and the government are in cahoots. A housemaker from the village Imiougou, close to the Bissa-Bouly mine states: ‘I ask the government and the mine not to turn their backs while we suffer.’229
The affected populations try to engage with the mine management and the local and national authorities to demand local employment and income generating opportunities. They also seek compensation payments, investment in local infrastructures, and access to artisanal mining sites, micro-credit schemes and training.230
Despite repression, the affected populations use different ways of addressing the actors they see in charge: letters, meetings, petitions, press conferences, demonstrations, marches, roadblocks and sit-ins are just some of the highly diverse array of strategies that the residents employ to raise their claims.231
GLOCON’s Country Report offers a rare perspective on how local populations experience industrial mining in Burkina Faso. Contrary to the promises of mining companies and the government agencies, the qualitative analysis of the survey show that the opening of mines in the country has not improved the living conditions of the residents. Instead, the findings reveal that the grave social and environmental impacts of the industrial mines are at the expense of residents. One peasant from Taparko in the North of the country summarises: ‘They have taken everything from us: our land, our jobs, our health, our peace and our hope.’232, 233
The link between artisanal and/or outright illegal mining was further explored in the report published in November 2019 by The West Africa Network for Peace Building.
Since the early 1980s, mining has been an integral part of Burkina Faso’s economy. The recent boom in the prices of minerals, especially gold in the world market has led to a significant increase in the contribution of mining to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which has trebled from 3 percent in 2009 to 9 percent in 2016 with its share of exports also increasing from 43 percent to 69 percent. Owing to this, the mining sector has attracted both domestic and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), causing significant expansion in the industrial and artisanal mining sectors in Burkina Faso. This has led to proliferation of small-scale artisanal mining, which has become the mainstay of livelihood security for many people, especially those in rural communities. In particular, expansion in small-scale artisanal mining has generated an increase in wealth for rural households. However, the hike in international gold prices in recent years has also contributed to a surge in the illegal mining activities in the country. Currently, there is an estimated 200,000 artisanal small-scale mining sites mostly in remote communities in the North, East and South-west of the country. Out of this figure, there are only 200 artisanal small-scale gold mining sites are legally registered and recognized.234
Though illegal mining activities continue to yield economic dividends for many people in mining communities, it portends security threats that could exacerbate the current security deterioration in the country. Notable trends emerging in extremist activities indicate continual exploitation of illegal mines for trafficking of gold and other minerals by Ansarul, AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Nusrat Al-Islam, Al-Mourabitoun and ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to finance their operation in the West African Sahel.235
Additionally, these extremist groups have exploited prevailing economic conditions in the country to recruit vulnerable youth population through the lure of financial gratification from illegal gold mining.236
Another cause for concern is the current surge in violent extremist and terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso which presents a critical risk factor that contributes to spikes in illegal gold mining activities to sustain terrorist operations in the country. While some criminal networks and conflict entrepreneurs engaged in illegal mining activities to keep their operations thriving, others also create and sustain insecurity in order to optimize the dividends from illegal mining proceeds. Already, the consequences of recent upturn in illegal gold mining activities is manifesting in the influx of migrants in mining communities, health, food and environmental security challenges. While growing insecurity in Burkina Faso has gained prominence in recent regional and global security conversations, attention to illegal mining and how it is fueling insecurity in the country is relatively minimal. These trends are worrying, particularly in light of the upcoming 2020 elections.237
Burkina Faso has been dogged by surging terrorist and violent extremist attacks as well as communal violence since the fall of President Blaise Campaore’s rule in 2014. Timeline analysis indicated initial attacks were confined to the northern part of the country and was perpetrated by terrorist and extremist groups operating along the Mali and Niger borders. However, prevailing challenges with weak capacities of State security institutions provided the leverage for expansion of operations and attacks by insurgent groups to the upper west, east and the southern regions of the country. From April 2015 – June 2019 Burkina Faso has witnessed over 283 terrorist attacks, resulting in 524 deaths and 308 injured. Consequently, as of July 2019, the Government had extended state of emergency to 14 out of the 45 provinces of the country due to increased terrorist attacks and armed violence. Amidst the state of insecurity, Burkina Faso has witnessed significant growth in the mining industry with cascading effect its socio-economic indicators including increased GDP and livelihood support.238
However, the dividends of these positive socio-economic trends are being overshadowed by the nexus between illegal mining and operations of extremist and armed groups in communities. Over the years, the activities of illegal miners are mostly confined in rural poor communities where the presence of security is fragile. Given that 43.7 per cent of Burkinabè live on less than $1.90 a day, coupled with a high rural population of 70 percent, illegal mining serves as a viable livelihood support for most of the rural poor communities. Also, 80 per cent of Burkina Faso’s active population is engaged in the agriculture sector, which accounts for about 35 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs about 90 percent of the labour force in the country.239
Paradoxically, illegal mining offers alternative livelihood support for most subsistence farmers in rural communities whose farming activities have been devastated by climate risks. This economic disempowerment has also led to unemployment among population, especially the youth who find illegal mining lucrative to support their livelihood. In the two poorest regions in Burkina Faso – the North and East Regions – where there is a sense of abandonment and frustration at the failure of the State to provide basic public goods, illegal mining provides support for the local economy. The illegal mining sector accounts for over 1 million people who engage in the exploitation of gold and other minerals. In view of this, Government authorities tolerate illegal gold mining despite its illegal character because it is undertaken by a number of poor rural dwellers and thereby filling the gaps in Government’s responsibilities in provision of human security needs of the poor rural population. Therefore, the laws on illegal mining become difficult to enforce by the Government. In terms of its impact on households, illegal artisanal small-scale mining is key in sustaining the livelihood of over 3,200,000 people, which corresponds to 18 percent of the country’s population. Studies on the income of the miners have revealed that in spite of the challenges associated with illegal artisanal small-scale mining, they generally earn a living which varies between CFAF 4,000 and 100,000 while sometimes peaking at more than a million CFA francs (US $2000).240
Additionally, the sector has spillover benefits to other income generation sectors of rural economy. These include the sale of water, food, drinks, mobile phones, motorcycles, clothes and fuel among others. It is also worthy of note that there are a number of women involved in the illegal mining industry in Burkina Faso. Between 45,000 and 85,000 women are engaged in illegal mining alone. Also, women mostly participate in illegal artisanal small-scale mining in the country as a result of limited economic empowerment. Women participate to shoulder the responsibilities of catering for their households needs including provision of basic necessities of life and paying their children’s school fees. In view of the economic incentives illegal artisanal mining provides for youth and women population, it also has the capacity to minimize the population of youth involved in violent extremism despite the spread of extremist groups’ activities across the country.241
Further corroborating such reports as already cited above is the report titled “Insecurity in Burkina Faso – beyond conflict minerals: The complex links between artisanal gold mining and violence” written by Cristiano Lanzano, Sabine Luning and Alizèta Ouédraogo, and published by The Nordic Africa Institute in September 2021242
In this interesting report, the authors asserted that the assumption that there is a natural causal link between the two (both the increase in artisanal mining and violent attacks by non-state armed groups) is too simplistic. “As artisanal gold mining in Burkina Faso has increased in recent years, so have violent attacks by non-state armed groups. The assumption that there is a natural causal link between the two is, however, too simplistic. The escalating violence should rather be seen as a result of long-term trends, such as state disengagement, a growing dependence on gold and the gradual privatization of security. To curb the violence, we recommend that policy makers avoid a repressive approach to artisanal mining and rethink the governance of the sector, in consultation with miners and rural communities.”243
Jihadists have made $140 million from attacks on gold mines in Burkina Faso since 2016, according to a report commissioned by the government.244
Gold mining has become increasingly vital to the economy of the landlocked West African country, which was once dependent on cotton exports for foreign earnings. But the industry has also become a welcome source of funding for jihadists and other armed movements in areas lacking in central authority, according to the report’s author Ollo Kambou of the Burkina Economic and Social Observatory (OES). The report estimated the total cost of the attacks in terms of damage to property and wider effects to be 600 billion CFA francs ($1.1 billion) since 2016, roughly one-third of the state’s entire revenue.245
A spiral of jihadist violence began five years ago in parallel with a gold rush. From 0.40 tonnes in 2007, gold production rose to more than 52 tonnes in 2018, according to Burkina’s Chamber of Mines. The sector made up 11.4 per cent of economic output in 2018. It accounts for 9,200 direct jobs and 26,100 indirect jobs, while the gold panning sub-sector employs 1.5 million people.246
But jihadist attacks are hindering production at artisanal mines. “Terrorist organisations exploit natural resources such as gold,” Kambou said. The mines also give jihadists access to explosives. More than 1,100 people have died and more than one million have fled their homes in Burkina Faso since 2015 when jihadists crossed from neighbouring Mali and began their attacks.247
Swathes of territory are now outside of the control of central authorities. The violence has been attributed to jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State group. While those groups are using the gold to funding terrorism, Kambou said that most attacks are financed from abroad. “Money transfer companies and non-profit organisations are the main channels used to finance terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso,” he said, pointing out that the groups benefit from the fact that much of the economy is cash-based.248
Gold mining in Burkina Faso has also been linked with human trafficking that extend its tentacles as far as Nigeria.
As part of a months-long investigation into sex trafficking and the gold mining industry, The Associated Press met with nearly 20 Nigerian women who said they had been brought to Burkina Faso under false pretenses, then forced into prostitution. Some of the women, who like Blessing spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for their safety, said they knew hundreds of others with similar stories. To protect their safety, AP is identifying the women by the names they used for sex work.249 The AP verified the women’s stories through interviews with aid workers, lawyers, police, local anti-trafficking activists, health workers, a trafficker, and members of the Nigerian community in several towns throughout Burkina Faso.250
People with knowledge of the trafficking say most of the women come from Nigeria’s Edo state, where promises of jobs in shops or salons in Burkina Faso sounded like a good way to support their families. Once here, they were sent to work off debts in squalid conditions at or near small-scale gold mines.251
While both Burkina Faso and Nigeria have signed the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, neither has finalized a joint plan on how to combat trafficking.252 Burkina Faso’s security sector, already struggling to stem a violent jihadist insurgency, is undertrained and ill-equipped to disrupt the expansive network of recruiters, traffickers, and pimps.253 As a result, the country not only struggles with trafficking within its borders but has also been identified as a transfer point for trafficking women into other countries, according to reports from the US State Department.254
Burkina Faso’s gold mining industry is relatively new. The first of its 15 industrial mines, all but one of which is for gold, started production in 2007, a few years after the government changed the mining law to attract commercial investors.255
Today, Burkina Faso is the fastest-growing gold producer in Africa, and currently the fifth largest on the continent after South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali. Gold is the nation’s most important export, according to a February report by the German-based research group GLOCON. The industry employs about 1.5 million people and was worth about $2 billion in 2019.256 More than 70% of the industrial gold mined is sent to Switzerland, according to 2019 data from the United Nations Comtrade Database, and the vast majority of it is processed by Metalor Technologies, a Swiss-based refinery of precious metal and one of the largest in the world.257
Metalor Technologies said its suppliers are owned and managed by listed companies with a high sense and respect of corporate social responsibility standards.258 “In Burkina, as in all other countries we do work with, our suppliers have followed a thorough due diligence and compliance process to make sure that the way they operate do respect human rights and environmental standards,” the company said in a statement, adding that it follows guidelines set by groups such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, an international organization composed of 37 member countries established to stimulate economic progress and world trade.259
Gold from Burkina Faso is also likely used to make products sold by companies in a number of industries, including the technology sector, according to conflict mineral reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.260 In the filings, companies say they perform due diligence to make sure that the gold used in their products is not being mined or processed by forced labor or exploited workers. But many companies admit that they are unable to verify with absolute certainty the source and chain of custody of gold used in their products.261
Experts and local officials say most documented human trafficking cases of women appear at small-scale gold mines, not the larger industrial mines.262 The gold from the country’s approximately 800 small-scale mines is hard to track. Much of it, particularly from the east, is smuggled across Burkina Faso’s borders with Togo, Benin, Niger, and Ghana, according to the Institute for Security Studies, based in South Africa. Industry experts said this gold likely ends up in Dubai. The government of Burkina Faso estimates the illicit market produces more than $400 million worth of gold a year.263
Salofou Trahore, general director for Burkina Faso’s regulatory body for small-scale mines, said he was unaware that women were being exploited at the sites. The government is in the process of regulating small-scale mines more strictly, he said. Trahore added that this would provide better oversight of the mines, as well as tracking environmental and human rights abuses.264
In one now-vibrant mining community, the southwestern town of Hounde, the opening of an industrial gold mine four years ago led to an increase in brothels from one to six, according to Jean-Paul Ramde, whose organization, Responsibility Hope Life Solidarity Plus, gives women HIV/AIDS tests and condoms. “Where there are gold mines, there are many evils that develop around it, including prostitution,” said Oumarou Dicko, the head of the government’s Department for Family and Children in the region that serves Hounde.265
Prostitution exists in a legal gray area in Burkina Faso — it’s not illegal, but soliciting it is. Police say it’s hard to prove if someone has been trafficked into sex work because women fear retaliation from criminal networks.266 The limited available figures show an increase in reported trafficking cases in recent years. The U.N. International Organization for Migration helped over 35 people trafficked last year in Burkina Faso, compared with 12 for all of 2018, said Claire Laroche, the organization’s protection officer.267
AP’s investigation showed the problem is far larger.268 In Secaco, a makeshift mining town tucked behind uneven dirt roads deep in the brush, trafficked women live and work in tiny, ragged tents with plastic sheeting. Here they have sex on thin mattresses on the dirt floor with 30 men a night, trying to earn their freedom.269
The traumas these women have suffered are clear, according to local activists who help them.270 “When you try to dig deeper, they change the subject and don’t want to talk about it,” said Stephanie Benao-Ouedraogo, a social worker for Association Tie, a local organization focused on child protection.271
Human trafficking experts said abuses will continue until the mining industry — including buyers atop the supply chain, such as jewelers and electronics makers — take responsibility for where the gold originates. “There’s a lot of focus on conflict minerals, but people have to be aware that gold is also being produced in a context of exploitation,” said Wagner. “People are being bought and sold, that’s basically putting a price tag on a person.”272
In January, a new European Union law came into effect aimed at stemming the import of conflict minerals and metals. The law, the Union’s first, requires that gold imports be sourced responsibly, including due diligence on human rights abuses and forced labor.273
Burkina Faso is one of several countries mentioned in the legislation as being high-risk, and therefore requiring extra oversight. The new law says gold mining has been a source of conflict in the region since the late 2000s, usually between local communities, artisanal miners, the state and private security forces.274
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world, of which there is no gainsaying, despite the abundance of natural solid mineral resources that could be mined within a people-centred legal structure or framework to help lift the country out of the unenviable club of poorest countries in the world. However, the grinding poverty is as a result of the entire political economy that has been allowed to go into shamble since the time of independence especially under the near three-decade of iron-fisted rule of Blaise Compaore. In this regard, the economic story of Burkina Faso is not fundamentally different from other poor African economies except in details.
