Attack on Nigerian Army University: ISWAP vs the Nigerian State: Who Blinks First?

By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY

Executive Summary

1. Dispassionate analysis of the ongoing security crisis in Nigeria would inevitably come to the conclusion that there now exist a sort of dual or bipolar power base in the country vying for hegemonic supremacy. The first power base is the absolute power commanded by the Nigerian State with all habiliments of waging war: the armed forces and security services and their instruments of inflicting violence on the citizens, huge revenue base, international diplomatic clout, propaganda machineries, etc. The second power base is the aggregate sum of power controlled by the assortment of extremely violent non-state actors notably Boko Haram, Islamic State for West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru, various groups of bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers – all of them spread across the length and breadth of the Northern part of the country, with their different ideological leanings, coupled with their kamikaze kinetic attacks on various targets (both hard and soft targets) including individuals, with their quasi-propaganda machineries, illegal revenue base, allegiance and alliance with various international terrorist and/or criminal organizations, powerful individuals (who provide morale and funds), etc. Thus despite the might of the Nigerian State, it is wondrous to note that it is being held hostage and forced to pay steep political premium/ransom by these bodies of extremely violent non-state actors in their sworn attempt to bring the Nigerian State to its knee.
2. The attack on the Nigerian Army University in Biu, Borno State, by the Islamic State for West Africa Province on January 10, 2022, is further testimony to the power of ISWAP in challenging the might of the Nigerian State. It is further heightening geopolitical risk premium in already steep socio-political prices coming from the unending conflicts, violence and tension in the North eastern part of the country. The security crisis has spread throughout the length and breadth of Northern Nigeria. This growing geopolitical risk is coming at a time when the country is preparing for another general election that will come up in early 2023 and while there is already enough concerns in the country over the potential impact of an escalation of insecurity in the country not only in the North east, but also in the North west, North Central and South east. These growing risks, against the background of visible inability of the Nigerian military and other security agencies to contain the growing insecurity may mean that the country may be heading towards strategic failure as a nation-state. The question here is whether this administration will be able to, once again, coral the various insurgent groups by backdoor negotiations and bribery to allow elections to take place in various security flash points across the North the way it did in 2019 general elections to secure landslide electoral victories in those places?
3. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the Nigerian State has come under enormous stress with heavy moral penalty and financial burden in its stand against the various groups of violent non-state actors. The State has not been able to rationalize away the escalation of conflicts and upsurge of violence that has become a permanent feature of social and political life of the country since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. The State has also spent trillions of naira combating these various extremist groups – financial resources that could have been handy in the economic and infrastructure development of the country. There is regression of social mores into the Hobessian state of nature where life has become short, nasty, brutish and hopeless.
4. Of all the various violent non-state actors, the Islamic State for West African Province (ISWAP) that broke away from mainstream Boko Haram in 2016 has now emerged as one of the most dangerous enemies of the Nigerian State, even surpassing Boko Haram in its brutality and increasing number of attacks on the Nigerian State. It has become a dreaded and frightful monster that gives no inch in its Manichean quest to humiliate and bring down the Nigerian State by wearing it down in fratricidal asymmetric warfare over arch of time and space.
5. There can be no doubt anymore that the existing national defense policy and national security strategy are a resounding failure in view of the inability of the Nigerian State to defeat both the Boko Haram and Islamic State for West Africa Province in the last eleven and seven years respectively. Both the national defense policy and national security strategy need reappraisal in view of the mortal threat these terrorist groups represent to the existence of the Nigerian State and its sovereignty, not to mention other asymmetric threats posed by bandits, kidnappers and herdsmen killers to internal security. The Police and other security agencies need full-scale reforms to enable them join as equal partners in the enormous task of defeating these assorted criminal groups.
6. In response to the increasing attacks on the Nigerian State, a new body of languages have emerged directly from President Muhammadu Buhari who had been quoted several times in the media, too numerous to mention, stating that the insurgents, terrorists, bandits should be “eliminated”, “crushed”, “killed”, “wiped out” – without recourse to rule of law, rules of engagement in the war theatre, thus ruling out taking prisoners of war in order to mine intelligence from them, etc. This body of languages is in direct contradiction to earlier policy of taking prisoners of war, rehabilitating them, and returning them back into the society or even direct employment with the Nigerian Armed Forces and allied bodies. The new lingos are a tacit admission of the failure of the Nigerian military and security agencies in overcoming the security challenges facing the country. But more important is the fact the languages have not been seen to serve as morale booster for the Nigerian military to launch a full-scale war against the insurgents. They have not altered the dynamics of the war from what it has always been especially on the part of the Nigerian military. They seem not to have registered any impression on the mind of the foot soldiers fighting at the battle fields. They have not refined the strategies and tactics of the military high command. The languages are just, unfortunately, waste of energy for want of better or refined languages to use. They are simply crude!

