By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY

 “The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility,”

• Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General (March 2022).

 “I know many people around the world are concerned about the use of nuclear weapons. We currently see no indication that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, though Russia’s occasional rhetoric to rattle the nuclear saber is itself dangerous and extremely irresponsible. Let me be clear: Any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe consequences.” 

• Joe Biden, President of the United States, on May 31, 2022

Executive Summary

1. The Western nuclear powers (United States, United Kingdom and France) and to that extent other nuclear powers are most probably not unaware that Russia was about to test-launch its SAMAT or Satan II ICBM. This was why the Western nuclear powers (most especially the United States and United Kingdom) did not front-load the information into the public domain as they did with other intelligence information on the ongoing war in Ukraine. Thus, it can be argued that the Western powers were not taken by any form of surprise about the test-launch.
2. The test-launch is a stand-alone event. It has nothing to do with the war in Ukraine as such. However, it coincided with the war hence the rhetoric generated over it from both sides of the divide: i.e. Russia and the West. But the test-launch cannot be understood in its immediate impacts without relating it to the war in Ukraine and what may likely trigger off provocation to shoot either a strategic or tactical nuclear missile by Russia with corollary Western response thus creating an escalating condition for global or limited nuclear war. Western reactions to the test-launch have been largely mooted and in the context of the war in Ukraine this can be considered a safety valve for avoiding nuclear war with Russia.
3. Despite all the threats by Russia including all the rhetoric or propaganda, the US (and to that extent the United Kingdom and France) has not activated its strategic deterrent force alert system. It has not activated what is popularly known as DEFCON alert system. All the strategic ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles remain in their positions. Ditto the nuclear submarines including the long-range strategic nuclear bomber aircrafts. This is because the US (or the Western nuclear powers in general) has assessed that nuclear war is not imminent at least for now. Russia, even though Putin has ordered its strategic deterrent forces into a state of combat readiness, has not been reported to have moved any of its strategic nuclear weapons towards any destination or goal. However, this does not suggest that the nuclear weapons cannot be moved at a moment notice. But this also means that this cannot happen without the US knowing simultaneously because of the highly efficient intelligence machinery put in place to monitor such movement of nuclear weapons from their hitherto known stationary positions. Thus there is a sense in which the media debate on the nuclear threat by Russia which may be considered hysterical is actually a sort of proactive warning to the Western nuclear powers not to be caught by surprise of any Russian nuclear move towards launching pre-emptive strike against the West. 
4. But the constant threat by Russia to start a nuclear war if “provoked” alongside the test-launch of the SAMAT ICBM has created a kaleidoscopic situation and has kick-started a new debate about a possible new world nuclear order which is yet to be properly defined. This debate is still in its inchoate stage. But this new world nuclear order goes far beyond the traditional epistemology of the unthinkability or undesirability of nuclear war. It has now made possible to think about an exchange of tactical nuclear blows between Russia and the West with its unavoidable spillover effects to other nuclear powers. The new world nuclear order has thrown up new questions about what to do with the new world nuclear upstarts such as Iran, Israel, and North Korea, of how to bring their nuclear arsenal under control within the framework of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), etc.

Introduction

One of the features of the war in Ukraine, and a dreadful one for that matter, was the threat by Russian President Vladimir Putin to unleash nuclear holocaust or Armageddon – if Western powers were to support or intervene in its war with Ukraine –  a threat that has fortunately not materialize so far.

The war has hardly started when Russia proclaimed its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. But it is not known whether the nuclear weapons will be aimed at Ukraine or the West and under what circumstances would Russia do so. This situation has led to speculations in strategic-thinking quarters in the West. Is it when the push comes to a shove in the ongoing war? And what could that be?

The nuclear threat is one big issue less debated in the media but no less an important aspect of the war.

Putin warned in a televised statement that if any nation interferes in the Ukrainian war especially on the side of Ukraine, “Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” He then publicly ordered his Minister of Defense to put Russian nuclear forces into “special combat readiness.”

During a meeting on Sunday 27 February, Russian television footage showed Mr. Putin meeting with his defence minister and the chief of the general staff and instructing them to put the nuclear weapons on a “special regime of combat duty”.¹

Outlining what this means, Patricia Lewis, director of the international security programme at the think-tank Chatham House, told the PA news agency: “What we think has happened is that under peacetime, Russia has checks and balances in place so that they can’t launch nuclear weapons.² “So in order to be able to launch nuclear weapons, President Putin has to change the status from peacetime to combat, hence the phrase he’s ‘put his forces on special mode of combat duty’. I think we would probably call it combat readiness but it’s hard because of different languages and different meanings.”³ “What he seems to have done is created the legal platform to be able to launch if he wishes,” she added.⁴

Deputy Director General of RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), Professor Malcolm Chalmers, said that wording had not been used before, so it is not “entirely clear” what was meant. “I haven’t seen any reporting of changes in Russian nuclear forces postures,” he told PA. “Obviously I don’t have access to classified intelligence but I haven’t seen reports as such.”⁵ “So it’s not clear how that changes. It may be something to do with the particular authorisation mechanisms between the president and the nuclear forces or it may be nothing at all. What is clear is that this is designed to be something that we need to listen to. It’s designed to be a reminder that Russia is a nuclear weapons power.”⁶

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace has attempted to pour cold water on fears of a nuclear war, stating that while he understood the concerns, the phrasing is a “battle of rhetoric”. During media interviews, he told Sky News he “was not going to speculate” on what Mr. Putin might do in the future. Later on, he told BBCBreakfast: “We don’t see or recognise in the sort of phrase or the status he described as anything that is a change to what they have currently as their nuclear posture.”⁷ “This is predominantly about Putin putting it on the table just to remind people, remind the world, that he has a deterrent.⁸ “We will not do anything to escalate in that area, we will not do anything to feed any miscalculation, we take it very, very seriously.⁹ “But at the moment this is a battle of rhetoric that President Putin is deploying, and we just have to make sure we manage it properly.”¹⁰

Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, meanwhile, stated that Russia sees battlefield nuclear weapons as simply “a bigger bang” and could give a military order to use them. Some experts stated that it is unclear whether or not Mr. Putin would go ahead with a nuclear attack, while others quashed the possibility, stating that the mutual destruction would be too great.¹¹

Ms Lewis said: “Now he’s moved to a situation of combat, he can [launch a nuclear attack]. But will he? We don’t know. This is the problem. Of course, he wants to frighten us. And I think Russia has long worked out that the West is far more frightened of Russian nuclear weapons than Russia is frightened of Western nuclear weapons, and I think that’s true.” She added: “There is a possibility to retaliate against conventional force with nuclear weapons under Western doctrines, but it is generally believed that would be a last resort.¹² “I think there’s been a sense over the last decade that Putin, along with [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un and [former US president] Donald Trump, are people who could have just launched a nuclear weapon. So there’s always been this unpredictability… I don’t want to overplay it but I don’t want to downplay it either.”¹³

Professor Chalmers meanwhile said that he thought it was “unlikely”, adding: “Because any use of nuclear weapons would open up such a Pandora’s box, and the possibility of escalation to the use of more nuclear weapons once one country has used them, the pressure on other nuclear weapon states to use them in response would be very considerable… the Russians understand that and so do the west. So it’s a paradox.”¹⁴

If Russia launched an attack on a NATO country, experts have said there could be retaliation strikes from other NATO nations, prompting a conflict which Professor Chalmers said would lead to “orders of magnitude worse than the Second World War”. Numbers of casualties would depend on what area was attacked. Nuclear weapons have the capability to kill hundreds of thousands of people depending on how populated an area is that is targeted. Others could be left injured as a result of radiation poisoning if a specific facility is targeted instead.¹⁵

What is the current state or balance of nuclear power in the world?

According to The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which has published an account of world nuclear arsenals compiled by leading experts from the Federation of American Scientists since 1987, updated its records on Russia’s nuclear arsenal last week. It said the stockpile is at approximately 4,477 warheads, of which around 1,588 are strategic warheads which can be deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, while an approximate additional 977 strategic warheads, along with 1,912 nonstrategic warheads, are held in reserve. According to the Federation of American Scientists, latest figures state that the UK has a stockpile of approximately 225 nuclear warheads, while the US has 5,428, France has 290, Pakistan has 165, China has 350, India has 160, Israel has 90 and North Korea has 20.¹⁶

Questions yet Unanswered

What exactly does or did Russia/Putin mean when he stated that he was moving his strategic deterrent forces to combat readiness status? What scenario did Putin see when making this threat? What are the strategic issues at stake for which Russia is willing to go to nuclear war? What types of nuclear weapons was Putin referring to: strategic or tactical nuclear weapons?

Furthermore, is Russia really willing to provoke a Third World War with nuclear holocaust because of its mad imperialist ambitions? What is Russia really afraid of in its ongoing war with Ukraine? What does Russia reasonably expect the West to do in response to exploding nuclear weapons whether strategic or tactical: hold its hands akimbo or retaliate with full force at its disposal? Why would Russia want to risk nuclear annihilation with full destruction of the Russian State as it is known today? Does Russia really believe it can bully the West with nuclear weapons? Does Russia really want to take on these Western powers at the same time: the United States, United Kingdom and France and their other allies such as Israel? Should Russia be expecting the support of China and North Korea to face the Western nuclear powers? Where would India and Pakistan stand in a nuclear war between Russia and Western powers?