Burkina Faso has hitherto been regarded as a fairly stable country in a backward and increasingly unstable region, though at the price of a highly repressive regime under Blaise Compaore. This view may have been wrong after all.
First, the seeds of the current crisis have been quietly sown right under Compaore-led dictatorship. It is the seeds of repression which became the causative factor for current crisis over the arch of time. Dictatorship cannot be equated with democratic rule. There have only been two elections in post-Compaorean era: the first in 2015 which brought in President Roch Christian Kabore while the second was in 2020 which again saw the re-election of Kabore but for the last time. This period is not enough in the learning curve in democratic rule or its consolidation through the strengthening of state institutions that have become weakened under the jackboot of Compaorean dictatorship – to justify the claim that Burkina Faso has been a fairly stable country.
Now the genie has been let out of the bottle with his downfall in 2014. The dogs, jackals, lions, camels, and elephants of war and furies of violence and bloodletting have been let out of their arenas and pit of hell – all baying for the blood of the Burkinabe State, seeking to tear it apart and devour it.
Security crisis is like a genie, once let out of the bottle that is difficult to put back. Financial and material resources that could have been deployed to help lift the country out of the excruciating poverty are unavoidably diverted to the security sector to fight the assortment of insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the government partly on account of gross mismanagement of the political economy by the past and present regimes that have traipsed in and out of power. It is an inexplicable conundrum: the security crisis cannot be solved without adequate commitment of financial and material resources to the security sector but which divert or take away the same resources from the economic sector where they are needed to help improve the economic welfare of the people.
It is a quandary. President Roch Kabore has not shown evidence of sacred commitment to economic development of Burkina Faso but to the security sector to help crush the insurgents that his wrong-headed economic policies have brought about since he took over. He came into power precisely at a time the country was already heading towards the battlespace to fight against the emergent sundry insurgent groups. The two cannot be divorced from each other. With the raging security crisis, President Kabore has successfully diverted attention from his incompetent handling of the economy in the face of global economic challenges and/or fast-paced technological-driven global economic changes.
Like Guinea, Nigeria, Mali, and Sudan and down to Democratic Republic of Congo, the mining sector is still nothing to write home about in Burkina Faso. Large-scale corporate mining is still largely absent in Burkina Faso despite the publicity to the contrary in the mainstream media. Artisanal mining is predominant with its well-known limitations and negative consequences. The much-expected revenue from the mining sector is not forthcoming because of the above-mentioned factors. Added to these are the various insurgent groups carrying out illegal mining to generate funds to finance their campaign of terror against the Burkinabe State. Millions of dollars have been so generated and thus prolonging and sustaining the war against the Burkinabe State. Thus the economic development largely and expectedly predicated on the mining sector has been a mirage thus deepening poverty in the country.
Caught between Desert Storm and the Devil
Burkina Faso is caught between the howling desert of Islamic Jihadism threatening to overwhelm it and the Devil of Operation Barkhane.
Security in Burkina Faso has steadily deteriorated since 2015. Seeking to address the spiraling violence, the Burkinabé government enacted a state of emergency in nearly one third of all provinces in the country by the end of 2018. Yet, so far, 2019 in Burkina Faso is on track to be the most violent and deadliest year on record, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Violent crime and small-scale attacks are on the rise in previously peaceful areas of western and southern Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, a region known as Liptako-Gourma, comprising parts of northern and eastern Burkina Faso, risks becoming a growing focal point of militant Islamist activity in the Sahel. According to ACLED, militant Islamist groups have more than tripled their attacks over the last year in this region, demonstrating that they are increasingly entrenched across Liptako-Gourma. Who are the groups behind these attacks? What so far have been the state’s responses? And, what reasons to hope for peace and stability exist, if any, amidst this worsening situation?275
A set of maps produced by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies displays the activities of different militant Islamist groups over time in the Sahel. The maps underscore the increase and expansion of activity, and, also importantly, the diversity of actors engaged in destabilizing the region. In Burkina Faso, a few developments deserve special attention.
Along the border with Niger, in the north and east, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has expanded its activities by exploiting a lack of border security, as well as by inflaming local grievances against the state. Led by Adnan Abu Walid al Sahrawi, ISGS maintains ties in the region to groups affiliated to the Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda, demonstrating the opportunistic style of this particular group. ISGS has profited from long standing smuggling routes that connect the Sahel to North Africa and to Europe. By generating instability across a wide swath of these borderlands, ISGS facilitates the illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and people. Since the renewal of the state of emergency in the Burkinabé provinces bordering Niger in July, Operation Otapuanu led by Burkinabé forces appears to have diminished ISGS’s activities. However, the possibility that insecurity in eastern Burkina Faso may spread farther south, threatening coastal countries, continues to capture the attention of leaders in the region. The May 2019 kidnapping of foreigners traveling in northern Benin, who were recovered during a French military operation in northern Burkina Faso, substantiates many of these fears.276
In northern Burkina Faso, violence has escalated steadily since 2015. Initially, this violence centered around Djibo, the capital city of Soum province, and was claimed by the group Ansaroul Islam. Led by the radical Burkinabé imam Ibrahim Malam Dicko, Ansaroul Islam sought to stoke grievances against traditional hierarchies to gain followers and supporters in and around the province. However, after the death of Dicko, it is widely believed that Ansaroul Islam fractured into various smaller groups that joined other groups or opted to pursue other forms of criminality. The sustained presence of Burkinabé security forces through Operation Ndofou, and pressure from the French counterterrorism operation Barkhane, may have also contributed to Ansaroul Islam’s apparent decline in 2019.277
However, by mid-2019, attacks on security forces had seen a surge in the northern regions. For instance, on August 19, Burkinabé armed forces based in Soum province at Koutougou fell under attack by militant Islamists. The attack on the Koutougou base resulted in dozens of casualties—the deadliest single attack suffered by Burkinabé security forces in the country’s history.278
This attack and others suggest that the remnants of Ansaroul Islam may have reorganized or joined a larger, well-coordinated effort by other militant groups. It is unclear which groups are responsible for this attack or others that have taken place recently in the Liptako-Gourma region. However, groups linked to Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) have been responsible for large-scale attacks in the past and may be attempting to exert a stronger presence on Burkina Faso’s northern front.279
Many of the violent events in Burkina Faso that have captured international attention are attributed to JNIM or its affiliates. Operating as a loose network of militant Islamist groups, JNIM is officially led by Iyad Ag Ghali, the Tuareg leader of Ansar al Dine which is primarily active in northern Mali. However, JNIM also includes the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) which is responsible for much of the violence in central Mali and at times, violence in north-central Burkina Faso. With the apparent decline of Ansaroul Islam, JNIM may be seeking to expand its influence by incorporating combatants familiar with and already in northern Burkina Faso. This may pose an increased threat to Ouagadougou. JNIM, or groups linked to the terrorist network, targeted the capital using attacks on soft targets in 2016 and 2017 as well as simultaneous attacks on the French Embassy and Burkinabé Military headquarters in 2018.280
Operation Barkhane is the military arrowhead of French modern imperialism in Franco-phone countries especially within the Sahel region. Only Algeria seems to have been freed from French military incursions via Operation Barkhane. Operation Barkhane is the G5 Sahelian countries that is at the root of this modern-day French imperialism: Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. He who cannot see Operation Barkhane as the military tool of French imperialism cannot understand the core of the complex phenomenon that has become the lot of the G5 countries.
But it is not only Operation Barkhane that is operating in the Sahel region. Indeed, the operation in the Sahel is multi-prong involving known and unknown international actors. This is because the Sahel region is perhaps the most poorly governed space in the world thus leaving it as a theatre for non-state actors to mushroom and also for reprisal actions by State actors.
The Sahel is a vast area with a population of almost 100 million people across five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (which form the G5 Sahel). This region is facing many difficulties and challenges, including the growing threat of terrorism and organized crime, climate change and demographic growth, all of which are sources of fragility. As shared challenges, they must be addressed from the political, military and development perspectives.281
France and its European and international partners are fully committed to supporting the efforts of the Sahel States. Along with other international partners, France is engaged in the Sahel, to stop the area becoming a long-term hotbed of instability for terrorist groups and of various forms of trafficking in drugs, weapons or people, or migrant smuggling, for example, which could also threaten its own security.282
Military support for Sahel countries: Since the outset of the security crisis in the Sahel, France has been strongly committed to curbing the terrorist threat. In 2012, terrorist and radical movements threatened Mali’s national integrity and security, and could have taken long-term control over swathes of its territory. At the request of Mali’s Government, France launched Operation Serval in January 2013 to push back the terrorist groups in North Mali, supporting troops from Mali and other African States. UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 highlighted the need for UN Member States such as France to support Mali in its efforts to restore peace and security.283
Despite this military engagement, terrorist groups remain active throughout the zone. In 2014, Operation Barkhane succeeded Serval. The aim of Barkhane is for the French forces to provide broader support to the G5 Sahel Member States.284 Task Force Takuba was launched on 15 July 2020 following the deployment of forward elements of French and Estonian Special Forces in the Sahel-Sahara belt.285
French military support in the Sahel:
- 5,100 French military personnel deployed,
- 75 cooperation officers,
- more than 7,000* G5 Sahel soldiers have received training,
- almost 750 training* or combat support activities carried out (2019 figures)
The Barkhane force operates in partnership with the armed forces of Sahel countries. The aim is for these States to be able to handle their own security independently.286
The G5 Sahel joint force: Created in 2014 at the initiative of the African Union, which at the time was chaired by Mauritania, the G5 Sahel is an intergovernmental cooperation framework. Based in Nouakchott in Mauritania, the G5 Sahel has two main purposes:
- fighting insecurity,
- conducting development actions to open up the region.