The Story

It was a New Year gift from the Islamic insurgents. On January 10, 2021, Islamic State for West Africa Province (hereinafter referred to as ISWAP) launched a deadly attack on the premises of the Nigerian Army University located in Biu town, Borno State. The attack did not attract screaming front-page headlines in the newspapers. No online media platform reported it as “breaking news”.  It was rather a less-than-five minute video of the attack that circulated on the social media that first generated public awareness of the attack.¹

In the video can be seen ISWAP fighters heavily armed shooting sporadically, pulling down three flags including that of Nigeria and the Nigerian Army. Army vehicles packed within the premises were burnt down including the entrance to the building housing Tukur Buratai Institute for War and Peace while two employees of the University were reported killed. In the video, there was no immediate response from the soldiers stationed at the University and the ISWAP warriors had a field day ransacking the premises within the proximity of the attack.

According to Daily Post, fighters suspected to be members of the Islamic State for West Africa Province, ISWAP, on Monday evening [of January 10, 2022] attacked the Nigerian Army University campus for Security and Strategic Studies in Buratai town, Biu Local Government Area of Borno State.²

DAILY POST gathered that two employees of the university were killed by the insurgents. Speaking with residents and staff members of the university on Wednesday [two days later], it was learnt that the insurgents overran the soldiers guarding the campus, who after exhausting their bullets reportedly took to their heels. “It is very unfortunate. We lost two of our staff. The soldiers ran away after they have tried to stop them. Despite what looks like a good security presence we are shocked that these elements can still have the guts of taking the soldiers head on. We are shocked, worried and pained by this development. Nothing seemed to be right now for me before I saw this with my eyes and narrowly escaped.³

“We have been hearing of it. And the Army and government have told us time and time that these bad elements have been degraded. For me, this is an insult to Nigerians. From what I saw nothing has been done to explain how degraded these insurgents have been as alleged. I cannot speak of others outside the Campus but I know we lost two staff here and this is enough to cry out loud,” a staffer who did not want his name mentioned told DAILY POST.⁴

A relation of one of the victims, Mohammed Usman, said he would have been a victim but could not explain how he escaped the attack. “We were going to meet him (my late cousin) when suddenly we came right in the crossfire at the entrance of the campus. I don’t know how I escape. I saw myself running into one of the residences in town how it happened I cannot say. It was yesterday morning after the insurgents have left that we went back and we discover this cousin of ours was killed during the attack,” he said.⁵

Also, Galadima Gaji, a resident of Buratai town, told DAILY POST that it was horrifying when the insurgents came. According to him, they attacked everything on their way and rode back into the forest. “It is true that the Boko Haram attacked Buratai town. They were specific on the military institution but still they touch on some parts of the town. They killed three people that I know in town aside from the two university staff, who were buried yesterday,” Gaji said.⁶

Citing Daily Trust, Punch reported that the Islamic State in West Africa Province released a video of its fighters attacking Tukur Yusufu Buratai Institute for War and Peace, a research Institute of the Nigerian Army University, located in Buratai village, Biu Local Government Area of Borno State, on Monday. Buratai is the country home of the immediate past Chief of Army Staff and current Nigerian Ambassador to the Republic of Benin, Tukur Buratai.⁷

In the video, the insurgents were seen firing in different directions, with no resistance from troops, according to Daily Trust. The insurgents also pulled down flags on the campus and torched some military vehicles on ground. The insurgents had raided the institute on Monday evening, shooting heavy artillery and burnt down four cars.⁸