What really is going on in the mind of Vladimir Putin? Is it really possible for Putin to order nuclear war that would cause the death of millions of human souls who have nothing to do with him at all – except to fulfill his murderously insane desires? Does Putin really think he can escape public accountability even if he escapes death by hiding in one off his numerous nuclear bunkers? If, for any reason, Putin orders a nuclear strike, whether an ICBM or a tactical nuclear missile attack either on Ukraine or any Western nation, does he reasonably believe that the West (especially the United States) will fold its arms and let him get away with mass murder? Does he think he alone has the monopoly of madness?

Should we take the Russian threat like that of the daily diet of North Korean threat that has become inconsequential in its essence over the years? Or should we place the Russian threat on its own special pedestal or category that should be treated with all seriousness? Were the Western powers really threatened by the Russian threat?

The difficulties in giving concrete answers to these questions lie in the fact that the statement was made in an atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty. In other words, it is not known whether it was a policy statement or not, i.e. whether it was part of the aims of invading Ukraine in the first place when considered against the background of the original proclamation of “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” Ukraine in a “special military operation”. Is the threat to move its strategic deterrent forces into a state of combat readiness part of this special military operation? Has there been any evidence to indicate that Russia has been threatened enough to warrant activating its strategic deterrent forces into a state of combat readiness?

The above is on the declaratory statement after invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to deploy nuclear weapons if the West should provoke Russia by interfering or intervening in its war with Ukraine.

However, on April 20, 2022, the world woke up to hear the news that Russia has test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile named SAMAT or Satan II. How did this test-launch relate to the early threat to deploy nuclear weapons against the West by Russia? Should the test-launch be taken as a stand-alone event or as part of the ongoing war in Ukraine?

The sequence of events is worrisome. On April 13, 2022, the Russian flagship of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea was hit by two Ukrainian Neptune missiles fired from the mainland. The flagship, Moskva, arguably the most powerful in the Russian naval arsenal, eventually sank and kissed the bed of the Black Sea. It was a major strategic blow to the solar plexus of the Russians.

Then on April 20, 2022, the Russians test-fired its Satan II strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in an apparent attempt to instill fear and scare into the Western Alliance and make good its earlier threat to deploy nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine “if” the situation warrants it. The attempt can be garnered from the whole gamut of rhetoric that trailed the test-launch which was mostly directed against the West, even mentioning Great Britain by name.

How does one place this test-launch contextually? Was there a correlation between the sinking of the Russian flagship in the Black Sea and the test-firing of the Satan II ICBM? Would Russia still have gone ahead to test-launch the missile if the Moskva has not sank? In this case, is there a nuanced relationship between the test-launch and the ongoing war in Ukraine? What major event or part of the war that might have possibly led to the test-launch? What message was Russia exactly trying to pass onto the West?

The incident (the test-launch of the SAMAT ICBM within the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine) is a new evolution in the relationship between the US and Russia in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine with particular reference to the increasingly turbulent Black Sea. Or put in a different way: it is a new dimension to the evolving Russian threat to use (as a fall-back option) nuclear weapons to scare away the United States and other Western powers from getting too deeply involved in the war.

From the standpoint of the latter perspective, it is unarguable that the US and other Western powers are already neck-deep in the war and it is easier said than done for them to back out from supporting Ukraine further. It would be a strategic tragedy of the century for the Western powers to do so. It would have been better if they were not involved at all and had allowed Russia to run over Ukraine. The West can no longer throw the sheep to the wolf because the latter is threatening to unleash a nuclear Armageddon. No one is intimidated anymore by the threat of nuclear holocaust by Russia.

However, one finds especially the threat curious because in the first place, Ukraine has no known stockpile of nuclear weapons anywhere in its war arsenal. Neither has the West promised to send nuclear weapons to Ukraine. Indeed, the West has been extremely reluctant to send “heavy weapons” to Ukraine to confront the Russians on the battlefield. So how did Russia become “threatened” warranting the threat to deploy nuclear weapons either against Ukraine or the West in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine?

There may not be doubt that Putin can order a nuclear strike if the push comes to a shove. But nobody knows how this “shove” would or could come about. This is because the West has carefully calibrated its support for Ukraine even with the sharing of intelligence and harsh economic sanctions against Russia. The West has not crossed the “threshold” into the realm of nuclear provocation. It is Russia that has been constantly threatening the West and/or Ukraine with nuclear Sword of Damocles. And this is what perhaps makes the whole situation interesting especially the understanding of the motive drivers or the driving force for this threat from Putin. Is this threat coming alone from Putin and his small band of extremist cohorts within the Kremlin (the security and intelligence agencies) or the entire Russian political-military nomenklatura?

During the time of Donald Trump administration, especially during the height of the political crisis in the US when his sanity was increasingly called to question, his Joint Chief of Staff said publicly he would question the order by Donald Trump to shoot a nuclear missile and may not carry such an order. Could Putin’s order to push the nuclear button be disobeyed?  What happens when and if the order by Putin to launch a nuclear strike is disobeyed?

Strategic or Tactical Nuclear Missile Strike

In the analysis of the nuclear scenario, attention has been copiously paid to the use of tactical nuclear weapons rather than strategic nuclear weapons (ICBM). For Putin to order an ICBM strike, this would mean the target would no longer be Ukraine but either the US, UK or France and that would also mean that Russia might have felt extremely threatened to order such an ICBM strike by something grievous done by any of the three Western nuclear powers to warrant such an ICBM strike. Interestingly, Britain was particularly mentioned in the propaganda barrage that followed the test-launch. France was not mentioned at all.

On the other hand, a tactical nuclear strike would be within the confines of the war in Ukraine or within a larger conflict between NATO and Russia.

According to Gordon Corera, [t]actical nuclear weapons are those which could be used over relatively short distances. This distinguishes them from “strategic” nuclear weapons. In the Cold War, these were the bombs which the two superpowers, the US and Soviet Union, could launch over long distances at each other’s homeland. The term “tactical” nevertheless incorporates many types of weapon, including smaller bombs and missiles used as “battlefield” weapons.¹⁷ These can be placed on various types of missiles which are normally used to deliver conventional explosives. They can even be fired as artillery shells on a battlefield. They have also been developed for aircraft and ships – for instance torpedoes and depth charges to target submarines.¹⁸ These warheads are believed to be in storage facilities, rather than deployed and ready to fire.^{19 Russia} is thought to have about 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons.²⁰

But one concern is that Russia could be more willing to use smaller tactical weapons than larger strategic missiles. “They might not see it as crossing this big nuclear threshold. They could see it as part of their conventional forces,” says Dr Patricia Lewis, head of the international security programme at the Chatham House think tank.²¹

 

Tactical nuclear weapons vary enormously in size and power. The smallest can be one kiloton or less (equivalent to a thousand tonnes of the explosive TNT) – the larger ones perhaps as big as 100 kilotons. The effects would depend on the size of the warhead, how far above the ground it detonates and the local environment. But as a comparison, the atomic bomb that killed around 146,000 people in Hiroshima, Japan, during   World War Two, was 15 kilotons.²² Russia’s largest strategic weapons are thought to be at least 800 kilotons.²³

President Putin has made more than one reference to Russia’s nuclear weapons – apparently to try to create a sense of fear. US spies see this as a signal to the West to persuade it not to intervene more in Ukraine, not as a sign he is planning nuclear war. (Ibid) But others worry that even though the chances are low, it is possible Russia, in certain conditions, might be tempted to use a smaller tactical weapon in Ukraine. “Putin is comfortable in the ‘stability-instability’ world, while the West is deterred by his nuclear bluster as if NATO’s billion-dollar deterrent is nothing but a paper tiger,” tweeted Dr Mariana Budjerva, a nuclear expert with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the Harvard Kennedy School.²⁴

US intelligence say Russia has a theory called “escalate to de-escalate” if it is in a conflict with NATO. This involves doing something dramatic – such as using a tactical weapon on the battlefield, or as a demonstration somewhere – or threatening to do so. The idea is to frighten the other side into backing down. The concern is that if Putin feels cornered and that his strategy in Ukraine is failing, he could use tactical nuclear weapons as a “game changer”, to break a stalemate or avoid defeat. But the situation would likely have to get worse in Ukraine – or back in Russia – for him to consider this.²⁵

James Acton, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Pace in Washington DC, says: “I am legitimately worried that in that circumstance Putin might use a nuclear weapon, most likely on the ground in Ukraine to terrify everyone and get his way. We are not at that point yet.” Dr Heather Williams, nuclear expert at Kings College London, says one problem is that it is unclear what “winning” in Ukraine would look like for Putin – and thus what might drive Russia to use a nuclear weapon.²⁶

Dr Williams says there is a further reason why Russia might not use nuclear weapons – China. “Russia is heavily dependent on Chinese support, but China has a ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine. So if Putin did use them, it would be incredibly difficult for China to stand by him. If he used them, he would probably lose China.”²⁷

No one knows quite where the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead. It could escalate and Putin would not want nuclear war. But miscalculation is always a risk. “They would imagine everyone would capitulate,” says Patricia Lewis. “What would happen is that NATO would have to come in and respond.”²⁸

The US says it is monitoring the situation closely. It has an extensive intelligence gathering machine to watch Russian nuclear activity – for instance whether tactical weapons are being moved out of storage, or if there is any change in behaviour at launch sites. So far, they say they have not seen any significant changes. How the US and NATO would respond to any nuclear use is hard to predict. They may not want to escalate the situation further and risk all-out nuclear war but they also might want to draw a line. This might mean a tough conventional rather than nuclear response. But what would Russia then do? “Once you have crossed the nuclear threshold, there is no obvious stopping point,” says James Acton. “I don’t think anyone can have any confidence of what that world would look like.”²⁹

A crucial factor that could decide whether Putin want to go nuclear or not is the balance of power on the battlefield in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The battle is still raging and nobody can say precisely which side is winning. Mariupol has already fallen into the hands of the Russians – even though Ukraine is not weeping over the loss. Battle is still raging in Severodonetsk and there has been no decisive victory for any of the warring parties. Indeed, the entire eastern part of Ukraine is in a state of swinging pendulum and nobody can predict with mathematical accuracy on which side the scale will tilt.