In 2017, the G5 Sahel Heads of State officially launched the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Bamako. It was officially created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2359 of 21 June 2017, which was sponsored by France and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Committee (AUPSC). The Joint Force is tasked with pooling efforts in the fight against terrorism, cross-border organized crime and human trafficking. It carried out its first operation in November 2017 with the armies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. At full operational capability, the Joint Force will have 5,000 soldiers (seven regiments spread across three zones: West, Centre and East). It is active in a 50km strip on either side of the countries’ shared borders. The Force has already carried out 17 successful joint operations.287
[There is also] the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA’s mandate is to:
- support the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement
- protect civilians
- support the work of the Malian authorities to stabilize their country.
With over 15,000 civilian and military personnel, MINUSMA is essential to the international presence in Mali, especially in the north and centre of the country. UN Resolution 2391 of 8 December 2017 governs the coordination of this mission with the Joint Force as MINUSMA provides it with operational and logistical support. At the UN Security Council, France provided political support for the creation and deployment of the MINUSMA.288
European missions: EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger. EUTM Mali provides EU training in Mali. It has been advising and training the Malian armed forces since 2013, to increase their capabilities and thus better tackle the many challenges facing them to re-establish the country’s territorial integrity and to improve border control in cooperation with their G5 Sahel partners, thus reducing the terrorist threat.289
EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger are civilian missions assisting the countries’ internal security forces through training, strategic advice and equipment. Within the EU, France supported the creation of the civilian missions EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, as well as the EUTM Mali training mission.290
The terrorist threat is intrinsically linked to the economic, educational, health and institutional challenges facing the region. This is why it is important to facilitate momentum towards peace and sustainable reconstruction on solid foundations, in addition to providing immediate support to local armed forces. As such, the “3D” approach is developed jointly by defence, diplomacy and development stakeholders.291
Mobilizing for security in the Sahel: The French diplomatic network is present in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, as well as in international organizations. Through this network, it has been advocating among its partners (United States, European Union, and United Nations) for material and human support in the region. In 2017, the conference to finance the G5 Sahel Joint Force mobilized the main international stakeholders in the Sahel. The Brussels Conference in February 2018 raised €414 million of international funding for the G5 Sahel Joint Force.292
Supporting dialogue and stabilization: Diplomatic efforts seek to foster peace on the ground, supporting dialogue between all parties with regard to the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement (Malian Government and signatory groups). The aim is to find a long-term political and development solution for Mali. Through its Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS), the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs finances a dozen stabilization projects in areas as broad as:
- mine clearance
- support for institutions and local governance by training senior officials
- support for the media
- the promotion of citizenship293
Commitment to development: Crises originating from structural problems cannot be curbed by a security response alone. This response must be combined with a development approach. This is why, through increased funding from France, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency) and other French agencies are supporting short-, medium- and long-term projects to improve access to basic services (water, energy, education and health) and support populations’ autonomy through training and employment.294
In the Sahel Alliance framework, France is working alongside other major development donors. This partnership was launched by France, Germany and the EU, with support from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, currently forming a platform with 13 members. The Sahel Alliance brings together the major donors active in the region around the two-fold aim of improving aid coordination and effectiveness in an approach that combines addressing the emergency, stabilization and development. The Alliance has more than 800 projects being implemented or processed, adding up to a total of €11.6 billion to implement, with an estimated disbursement rate of 29% in 2019.295
Under a strategic partnership with the G5 Sahel, the members of the Sahel Alliance are implementing several Priority Investment Programmes (PIP), including the financing of a G5 Sahel Partners and Donors Coordination Conference which was held in Nouakchott on 6 December 2018, and an Emergency Development Programme in vulnerable cross-border areas. Initial needs were estimated at €1.7 billion, but pledges totalled €2 billion. Of the pledged amount, the members of the Sahel Alliance represented €1.8 billion, including €266 million to fund the Emergency Development Programme with a focus on three priority sectors: access to water, strengthening resilience and supporting social cohesion.296
At the end of the General Assembly held alongside the Summit of G5 Sahel Heads of State in Nouakchott on 25 February 2020, the Alliance members drew up a series of conclusions. They wanted to increase the flexibility of their methods of intervention to take swifter action for the people of the Sahel. They also recommended stepping up efforts to make the Sahel Alliance more efficient, including by improving procedures and project synergy; using an integrated territorial strategy to promote a differentiated approach in vulnerable areas. Strengthening the management of the Sahel Alliance on the ground so that it will have a faster impact is also among its recommendations, as well as opening dialogue on public policy reform in a spirit of mutual accountability.297
Increased European engagement and coordination in the fight against terrorism: Several European States, including Estonia, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, are taking part in European missions in the Sahel and contributing to the fight against terrorism within Operation Barkhane.298
The Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel: The Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S), led by France and Germany, was presented at the Biarritz G7 Summit. The P3S aims to support efforts to redeploy government services and administrations, particularly internal security forces, and to strengthen the criminal justice system in Sahel countries. It also aims to enhance coordination between the major partners in the region. The P3S will initially focus on the G5 Sahel countries and existing cross-border initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Accra Initiative.299
The Dinard Partnership: The Dinard Partnership announced by France in April 2019 aims to combat trafficking in the Sahel in synergy with the P3S. “Combating terrorism within the G5 Sahel zone alone is no longer enough. And to stop the threat spreading, the effort now needs to be extended to the neighbouring countries of the Sahel and regional coordination needs to be strengthened. The Sahel countries, their neighbours and their international partners, need to work together in the spirit of shared responsibility to address the threat and meet people’s needs. And the first of those needs is the return of security and justice.”300
At the Pau Summit on 13 January 2020, the International Coalition for the Sahel was launched by the Heads of State of France, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the European Council, the European Union High Representative, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary General of La Francophonie.301
The gravity of the crisis in the Sahel, the sense of urgency, and the volume of the needs require stronger, more inclusive action. The International Coalition for the Sahel aims to provide a collective response to the challenges of the Sahel region by pooling the work undertaken by the G5 Sahel States and their international partners. The goal is to take coherent action across the Sahel by including all relevant levers and stakeholders, whether dealing with the issues of security, politics or development.302
International terrorism is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Since this threat has never been so strong, France is taking action at every level with its international partners to combat terrorist networks in France and abroad. The goals are many:
- Reduce terrorist groups’ regional hold;
- Combat financial, human, logistic and terrorist propaganda networks;
- Prevent radicalization;
- Protect French interests and nationals abroad.303
To achieve these goals, France’s international action against terrorism includes:
- Taking determined military action;
- Stabilizing liberated areas and seeking political solutions to conflicts;
- Scaling up action by the European Union;
- Enhancing international cooperation to fight terrorist financing in particular.
- Enhancing international cooperation304
Because terrorist groups represent a global threat, France is taking action with its partners to enhance international cooperation when it comes to fighting terrorism in many areas, including:
- Preventing radicalization and curbing terrorist propaganda: France conducts high-level dialogue with its main partners on prevention of radicalization and participates in multilateral discussions on this issue. Efforts to stop the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes remain a key focus of our counterterrorism action. France is conducting high-level dialogue with digital companies to achieve rapid and lasting withdrawal (in one hour maximum) of terrorist content online.
- Working to combat foreign terrorist fighters (FTF): France is involved in different work aiming to contain the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, in the appropriate international bodies, notably the United Nations, and within the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which brings together 29 countries and the European Union.
- Building our partners’ capacity to combat terrorism: France is implementing training programmes for its partners: law enforcement investigators, magistrates and services working on counterterrorism.305
Terrorist groups need financing and they use all the means at their disposal to attain it, including new technologies to collect and transfer funds. That is why in 2018 France mobilized countries determined to identify and drain all the sources of terrorist financing. At the instigation of President Macron, an international No Money for Terror Conference was held on 25 and 26 April in Paris on combating the financing of Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Representatives from 70 countries and leaders of some 20 international and regional organizations and specialized agencies attended the first No Money for Terror Conference. In their final statement, the participants committed to reinforce their legal frameworks and their intelligence cooperation. Several clear priorities and tangible measures were defined in in a summary document called the Paris Agenda.306
A second No Money for Terror Conference was held on 7 and 8 November 2019 in Australia. France is making important efforts to rally the international community’s support for implementing the Paris Agenda:
- For the first time, a resolution on terrorism was adopted in the Security Council on 28 March 2019, enshrining a key political decision on this issue:
– By reaffirming the obligations of States, including the criminalization of the financing of terrorists, terrorist organizations and acts.
– By calling for increased use and effectiveness of asset freezing tools in counter-terrorism;
– By urging States to assess and anticipate terrorist financing risks, create a financial intelligence unit, and strengthen international cooperation:
– By increasing the involvement of the UN system in tackling terrorist financing, in addition to the action conducted by the FATF whose central role in determining international standards in this area must be enhanced.
– By recalling the need to make sure humanitarian stakeholders’ action continues when measures are taken to curb terrorism financing.
- Fighting terrorist financing was one of the three counter-terrorism priorities promoted by France during its G7 presidency.
- France, which seeks to set an example in this area, regularly recalls its commitment to implementing the Paris Agenda to its technical and political partners.
- France actively supports increasing FATF’s resources and visibility. In 2018, it made a voluntary contribution of €1 million over three years. It supported prolonging the FATF mandate and increasing its operational budget in April, during a ministerial meeting that was held on the sidelines of the World Banks’ and the IMF’s spring assemblies.307
In recent years, several terrorist groups have sought to broaden their regional hold in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Africa. Terrorist safe havens are a threat to the international community. They are hotbeds of terror and oppression for local populations and centres for disseminating murderous ideology. It is from these havens that many terrorist attacks targeting local populations and foreign countries have been planned and organized.308
France is combating terrorism on all fronts. Present in the Sahel since 2013 (Operation Serval in Mali), France has played a leading role in blocking the advancement of terrorist groups in the region. French troops participating in Operation Barkhane provide vital assistance to the G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) in their action to fight terrorism.309
In the Sahel region, France’s strategy is based on a comprehensive approach (addressing political, security and development issues). Created in February 2014, at the instigation of regional leaders, the G5 Sahel is an institutional framework for monitoring regional cooperation with the aim of coordinating the security and development policies of its members. Launched in July 2017, the Sahel Alliance reinforces the action of the G5 Sahel with a focus on the following five areas: the employability of young people, education and training; agriculture, rural development and food security; energy and climate; governance; and decentralization and support for the deployment of basic services.310
France is also taking action at European level to improve and strengthen the tools available to the European Union for combating terrorism. In recent years, France and its partners have made several notable advances:
- The creation of a European Passenger Name Record system that will help better monitor air travel;
- The strengthening of cooperation with the digital platforms to combat the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes within the framework of the EU Internet Forum;
- The mobilization of European asset freezing and seizure tools;
- The bolstering of arms trafficking measures;
- The establishment of new rules to prevent terrorist financing and money-laundering;
- The reinforcement of Europol, and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre.311
There is also the so-called Crisis and Support Centre of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs which is said to be active 24/7[/365]. When a crisis occurs abroad, it protects French nationals and coordinates France’s emergency humanitarian assistance to help local populations. The centre was created in 2008 to bolster France’s ability to respond to crisis situations against a global backdrop of large-scale disasters, with an increasing number of French nationals living and travelling abroad. It works actively during and also ahead of crises with anticipation, preparation, monitoring and warning missions to provide the quickest response possible. In post-crisis contexts, it supports countries that have been weakened by working to stabilize them.312
The CDCS’s work includes but may not be limited to
- Monitoring and analysing information and informing French nationals
- Managing consular crises
- Protecting French nationals abroad: processing individual matters
- Providing medical and psychological expertise
- Managing France’s humanitarian action
- Stabilizing post-crisis countries
- Supporting State agencies and businesses313
The Crisis and Support Centre mobilizes and coordinates all the resources of the Quai d’Orsay and other government departments in the event of a crisis abroad. The CDCS is part of the inter-ministerial work and works in close collaboration with: the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the Ministry for the Armed Forces’ Joint Operations and Planning Centre, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior’s Operational Centre for Inter-ministerial Monitoring of Crises and in collaboration with France’s National Public Health Agency. The Crisis and Support Centre also has a network of extremely active partners to deal with crisis situations outside France. It sometimes joins forces with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, business foundations, local or regional authorities, UN and European bodies and crisis centres from other countries.314
French interventions, antics and motives in the G5 Sahel countries as well as other Franco-phone African countries are not hidden at all. They are visible for the critical minds to see. The objectives of these interventions are also stated in clear terms for all to know. It is only the African leaders concerned that failed miserably to decipher or decode their meanings – thus ending up in collaboration with the French imperialists with the sole purposes of the French interventions: destabilization of the countries and disarticulation of the collective peoples’ responses to these evil interventions, weakening their ability to respond positively and thus rendering them powerless.