While reacting, the management of Army University Biu in a statement confirmed that two civilians lost their lives but that normalcy had since returned. “The terrorists who came in their numbers were met by superior firepower forcing them to retreat in disarray. Unfortunately, 2 civilian staff of the Institute paid the supreme price.⁹

“Management wishes to commend troops for their gallantry during the attack and to commiserate with families of the fallen staff. Finally, management wishes to assure the general public that the Institute remains 100% operational as security has been beefed up in the general area,” the statement read in part.¹⁰

Insurgents have continued to attack both military and civilians in Borno and other parts of the North-East. Earlier in the week, Governor Babagana Zulum said two local government areas in the state were under Boko Haram control.^{11, 12}

However, in a four-paragraph press statement issued by the Nigerian Army spokesman, Brigadier General Onyema Nwachukwu, on January 16, 2022, titled “OPERATION HADIN KAI: DECISIVE BLOW, AS TROOPS NEUTRALIZE BHT/ISWAP TERRORISTS IN BIU ATTEMPTED INFILTRATION”, the Nigerian Army high command claimed that “troops of Sector 2 Joint Task Force (JTF) North East (NE) Operation HADIN KAI(OPHK) have dealt decisively with Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists, who made frantic attempt to infiltrate the ancient town of Biu, Borno State.¹³ The criminal elements met their Waterloo, when the gallant troops of 231 Battalion and 331 Artillery Regiment swiftly routed them in a failed incursion at Maina Hari village in Biu on Saturday15 January 2022.¹⁴ In the intense battle, troops unleashed superior fire power on the terrorists, neutralizing five BH/ISWAP terrorists, compelling others to withdraw in disarray.¹⁵ The gallant troops also captured from the terrorists, one gun truck, one Deshka M Anti-Aircraft Gun, one HK 21 Machine Gun, one Rocket Propelled Grenade Bomb, 137 rounds of 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft Rounds amongst others. Troops are currently in pursuit of the fleeing terrorists.^{16, 17}

The counter-attack from the Nigerian Army took place when the ISWAP fighters were going back to launch another attack on Biu town. This occurred just few days after ISWAP attacked Tukur Yusufu Buratai Institute for War and Peace (TBI), a research Institute of the Nigerian Army University, located in Buratai Village, Biu Local Government Area of Borno State.

According to Prnigeria, an online platform alleged to have close ties with the Nigerian military, the counter-attack took place after the Nigerian Army troops were alerted on the movement of the terrorists to attack Biu town, i.e. through intelligence information gathering.¹⁸

An intelligence military officer, who pleaded anonymity, said troops were mobilised to the route, immediately they received the alert. “We cautiously mobilised the troops and stationed them around Yamarkumi, a village about 5km away from Biu town in the southern part of Borno state. Not only did the ground troops engage them, but our Air Task Force also arrived timely and demobilised the gun trucks of the terrorists. Meanwhile, we have recovered huge weapons and ammunition from the terrorists. Some of the surviving terrorists fled towards Talala and Ajigin axis of Mandaragirau. But a NAF fighter aircraft engaged them,” he said.¹⁹

Biu town is the seat of the Nigeria Army University established about three years ago by the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Yusuf Buratai (rtd).²⁰ Biu is south and about 180km drive along the easiest Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu road which was shut down by motorists for the past 4 years.²¹

Sources and residents told Vanguard [newspaper] that the insurgents heavily armed had gained access through Damboa road axis from Sambisa Forests at about 2 pm on Saturday, but were intercepted at the Mainahari/Yamarkumi community Junction, just some 2km to Biu town by gallant troops with support from air force Task Team and men of Civilian Joint Task Force, hunters and vigilantes.²²

Some residents of Biu while speaking to our correspondent confirmed the attempted invasion of [the] terrorists but insisted that scores of the terrorists met their waterloo, including the destruction of their vehicles, arms and ammunition. Yakubu Isa, a resident of Yamarkumi village said, “I saw scores of dead bodies of the terrorists on the ground as their vehicles were consumed by heavy firepower from the troops”. All efforts to get confirmation from the Police Public Relations Officer, ASP Sani Shatambaya, proved abortive at press time, but a reliable security officer in Biu confirmed the incident, even as he couldn’t give the number of casualties, if any, from the side of the security forces.²³

