By Alex Ekemenah, Chief Analyst
It is exactly ten years that Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency broke out in the North eastern part of the country with Maiduguri as the epicenter – even though the origin of Boko Haram can be traced back as far as 2002.
It was analogous to the famous Trojan War that lasted exactly ten years when the coalition of Greek city-states laid siege on fortress city-state of Troy and was only able to conquer and sack Troy through subterfuge of what has become popularly known as “Greek gift”.
Even though Nigeria is now ten years at war with Boko Haram, there is nothing on the horizon to indicate that Boko Haram is about to be defeated. Rather, every indication points to a protracted struggle except if a “miracle” should happen.
Boko Haram has struck at hard and soft targets alike across the federal capital territory and other cities in the North. Examples:
- Louis Edet House (Police Headquarters) bombing on June 16, 2011, killing at least 2 people
- United Nations headquarters bombing on August 26, 2011 by Boko Haram that killed at least 21 and 60 wounded.
- February 2012: Boko Haram attacked 1st Army Division, Kaduna, through suicide bombing.
No Victor No Vanquished yet!
While the Greek coalition forces were able to defeat and crush Troy after a protracted naval warfare and land engagements, there is no sign in sight that Nigeria will be able to defeat and crush Boko Haram even with land warfare and aerial bombardments – despite the previous claims that Boko Haram has been technically defeated.
So where is the missing strategy needed to defeat and crush Boko Haram? What policy options are available in combating terrorism and insurgency of Boko Haram typology in Nigeria? What would be the pros and cons of such policy options?
The Nigerian State has hitherto relied on instruments of hard power to fight its enemies: deployment of military forces. This is a traditionalist security concept that can be justifiably regarded as reductionist for the simple reason that it does not take into consideration the totality of the insecurity spectrum that has emerged over the years as a result of accumulated grievances, antagonisms and conflicts, arising, for instance, the transition from military despotism to civil democratic but very illiberal rule.
The Nigerian State has largely ignored the instruments of soft and smart powers until the emergence of amnesty programme (an example of soft power) as applied to Niger Delta militancy.
No example of smart power deployed anywhere.
Even when another amnesty programme was declared for the North east, it has not worked and Boko Haram campaigns of terror and insurgency have not abated.
So what kind of insurgent group is Boko Haram in context of Nigerian geopolitical reality?
Thesis: “hard power”: “power to coerce through military, economic and financial power.
Antithesis: “smart power”: power to attract, the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (based on the policies, culture and political ideals of each country).
Synthesis: “smart”: neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’ power but the skillful combination of both”. According to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, “Smart power” tools are diplomacy, development and communication (public diplomacy).
The dichotomy between hard and soft power approaches in Nigeria exposes the fundamental fault-line of the Nigerian State from policy standpoint. It reveals the failure of the hegemonic ability of the Nigerian State to control events and earn goodwill from the citizens. It reveals the dirigisme of hardline worldview and operating mindset about national security defined exclusively from the viewpoint and parameter of hitherto military rule.
Whither smart power
Since the outbreak of Boko Haram acts of terror and insurgencies including kidnapping and armed robberies, there is hardly any empirical evidence of use of smart power, for instance, the use of science and technology to fight crimes, terrorism and insurgency. Specifically, there is no evidence of scientific and/or technological policy framework and thrust to help defeat terrorism by the Nigerian government. there is no evidence to show that Nigeria has ever deployed instruments of science and technology on any known scale to help defeat terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.
However, there is the legal instrument of anti-terrorism. There is Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (2013 as amended). But how many terrorists and insurgents have been charged and tried under this Act?
Buhari administration inherited this Act but has never charged nor tried anybody under it.
Kabiru Umar, alias Kabiru Sokoto, the mastermind of the 2011 Christmas Day bombing at St Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, that killed about 44 persons and wounded another 75, was arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by a Federal High Court, Abuja, under Jonathan administration in December 2013.
Buhari administration also inherited the National Security Strategy of 2015 but never reviewed it, improved upon it or implemented in any known form in the fight against Boko Haram. In fact, it is not known under which security policy is Buhari administration fighting Boko Haram. The situation is analogous to a soldier going to the battlefield not knowing which weapon to carry because he does not know which weapons are suitable to the particular battlefield terrain.
Whereas there is observable consistent manner or pattern that the enemy (Boko Haram) has been fighting its war against the Nigerian State: hit and run!
The fundamental fact is that Nigeria lack a philosophical foundation for its security policy. There are no known philosophical values upon which its security policy and strategy are based. Too bad!
Boko Haram is a pestilential scourge. Nigeria must deal with it.