In all the countries where France operated and still operating, it is always a story of blood, tears and sorrow, of poverty, diseases, dislocations, displacements, humanitarian disasters, and backwardness. Their cultural identities are stripped away, losing their Africanness as a result of stupefying French cultural assimilation policy. Their currencies are subordinated to that of France almost with no value at all. More than $500 billion have been extracted from Franco-phone countries and exported to Paris to sustain French economy and bourgeois lifestyles while the Franco-phone countries are dying of hunger, impoverishment and diseases. The travails of Africans in Franco-phone countries including the G5 Sahel countries, know no bound – dying in misery at home and forced to flee abroad and perishing on the high Mediterranean Sea.
The Crisis of Burkinabe State
The primary purpose and/or duty of a government anywhere in the world, conventionally speaking, are the security and welfare of its citizens. Where a government or State fails to achieve this, it earns itself all manners of pejorative terms: weak state, fragile state, failed state, bad government, etc. Yet, these are still conditional situations which vary from one degree to another and from place to place. The core of this conditional situation remains the composition of each government or its ruling clique: its preferences, its priorities, its ideological worldview whether stated publicly or not and finally the balance of social and political power in relation to the opposition forces and the citizenry.
Burkina Faso has been able to avoid open conflict and confrontations with forces that now threaten its very existence for a long time until the overthrow of the Blaise Compaore-led dictatorship in October 2014. This opened the floodgate to internal dissension, conflict and confrontations with external and home-grown insurgent groups coupled with external interventions by the duo of France and the United States. However, it cannot be argued that Compaore government was a guarantor of peace in Burkina Faso during its twenty-seven year rule. Rather Compaore government prepared the ground for the conflicts and confrontations that eventually emerged after its disgraceful exit from power in late 2014. It was a confrontation or disaster waiting to happen. The trigger or fuse for the explosion was the downfall of Compaore. Compaore failed calamitously to achieve economic development and/or growth for Burkina Faso during its iron-fisted rule that lasted almost three decades. His ouster tipped the scale. The bottled-up anger and pent-up frustrations with his iron-fisted rule especially his incompetence in governance exploded immediately he was kicked out of power and cascaded to all sections of the Burkinabe society.
The crisis of Burkinabe State is mainly signposted by failure of governance, and the lack of presence of state institutions in the remote rural areas mainly in the northern and eastern parts of the country where economic development literally made no positive impacts of the lives of the rural populace. This is what made the rural populace highly susceptible to the extremist ideologies of the Islamic Jihadists seeking to overthrow the State and replace it with their own version. The rural areas where the State has failed became a breeding ground for rebellion and revolt against the State. Here is also the scenario of clash of civilizations: the Burkinabe State is largely oriented towards the West on the one hand, and Islamic Jihadists with their repudiation and rejection of the Western world based on their Wahabist/Salafist extremist or fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.
The crisis of Burkinabe State can be viewed from the broad spectrum fairly captured in a United Nations document dated November 2017.
According to the Country Program document for Burkina Faso, [f]rom October 2014 to December 2015, Burkina Faso underwent one of the most eventful periods in its post-independence history. After 27 years in power, the departure of President Blaise Compaore in January 2016 ushered in the establishment of a transitional regime, peaceful presidential and legislative elections, and a new era for citizens. While all changes inspired optimism, they carry high expectations for the new government to immediately deliver on commitments made during the transition that reflect the new social contract and restore confidence. The most prominent commitments are related to the reform and renewal of the justice system, reconciliation and national unity, and the effective application of transparency/anti-corruptions measures. In addition, Burkina Faso’s active civil society and hopeful youth population, who were commended for constructive engagement during the transition, are putting in place mechanisms and tools for continued citizen engagement and accountability. High expectations call for participatory, inclusive approaches to governance based on rule of law, and that are captured in the popular slogan plus rien ne sera comme avant (things will never be the same again).315
In 2017, the population of Burkina Faso hit an estimated 19.6 million and is projected to increase to 21.5 million by 2020. More than 40 per cent of the population lives in poverty. A 2013-2014 Development Cooperation Report showed a low rate of project implementation for the period prior to the popular uprising. The government implemented 69 per cent of projects, while development partners implemented less than 60 per cent. This trend was confirmed in the 2017 mid-term report of National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), which showed a financial implementation rate of only 21.3 per cent. This backlog in implementation puts additional pressure on an administration that must keep pace with rising public expectations.316
Since 2014, Burkina Faso—a member of the G5 Sahel countries—has been hit by multiple terrorist attacks by extremist groups. Most are concentrated in the North and Sahel regions, and in areas bordering Mali and Niger. A few attacks took place in the capital. All expose how vulnerable Burkina Faso is to the effects of the Malian crisis, and the need for: i) an immediate review of the security strategy to better prepare the sector for new threats, ii) providing those working in security with new knowledge and training that is aligned to the evolving context, and iii) ensuring that governance in the sector is consistent with the principles of efficiency and democratic control as adopted by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, and the United Nations. The situation calls for greater state presence, including the immediate provision of basic social services to border communities, which traditionally have lower human development levels, to prevent and mitigate the risk of youth being exposed to religious extremism. In March 2016, a United Nations, government, and development partner assessment was carried out in provinces affected by the attacks. It recommended measures be taken to promote social cohesion between local populations and refugees from Mali, as well as mining companies that disregarded social responsibilities to local populations.317
Despite efforts made by authorities, and a legislative environment conducive for the empowerment of women, socio-cultural norms reinforce gender inequalities and drive investment decisions in favor of men. Women represent 52 per cent of the population but only account for 24.2 per cent of the workforce in the public and formal private sectors. The country was ranked 123 out of 144 countries in the 2016 Global Gender Gap Index. The absence of instruments and measures to incentivize the application of the law on gender equality preserves the status quo.318
The 2016–2020 NESDP estimates that approximately 20 per cent of the population suffers from food insecurity. Dated agricultural practices (e.g. clearing new land, use of fertilizers and pesticides, brush fires) contribute to land and soil erosion, and the depletion of water resources. The socio-economic conditions of close to 70 per cent of the country’s population, whose livelihood depends on agriculture, engage in unsustainable production practices for subsistence and income-generating activities. Collective and sustained efforts are needed to scale-up adaptation practices that have resulted from bilateral partner financing, and Adaptation and Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds. Doing so will support communities, in particular women and youth, to be active beneficiaries and leaders of sustainable agro-silvo-pastoral production systems. The population of Burkina Faso is vulnerable to the triple threat of: i) competition for land use and potential conflict over access to natural resources, ii) instability resulting from lack of employment opportunities for rural youth, and iii) the risk of people being radicalized due to social and economic disenfranchisement.319
Limited access to modern energy services has created problems that undermine the effectiveness of government policies for the sustainable management of environmental resources and forests, including bio-diversity conservation. Nationally, some 18.8 per cent of the population has access to electricity. This number is only 3 per cent for rural populations that, in addition, have no access to other forms of modern energy services. Because women and young girls are expected to gather fuel, and carry out tasks that require mechanical/modern energy sources, it takes them away from other productive activities and/or opportunities for education. Access to electricity and modern energy services from sustainable sources is a priority in the NESDP. Consequently, the government, with support from UNDP and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), formulated an integrated local economic programme (PADEL) to address inequality and exclusion. Programme goals are to: i) increase poor household and rural community access to modern energy services, ii) accelerate local economic development, and iii) ensure social protection. To effectively implement the programme, institutional capacity support and accelerated delivery measures are required because of demand and limited capacities at the local levels.320
Because it is located at the center of the Sudano-Sahelian region, Burkina Faso is susceptible to variations in climate and prone to recurrent cycles of drought and floods. The worst recorded floods date back to 2009, causing $102 million US dollars in damage and $120 million US dollars in reconstruction. Despite joint early recovery efforts, affected populations continue to struggle. From 2011 to 2016 Burkina Faso suffered the consequences of climate-related hazards linked to the unsustainable use of environmental resources. According to the Permanent Secretariat in charge of Emergency Preparedness and Response (SP/CONASUR), between May 2012 and April 2017 floods and violent winds in all 13 regions affected 264,177 people. Eighty three people were killed, 384 injured, and 17,393 were left homeless. Women and girls have been more acutely affected by such crises, as they have to walk longer distances to draw water. The situation has been exacerbated by the destruction of 485 toilets in the five most-affected regions over the last five years. Women and girls have to resort to makeshift toilets in places that do not offer protection or dignity. It is imperative that prevention and risk management responses take into account gender aspects. The 2016 and 2017 Risk Inform indices show the coping capacity of populations is relatively weak (6.2 out of 10) and immediate risks are security and climate-related, with the Sahel region being the most exposed to multiple hazards.321
Thus the modern crisis of Burkinabe State started with the fall of President Blaise Compaore in October 2014 after ruling the country with iron fist for twenty seven years. With the fall of Compaore, everything went downhill for Burkina Faso. ECOWAS was unable to do much to stem the rising tidal wave of insecurity in the country.
According to International Crisis Group in its report Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa of 2016, “faced with the political vacuum left by the sudden resignation of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014 and Lieutenant-Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida’s takeover of power, ECOWAS issued a first communiqué on 31 October calling on the parties “to embrace dialogue with a view to arriving at a political consensus that will lead to free, fair and credible elections consistent with constitutional provisions”. It said that “in line with its principle”, ECOWAS “will not recognise any ascension to power through non constitutional means”.322
Some Burkinabe civil society actors expressed reservations, deploring that ECOWAS had not expressed an opinion before the start of the insurrection, when President Compaoré was trying to change the constitution to stay in power. However, ECOWAS took charge of the Burkinabe crisis and led a joint mission with the AU and UN in Ouagadougou. The then-ECOWAS chairman, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama, Senegalese President Macky Sall and then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, travelled to Burkina Faso.323
After consulting Burkinabe actors, the three heads of state called on stakeholders to “urgently designate by consensus a suitably eminent civilian to lead the transition, form a transitional government for a period of one year, organise presidential and legislative elections by November 2015, … initiate an all-inclusive consultation among political party leaders, representatives of civil society organisations, religious and traditional leaders as well as the national armed forces, to work out the structure and composition of the transitional organs”. A contact group was created, chaired by Macky Sall, and the Senegalese diplomat Ibrahima Fall was appointed by the chairman of the Commission as special envoy for Burkina Faso.324
ECOWAS experts stayed in the capital for several weeks to help national stakeholders reach a compromise on a transition charter, the composition of its organs and appointments to the positions of president of the transition and head of government. While Burkinabe stakeholders deserve most praise for understanding the need for an inclusive dialogue, ECOWAS played a constructive role by remaining on the ground and taking balanced positions in compliance with its protocols, notably the requirement of a civilian president for the transition.325
The involvement of ECOWAS in managing the Burkina Faso crisis was a delicate task because President Compaoré had played a central role in the organisation for more than a decade. Between February 2012 and April 2016, the president of the ECOWAS Commission was a Burkinabe national, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, who was Compaoré’s prime minister from 1996 to 2000 and ambassador to Brussels between 2001 and 2012. Although he was never a political activist within the regime, this technocrat had always been an important part of Compaoré’s system. It was difficult for Kadré Ouédraogo to express an opinion on his former chief’s plan to revise the constitution, especially given that the latter had vigorously defended his candidacy to the most important function at ECOWAS.326
The crisis in Burkina Faso showed the extent to which the stability and security of the countries in the region could depend on personal decisions of their presidents, and to which ECOWAS was itself dependent on the dynamics of power, balance of forces, individual sympathies and calculations among heads of state, who are its supreme authority. However, ECOWAS was able to conform to its principles, thanks in particular to its protocol on democracy and good governance.327
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the largest regional community in Africa with fifteen member states and close to 345 million inhabitants, has the most sophisticated peace and security architecture on the African continent. Formed in May 1975 on the initiative of the Nigerian and Togolese presidents, Yakubu Gowon and Gnassingbé Eyadema respectively, ECOWAS had a difficult start. Its efforts to promote the integration of West African economies were soon hindered by the economic crises of the 1980s, as well as rivalries between heads of state with diverse political cultures and external alliances.328
For its first fifteen years, ECOWAS mainly kept out of security issues, which were considered the sole preserve of member states. At the end of the Cold War, the East-West rivalry that had shaped the interventions of the great powers in African countries ended, giving way to a different international context. ECOWAS had to take responsibility and deal with the conflicts threatening the existence of Liberia, and then Sierra Leone.329
Although the ECOWAS founding treaty, signed in Lagos in 1975, ratified the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, the conflict in Liberia at the start of the 1990s put this principle under severe strain. At the end of May 1990, meeting in Banjul, Gambia, ECOWAS heads of state formed a permanent mediation committee to facilitate finding a solution to the crisis in Liberia. A few months later, in August 1990, this mechanism was complemented by the creation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in effect the regional body’s armed wing. However, ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia was less a jointly planned operation than a Nigerian military adventure. Nigeria initially tried to assist a regime in danger before gaining support from other West African countries.330
ECOMOG intervened on two other occasions in response to violent political crises: in Sierra Leone (1997-2000) and Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999). Although the three interventions succeeded in limiting the scale of humanitarian disasters, they had only qualified success. ECOWAS paid dearly for its lack of experience in the security field and it learned about peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations the hard way. In all three cases, it was only several weeks after the deployment of ECOMOG troops that the supreme institution of ECOWAS, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, officially approved military intervention. Considering its lack of experience in these matters, ECOWAS showed remarkable perseverance. ECOMOG remained involved in Liberia for nearly a decade, until 1999, at the price of many lives and significant amounts of money.331
Since the early 2000s, ECOWAS has had many opportunities to use its conflict prevention and management instruments: from Guinea to Mali, Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Niger, West Africa has not been spared political-institutional crises and armed conflicts. Although ECOWAS has definitively buried the principle of non-interference and has showed a great capacity to react, its interventions have not always had the expected results. They have revealed its limitations, notably its lack of military and diplomatic capacity.332
ECOWAS has run into problems when intervening in complex crises involving regional heavyweights or bringing into play a range of structural factors and those relating to a specific time and place. These crises have highlighted the organisation’s deficiencies when it comes to overcoming political deadlocks and making credible threats of military intervention. Although its intervention helped to stabilize Guinea-Bissau, the crisis in Mali exposed the limitations of its interventions in open armed conflicts.333
Finding a comprehensive solution to a deep-rooted crisis is not an overnight task. ECOWAS’ ECOMOG failure is France’s G5 Sahel Security Initiative/Operation Barkhane’s gain. There is need to return to ECOWAS’ ECOMOG framework to strengthen ECOWAS’s institutions in the field of peace and security.