In this scenario, despite the fact Russia has suffered enormously in this war, loss of men and military hardware, Russia is yet to face a situation of imminent crushing defeat from Ukraine with or without support from the West. Until this point is reached, Russia may still believe it can win the war on its own strength. When, however, it believes it is losing the war, it may then decide to escalate to de-escalate as a smart face-saving way out of such an imminent defeat. As at the time of writing this, the war has passed its 100^th day. The West has largely agreed to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons. But the effects of this supply of heavy weapons are yet to be felt on the battlefield. For instance, Russia is still lobbing artillery and rockets into Severedonetsk without the demonstrated ability of the Ukrainians to counter these artillery fires and rockets effectively which can only be achieved with long-range missiles directed at the sources of these Russian artillery fires and rockets.

In short we are yet to witness the situation of escalation to de-escalate in the ongoing war in Ukraine.

While the C.I.A. director, William Burns, has warned of the possibility that Mr. Putin could use a tactical nuclear weapon, even if there is no “practical evidence” right now to suggest it is imminent. Mitt Romney, the former US Secretary of Defense under Bush Administration has warned that the US “should be prepared” for all contingencies. “We should imagine the unimaginable, specifically how we would respond militarily and economically to such a seismic shift in the global geopolitical terrain.”³⁰

“Together with our key NATO allies, we should develop and evaluate a broad range of options. I presume the president and the administration are already engaged in such a process. The potential responses to an act so heinous and geopolitically disorienting as a nuclear strike must be optimally designed and have the support of our NATO allies. Mr. Putin and his enablers should have no doubt that our answer to such depravity would be devastating.”³¹

President Biden is right not to have elevated our nuclear DEFCON level. Nor has the administration’s rhetoric stooped to Mr. Putin’s bait. In 2012, I noted that Russia was the biggest geopolitical adversary to the United States, and it clearly remains a source of great concern to both Republicans and Democrats. Given the magnitude of consequence of a nuclear strike, our potential options merit thought, by our leaders and by American citizens alike.³²

Romney said “free nations must continue to support Ukrainians’ brave and necessary defense of their country. Failing to continue to support Ukraine would be like paying the cannibal to eat us last. If Mr. Putin, or any other nuclear power, can invade and subjugate with near impunity, then Ukraine would be only the first of such conquests. Inevitably, our friends and allies would be devoured by brazen, authoritarian nuclear powers, the implications of which would drastically alter the world order.”³³

The right answer is to continue to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defend itself and to win. Its military successes may force Mr. Putin to exit Ukraine or to agree to a cease-fire acceptable to the Ukrainian people. Perhaps his control of Russian media would enable him to spin a loss into a face-saving narrative at home. These are the outcomes he would be smart to take. But if a cornered and delusional Mr. Putin were to instead use a nuclear weapon — whether via a tactical strike or by weaponizing one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants — we would have several options.³⁴

Romney finally fired a shot at Russian supporters without mentioning names: Russia’s use of a nuclear weapon would unarguably be a redefining, reorienting geopolitical event. Any nation that chose to retain ties with Russia after such an outrage would itself also become a global pariah. Some or all of its economy would be severed from that of the United States and our allies. Today, the West represents over half of the global G.D.P. Separating any nation from our combined economies could devastate it. The impact on Western economies could be significant, but the impact on the economies of Russia and its fellow travelers would be much worse. It could ultimately be economic Armageddon, but that is far preferable to nuclear Armageddon.³⁵

The test-firing of SAMAT ICBM

What could have led Russia to test-launch the SAMAT ICBM in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine?

In order to understand the Russian mindset in test-launching an intercontinental ballistic missile while its war with Ukraine is still ongoing, it is necessary to contextualize it.

First, Russia’s decision to test-launch the ICBM was not part of the original war plan in Ukraine. It is a stand-alone event. In other words, the launching of the ICBM was not part of the on-going war in Ukraine. It stands all alone by itself but in context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. In other words, the timing fitted perfectly into the Russian game-plans in Ukraine chiefly to intimidate the West and find leverage to discourage the West from continuing to support Ukraine in its war with Russia.

Second, in the course of the war in Ukraine, Russia has actually threatened nuclear war against the West, again, to intimidate and discourage the West from continuing to support Ukraine. However, the test-launching of the ICBM may now be regarded as reinforcement of that threat of nuclear war against the West which will most probably never going to happen whether the West continues to support Ukraine or not.

Third, from all evidences so far, the West is not in any way intimidated by the test-launch because Russia intimated the United States, (it is not known whether the United Kingdom and France were similarly intimated) about the impending test-launch. Therefore, the launch did not come as a surprise at all to the United States and by extension, NATO. It would have been a different scenario if the United States has not been forewarned before carrying out the test-launch.

Fourth, the test-launch of the ICBM has not in any way affected the conduct of the ongoing war in Ukraine from both sides of the conflict. The war in Ukraine is still going hither and thither with no victor and no vanquished yet in sight. In fact, Russia may be argued to have been bogged down unexpectedly in Ukraine both from strategic, tactical and political standpoints.

Fifth, President Biden has long stated that he would not go into ground battle with Russia. The Western Alliance or NATO has also refused to impose a “no-fly-zone” over Ukraine. But these measures have not prevented the US/NATO from forward deploying thousands of its forces including sophisticated jet fighters, two B-52 Stratofortress strategic nuclear bombers capable of delivering ALBMs and other heavy weapons to eastern-most countries of Europe such as Moldova, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.³⁶

Finally, the test-launch of this particular ICBM, to demonstrate its prowess or firepower, has not been perceived in any particular sense to have disrupted the strategic balance of power in the world in favour of Russia in the realm of sophisticated nuclear weaponry.

It is from the above premises that one can then conclude that Russian test-launch of an ICBM in time of war with a neighbouring country, Ukraine, has been an exercise in futility if not a complete nullity. It has not achieved any concrete purpose other than the demonstration of megalomania of the Russian leadership.

Thus the news of the Russian test-launching an ICBM can be regarded as part of the general news about the ongoing war in Ukraine. There is nothing spectacular about it. It is a footnote to be noted when analyzing the global impact of the war from a “nuclear strategic” domain especially when further contextualized within the earlier threat by Russia to put nuclear missiles to use.

The test launch took place almost two months into the Russian war with Ukraine. This timeline itself is suspect when considered against the fact that Russia was already bogged in Ukraine contrary to the expectation that the war would be a snappy one for Russia.

Russia has said it had test-launched its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, a new addition to its nuclear arsenal, which Vladimir Putin said would give Moscow’s enemies something to think about. The Russian president was shown on television being told by the military that the missile had been launched from Plesetsk in the north-west and hit targets in the Kamchatka peninsula in the Far East.³⁷

 “The new complex has the highest tactical and technical characteristics and is capable of overcoming all modern means of anti-missile defence. It has no analogues in the world and will not have for a long time to come,” Putin said. “This truly unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces, reliably ensure Russia’s security from external threats and provide food for thought for those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country.”³⁸

The Pentagon said on Wednesday Russia had properly notified it ahead of its test launch, adding it saw the test as routine and not a threat to the United States.³⁹

Russia is expected to deploy the Sarmat with 10 or more warheads on each missile, according to the US Congressional Research Service. It has been in development for years and so its test-launch is not a surprise for the west, but it comes at a moment of extreme geopolitical tension due to Russia’s war in Ukraine.⁴⁰

Jack Newman wrote that the Russian test launch is “raising fears of a further escalation of Vladimir Putin’s barbaric war in Ukraine”.⁴¹

The Russian leader said the Sarmat missile, also known as Satan-2, will provide ‘food for thought for those who try to threaten Russia’ and will make his enemies ‘think twice’.⁴²

The first launch was carried out today from an underground silo at the Plesetsk spaceport in northern Russia at a moment of heightened tensions after Putin threatened the use of nuclear weapons in response to perceived Western provocation.  The Kremlin claims the unmatched 16,000mph missile, which has been in development for years, could destroy the UK, hit any target on earth and carry 12 nuclear warheads. It is among Russia’s next-generation missiles that Putin has called ‘invincible,’ and which also include the Kinzhal and Avangard hypersonic missiles.⁴³ 

The launch comes as a growing number of senior Kremlin insiders are said to be fearing the Russian strongman could resort to using nuclear weapons as Moscow’s position worsens. They said Putin is dismissing all criticism by officials who warn of the damaging political and economic cost of his war plan, which they fear could set Russia back for years amid growing military losses and crippling Western sanctions. The insiders warned Russia will be left with a crippled economy and limited global influence. They also voiced fears that Putin could turn to the drastic measure of using nuclear weapons against his enemies if his invasion of Ukraine fails.⁴⁴ 

Russia’s testing of the new intercontinental ballistic nuke came as…

• After Putin threatened use of nuclear weapons in response to perceived Western provocation.
• Russia claims 200-tonne missile could destroy the UK, hit any target on Earth and carry 12 nuclear warheads
• Moscow suffered another devastating blow today after its force’s death toll rose to 20,900, according to Kyiv estimates, after weeks of having their assaults on cities thwarted at every turn by battling Ukrainian troops.
• Yet another Russian colonel was killed in Ukraine, with Mikhail Nagamov becoming the latest of Putin’s top brass to die fighting Kyiv’s forces on April 13.
• Russia issued a fresh warning to Finland and Sweden over joining NATO, as the two countries draw closer to becoming part of the western military alliance;
• Putin was seen in a video conference with his defence minister Sergei Shoigu, to play down speculation of a rift, and amid claims he had been sidelined him from overseeing the war in Ukraine, including the rumours that Shoigu had suffered a heart attack or coronary problems. The men appeared on friendly terms today but Shoigu was seen carefully reading his pre-prepared remarks.