From the above accounts, nobody can be certain of the number of ISWAP fighters killed by the federal troops. More worrisome is the confusion caused by interchangeable use of ISWAP and Boko Haram or lumping both together in a very unhealthy manner. The Institute for War and Peace was confused with Institute for Security and Strategic Studies, ad naseum. The Nigerian Army also use the term “Boko Haram Terrorists” pari-passu with ISWAP terrorists in a manner that can be seen to derive from its epistemic fixation with the words “terrorism”, “terrorists” (and their variants such as criminals, miscreants, hoodlums, etc) – whereas the greatest terrorists are the big masquerades behind the foot-soldiers – i.e. the financiers/sponsors and their ideologues (the latter who rationalize the insurgency and campaign of terror in the context of geopolitics between the North and South). In recent time too, the confusion is further deepened by the court declaration that bandits are terrorists and should therefore be classified as such where there is no jurisprudential basis for such classification. Unfortunately too, the media also suffer from this epistemic disease and peddle or prattle such nonsensical and confusing terms. 

This was attested to by the media between the highest authorities of the Nigerian Army and a section of the media as announced by the Director of Army Public Relations, Brigadier General Onyema Nwachukwu on January 13, 2022 through a press statement.

The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Faruk Yahaya has emphasized that the media plays key role in the success or otherwise of military operations and therefore remains an indispensable partner of the Nigerian Army. Gen Yahaya stated this [on] Thursday 13 January 2022, when he hosted the Managing Director/Editor-in-Chief of Sun Publishing Limited, Mr. Onuoha Ukeh and his management team at the Army Headquarters.²⁴ The COAS maintained that support and sacrifices of the media in the fight against insurgency and banditry are well noted and highly appreciated. He pointed out that expectations of the NA are that the media will continue to support the efforts of the military, as part of their patriotic duty, by giving publicity to troops’ operations, which he said, will undoubtedly shore up troops’ morale and fighting will.²⁵

General Yahaya disclosed that insurgents and bandits thrive on the publicity they get from a section of the media, noting that if their activities are denied media publicity, fifty percent of the military’s job would have been done.²⁶ In his remarks, the CEO of Sun Publishing Limited, Mr. Onuoha Ukeh, lauded the NA for its efforts and sacrifices towards stamping out terrorism, banditry and sundry violent crimes in the country.²⁷ He noted that the command style of the COAS and synergy with sister services and other security agencies have changed the dynamics of military operations, especially in the north east, where elements of Boko Haram fighters are surrendering to the troops in droves.²⁸ He promised continued support and collaboration of Sun Newspapers with the NA.²⁹

The press statements are infested or riddled with logical crisis or disease of illogicality (the worst form of self-deception). The media too is unfortunately infested with this deadly disease. The accounts above were laced with efforts to present the Nigerian Army in good light, papering over cracks that are clearly visible in their performance, without resort to objective examination of events.

The military high command want to portray itself before the public as winning the war against insurgency and terrorism in the country whereas this has not been the case.

The Army authorities claimed it captured one gun truck, one Deshka M Anti-Aircraft Gun, one HK 21 Machine Gun, one Rocket Propelled Grenade Bomb, 137 rounds of 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft Rounds amongst others from the ISWAP fighters during the counter-attack. The big question is how the ISWAP fighters came into possession of such fairly sophisticated weaponry. Every weapon has a manufacturer which can be traced through paper trail in terms of purchase or exchange to the very last end-users. No media house, in its editorial has queried the sources of these weapons and how they got into possession of the insurgents in this particular case.

There is no doubt that the media has a critical role to play in the fight against insurgency and terrorism in the country. But the media is first of all bound by the sacred duty of objective reporting. There can be no compromise on this. Of course, individual media houses are at liberty to exercise in a discretionary manner one way or the other this oath of objective reporting no matter whose interest is perceived to have been injured in the process. From the critical assessment of the media reporting of the security crisis in the country in the last decade or thereabout, there has been no incidence of deliberate promotion of the “interests” of the insurgent groups over and against that of the Nigerian State. So there can be no basis for the Nigerian military high command to be demanding from the media to “moderate” its reporting in favour of the military. It is an un-called for demand. However, sensational reporting cannot also be ruled out especially in this era of citizen journalism and mushroom social media platforms. This should never be the criteria for judging the media in a prejudicial manner that runs counter or violate the fundamental human rights of the citizens as regard freedom of expression. This should not also be the basis for corralling the media to the side of the State in order to paper over its misdeeds and mishandling of the fight against the raging insurgency and banditry in the country. The media is duty-bound to ask salient questions about the conduct of the war against insurgency and banditry, and to call for accountability of all actions and inactions. 