To ECOWAS’s Authority of Heads of State and Government:
- Reaffirm the essential and irreversible nature of the implementation of the institutional reform proposed in 2013 that aimed to strengthen the organisation’s capacity in the field of peace, security, stability and social and economic development.
- Create a working group tasked with monitoring the implementation of this reform process, including heads of state and government, or, alternatively, high-level political figures, representative of the political, cultural and linguistic diversity of ECOWAS.
To the president of Nigeria:
- View the restoration of Nigerian diplomacy and its influence throughout Africa as a priority for the federal government, and make the revitalisation of ECOWAS a central pillar of this renewed diplomatic role.
- Strengthen ECOWAS’s capacity by supplying additional financial resources to peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions.
To the president of the ECOWAS Commission:
- Take immediate action to improve the efficiency of departments, by addressing dysfunctions within human resources management, administration and finance, and blockages or delays in the implementation of decisions which result from the concentration of power within the commission presidency.
To improve ECOWAS’s efficiency in attaining its objectives for peace and security
To the ECOWAS Commission:
- Accompany member states in the reform of their political practices to strengthen their legitimacy and effectiveness, specifically in the areas of good governance and in strengthening their judiciaries in line with ECOWAS protocols, specifically by establishing ECOWAS permanent representation offices in every member state.
- Strengthen the capacity of member states to face collectively transnational threats by:
a) creating an ECOWAS centre for the fight against organised crime that would integrate different action plans against transnational criminal activity, including terrorism, drug, human and arms trafficking and maritime piracy;
b) strengthening communication between Abuja, the permanent representation offices and member states;
c) encouraging them to develop greater knowledge of political and security dynamics in neighbouring regions, specifically North and Central Africa, and ensuring regional collaboration occurs at political, technical and operational levels, and engages all actors, including the judicial system;
d) strengthening significantly ECOWAS’s expertise on other regional economic communities in Africa and throughout the world, and inviting other regional economic communities in Africa and the African Union (AU) to define a framework of coordination and collaboration on issues of terrorism, trafficking, maritime security, money laundering, infiltration and destabilisation of states by criminal networks.
- Implement the recommendations of ECOWAS’s self-assessment conducted in 2013 following the Mali crisis, specifically those concerning operationalising the mediation facilitation division and re-examining all dimensions of the ECOWAS Standby Force (doctrine, operational procedures, logistical strategies and financing).
To West African civil society organisations:
- Support publicly the recommendations contained in the institutional reform project proposed in 2013, and implement an ad hoc structure for West African civil society to independently monitor its implementation.
To AU member states and to the chairperson of the AU Commission:
- Clarify the principles of subsidiarity, comparative advantage and responsibility sharing to quell tensions between the AU and ECOWAS during major crises in West Africa and its neighbours.
- Continue to reflect on the doctrine, format and configuration of the African Standby Force with a view to better adapting the model to current threats and the future of peace and security on the continent, drawing lessons from challenges encountered by ECOWAS.
To ECOWAS’s international partners:
- Support ECOWAS’s institutional reform without interfering in the process, and continue technical and financial assistance projects while ensuring they do not reduce incentives for reform.334
For decades, the land-locked country of Burkina Faso has avoided the exogenous shocks and internal conflicts that have plagued so many of its neighbors. As a result, authoritarian rule has overseen the informal social systems primarily responsible for steady incremental increases in Burkinabé capacity. In 2014, a groundswell of democracy overtook the country, and the advent of civilian leadership signaled that the potential for an exit out of fragility was on the horizon. However, the incursion of regional Islamic extremist groups has challenged the resilience of state security mechanisms as well as the capacity of its fledgling democratic institutions, demonstrating that Burkina Faso remains fragile and threating to undo hard-earned gains. It is unlikely that Burkina Faso will be able to withstand further shocks over the long term, and a failed state in central West Africa could have cascading effects in the global fight against violent extremism. For a middle power such as Canada, the options to support Burkina Faso are dependent upon Canadian national interests and desired levels of commitment.335
Unfortunately, Burkina Faso became more fragile with the exit of Blaise Compaore with the enthronement of quasi-democratic rule. “This period was marked by immense social dissatisfaction spurred by numerous acts of theft and looting committed by military officers, resulting in frequent clashes between law enforcement and students. In 2014, tensions climaxed when Compaoré attempted to circumvent the two-term presidential limit and run for re-election in 2015; however, hundreds of thousands of Burkinabé protested in the capital of Ouagadougou to denounce this reform. Soon after, Compaoré announced his resignation, taking refuge in Côte d’Ivoire. In the interim, the Burkinabé army oversaw the transition of power. In November 2015, organized elections were held, through which Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former prime minister and president of the National Assembly of Burkina Faso emerged as (and remains) president.”336
While the Kaboré era has been an improvement upon that of his predecessor’s, there are nonetheless a myriad of issues presently facing the state. First, terrorist activity linked to al-Qaeda and groups operating between Niger and Mali have produced several hundred Burkinabé casualties since 2016. The subsequent deterioration of the security landscape is the weak link in Burkina Faso’s climb out of fragility. In addition to these security concerns, relatively weak governance continues to create inefficiencies and gaps in service delivery for the Burkinabé, especially in rural areas. Similarly, the state has yet to address its fundamental constitutional instability, which has paralyzed the advance of Burkina Faso.337
Optimistically, however, the democratic integrity displayed during the recent November 2020 presidential election represents a new chapter for Burkina Faso’s democratic system. On the economic front, performance has remained relatively stable in 2019 despite the COVID-19 pandemic and security crisis. The state has experienced minor GDP growth, led mainly by the services sector which counterbalanced the decline of agricultural, mining, and construction performance. Moreover, fiscal deficit and public debt improved in 2019. Burkina Faso also achieved significant improvements in the infrastructure and environment, notably in the water sanitation sector, ensuring better access to safe drinking water, piped water. In light of these successes, we believe that the country’s slight 2020 downturn into fragility does not indicate a trend towards collapse but rather the cause of such temporary shocks. Once these exogenous stressors are controlled, we believe that Burkina Faso will be able to resume its course towards improving the political, environmental and socio-economic shortcomings addressed hereafter.338
It can be said that there are two opposite forces now vying for the control of the Burkinabe State.
The first is the Western powers’ neo-imperialism through Sahel Coalition built around the existing Burkinabe State. Established in January 2020, the Sahel Coalition represents a partnership between G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) and 12 Alliance members: France, Germany, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland. The Coalition seeks to achieve stabilization and development through four key pillars: fighting against terrorism; strengthening the capabilities of the G5 states’ armed forces; supporting for the return of the state and the administrations in the territory, and development assistance. Canada’s contributions to the coalition aim to “help advance the group’s priorities for peace and security, economic and social development, inclusive government, gender equality and climate change.”339
The second group is Islamic Jihadism through the coalition of members of the Islamic State, Al-Qaida, and other extremist groups that emerged in the last few years, following the pattern already visible in some other countries in Africa and the rest of the world (Middle East and Asia in particular). Islamic Jihadists seek to overthrow the Burkinabe State and replace it an Islamic State/Caliphate.
In recent years, Mali-based members of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda “have exploited porous borders and a weak state to launch attacks – growing in number and deadliness – on military personnel, infrastructure and civilians.” This is in addition to the recent escalation of activity from the Burkinabé group Ansarul Islam. The actions of such groups have resulted in not only loss of life but also loss of infrastructure and capacity for service delivery, the closure of hospitals and schools, and a loss of confidence in the 2020 general election. While these groups are not the cause of Burkina Faso’s fragility, they do represent the largest stressor thereof.340
[As a result of the Islamic Jihadist activities and terror attacks] The Government of Burkina Faso actively maintains state of emergency in the entire East and Sahel regions, the provinces of Kossi and Sourou in the Boucle de Mouhoun region, the province of Kenedougou in the Hauts Bassins region, the province of Loroum in the North region, and the province of Koulpelogo in the Center-East region. These areas along different parts of the national border are non-contiguous geographically, but extremists within each share a common network, meaning the threat radiates from a transregional base. Active military operations, curfews, and movement restrictions, including bans of motorcycles and other vehicles are ongoing or could occur in the affect provinces. Both the US and Canada diplomatic posting to Burkina Faso are considered ‘unaccompanied’ and travel is restricted throughout the country due to threats of terrorism, kidnapping, and banditry. However, homicide and other violent crime, while on the rise, remain low, even within growing urban centers and contested spaces, suggesting that even in regions and provinces with contested access, a degree of informal order is being provided from armed groups.341
Long spared by the Sahel’s armed groups, Burkina Faso now faces increasingly frequent and lethal attacks in its north. Although this insecurity in large part is an extension of the Malian conflict, the crisis has strong local dynamics. Ansarul Islam, the group behind much of the violence, which often is portrayed as tied to jihadists elsewhere in the Sahel, is first and foremost a movement challenging the prevailing social order in Soum province, in Burkina’s Sahel region. While military operations reasserted the state’s control in the spring of 2017, the crisis is far from over. Ouagadougou and its foreign partners recognise that their response requires more than military offensives and that a definitive resolution of the crisis hinges in part on the situation in Mali. However, their approach needs to better take account of the local and social roots of the crisis, which are more profound than its religious and security dimensions.342
In its early stages, Ansarul Islam, founded by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, a preacher from Soum, is a manifestation of widespread discontent at the province’s social order. For years, Malam promoted equality between classes and questioned the dominance of traditional chiefs and the monopolization of religious authority by marabout families – religious leaders – whom he accuses of enriching themselves at the population’s expense. This rhetoric earned him a wide audience, especially among young people and socially disadvantaged sectors of the population. His turn to violence lost him many followers, but his movement retains enough support to continue a low-intensity insurgency against local and national authorities. Reports of his death during the spring 2017 military operations have not been confirmed and in any case would not end the crisis.343
A product of local socio-political and cultural conditions, Ansarul Islam is at least as much a social uprising as it is a religious movement. It is less a group critical of modernity than a movement that rejects traditions it believes archaic. It expresses the grievances of a silent majority that holds neither political power nor religious authority. Ansarul Islam uses Islam to frame its opposition to an ossified social order that breeds widespread frustration. Nor is the movement primarily a self-defence group for Fulani, who are in the majority in the Sahel region. Ethnic and identity-based grievances for now assume a marginal role in its discourse.344
The distant relationship between state and populations in Burkina’s Sahel region also fuels the crisis. The contrast between the north’s economic potential and its lack of infrastructure feeds a sense of abandonment amongst its population. As in central Mali, local communities see state representatives and security forces as foreigners trying to enrich themselves rather than state agents responsible for providing services. As a result, Soum inhabitants are reluctant to cooperate with security forces who are often from other provinces and whose behaviour is sometimes brutal.345
The northern Burkina crisis is also more than a mere reflection of the situation in central Mali. Ansarul Islam uses Mali as a support base and similarities on both sides of the border exist. But the surge of violence supposedly committed in the name of jihad distracts from conflict’s extremely local and social dimensions and the ability of armed groups to exploit social divides. Insecurity in northern Burkina is due not only to the development deficit, the central state’s failure to understand a territory in its peripheries, or the spillover from its neighbour’s war. It is above all the result of a profound social crisis in the north. Divisions between masters and subjects, rulers and ruled, ancient and modern provide the base upon which Malam Dicko’s popularity grew.346
A definitive resolution of the crisis depends in part on Mali’s stabilisation as well as the implementation of effective development plans by the government and its partners. More importantly, though, it requires devising a more balanced social order and for local communities to resolve their differences. In this context, the government’s efforts to address the crisis should factor in the following points:
- Formulate responses that take into account the social and local dimensions of the crisis. While the local order continues to provoke frustration and conflict, ending the crisis will be hard. The scope for government action in this respect is limited: it should not seek to upend a centuries-old social order. The onus should be on local actors to devise solutions adapted to local circumstances. The government and its international partners can at best encourage intercommunal and inter-generational dialogue.