Putin was shown on TV being briefed by the military that the missile, expected to go into service this year, had been launched from the country’s northwest and hit targets in the Kamchatka peninsula in the far east.  He told the army: ‘I congratulate you on the successful launch of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile.⁴⁵ ‘This truly unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces, reliably ensure the security of Russia from external threats and make those who, in the heat of aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country, think twice.’⁴⁶

Russia said it used Kinzhal for the first time in warfare to strike a target in Ukraine. Putin added today: ‘The new complex has the highest tactical and technical characteristics and is capable of overcoming all modern means of anti-missile defence. It has no analogues in the world and won’t have for a long time to come.⁴⁷  ‘This truly unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces, reliably ensure Russia’s security from external threats and provide food for thought for those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country.’⁴⁸

Part of the threat by Putin is to nuke Britain. Why Putin decide to mention Britain by name is still unknown. Anxieties have heightened as a result of this.

Dmitry Kiselyov, a key propagandist for President Putin, used his show on Russian state TV to warn the UK it could be “plunged into the sea” by an underwater nuclear strike. He made the comments as part of a broadcast last Sunday where he suggested an attack on the UK, using a Poseidon underwater drone, could be a possible course of action for Russia. Mr. Kiselyov said the weapon would trigger a radioactive tidal wave and plunge Britain “to the depths of the ocean”. He added: “This tidal wave is also a carrier of extremely high doses of radiation. Surging over Britain, it will turn whatever is left of them into radioactive desert, unusable for anything. How do you like this prospect?”⁴⁹

Though the comments along with recent actions by President Putin are alarming, they don’t mean Russia intends to use any of its nuclear stockpile. But if that stance changed and such a weapon was launched, where in the UK might it try to target? According to data from Quora there are nine military facilities in Britain which Russia could obliterate within a matter of 20 minutes. Of these six are Royal Air Force (RAF) bases, scattered mostly around central England, and three are naval bases which are dotted along the British coastline. While Russia might look to prioritise military targets, it also has the capabilities to fire nuclear warheads at practically any location in the UK.⁵⁰

Major cities such as London, Birmingham and Manchester in England could all be placed in harm’s way. While the respective capitals for each of the three other countries that make up the UK could also be caught in the firing line. The Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has 15 nuclear bases from which weapons could feasibly be launched toward the UK.⁵¹

All figures are estimates, but according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Russia has the largest supply of nuclear weapons in the world. In terms of warheads, Moscow owns approximately 4,447 of which 1,588 are deployed on ballistic missiles and heavy bomber bases. A further 977 strategic warheads and 1,912 nonstrategic warheads are kept in reserve by the Kremlin. Hans M Kristensen and Matt Korda, writing for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, said: “Of the stockpiled warheads, approximately 1,588 strategic warheads are deployed: about 812 on land-based ballistic missiles, about 576 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and possibly 200 at heavy bomber bases.”⁵²

Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.⁵³

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet “no first use” policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials’ public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO member, in an effort to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the conflict. Russian officials, along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.⁵⁴

Russia’s current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. In addition, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States, others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle carried on an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.⁵⁵

Over the years, the United States has signed bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and then Russia that have limited and reduced the number of warheads carried on their nuclear delivery systems. Early agreements did little to reduce the size of Soviet forces, as the Soviet Union developed and deployed missiles with multiple warheads. However, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, combined with financial difficulties that slowed Russia’s nuclear modernization plans, sharply reduced the number of deployed warheads in the Russian force. The 2010 New START Treaty added modest reductions to this record but still served to limit the size of the Russian force and maintain the transparency afforded by the monitoring and verification provisions in the treaty.⁵⁶

According to Brad Lendon of the CNN, But Western experts portrayed the test as “nuclear saber-rattling,” saying the threat to the US or its allies was “extremely low” and suggesting Putin’s real motivation was to distract his domestic audience from Russia’s recent military failures, such as the sinking of its Black Sea flagship the Moskva.⁵⁷

The launch was the most extensive yet for a missile that was first tested in December 2017 and was promptly lauded by Putin in a statement published by the state-run TASS news agency. It is not the first time Putin has boasted of the missile’s potency. He mentioned the Sarmat in a 2018 speech as being among a host of new weaponry he said would render NATO defenses “completely useless.”⁵⁸

But US officials played down his remarks back in 2018 and took a similar view after the latest test. They noted that Moscow had informed Washington ahead of Wednesday’s test, as required under international agreements, and said the US had tracked the launch. “Such testing is routine, and it was not a surprise. It was not deemed be a threat to the United States or its allies,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said. Putin was engaging in “nuclear saber-rattling,” former CIA chief of Russia operations Steve Hall told CNN’s Kate Bolduan, and the probability of any strike on the US was extremely low.⁵⁹ Rather than an immediate threat to the West, the launch should be seen as an incremental step in Russia’s ICBM program, analysts said. The Sarmat, when operational, will be a one-for-one replacement for the Soviet-era Voevoda ICBMs, known by the NATO designation SS-18 Satan, they said.⁶⁰

Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said developing the liquid-fueled Sarmat was like giving “a facelift” to the original Satan missile. It had “similar capabilities to the existing SS-18,” but there were “probably some enhancements under the hood” too, Kristensen said. Like the SS-18, the Sarmat could carry 10 and possibly more independently targeted nuclear warheads with a range of up to 18,000 kilometers (11,185 miles), according to the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That is far enough to reach the continental US.⁶¹

It could also carry a hypersonic glide vehicle to deliver those warheads, a CSIS fact sheet says. Kristensen said for the past year or so Russia has been upgrading silos to handle the Sarmat. He also said the Sarmat program had suffered several delays. The CSIS said it was scheduled for deployment last year. When operational, the Sarmat — like all silo-based missiles — is likely to be kept on a higher alert status than ICBMs on mobile launch platforms, Kristensen said. This is because silos are stationary and therefore more vulnerable to an enemy strike.⁶²

The launch should also be seen in light of Russia’s recent military failures, and was likely being used by Putin as a distraction for his domestic audience, analysts said. From the Russian perspective, the war in Ukraine  has not been going well. A conflict Moscow originally envisioned as likely to be over within days has now stretched well into its second month, with Russian efforts stalled by a determined and highly-skilled Ukrainian resistance, as well as mundane problems, like a lack of trucks, substandard logistics and a reliance on poorly trained conscripts.⁶³

And just last week, Russia lost one of its most visible military assets when the guided-missile cruiser Moskva sank in the Black Sea. The loss of the ship was an embarrassment to Moscow, which admitted the vessel had suffered a catastrophic fire but did not confirm Ukrainian claims that it had been hit by anti-ship missiles.⁶⁴ Such high-profile failures have left Putin in dire need of some positive military news to feed audiences back home and Wednesday’s launch provided that.⁶⁵

At the same time, experts say Russia’s obsession with showcase weapons such as the Satan II hides deeper, more basic problems at the heart of its military. “Often glamorous dictator militaries are good at the showy weapons, they buy the fancy aircraft and the fancy tanks, but they don’t actually buy the less glamorous stuff,” said Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, in an interview with CNN earlier this month. After Wednesday’s launch, he reiterated that point on Twitter, saying that “so much of this reeks of Hitler’s ‘wonder weapons’ of World War II.”⁶⁶

The wonder weapons were “German propaganda to make it look like Germany had a chance of winning the war when things were going very badly. These weapons often existed … but their impact was used to distract the German people.”⁶⁷

O’Brien said Putin had used “very Hitlerian rhetoric when boasting about the Sarmat being the best system in the world”. “[He’s] trying to make the Russians confident and proud in their technological prowess, when the war is highlighting constant shortcomings with the Russian military’s ability to operate complex systems,” O’Brien said.⁶⁸

But as far as the situation on the ground in Ukraine goes, analysts said, the ICBM test would have no practical effect. It’s a strategic weapon, essentially designed to hit the United States as was the SS-18, its Cold War predecessor.  And even then, Putin’s menacing words should be seen in a wider context. Like Russia, the United States has its own ICBMs — as well as ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-capable strategic bombers — that would prove a strong deterrent for Putin to ever use his “Satan II.”⁶⁹

Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, has previously told “Fox News Sunday” that Washington is confident of its own ballistic missile capabilities. However, unlike Russia, the US has made efforts to avoid inflaming tensions with its own missile programs. Earlier this month the US Air Force canceled a scheduled test of its Minuteman III ICBM for this very reason. “I think there was a prudent decision at the time to take a knee on that and to not launch it, where we were in space and time in the early goings on with respect to this invasion, it was the right thing to do,” Kirby said.⁷⁰