The attack on the Nigerian Army University premises is strategic by all considerations, intents and purposes. It is not just that the University is or presents itself as a soft target. It is that the University represents a symbol of hatred by the Jihadist fighters. The University represents Western educational influence that forms the ideological and perhaps cultural fulcra and orientation of the so-called secular Nigerian State. What is perhaps “nasty” about the University, according to worldview of ISWAP, is that it was established by the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Tukur Yusuf Buratai (now retired) while in active service and serving as the arrowhead of the fight against ISWAP since 2016, using the instrumentality of the State to achieve a set of narrowly-conceived interests such as establishing a university in his home town, Biu.

Thus it could not have come as an irony that one of the areas attacked within the University premises was none other than the building that bore the name of Buratai: Tukur Buratai Institute for War and Peace, which came under heavy attack and sustained extensive damages. The attack and near-destruction of the building is a loud and clear statement by the Islamic Jihadist fighters that they care little about the concept of war and peace as enunciated by the Institute and as propagated by the Nigerian State and its Western intellectual backers.

The attack is similar to the attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy by alleged horde of bandits on Tuesday, August 24, 2021, in which one soldier was killed and another abducted. The only difference is that the Nigerian Defense Academy is a hard strategic target (a military formation) and symbol of the might of the Nigerian military power where newly-recruited cadres are trained and indoctrinated to serve the Nigerian State and all that it represents while the Nigerian Army University on the other hand is a soft (though strategic) target because it is essentially a civilian domain.

But the attack on the Nigerian Army University, when combined with similar attacks on the strategic military formations in the country since June 2011 when the Nigerian Police Headquarters was attacked and bombed by a suicide bomber killing one police officer but narrowly missing the then Inspector General of Police, Haffiz Ringim, including the bomb attack on Eagle Square, Abuja on October 1, 2010, Abuja, that claimed more than a dozen lives can now be said to be creating a binary opposite of power in the country, i.e. creating two independent strongholds of power in the country.³⁰

Since then, other military and police formations have been attacked with dare-devil impunity by insurgents, terrorists, unknown gunmen, and now the so-called bandits that have now reared their ugly monstrous heads in the national security landscape in the last six years or thereabout.³¹

This situation may not be taken lightly because it only portends greater danger for the destiny of the Nigerian State and its sovereign status; it also shows the direction that the battle may be taken in the coming months and years. This is because the frequency of attacks on both hard and soft targets is not only becoming frequent and alarming but it is seen to be wearing down the ability of the Nigerian State and its military machine to contain the escalating security crisis across the length and breadth of the country.

This article is divided into fourteen parts, each part examining what has taken place in the last few months or years. The article uses sources such as newspapers’ and online reports including already researched works by other authors and analysts. The article places most of the events in historical context including regional, international and strategic contexts and also places the responses of the Nigerian State against this major historical contextual background. The article is finally of the view that with the kind of “strategically weak” responses from the Nigerian State, the war against insurgency, terrorism and banditry would drag into the coming years even after the current administration might have left power in May 2023.

The Year of the Locusts

Many Nigerians lost their lives and properties in 2021. It was like no other year in recent memory. These unfortunate Nigerians were either killed by terrorists, bandits, herdsmen killers, kidnappers, separatists, ritualists or other sundry criminals. Worsening the situation is not only the impunity of the hordes of killers but also the helplessness of the law enforcement agents to arrest the growing spate of killings across the length and breadth of the country. More painful are also the lack of justice dispensation to the culprits and the lack of compensation to the bereaved families.

The year 2021 witnessed one of the worst killings with impunity in the nation’s post-independence era outside the civil war.  Scores of persons were either killed or kidnapped on a daily basis. For the kidnapped, payment of heavy ransom to secure the lives of the victims become the order of the day, or the new business in town. People even have themselves kidnapped in order to extract ransom from family members. It is a new criminal enterprise that has reached a worrisome level eliciting growing concern from the international community. Foreign embassies in the country are now in the habit of issuing security warnings on a regular basis, warning their citizens not to go to many places in the country because of the fear and risk of being kidnapped.