- Reduce the gulf between security forces and authorities and the local population. Several measures could help: improving intelligence and providing informants better protection; encouraging security forces and the civil service to recruit Fulani (without imposing quotas); boosting joint civil-military activities; prioritising the appointment of Fulani speakers as civil servants and security officials in the Sahel; and severely punishing abuses by officials.
- Place greater emphasis in the Sahel region emergency program – the development component of the government’s response – on promoting herding, improving justice provision and fighting corruption. Supporting livestock breeding and addressing the dysfunction in the judicial system and the scourge of corruption in the administration would reduce negative perceptions of the state and show it can be useful to the public.
- Work toward strengthening, in the long term, judicial and police cooperation between Mali and Burkina. This would facilitate investigations that have ramifications in both countries and the management and prosecution of prisoners and suspects.347
In Burkina Faso, violence is escalating amid a governance crisis across rural areas. Jihadists returning from neighbouring Mali, most of whom are Burkinabè, gained a foothold in 2016 by exploiting the frustration and anger of rural communities. Self-defence groups that villagers began forming in 2014 have fueled local community-based violence, especially since 2019 in the Centre-Nord and Soum regions. The state’s recent call for volunteers to fight militants could amplify this phenomenon.348
The government’s largely military response, including the use of self-defence groups over which it exercises limited control, has often led to abuses that push those targeted into jihadists’ arms. To stop the downward spiral, the authorities should limit the role of vigilantes in counter-insurgency efforts, introduce better checks to guard against abuses and develop an integrated approach to security. In the longer term, resolving land disputes that often underpin rural conflicts is a priority.349
The Burkina countryside is undergoing a multifaceted crisis. Following former President Blaise Compaoré’s ouster in October 2014, the state’s already limited capacity to maintain order in rural areas has further weakened. Villagers increasingly distrust elites, both local and urban. The absence of any form of regulation across much of the countryside has led to a rise in banditry and land disputes, as well as the emergence of self-defence groups, notably the Koglweogo (“guardians of the bush” in the local Mossi language).350
In this context, Islamist militants have expanded their footprint across rural areas. In 2019, Burkina Faso suffered more jihadist attacks than any other Sahelian country. Militants are a motley crowd of insurgents motivated by local concerns around a small core of ideologues. They include farmers and herders who are victims of land-related injustices or racketeering, bandits who bring experience in weaponry and fighting, gold miners seeking protection, and stigmatized populations. Militants extend their reach notably by exploiting local conflicts that are linked to the multifaceted rural crisis and often involve self-defence groups.351
The state’s response thus far has fallen short and even contributed to the deteriorating security environment. The authorities have been too quick to blame the former ruling elites’ supposed maneuverings for the crisis and too slow to recognise its endogenous nature and sheer scale. Unprepared to deal with the challenge, they have largely resorted to military force, with some limited support from French troops. Counter-terrorism operations have often generated abuse against civilians and led to the killing rather than arrest of suspects. The authorities have reportedly thwarted several attacks since December 2019, but overall have not curbed the threat. Their response has pushed those who feel unjustly victimised by state violence, particularly within the Fulani ethnic group, to join jihadist groups.352
To compensate for the security forces’ shortcomings, particularly in terms of territorial coverage, the Burkina authorities have encouraged the establishment of community-based self-defence groups and, more recently, announced they would recruit “homeland defence volunteers”. Such measures could prove counterproductive if the arming of civilians, which is always difficult to supervise, aggravates local divisions and gives rise to further violence.353
The attempt to reconcile security and development through the Sahel Emergency Plan (Plan d’urgence Sahel, PUS), launched by the government in 2017 to boost economic and social development in the area, in itself is unlikely to be sufficient or address the political causes of Burkina Faso’s insurgencies. Yet thus far neither the government nor the country’s international partners have offered any alternatives. The Burkinabè authorities should integrate military action into a more comprehensive approach aimed at addressing the political roots of the crisis. The state could safeguard social cohesion in the countryside, which currently risks being torn apart, by combating the stigmatization of certain communities, promoting local conflict resolution – including community-based peace making and negotiation with some militants – and by demonstrating the value of its presence.
- In the short term, the authorities should limit the use of force and the involvement of self-defence groups in counter-insurgency operations. They should ease prison overcrowding and revitalise the penal system. This would rebuild confidence among the security forces in the justice system’s ability to bring suspects to justice and reduce their tendency to kill rather than arrest alleged jihadists. Burkina Faso’s partners should encourage its security forces to strengthen and enforce internal control mechanisms to limit the abuses that play to jihadists’ advantage.
- In the medium term, the authorities should set up a public body to design and implement a security strategy throughout the country that combines prevention, mitigation and post-crisis stabilisation, with precise measures tailored to each local context. Such a body would balance out the state’s crisis management approach by offering a range of non-military responses which it would coordinate with military action, which remains essential. The body could react quickly and overcome what are often inefficient responses by individual ministries. It should report directly to the president so as to benefit from strong political support. Its director should sit on the National Security Council and coordinate different aspects of the state’s response. International partners should support the creation of such a body.
- In the longer term, the government should initiate structural reforms to heal rural divides. Notably, it should revise the 2009 Rural Land Law to better reconcile different populations’ interests and ease tensions between so-called indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. It should also review its policy on protected areas, so that it better benefits local communities. Finally, it should review the governance of nomadic areas, particularly with an eye to promoting Fulanis’ social and political inclusion.354
According to Judd Devermont of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies “The governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are ill-equipped to confront the worsening security crisis in the region. Their approach to these challenges has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.”355
The international community has become seized with the spiraling crisis in the Sahel. In September 2019, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that “we are losing ground in the face of violence.” There has been a rapid expansion of extremist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, from around 180 incidents in 2017 to approximately 800 violent events in the first 10 months of 2019. There has also been a sharp increase in displaced persons. In Burkina Faso, for example, the United Nations reports that 486,000 people have been displaced in 2019, compared to just 80,000 in all of 2018. The deteriorating situation in the Sahel and its implications for regional security, migration, criminality, and corruption have spurred foreign partners—including the United States, European capitals, Gulf states, and some West African governments—to throw soldiers, diplomats, and development experts at the problem.356
A missing part of the global response, however, has been a focus on domestic politics in the Sahel. In Mali, the epicenter of the violence, there are considerable domestic political barriers to supporting international engagement to re-reestablish security in troubled areas. As one U.S. scholar explained in June 2019, “the real problem in Mali is the separation of the political class that [is] ruling in Mali and the rest of the country . . . the politicians in Mali are not effectively responding to this crisis unfolding across the whole country. … In addition, the political opposition and civil society in Mali have failed to adequately pressure the government to address the violence. While domestic activists have mounted some protests in recent months, the government of Mali sees political costs—not benefits—to shifting resources and expanding government services in the troubled north and central regions.357
In Burkina Faso and Niger, however, there is comparatively more urgency, domestic political pressure, and government willingness to address the violence. Both governments have at times adopted heavy-handed security measures, although Niger has combined security operations with development and service provision.358
Burkina Faso has had to turn to the less capable police and gendarmes to respond to the mounting extremist threat, having disbanded the elite Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) in 2015, which represented some 10 percent of the total military. These security forces have allegedly conducted summary executions and en masse detentions. According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the vast majority of victims of security force abuses in the cases documented were ethnic Fulani. This abuse, the report continued, is encouraging members of the Fulani community to join extremist groups. The government has also backed the community militias, known as koglweogos, which appear to have targeted Fulanis out of an assumption that all Fulanis support terrorist groups.359
Presidents of Burkina Faso and Niger, in contrast to their counterpart in Mali, face persistent pressure and protests from domestic political opposition and civil society to respond to the security crises in their countries. These Sahelian leaders have shown more urgency in addressing the extremist threat in part because political opponents have made it a top issue.360
Burkinabe president Christian Roch Kaboré has faced demonstrations led by the opposition and trade unions that have criticized his handling of the crisis. In response, he has reshuffled his cabinet, appointed a new chief of general staff, and invited the opposition to participate in an albeit-lagging national dialogue to discuss political and security issues. Despite these changes, in August 2019 the main opposition party, Union for Progress and Change (UPC), called for the government to step down because it is “currently crossing its arms” and has failed to counter the extremist threat.361
Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a coalition of extremist factions, and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) have exploited government mistakes, increased their footprint, and stoked communal tensions to execute coordinated attacks. JNIM and ISGS now operate across the central Sahel and have conducted attacks in littoral West Africa, including a kidnapping operation in northern Benin in June 2019 and the storming of the resort town of Grand Bassam in Côte d’Ivoire in March 2016.In early November 2019, ISGS killed more than 40 Malian soldiers at a military base near the border with Niger.362
JNIM has benefited from the region’s heavy-handed and often abusive security responses, recruiting civilians who say they are “hostages to both sides.” In Burkina Faso, [HRW’s West Africa Director Corinne] Dufka says the government’s counterinsurgency tactics, which have included summary execution of suspects, is “shoring up the ranks” of the extremists.363
The multiple foreign and regional security missions in the Sahel, including the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in Mali, G-5 Sahel Joint Force, and French Operation Barkhane, have committed some 25,000 personnel to the region. At a G7 Summit press conference in late August 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron, German chancellor Angela Merkel, and Burkinabe president Kaboré called for the expansion of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force to include other West African countries to bolster the G-5’s capacity and manpower. France has also announced a new military initiative in Mali that will involve mentoring and accompanying Malian armed forces into combat.364
The international community has earmarked billions of dollars in economic and military aid to respond to the crisis. The founding members of the Sahel Alliance— France, Germany, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)—have been joined by Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom in committing to disperse more than $6 billion in projects through 2022. In 2017, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million, and the United Arab Emirates committed $30 million to the G-5 Sahel. In November 2018, the United States nearly doubled its pledge of military assistance to the G-5 Sahel to around $111 million. Not all of the pledged military aid has been delivered to date. UN Secretary-General Guterres has warned that significant funding shortfalls are undermining humanitarian responses.365
Devermont recommended that the international community “should continue its security assistance and engagement in the region, especially in Burkina Faso and Niger. Both governments and their political opponents are deeply troubled by the growing extremist threat and are seeking to restore security. However, as noted by [academic Andrew] Lebovich at the [CSIS’] Sahel Summit [2019], the governments of Burkina Faso and Niger are “privileging short-term solutions” even though they are aware of the embedded problems. It is essential to harness their sense of urgency and willingness to tackle what is quickly developing into an existential threat to the region.366
Burkina Faso’s friends could leverage the government’s requests for more external assistance to promote more balanced counterterrorism tactics, defend political speech, and direct economic and development resources to its northern region. In addition, there is utility in rebuilding Burkina Faso’s weakened and demoralized military to relieve pressure on the police and gendarmes.367
The crisis in Burkina Faso can only be said to be multidimensional and multifactorial.