Speaking to senior officials, Putin hailed the Sarmat launch, claiming that the new missile has no foreign analogues and is capable of penetrating any prospective missile defense. “This really unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces, reliably ensure Russia’s security from external threats and make those, who in the heat of frantic aggressive rhetoric try to threaten our country, think twice,” Putin said.⁷¹

Amid the new Western sanctions that banned the exports of high-tech products to Russia and specifically targeted its arms industries in response to Moscow’s action in Ukraine, Putin emphasized that the Sarmat is built exclusively from domestic components “Of course, this will simplify the serial production of the system by enterprises of the military-industrial sector and accelerate its delivery to the Strategic Missile Forces,” he added.⁷²

The Sarmat is a heavy missile that has been under development for several years to replace the Soviet-made Voyevoda, which was code-named Satan by the West and forms the core of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. “The Sarmat is the most powerful missile that has the highest range in the world, and it will significantly bolster the capability of the country’s strategic nuclear forces,” the Defense Ministry said in a statement.⁷³

The ministry said the Sarmat is capable of carrying hypersonic glide vehicles along with other types of warheads. The Russian military had previously said that the Avangard hypersonic vehicle could be fitted to the new missile. The military has said that the Avangard is capable of flying 27 times faster than the speed of sound and making sharp maneuvers on its way to target to dodge the enemy’s missile shield. It has been fitted to the existing Soviet-built intercontinental ballistic missiles instead of older type warheads, and the first unit armed with the Avangard entered duty in December 2019.⁷⁴

Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the state Roscosmos agency that oversees the missile factory building the Sarmat, described Wednesday’s test as a “present to NATO” in a comment on his messaging app channel. Rogozin said the Sarmat is set to be commissioned by the military this fall after the completion of its trials, calling it a “superweapon.”⁷⁵

Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of Russia’s National Defence magazine, told RIA news agency it was a signal to the West that Moscow was capable of meting out “crushing retribution that will put an end to the history of any country that has encroached on the security of Russia and its people”.⁷⁶

Moscow “properly notified” Washington of the test following its obligations under the 2011 New START treaty, which placed limits on the two countries’ nuclear weapons, said US Department of Defense Spokesman John Kirby. “Testing is routine and it was not a surprise,” Kirby told reporters. “Of course, the department remains focused on Russia’s unlawful and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.”⁷⁷

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the launch was an important milestone after years of delays caused by funding issues and design challenges. He said more tests would be needed before Russia could actually deploy it in place of ageing SS-18 and SS-19 missiles that were “well past their sell-by date”. Barrie said the Sarmat’s ability to carry 10 or more warheads and decoys, and Russia’s option of firing it over either of the Earth’s poles, posed a challenge to ground and satellite-based radar and tracking systems – “this complicates where you’ve got to look”.⁷⁸

Jack Watling of the RUSI think-tank in London said there was an element of posturing and symbolism involved, eight weeks into the war in Ukraine and less than three weeks before the annual Victory Day parade where Russia shows off its latest weapons. “The timing of the test reflects the Russians wanting to have something to show as a technological achievement in the lead-up to Victory Day, at a time when a lot of their technology has not delivered the results they would have liked in Ukraine,” he said.⁷⁹

Asked about Putin’s comments, a senior US defence official called them irresponsible. “We find that rhetoric to be to be unhelpful, given the current context of things, and certainly it’s not the kind of thing that we would expect from a responsible nuclear power, especially in the current environment,” the official said on condition of anonymity. The Pentagon said on March 2 it postponed a test of its own Minuteman III ICBM to avoid escalating tensions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the time, Kirby said the postponement was ordered by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin “to demonstrate that we are a responsible nuclear power”.⁸⁰

Launching the Ukraine invasion on February 24, Putin made a pointed reference to Russia’s nuclear forces and warned the West any attempt to get in its way “will lead you to such consequences that you have never encountered in your history”. Days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.⁸¹

Food for Thought

The seeming aim of the test-launch both from Russian military and political standpoints is to send a strong message to the West. Russian leader, Vladimir Putin was quoted to have said that the test-launch of the Sarmat or Satan II missile is to provide ‘food for thought for those who try to threaten Russia’ and will make his enemies ‘think twice’. What kind of food for thought that might be? Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of Russia’s National Defence magazine, also told RIA news agency that it was a signal to the West that Moscow was capable of meting out “crushing retribution that will put an end to the history of any country that has encroached on the security of Russia and its people”.

First, the West has not threatened nuclear war with Russia in its altercation with Ukraine. Rather it was Russia that has threatened nuclear war if the West should continue to support Ukraine. Thus Russia has resorted to arms-twisting or direct intimidation of the West over its war with Ukraine for fear it might lose the war and end up in humiliation as it has historically encountered since its failed military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to 1989 – an event that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact empire from the same 1989 to 1991. Russia is fearful of repeating the same experience within a generation.

In the wildest or scariest imagination in the strategic quarters in Western capitals, no one has been reported to have advocated for nuclear war with Russia in the contextual connection with the war in Ukraine. Such advocacy would have been roundly condemned even in the Western media. If such advocacy exists at all, it resides and sits secretly away at the outermost edge of mindset or consciousness among the strategists and decision makers. Of course, the strategists and decision makers are not unaware of the nuclear war scenario as threatened by Russia. But nobody is taking the bait nor alarmed at the turn of events or twists of trends that led to or warrant the threat of nuclear war from Russia. American nuclear forces are relatively at alert, such that such a threat could not have gone unnoticed or viewed with alarm. The same can also be safely assumed of the British and French nuclear forces. Indeed, it has not escapef notice that the West responded to the Russian nuclear threat with calmness or lukewarmness, without displaying any hysteria with protests in the streets of Western capitals. It is not impossible that the threat may have been derided and dismissed as “nonsense” in the War Rooms of Washington, London and Paris.  

Second, the war situation in Ukraine has not escalated to the point where Russian entire national security interests or sovereignty of the Russian State and its territorial integrity and safety of its people are under massive threat of annihilation. The war is still being conducted on Ukrainian soil and has not crossed or spilled over into the Russian territory. Russian nuclear arsenal itself is not under any perceived threat. Apart from the loss of its personnel, Russia has not suffered damage to any of its infrastructures that serve as pillars of the Russian State and its military power. Russia has lost military hardware including the huge naval warship, Moskva. But this has not vitiated its ability to continue with the war against Ukraine. Russia still believe it can win the war by conventional means and has not even factor in the use of nuclear weapons going by the ways the war is currently unfolding. Ukraine has not inflicted heavy or any substantial damage that could alter the balance of power in the battlefield domain so far. Ukraine is still conducting what may be regarded as asymmetric warfare against the Russians to wear them down. While Russia has displayed superior firepower, Ukraine on the other hand has demonstrated high level resistance and resilience of spirit against all odds stacked against it in the war.

Among the weapons moved by the West into Ukraine so far, nothing has come close to threaten Russian nuclear arsenal. Not until that is done, the hues and cries about nuclear threat from the West will only remain noise without any substance to it. Not until, for instance, heavy weapons such as long-range cruise missile that can strike at any big Russian city or its military installations is seen to have been moved into Ukraine and deployed by it in combat, the threat of nuclear war will remain a mirage or avoidable. Russia is merely trying to forestall the possibility of such movement of heavy weapons into Ukraine that can tilt the scale of war to its disadvantage by its issuance of nuclear threat in advance.

From the Western perspective, Putin is not seen as suicidal enough to start a nuclear war without any justification for it, for instance, reckless provocation of any typology from the West. Putin is still largely regarded as sane enough not to start a war he cannot finish or that will also consume him and his political base. 

Encroachment on the security of Russia and its people seem to be the guiding rule for unleashing nuclear Armageddon on its perceived enemies. But there has been no known encroachment of any sort on the security of Russia and its people by any definition, legally speaking. Ukraine is not a superpower. Rather it is Russia as a superpower that has gone to invade a “dwarf” that suddenly and surprisingly turned out to be a fierce fighter for its own survival against the onslaught of the Russia with its hitherto known military might.

So the question remains: could Russia ever detonate tactical nuclear weapon on Ukraine and thus start a nuclear war?

In the interim, it can be argued that it is not possible because Russia still have the upper hand in the ongoing ground battle in Ukraine and believe it can still conveniently win the war in the long run. However, in a counter-factual reasoning it is not impossible in the worst case scenario – especially if Russia thinks it is about to lose the war and to avoid humiliation and save face – it might tinker with the idea of the unthinkable. But thinking through this unthinkable scenario, the corollary fundamental questions to ask are: what could push Russia to press the nuclear button? What would be the strategic advantage and political goal of such a nuclear attack upon the fact that Ukraine is not a nuclear power and has not secretly or openly acquire nuclear weaponry from any of its numerous allies in the West in the fight against Russia?

There is no doubt that Russia still has the strategic advantage given its nuclear power status. But Russia would not rush ahead to explode a nuclear missile over Ukraine because of such a fact. Nuclear weaponry is not a low-hanging fruit that can be randomly plucked and thrown at the enemy. From a military standpoint, Russia may only entertain such nuclear strike mainly to save face from an overwhelming military defeat in the hands of the Ukrainians. But there is no immediate visible political goal that Russia may wish to achieve in launching a nuclear strike against Ukraine even with the recognition that the West may not respond or retaliate against such nuclear explosion over Ukraine (mainly to avoid escalation into nuclear exchange between Russia and the West). But if Russia should launch any nuclear strike against any NATO member, it can then expect full and profound retaliation from the West. 