Burkina Faso has faced a wave of attacks by armed opposition groups in recent years, leading to the displacement of more than one million people in all 13 regions of the country. To date, over 54% of internally displaced people (IDPs) have been left homeless or without adequate shelter as a result of conflict.368
Due to the increase in violence against civilians and a lack of access to basic essential services such as health and education, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is constantly increasing, rising from 2.2 million people to 2.9 million between January and June 2020. As of June 2020, 289 health centres were operating at a minimum or not functioning at all, depriving 1.5 million people of access to care.369
In this increasingly difficult context, Burkina Faso recorded its first COVID-19 case in March 2020. Alongside this, the country also detected a total of 5 cases of polio, joining other neighbouring countries on the list of locations currently suffering epidemics.370
The 2020 rainy season has exasperated an already precarious situation for many people affected by security and health crises. Floods and high winds have impacted over 190,000 people in the 13 regions, resulting in the loss of over 500 tonnes of food and damage to residential homes and emergency shelters. The scale of the situation led the Government to declare a state of natural disaster in Burkina Faso.371
According to analysis from the General Directorate of Meteorology, Burkina Faso has recorded a steady downward trend in annual rainfall since the 1950s, with an overall upward trend in consecutive days without rain. The number of hot, dry days and warm nights has also increased. Additionally, between April and September 2020, several localities in Burkina Faso experienced flooding and high winds, affecting 106,228 people and leading to food, animal and land losses.372
The loss of, or damage to agriculture, water resources, animal resources and forestry/biodiversity due to climatic issues has severe consequences for people in Burkina Faso, including famine, decline in agricultural yields and food stocks, and loss of livestock. For women who often sell products made from these natural resources, the loss of income is another devastating side effect of climate change. Those who live on subsistence agriculture are very vulnerable to climatic stressors, with cereal production down 4.65% from the previous year and depletion of natural pasture putting pressure on animal resources.373
Some 3,280,800 people are living without proper food sources and are in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, accounting for around 15% of the total population.374 People in Burkina Faso are vulnerable to both communicable and non-communicable diseases, with resurgences of polio and meningitis, and the COVID-19 pandemic adding to existing endemic diseases such as malaria. Despite the efforts of the State, access to quality health care remains inadequate.375
Growing security crises have worsened the health situation in Burkina Faso. At the beginning of August 2020, the WHO recorded 95 health facilities had closed and a further 199 were operating at minimum capacity, with an estimated 1,170,000 people living without access to basic health services.376 In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has created a crisis of confidence between the population and the health sector. The National Society in Burkina Faso is part of the “immunisation committee” of the Ministry of Health and leads community mobilisation. As an auxiliary to the Government, the National Society is already implementing several health emergency projects – nevertheless, there are still shortcomings in terms of staffing, volunteers and equipment.377
As a result of globalisation, poverty and political crises across Africa, migration issues have intensified and become more complex. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), there were an estimated 708,921 migrants living in Burkina Faso in 2017 and 1,472,712 Burkinabe people living outside of the country.378
Although there is a lack of reliable data, Burkina Faso is known to be a transit country for a significant number of migrants attempting to cross into Maghreb or European countries, due to its location in the heart of West Africa. Mobility in Burkina Faso is multidimensional and multifactorial, with migrants mainly motivated by socio-economic factors such as improved living conditions, health services and access to food and clean water. Given the changing security situation and socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration phenomenon is likely to worsen both internally and beyond the country’s borders.379
The immediate emergency needs for displaced people are wide-ranging, from basic health, water, sanitation and hygiene services to nutrition, protection and assistance with restoring links to family members. In the longer term, migrants and internally displaced people require support with social integration into their new community, education and sustainable solutions for the future, be it resettlement or safe return to their home country.380
Considered as a model of stability for at least two decades in a region destabilised by crises (Liberia and Sierra Leone from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, Côte d’Ivoire 2002-2011 and Mali since 2012), Burkina Faso was shaken in 2014 by popular protests that overthrew the 27-year rule of President Blaise Compaoré. In the aftermath of the 2014 historic demonstrations, a civil-military transition government was appointed to stabilise the country and return it to constitutional order. However, in September 2015, the Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP), loyal to Blaise Compaoré, staged a coup d’état against the transition government. In that context, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), pressured by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), were prompted to intervene and restore the transitional government. Elections were subsequently organised and President Marc Roch Kaboré (former Prime Minister of President Blaise Compaoré from 1994 until 1996 and President of the Parliament from 2002 until 2012) was elected in November 2015.381
Although President Kaboré vowed to improve the livelihood of his citizenry, the economic constraints manifested by the fluctuation of prices of the country’s main foreign exchange earners (gold, cotton and shea) coupled with terrorist activities since 2015 have hampered his political programme aimed principally at poverty reduction among the 19.2 million inhabitants of the country. The state is losing control over important parts of its 270,764 km² territory, especially in the northern, north-western and eastern parts. The threat is spilling over into the southern provinces including Comoe and Poni. The low income (see country profile and demographics above) of the country, the negative impacts of climate change (environmental degradation), the transnational organised crime, the flow of arms from Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime and the lack of readiness of its security institutions have undermined its capacities to properly address those challenges. As a result, Burkina Faso, from a model of stability in West Africa, became a peak of instability in the region. Thus, the upcoming 2020 electoral races in Burkina Faso are to be cautiously monitored given the fragile context in the country marked by terrorist activities, proliferation of self-defence groups, growing socio-political protests and discontent among the security forces.382
Weak presence of state institutions outside Ouagadougou: The weak presence of state institutions in Burkina Faso is manifested by the limited and unequal distribution of state institutions outside the capital, Ouagadougou. Such institutions are scarce and the existing ones are over-stretched and unable to deliver efficient services. They are in short supply to provide effective basic social services such as health care, security, water and electricity. A number of regions remain with limited state presence and are underdeveloped having only few amenities. This led to growing anger among sections of the population. Further, the borders between Burkina Faso and Mali (Northern segment) and between Burkina Faso and Niger have been historically ill-monitored and committed against individuals or groups considered as thus provided easy access for terrorist groups ousted from countries such as Algeria and other parts of the Sahel.383
The government intended to resolve the concern through a national decentralisation process aimed at giving autonomy to regions and localities, promoting local resources and allowing a better social, economic and political representation of the social fabric appropriate to their local contexts. However, the process resulted in a general failure and revived tensions between communities over land ownership. As a result, populations, peculiarly in the North, were frustrated due to failure to satisfy their basic needs and uneven access to political and economic opportunities and thus felt abandoned by the government. That led to several unrests in the country which were later exploited by terrorist groups. An effect of contagion spread to eastern Burkina Faso due to the similarities of issues (poor governance and weak presence of State) and the proximity with the Sahel region. The main reasons behind the failure of the decentralisation process were linked to lack of finance, absence of follow up to sustain the process and lack of political will.384
Lack of rule of law: Burkina Faso, in its history, has experienced six coup d’états (1966, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987 and 2015) which have hampered its democratisation process. The coup d’état of 1987 was a significant turning point in Burkina Faso’s history. It saw the assassination of Captain Thomas Sankara followed by the prolonged authoritarian rule of President Blaise Compaoré until he was forced to leave office in 2014. President Compaoré’s 27-year rule was driven by an agenda aiming to weaken political opponents and other social checks and balances. Several times, he acted out of the boundaries of the national laws to maintain power among the Burkinabe social fabric. During his reign, human rights abuses were threats to his power. The assassination of the journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998, the deaths of many in custody, the detention, intimidation, ill-treatment of political opponents and civil society leaders, and the subsequent impunity all illustrated the lack of rule of law in Burkina Faso from 1987 until 2014. As such, distrust was nurtured for years among the Burkinabe citizens, civil society, opposition parties and the state apparatus.385
Economic insecurity: Burkina Faso’s economy is among the poorest in the world with a low level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The country’s exchange earners (gold, cotton and shea) are easily affected by fluctuation of world market prices and do not generate sufficient income to sustain Burkina Faso’s development although its economic growth rose by 6.8% in 2018. Moreover, the debt ratio (34.1% in 2016) of Burkina Faso, although it is under the general ECOWAS regional ratio (70% of the GDP), is likely to increase in 2020 due to the need to finance the state’s security strategies. In that context, the country is expected to rely on multi-lateral and bi-lateral partners such as Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). The inability of the state to provide adequate and sufficient economic opportunities to its entire citizenry by developing infrastructures (roads, dry harbours, agricultural programs) and enhancing employment to sustain the national economy would worsen as its little income would essentially serve to reimburse debts contracted from various partners. Currently, more than a half (66.8%) of the Burkinabe remains poor with low purchasing power while the cost of living is continuously increasing. That situation would generally result in frustrations that lead to protests and threaten state stability as indicated by the unrests of September 2018 that highlighted how economic fragility can negatively impact Burkina Faso.386
Since the late 2000s, mining has become a source of conflict in Burkina Faso. At least 11 industrial mines of gold and 1 of zinc are currently exploited by foreign companies while more than 700 local artisanal mines existed as of 2014. The mines are generally accompanied by conflicts between local communities and artisanal miners on the one hand, and the state and industrial companies’ security forces on the other. Locally, communities are frequently engaged in violent clashes with artisanal miners mainly over water pollution and other issues such as degradation of fertile lands. Both groups (local communities and artisanal miners) also have conflicting relationships with the state and industrial mining companies’ security forces for diverse reasons. Local communities demand efficient monitoring measures from the state to stop the miners’ use of prohibited chemicals that pollute water and soils. However, the state security forces’ attempts to eradicate illegal artisanal mining escalate to clashes between them and the artisanal miners.387
Radicalization and violent extremism: Radicalisation in Burkina Faso resulted in violent extremism and is mainly localised in the Sahel and in the East mostly inhabited by Muslim communities. However, currently, the religious factors are not relevant for a comprehensive analysis of radicalisation and violent extremism in Burkina Faso as the causes and trajectories of the phenomena vary from region to region. In northern Burkina Faso, especially in the Sahel, radicalisation and violent extremism are rooted in the frustrations of the population over underdevelopment and the established uneven social order while in the eastern part of the country, they are deeply linked to poor governance issues that also include the absence of the state which led to sentiments of injustice among the local communities. In the two areas, religious issues respectively represent 20% and 5% of the grievances. Although foreign influences including the fall of President Gaddafi in 2011 and the spread of terrorist groups in the greater Sahel region contribute directly or indirectly to insecurity in Burkina Faso, the current situation is mainly rooted in the internal governance issues mentioned above.388
The several years of state absence in eastern and northern areas of Burkina Faso has been problematic for the populations. Their regions never had a decent level of development compared to the southern regions, especially the greater regions of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso. The uneven access to economic opportunities as well as basic services in the northern regions, especially in Soum Province, underpinned distrust between the state and the local populations. In addition, inequalities within communities at the local level, especially the division of the Fulani community into classes (Masters) and Rimaibé (Slaves), were also contested by community members. The 27-yearauthoritarian rule of President Compaoré characterized by violent repressions of protests over governance issues could explain why such phenomena did not happen until recently. As such, following the fall of President Compaoré’s regime in 2014, paths were open for violence entrepreneurs to mobilise local grievances and radicalise positions vis-a-vis the state and the local administrative structures.389
Absence of mitigating mechanisms for effects of climate change: In Burkina Faso, as in the whole Sahel region, climate change is manifested by a continuous environmental degradation resulting in a considerable reduction of natural resources such as pasture, fertile soil and water; and in the modification of ancestral routes of transhumance. In that context, both farmers’ and herders’ activities are negatively impacted by climate change. The capacities of farmers to produce maximally are reduced due to lack of fertile soil and that eventually results in decreased revenues while herders’ livestock and incomes are threatened by the lack of pasture and water. In addition, the modification of the traditional routes of transhumance due to climate change and conflict over land distribution and ownership is fueling clashes between the two communities. The state-advantaged farmers in the redistribution of lands as in Burkina Faso agriculture have always been the main providers of state’s incomes. Hence, herders, felt biased by the state to the advantage of the farmers, have been continuously claiming the ownership of their lands (including routes and pastures) unfairly despoiled by the state.390
There is also the critical factor of the religious diversity of Burkina Faso which has lately played into the crisis facing the Burkinabe State
Burkina Faso’s great religious diversity and tolerance make it an exception in Africa’s sub-Saharan Sahel. Its model of religious coexistence remains solid but could be at risk of being eroded. For several years now, Muslim leaders have complained that Muslims are under-represented in the civil service and that the administration is not always even-handed in its treatment of Christianity and Islam. Meanwhile, the rising tide of religiously motivated violence in West Africa and the Sahel has created a new regional context. As Burkina is recovering from a period of instability following the October 2014 downfall of former President Blaise Compaoré, and faced with a security emergency and strong social pressures, the government could be tempted to ignore these developments. It would be risky to raise the sensitive issue of religion in a country where religious identity is of secondary importance. But the government must take steps now to ease frustrations and regulate religious discourse to safeguard Burkina’s model of peaceful coexistence.391
Burkina lies at the crossroads of two large regions in West Africa: the Sahel region, where a fundamentalist form of Islam seems to be gaining ground and armed and terrorist groups are active; and the coastal region, where new Protestant churches sometimes adopt an intolerant discourse toward other religions. Given the porosity of borders and the speed at which ideas circulate, the country cannot remain untouched by the changes that are affecting its neighbours.392
Burkina has never suffered civil war or religious conflict. Muslims, Christians and animists are neighbours, live together and inter-marry. However, the January 2016 attacks in Ouagadougou were a shock to both the general public and the ruling class. Isolated incidents of verbal aggression against Muslims were reported in the following weeks. They revealed some degree of stigmatization and reflected concerns that had not been present until then. Religious matters are taboo in Burkina. Peaceful coexistence is based on religious pluralism and the secondary importance of religious identity. Bringing the question of religion into the public and political arena carries risks, including exacerbation of religious differences and political manipulation of identities. However, in a worrying regional context and as new domestic tensions emerge; it is time to break the taboo.393
Muslims have long been frustrated at the discrepancy between their numbers – according to a contested census they represent about 60 per cent of the population, Christians 25 per cent and animists 15 per cent – and their low representation within the political elite and the civil service. They also feel that public administration is sometimes biased in favour of Christianity and does not take their interests sufficiently into account. Frustrations are sometimes exaggerated, but perceptions are more important than reality. In a country long ruled by mainly Christian elite, this imbalance is not due to intentional discrimination; rather, it is the legacy of colonization and a multi-tiered education system. Burkina’s authorities must correct the imbalance while avoiding sectarianism. They must upgrade Franco-Arab education, which caters for a certain number of Muslim children and aims to combine Islamic and general education. If they fail to do so, some parts of the population may no longer feel the state is a useful interlocutor and turn to other ways of expressing their feelings.394
It is all the more important to maintain the balance between communities given that individual religious behaviours have evolved, though it is difficult to assess the extent of such changes. Some Muslims are attracted to a fundamentalist form of Islam inspired by Wahhabism. Certain Muslim leaders are concerned about foreign influence, especially from Gulf countries, which, although difficult to measure, may contribute to the development of stricter religious practices. Meanwhile, some Protestants are attracted by the discourse of new churches, some of which preach values that have little to do with tolerance.395
However, the rise in religiosity does not mean a higher risk of violence – a distinction rarely made in the current debate on violent extremism and religious radicalisation. The return to a more fundamentalist Islam does not necessarily involve a greater propensity to violence, as shown by the existence of fundamentalist quietist currents. Similarly, violence that seems to be religiously motivated may in fact be due to other reasons, such as crime, greed and local, ethnic or socio-economic grievances. Changes in religious behavior may nevertheless be dangerous when they disrupt social relations. Disregard of or refusal to dialogue with other faiths could lead to communities withdrawing into themselves. The authorities must understand the significance of this risk and do more to regulate religious discourse.396
Kabore has been operating from within the same repressive framework inherited from the immediate past government. Even the Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP) (the Presidential Guard) was dissolved after the failed September 2015 coup, Kabore did not embark upon any other initiative to reform the top-echelon institution of governance, i.e. the Presidency itself. Kabore has been part and parcel of Compaore-led dictatorship having served in various capacities including as a Prime Minister. He has benefitted immensely from the perceived rotten system. With such a taproot in the past serving as his background it is understandable that he could not “think outside the box” because of the limitation of the dirigisme that nurtured and sustained his political career till date. He had enjoyed and he is still enjoying all the trappings (power, prestige and privileges) of a bankrupt system that spike off the current crisis in the first place – those trappings that sometimes prevent a leader from thinking outside the box because of what they are capable of doing to one’s mental horizon or structure. This conveniently served as his alibi (excuse) for his failure to make any fundamental difference. But at the same time that is his guilt and a burden on the soul which he has not found the courage to discharge by publicly admitting his faults, guilt and failure.
This author has written fairly extensively on the conditions of some of the G5 Sahel countries397, 398, 399 The author has also written on Guinea, a former French colony, where a coup took in September 202.400 The only exception is Mauritania. With particular reference to illegal mining and its implications for national security, Akinsulore, Ekemenah and Akinsulore drew a nexus between illegal mining and escalation of conflict with its implication for national security with Zamfara State in Nigeria as a case study.401
Why the situation in the Sahel, and not just Burkina Faso, is extremely worrisome is that the fate of the G5 member countries with a population of over 100 million people is at stake, a population that almost double that of France, the former colonial master in this region and one of the current puppeteers of events in the region.
In reviewing all over again what one has written, one is left wondering whether there are still certain grey areas not yet understood or explored. The first wonder is how a whole region has come under the captivity and/or stupefying and ruthless foreign imperialist manipulation or machination, unable to free itself over the decades despite their so-called political independence and sovereignty. It is without doubt wonderful how France, for instance, has been able to hold down these countries for decades after their political independence. How did France achieve this “magical” feat? Is it through sorcery or occult power of modern type? Is it through the much acclaimed cultural assimilation? Or was it as a result of accumulated experiences in statecraft over the centuries, experiences turned into a kind of neuroweaponry to confuse, brainwash and/or lower the guards (mental alertness) of the concerned African leaders? Or is it just plain laziness on the part of African leaders that they cannot find counter-offensive weaponry to such foreign firepower of neuroweaponry? Or is it advanced thinking based on intellectual sophistication derived from military and intelligence diplomacy over the centuries? Or is it advancement in scientific thinking, discoveries and breakthroughs that ultimately and cumulatively impact quality of political thinking?
Why are the above questions necessary or relevant here? African leaders in general, and not just in the G5 Sahel countries, have never achieved any breakthrough in any field of human endeavours especially in the field of strategic thinking that underpins foreign policy objectives and national security interests.
A critical studies of established powers (superpowers for instance in this case) including emergent and/or rising powers tell a story that we have not been telling ourselves in African countries.
As at the time of the Second World War, it was only the United States that has nuclear weapons which it detonated on Japan (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) in 1945 that finally and quickly brought the Second World War to an end. United States never detonated its nuclear weapons on Germany because Germany was already pulverized by the Allied Forces. At any rate, the scientific secret of nuclear weapons (especially the splitting of the atom) was gotten from the same Germany through Albert Einstein who fled to the United States to escape from the Nazi Germany. It was after the detonation of the nuclear devices on Japan and after the Second World War had ended that other powers scrambled to have their own nuclear weapons. These countries include the United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union of yore, and China – the very countries that formed the exclusive 5-member of the Security Council of the United Nations with corresponding veto powers. India and Pakistan are nuclear powers but not members of the UN Security Council with veto power. Germany, Italy and Japan were prevented from pursuing and having their own nuclear powers for military purposes.
However, several years later, North Korea acquired its own nuclear technology and military power status with which it has been grandstanding the United States over the last several years. Of course, other superpowers such as Russia and China are equally afraid of North Korea. Israel is also reputed to be a nuclear power. Iran is now pursuing very vigorously to have its own nuclear weaponry but hamstrung mainly by the United States.
What does the above story tell us? No African leader has been able to elevate its country to the status where it has strategic leveraging ability to withstand the machinations of the foreign superpowers. It is that strategic leveraging ability that African leaders must seek and acquire to put an end to foreign domination of the continent.
Conclusion
The profound issues emanating from the protests that ended the regime of Blaise Compaore and his political career were never addressed by the subsequent new leaders. The following elections that took place in 2015 and which saw the victory of President Roch Christian Kabore subsequently swept under the carpet with electoral campaign promises that were on the other hand never addressed. Thus it became a double jeopardy for the Burkinabe masses.
The same thing happened in Nigeria after 1999. All outstanding issues under the military rule were never addressed by the new civilian leaders. It did not take time before the furies of violence across the length and breadth of the country were let loose as the dogs, jackals, lions and elephants of war came out of their abodes to launch attacks on the Nigerian State. Nigeria has never known peace since 1999 till date because the ruling elite refused to address the various grievances of the people.
Burkina Faso has similarly not known peace since 2014-2015. It can thus be argued that the totality of the issues never addressed formed part and parcel of the corpus of grievances that have now become combustible materials for the insecurity that has now come to grip the Burkinabe State and its people. Spearheading the campaign of terror and insurgency against the Burkinabe State are the assortments of Islamic Jihadist groups.
Neither could the Franco-American imperialists and their military and non-military training and assistance offer any succor to the Burkinabe people ravaged by insurgency, campaign of terror by Islamic Jihadists.
Burkinabe State has failed itself, in its core duty to protect its own citizens and provide for their welfare. Burkinabe State is currently reaping the fruits of its neglect of the welfare of its citizens who unavoidably fall victims to the evil influence of Islamic Jihadist ideologies. Burkinabe State is reaping the fruits of its own incompetence, of its failure of governance.
Burkina Faso is increasingly becoming strategically vulnerable to collapse because the current political and security algorithms are correspondingly becoming unfavourable to it. The ability of the Burkinabe State to defend itself is waning almost every day as the Islamic Jihadists launch one attack after the other in order to cow the State. France is withdrawing its Operation Barkhane soldiers leaving the Burkinabe State more vulnerable. The Burkinabe Armed Forces is also gathering hostility almost every day because it is violating rules of engagement (violation of human rights) on the battlespace with the Islamic Jihadists by not distinguishing between friends and foes (i.e. between the Islamic Jihadists and the innocent civilians) in which case civilians are made to suffer unnecessary collateral damages.
The Jihadists are increasingly on the offensive while the Burkinabe State is on the defensive. Thus the balance of terror is increasingly favourable to the Jihadists than the Burkinabe State. Burkinabe State is pummeled left, right and centre by the Jihadists with haphazard responses from the Burkinabe State.
The counter-terrorism efforts (especially those cobbled together by France, United States and a consortium of European powers) have not yielded the expected results. The Sahel region has become a hotbed of terrorism and a safe haven for terrorists of the Islamic Jihadist typology. And this is despite the millions of dollars that have been poured into the efforts. From the Sahel, terrorism has spread to other parts of Africa. The G5 countries individually and collectively have not been able to defeat terrorism.
Yes. The Burkinabe State has not collapsed and may not collapse very soon. But the ability of the military machine to defend the State is worrisomely becoming weakened. The Jihadists are waging guerrilla and/or asymmetric warfare against the Burkinabe State and the latter does not seem to have credible answer to this hybrid methodology of warfare even with Operation Barkhane or the US military training and advisory.
President Kabore was re-elected in January 2021.
Another general election will not come up in Burkina Faso until around 2024. What Burkina Faso needs in the meantime is the total overhaul of its national defense and security strategies to help save the country from being overrun by Islamic Jihadists – and not incremental reforms carried out by the State that do not even address the core issues affecting the structures of the Burkinabe society at any rate. Incremental reforms would only exacerbate the ongoing crisis mainly caused by social angst by the people against the colossal failure of Burkinabe State to protect them and provide for their welfare.