Then what Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of Russia’s National Defence magazine, told RIA news agency would now unfortunately apply to Russia: a “crushing retribution that will put an end to the history of that country (Russia)” that has, in a dare-devilry, encroached upon the democratic foundations and security of the Western world (civilization).

The technical details of the Satan II ICBM are not lost on the Western nuclear powers (United States, United Kingdom and France). But the propaganda surrounding the launch is a waste of everybody’s precious time in view of the escalating situation in Ukraine. In other words, while the intended and unintended underlining messages have been well received and noted by the Western strategic quarters, nobody is rattled or shocked but only probably amused or amazed at the cheap content of the messages and the propaganda outlay including the desperate extent to which Putin want to go to pass these messages to the West via the conveyor belt of test-launching an ICBM while the war is still raging in Ukraine.

Perhaps Russia is secretly afraid of being technically defeated in Ukraine forcing it to withdraw in humiliation without achieving the aims for which it invaded Ukraine in the first instance. This cannot be ruled out in the analysis of the corpus of reasoning behind this test-launch. Nuclear sabre-rattling is a face-saving device, though a cheap one for that matter, to kick the Western Alliance in the ass or groin for the overwhelming support it has unequivocally given Ukraine.

From the strategic military domain, the test-launch reveals a weak point in the Russia Nuclear Triad – its land or silo-based nuclear weapons – precisely like the United States in its Nuclear Triad.

Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remains low. Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns said the United States has not “seen a lot of practical evidence of the kind of deployments or military dispositions that would reinforce that concern.”⁸²

The threat of nuclear war would not easily go away. It raises its ugly head again when Russian occupied southern and eastern Ukraine is reported to be likely annexed to the Russian Federation or as independent nations under the protection of Russia.

According to Katherine Lawlor and Mason Clark this may likely lead to exercise of the “doctrine permitting the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory applies to those newly annexed territories. Such actions would threaten Ukraine and its partners with nuclear attack if Ukrainian counteroffensives to liberate Russian-occupied territory continue. Putin may believe that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would restore Russian deterrence after his disastrous invasion shattered Russia’s conventional deterrent capabilities.⁸³

Putin’s timeline for annexation is likely contingent on the extent to which he understands the degraded state of the Russian military in Ukraine. The Russian military has not yet achieved Putin’s stated territorial objectives of securing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and is unlikely to do so. If Putin understands his military weakness, he will likely rush annexation and introduce the nuclear deterrent quickly in an attempt to retain control of the Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies. If Putin believes that Russian forces are capable of additional advances, he will likely delay the annexation in hopes of covering more territory with it. In that case, his poor leadership and Ukrainian counteroffensives could drive the Russian military toward a state of collapse. Putin could also attempt to maintain Russian attacks while mobilizing additional forces. He might delay announcing annexation for far longer in this case, waiting until reinforcements could arrive to gain more territory to annex.⁸⁴

Ukraine and its Western partners likely have a narrow window of opportunity to support a Ukrainian counteroffensive into occupied Ukrainian territory before the Kremlin annexes that territory. Ukraine and the West must also develop a coherent plan for responding to any annexation and to the threat of nuclear attack that might follow it. The political and ethical consequences of a longstanding Russian occupation of southeastern Ukraine would be devastating to the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state. Vital Ukrainian and Western national interests require urgent Western support for an immediate Ukrainian counteroffensive.⁸⁵

The Kremlin could threaten to use nuclear weapons against a Ukrainian counteroffensive into annexed territory to deter the ongoing Western military aid that would enable such a counteroffensive. The Kremlin has already falsely claimed that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory—during an unprovoked war of Russian aggression against Ukraine—are somehow escalatory rather than a legal Ukrainian response under the laws of war. However, Russian nuclear doctrine clearly allows for nuclear weapons use in response to “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” The Kremlin could frame a Ukrainian counteroffensive into annexed Ukrainian territory as a threat to the existence of the Russian state—such an absurd claim would be no less plausible than many other claims Russia has already made. Making that claim, however, likely necessitates Russian annexation of occupied territories, rather than creating additional proxy statelets in places like Kherson and Zaporizhia.⁸⁶ 

The Kremlin could believe that a nuclear threat would deter ongoing Western military aid that would enable such a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine and the West should not let that happen. The Kremlin has likely calculated that NATO would rhetorically and materially support Ukrainian counteroffensives into a hypothetical proxy statelet Kherson People’s Republic (or simply Russianoccupied Ukraine), but would not support Ukrainian attacks into the Kherson Oblast of Russia, for example.⁸⁷

The Kremlin may also believe that Kyiv would be unwilling to directly attack claimed Russian territory, particularly after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on March 27 that Ukraine would not try to recapture all Russian-held territory by force, arguing that it could lead to a third world war. Zelensky has repeatedly called for the restoration of the de facto borders as of February 23, the day before Russia’s latest invasion. The Kremlin could conceivably believe that annexation would prevent Ukrainian counteroffensives, even without an explicit nuclear threat.⁸⁸

When some Atlantic Council experts were asked the question: What’s the likelihood that Vladimir Putin uses nuclear weapons in the course of the war in Ukraine? Alexander Vershbow, a distinguished fellow at the Council’s Scowcroft and Eurasia centers, who served as US ambassador to Russia from 2001 to 2005, and deputy secretary general of NATO from 2012 to 2016, answered:  In my view, the probability is very low – not zero, but less than 5 percent. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling has been aimed at deterring the United States and its allies from escalating their involvement in the war and introducing advanced military capabilities that could give Ukrainian forces a decisive advantage. If Russian forces suffered another humiliating defeat in the campaign to control [the southeastern Ukrainian region of] Donbas, Putin could be pressed by hardliners to deliver on his nuclear threats; but he is unlikely to do so, since this would only galvanize a harsh US and allied response without providing any significant military advantage. Even in the wake of a major military setback, Putin would not likely run the risk of uncontrolled escalation by being the first to break the nuclear taboo. He is more likely to escalate conventional attacks on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, as well as against allied [weapons] resupply operations.⁸⁹

Jan Lodal, a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Center and president of the Atlantic Council from 2005 to 2006, also concurred. “The likelihood is very low. Nuclear deterrence works in peacetime, and it has worked to prevent the use of such weapons in past crises and confrontations (such as in Cuba, on the Korean peninsula, and in Vietnam)”.⁹⁰

But Keir Lieber, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security was of the view that Putin is more likely than not to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine if he faces devastating defeat. If Putin perceives an existential threat to his regime, then he will be compelled to prevent that outcome—even if that requires taking risky escalatory steps. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate tools of last resort; any rational leader would consider using them if his or her regime (or life) were on the line.⁹¹ 

In line with Lieber is Walter Slocombe, a board director at the Atlantic Council and a former US under secretary of defense for policy, who argued that Putin presumably expects his threats will induce NATO to abandon Ukraine. However, if he believes he is facing defeat or a costly stalemate—or has a chance of success through sharp escalation – there is some non-zero (perhaps a worryingly high 1 or 2 percent) risk he will carry out his threats. Even a small risk is deeply dangerous, and he should recognize the risk of starting a nuclear war, so deterring him is the most desirable outcome. Accordingly, NATO should say clearly that any nuclear attack by Russia would meet with a response potentially including nuclear weapons.⁹²  

The fateful question was also asked: If Putin were to use nuclear weapons in the conflict, what’s the most likely way he would do so?

Keir Lieber and Daryl Press were of the view that [t]he goal of nuclear escalation would be to send the message that Russia will not accept a devastating defeat and, accordingly, that the United States and its allies need to back off. Since the goal would be coercion, Putin would seek to create fear instead of rage. Thus, nuclear weapons would be used in Ukraine rather than on NATO territory, and they would be used against military, not civilian, targets. We would also expect Russia to seek some military advantage out of nuclear use (though this would be of secondary importance), so any attack would likely involve detonating half a dozen low-yield air bursts (in order to minimize fallout) against well-entrenched Ukrainian military positions.⁹³

Walter Slocombe was of the view thatPutin’s motive would not be military in nature, but rather intimidation. He might begin with the ostentatious movement of nuclear forces, such as sending weapons to Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. He could order a “demonstration” or possibly a detonation at a Russian test range. For an actual attack, he might target a facility in Ukraine (or conceivably in Poland) associated with Western supply of arms.⁹⁴

Alexander Vershbow said that [w]hile unlikely, it is not inconceivable that Putin could decide to use nuclear weapons to stave off defeat. In that scenario, I would expect him to limit his initial use to a demonstration strike using a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon against a Ukrainian military target in order to minimize the scale of civilian casualties(and to discourage a US/NATO response in kind). He may hope that just by crossing the nuclear threshold, he would so shock Ukraine and its Western backers—and so terrify allied publics—that they would back down rather than risk further escalation.⁹⁵

Jan Lodal explained that [t]he sequence would look like this: Putin would first create a “provocation,” then hit a high-value target such as Kyiv in hopes of getting Ukraine to accept “peace at any cost.” However, he would also seek to avoid any potential spillover (such as radiation) into any NATO state.⁹⁶

The final question was asked: Should Putin use nuclear weapons in the war, what are the most likely ways the United States and its allies would respond?

Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that [i]f Putin uses nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies would face only grim options. Launching a disarming conventional or nuclear attack in response would be insane, since it would risk massive retaliation (and perhaps the end of civilization). Engaging in an escalatory tit-for-tat would be foolish because Putin has much more at stake—his regime’s survival, and perhaps even his life—than the West does. Tightening sanctions would merely increase the risk to Putin’s regime, which would fuel incentives for further nuclear escalation. The only wise response to Putin’s nuclear use in Ukraine would be to negotiate some kind of resolution in which all parties could declare Potemkin victories. If that is the chosen path, it makes far more sense now to dial down US rhetoric about regime change or decisive victory and, instead, find a solution before nuclear weapons are used.⁹⁷

Walter Slocombe stated: Assuming the United States, NATO, and Ukraine could agree on any action, there are several possibilities. If the Russian attack caused little damage, NATO might first try to issue an ultimatum with the aim of reaching a settlement on the Alliance’s and Ukraine’s terms. But if Putin had convinced himself that there was no other option but to strike, he would be unlikely to acquiesce to any allied proposals for such a settlement. Similarly, a non-nuclear military response (for example, conventional strikes on military bases and infrastructure in Russian territory that are supporting the invasion) would probably not be decisive and would appear inadequate to many—in addition to carrying its own risks of escalation.⁹⁸ 

That leaves the option, for which NATO forces are fully adequate, of a strike tailored to the scale and character of the Russian one. Some would understandably argue that continuing to defend Ukraine is simply not worth risking a nuclear escalation. But while it is easy to see the risks of a nuclear counterstrike, there are also serious implications of not doing it: The absence of a US nuclear response would gravely weaken the credibility among both friends and adversaries of the entire strategy of deterring nuclear attack through the prospect of US nuclear retaliation. This, in turn, would make a bigger war more likely. May we never need to face the choice.⁹⁹

Alexander Vershbow was of the view that [i]f Putin resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies would need to respond quickly and decisively to ensure that Putin paid a heavy price for crossing the nuclear threshold. An initial response, calibrated to reduce the risks of escalation, could involve a major strike with conventional weapons against high-value Russian military targets involved in the war against Ukraine (such as the Black Sea Fleet). But the United States and its allies should maintain ambiguity in their declaratory policy as to whether they would respond in kind, rather than using only conventional forces. Such ambiguity regarding the nature and scope of the response would be more effective in deterring Putin from using nuclear weapons in the first place. Allies should consult now on possible response options so that they are not paralyzed with indecision when crunch time comes.¹⁰⁰ 

Jan Lodal said the United States and its allies should deploy conventional weapons to quickly defeat Putin’s military in Ukraine and make clear that his use of nuclear weapons achieved nothing but defeat. In addition to providing an even higher level of military support, Ukraine’s Western partners would deploy naval forces to the Black Sea to destroy all Russian ships as well as Russia’s bridge to Crimea (a thirty-day mission); give Ukraine air superiority using Patriot missiles and, if necessary, US advanced jet fighters; and station US and allied intelligence, logistics, and humanitarian support units inside Ukraine.¹⁰¹

According to Alexander Hill, a professor of military history at the University of Calgary: “[i]n precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin’s intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine.”¹⁰²

Although NATO hasn’t sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks.¹⁰³ NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia. Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals.¹⁰⁴

Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn’t be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today.¹⁰⁵ Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine.¹⁰⁶ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so.¹⁰⁷ These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power.¹⁰⁸

The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin’s war in Ukraine. It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict.¹⁰⁹

Richard Hooker, Jr. was even of the view that [w]e can expect more nuclear threats, backed up by the visible deployment of tactical nuclear systems in the theater of operations. Use of primitive weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chlorine gas, may well begin to increase terror. As Western-provided lethal aid becomes more and more decisive, Putin will step up his efforts to interdict ground lines of communication, raising the chances of fires that stray across national boundaries into NATO territory. While probably intentional, these may be dismissed as accidental or Western provocations.¹¹⁰

According to Scott Sagan, Washington should be prepared to take further military steps if Moscow crosses the nuclear threshold. Senior officials should not specify exactly what kind of military response would be ordered, but a clear statement that crossing the nuclear threshold would bring the gravest consequences for Russia and for Putin might help deter such action. And the U.S. should remind Russian military leaders that any nuclear use against a Ukrainian city will be treated as a war crime and that they, not just Putin, will be treated as war criminals. The Russian military may not mind targeting civilians, as it has shown in its operations in Chechnya, in Syria, and now in Ukraine. But they do care about protecting themselves. Do they really want to live in a world in which they have broken the tradition of nuclear non-use that has existed since 1945? They may think twice about agreeing to drop nuclear bombs if they know that they may one day find themselves permanently imprisoned for their actions. And if Putin gives such a reckless, dangerous order, it may just be the last straw that makes other leaders in Moscow decide that he finally has to go.¹¹¹

Sagan, the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), says that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reminder of Russia’s nuclear arsenal at the beginning of its recent invasion into Ukraine is a warning to the United States and other NATO members that if they get directly involved in the conflict, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation.¹¹²

Sagan draws attention to historical precedents, if they are to be regarded as precedents. “The Pakistanis moved soldiers into Indian-held Kashmir soon after Islamabad first tested nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein wanted nuclear weapons and told his senior generals that if he got them, he would order a conventional attack to take back the West Bank and Golan Heights from Israel.”¹¹³ “Similarly, Putin was brandishing his nuclear arsenal to remind the U.S. and other NATO powers that if they get directly involved in his war of aggression in Ukraine, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation.”¹¹⁴ Therefore, there is a sense in which “it’s important to understand that nuclear weapons are not just a force used to deter another state from attacking. They can also be a shield behind which one can undertake aggression.”¹¹⁵

But Putin’s threats did not deter Washington and many NATO governments from “interfering” in Moscow’s attempt to overthrow the Zelenskyy government in many other ways, short of direct combat with the Russians. We have given the Ukrainian government millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including air defense systems and advanced anti-tank missiles, and have provided intelligence support. Without such rapid resupply of military equipment, the Ukrainians might well have lost the war already. Now they have turned back the Russian assault on Kyiv and Putin appears to have shifted his war aims from overthrowing the elected Ukrainian government to “liberating” the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine and possibly annexing it into Russia as he did with Crimea in 2014.¹¹⁶

The Black Sea as a likely theatre of nuclear war

Strategic movement in the Black Sea continues with Russia reportedly loading cruise missiles onto a pair of submarines among its Black Sea fleet. This comes just days after a report that stated the U.S. was preparing to target the Russian fleet to free up paths for Ukraine to export grain.¹¹⁷

Two Russian submarines have already moored at berths in the South Bay of Sevastopol to onload the Kalibr missiles, according to the Ukrainian media outlet Kyrm.Realii. Four of these “Caliber” types of missiles will be loaded upon two of the six Varshavyanka submarines, which are designed to fire these kinds of missiles that have both land and sea capability strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2017 said these missiles have the ability to strike a target from 1,400 kilometers (870 miles) from the underwater vessels.¹¹⁸

On Tuesday [May 24], a Ukrainian defense minister said the Black Sea fleet of Russia was planning to use the submarine missiles for strikes on the Ukraine territory. “Now the ship’s composition is used to strike with cruise missiles, this is a clear combat duty – two frigates, four small missile ships, two submarines, constantly on combat duty and constantly striking our territory using Caliber cruise missiles,” said Vadym Skibitsky, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.¹¹⁹

Ukraine is one of the world’s largest exporters of grain. Russia has prevented the export of Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean, where it can then have a global reach. This has already caused fears of a global food shortage that could lead to rising costs in some nations and starvation in others.

[On May 20, 2022], Ukrainian ministry of internal affairs adviser Anton Gerashchenko said the U.S. was getting ready to destroy Russia’s Black Sea fleet. “The effective work of the Ukrainians on warships convinced (the USA) to prepare a plan to unblock the ports,” Gerashchenko tweeted. “Deliveries of powerful anti-ship weapons (Harpoon and Naval Strike Missile with a range of 250-300 km) are being discussed.”¹²⁰

Sevastopol is the largest city in the Crimea peninsula, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014. It’s also one of the major ports in the Black Sea — and where the cruise missiles are reportedly being onloaded—along with the port city Odesa in southern Ukraine, which is one of the most northern ports of the Black Sea.¹²¹

Another report by Newsweek claimed that Russia is developing hypersonic missile system to up the ante in the Ukraine war.

A system designed to launch one of Russia’s much-vaunted hypersonic missiles is expected to be ready for use by the end of the year, state media have reported.¹²² News agency Tass said that a system to launch the Tsirkon missile was being developed at the renowned rocket design bureau NPO Mashinostroyenia in Reutov, near Moscow, which Newsweek has contacted for comment. A military source told the agency that the coastal missile system is slated to enter service with the Russian Navy “by the end of 2022.”¹²³

Another source said the new system will have the capacity to strike both ground- and sea-based targets. This would give it the same capability as its predecessor, the Bastion, which deploys Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. Anatoly Svintsov, deputy general director of NPO Mashinostroeniya, told the Zvezda military TV channel that while there were aviation- and sea-based versions of the Tsirkon, his factory had been ordered to “intensify work on the creation of a marine version of the rocket.”¹²⁴

The report of the missile system’s development comes as the Russian Navy plays an increasingly critical role in the Ukraine war. This week, Russia reported loaded Kalibr cruise missiles onto two Varshavyanka submarines in the Black Sea, only days after it was said that the U.S. would target the Russian fleet to free up grain stranded at Ukrainian ports.¹²⁵

Before his invasion of Ukraine, Putin repeatedly boasted about the capabilities of his country’s hypersonic missiles, which are faster and more agile than standard ones and are harder for defense systems to intercept. Over the last two and a half years, Russia has said it had test-launched the Tsirkon missile a number of times from its Northern Fleet vessel Admiral Gorshkov. Moscow says it can hit targets up to 660 miles away.¹²⁶ At Mach 9, the Tsirkon missile is at the low end of the hypersonic spectrum. As Newsweek has previously reported, unlike pure hypersonic missiles which rely on scramjets, it is believed to be a hybrid cruise missile and ballistic missile. Experts have warned that it could overwhelm the American Aegis Combat System. In March, Russia said it had used hypersonic missiles for the first time in the Ukraine war, targeting a military warehouse in the Ivano-Frankivsk region in the west of the country with its newest Kinzhal weapon.¹²⁷

The war in Ukraine has gone beyond President Volodymyr Zelensky and even beyond Vladimir Putin. The war has degenerated into a ferocious proxy war between the West and Russia especially between President Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin. It has become a battle between the US, UK and Canada, and lastly Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on the other. The US in particular has embraced the war in Ukraine as its own war against Russia. It is in this sense that the question has been asked whether President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin could ever meet to reconcile their differences especially when nuclear threat has come into play.

On May 31, 2022, President Joe Biden issued a stern warning ever to Russia, in an opinion published in the New York Times: “Let me be clear: Any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and entail severe consequences.”¹²⁹

What President Biden is probably saying is that any use of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or nuclear, whether few or many, would be met with retaliation of its own kind but on a more severe scale. Even though Washington officials said the consequences would almost certainly be non-nuclear, this could mean going into ground battle to smash up the Russian military once and for all. The Russian military has revealed all its vulnerabilities for the whole world to see. Further threats from Russia to deploy nuclear weapons may tempt NATO to go into ground battle with Russia to settle scores once and for all. To this author, it is better for Russia not stretch its luck too far. Russia should no longer issue more nuclear threats. The ones already issued are provocative enough.

President Biden said he wants to be clear about the aims of the United States in the war in Ukraine “America’s goal is straightforward: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression.”¹³⁰

As President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ultimately this war “will only definitively end through diplomacy.” Every negotiation reflects the facts on the ground. We have moved quickly to send Ukraine a significant amount of weaponry and ammunition so it can fight on the battlefield and be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.¹³¹ That’s why I’ve decided that we will provide the Ukrainians with more advanced rocket systems and munitions that will enable them to more precisely strike key targets on the battlefield in Ukraine.¹³²

We will continue cooperating with our allies and partners on Russian sanctions, the toughest ever imposed on a major economy. We will continue providing Ukraine with advanced weaponry, including Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger antiaircraft missiles, powerful artillery and precision rocket systems, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles, Mi-17 helicopters and ammunition. We will also send billions more in financial assistance, as authorized by Congress. We will work with our allies and partners to address the global food crisis that Russia’s aggression is worsening. And we will help our European allies and others reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and speed our transition to a clean energy future.¹³³

We will also continue reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank with forces and capabilities from the United States and other allies. And just recently, I welcomed Finland’s and Sweden’s applications to join NATO, a move that will strengthen overall U.S. and trans-Atlantic security by adding two democratic and highly capable military partners.¹³⁴

One of the stated reasons for the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was that the attempted application by Ukraine to join NATO poses an existential threat to Russia. Embedded in this is the sum of all fears that it is being gradually encircled by NATO and that Ukraine joining NATO will complete this encirclement. Russia may not be too far from the truth about. Unfortunately, it is Russia that is now seen to be accelerating this self-encirclement by the invasion of Ukraine which has brought NATO to the affirmative side of Ukraine.

President Biden stated unequivocally: We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. As much as I disagree with Mr. Putin, and find his actions an outrage, the United States will not try to bring about his ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.¹³⁵

My principle throughout this crisis has been “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” I will not pressure the Ukrainian government — in private or public — to make any territorial concessions. It would be wrong and contrary to well-settled principles to do so.¹³⁶ Ukraine’s talks with Russia are not stalled because Ukraine has turned its back on diplomacy. They are stalled because Russia continues to wage a war to take control of as much of Ukraine as it can. The United States will continue to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict.¹³⁷

Unprovoked aggression, the bombing of maternity hospitals and centers of culture, and the forced displacement of millions of people make the war in Ukraine a profound moral issue. I met with Ukrainian refugees in Poland — women and children who were unsure what their lives would be, and whether the loved ones who stayed behind in Ukraine would be OK. No person of conscience could be unmoved by the devastation of these horrors.¹³⁸

Standing by Ukraine in its hour of need is not just the right thing to do. It is in our vital national interests to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe and to make it clear that might does not make right. If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with catastrophic consequences the world over.¹³⁹

For all things, the West has been cautious enough especially not to escalate the war beyond Ukrainian borders, preventing it from spilling over into NATO members’ territories bordering Ukraine. President Biden himself has declared that he would like to avoid leading NATO into a ground battle with Russia. That was even before Russian military weaknesses and/or vulnerabilities became public knowledge – not to even talk of avoiding nuclear war at all cost. Thus from all intents, it can be seen clearly that the West has decided not to be provoked into any form of rash action that could either lead into possible ground battle or exchange of nuclear fisticuffs. But the question now is what happens when the push comes to a shove? What happens when Russia make good its threat by ordering, for instance, tactical nuclear strike against Ukraine or a NATO member, for instance again. Would the West look the other way or turn the other cheek?

It would be recalled that North Korea was and still is in the habit of issuing nuclear threats particularly against the United States from time to time. North Korea has not stopped test-launching all manners of nuclear missiles. But the United States no longer feel threatened by the North Korean nuclear sabre-rattling because it has become more evident that North Korea is only grandstanding to gain more attention to itself. It is only occasionally, depending on the prevailing circumstances especially when the test-launch is seen to be impacting on South Korean and Japanese security does the US respond in terms of public reaction. Otherwise, US would rather ignore North Korean antics. But it got to the point in 2017 when North Korea was becoming almost uncontrollable that former President Donald Trump went before the whole world at the United Nations General Assembly to threaten North Korea with complete nuclear annihilation from the face of the earth if it does not desist from threatening the US, South Korea and Japan with nuclear attack. That put paid to North Korean rattling of the nuclear Sword of Damocles at the face of the US, South Korea and Japan. In June 2018, President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader, Kim Jung-Un in Singapore, the first of such meeting ever, for hand-shaking, photo-ops, negotiation, etc. So the question again: would Biden meet with Putin in light of the current situation?

Conclusion

The issuance of the nuclear threat by Russia in the early stage of the war with Ukraine can be seen to actually meant to prevent the West or to serve as deterrent from supporting Ukraine militarily, politically and economically to enable Russia deal with Ukraine the ways it wants notably to conquer and crush Ukraine militarily and ultimately to subordinate and/or annex Ukraine to its orbit of influence. The test-launch of the SAMAT or Satan II ICBM is to further reinforce the above aim by intimidating the West.

Unfortunately, both aims have not been achieved by Russia. Russia has not been able to prevent the West from supporting Ukraine militarily, politically and economically. The West has not only done this, it has even gone to punish Russia severely with economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and political pressure. Russia is literally a pariah state in the Western dominated international order. Significantly, the West has not been intimidated by the nuclear test-launch of Russian SAMAT or Satan II ICBM. In fact, the West did not regard the test-launch beyond the conventional paradigm of general nuclear test-launches in which it is also engaged from time to time. There is nothing spectacular or outstanding about the test-launch for which Russia has expended so much rhetoric and/or propaganda.

As it stands today, Russia is pushing to excise the eastern and south-eastern part of Ukraine from the rest of Ukraine. Mariupol has already fallen into its hands. Severodonetsk is about to fall as at the time of writing. But the tide of war can still change. Peaceful resolution of the conflict is off the negotiating table for now. Both sides of the conflict still have a long way to go to achieve their diametrically opposed aims. Ukraine does not look like it is going to surrender very soon. Neither is Russia willing to withdraw its forces from Ukraine. Both sides are locked in fixated positions.

The US is now ready to send heavy weapons such as powerful rocket systems to Ukraine but with the proviso that Ukraine does not fire them into Russian territories. Germany, after procrastination or prevarication, is now also willing to send advanced air-defense system and tracking radar to Ukraine to help locate Russia’s heavy artilleries that have tormented Ukraine since the beginning of the war.¹⁴⁰ Western officials hope that weapons from the US and Germany could help Ukrainians turn the tide of the war, especially in the east, where Moscow remains focused on capturing Sievierodonetsk, despite fierce resistance from Ukrainians. It is the last city in the Luhansk region that is not under Russian control.¹⁴¹

President Biden stated unequivocally: Americans will stay the course with the Ukrainian people because we understand that freedom is not free. That’s what we have always done whenever the enemies of freedom seek to bully and oppress innocent people, and it is what we are doing now. Vladimir Putin did not expect this degree of unity or the strength of our response. He was mistaken. If he expects that we will waver or fracture in the months to come, he is equally mistaken.¹⁴²

Russia has lost the moral high ground in this war.