No one is really safe in an environment that has become virtually lawless as a result of the rising wave of insecurity across the country. Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, admitted on December 30 that insecurity was the “biggest challenge” the country faced in 2021.

In 2021, Nigeria recorded its worst insecurity-related death toll since 2016, according to data collected   by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The data showed that at least 10,398 persons were killed across the country between January 1 and December 31, 2021. Among the fatalities were 4,835 civilians and 890 security personnel.  So also were reported 1,760 Boko Haram members, 107 robbers, and 92 kidnappers killed by law enforcement agents. Comparatively, more people were killed in 2021 than in 2016 and 2017 combined, when the fatalities were 5,748 and 4,638 respectively.

Borno state remains the most insecure state in Nigeria, followed by Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Benue, and Sokoto states, which are in the Northwest and North-central regions. Throughout the year, most people were abducted in Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Katsina, Borno, Sokoto, and Kebbi.

While the rates of kidnapping in 2021 were highest between February and March, the greatest death tolls were recorded in the following months, between April and June.

In one of its deadliest attacks, Boko Haram reportedly killed about 81 people, injured 10 and abducted seven others in Gubio Local Government Area of Borno State in June. Few days later, Boko Haram staged additional attacks in Gubio, Ngazai and Mongonu LGAs, killing at least 40 people and damaging a major humanitarian facility. In the same month, suspected Boko Haram insurgents attacked a United Nations facility housing several aid groups in Ngala, Borno State. At least 20 IDPs awaiting assistance at the facility were killed, according to media reports.

According to Nigeria Security Tracker, there were 5,800 deaths and 2,943 kidnappings between January and June 2021. The reported cases are: North-West -1,405; North Central – 942; North East – 210; South-South – 140; South West- 169; South East – 77; Northern Nigeria – 2,557; Southern Nigeria – 386. There were 2,943 kidnap victims in 181 days, an average of 16 per day. The 12 states with the most number of deaths are – Borno: 1,137; Zamfara: 862; Kaduna: 715; Benue: 449; Niger: 407; Ebonyi: 210; Katsina: 164; Imo: 153; Kebbi: 144; Yobe: 137; Oyo: 114 and Anambra: 109, while the states with most kidnap victims were Niger, 795; Zamfara, 523; Kaduna: 479; Katsina, 289; Borno, 115; Kebbi: 103; Oyo: 63; Delta, 55; Taraba, 55; FCT, 52; and Edo, 37.

In July, five men including three humanitarian workers were executed by the Islamist insurgents, who circulated a video of the execution on social media.

Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgency and terrorist attacks have plagued the North-east region for over a decade. Boko Haram insurgency, now in its 11th year, has left over 7.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.   Insecurity in the region persisted as Boko Haram and its splinter faction, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continued to launch attacks against civilian, humanitarian, and military targets. At least 363 civilians were killed by the Islamist insurgents between January and September.

In August, authorities in Borno State in the northeast announced plans to send 1,860,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees back to their communities despite ongoing safety concerns. Sixteen days after IDPs were returned to Kukawa Local Government Area on August 18, Boko Haram insurgents attacked the community and abducted at least 100 people. The government continued to participate in forced returns of Nigerian refugees from Cameroon. Boko Haram also launched a deadly attack against Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum’s convoy on September 27, as he was returning to the state capital, Maiduguri, from Baga. At least 18 people, including four civilians were killed. The attack came two days after the governor survived another attack while traveling to an area near Lake Chad. His convoy was also ambushed earlier in July by insurgents.

But most parts of the North-west region are now being overrun by rampaging bandits who kidnap for ransom and kill victims who cannot pay for their freedom. In the northwest and parts of the south, intercommunal violence continued as herder-allied armed groups, vigilantes, and criminal gangs killed hundreds of civilians, kidnapped people for ransom, and raided cattle. In April, armed bandits killed at least 47 people in a coordinated attack on several villages in Katsina State in the northwest. According to the UN refugee agency, at least 1,126 people died between January and June in the northwest region, 210,000 people were internally displaced and over 70,000 fled to seek refuge in Niger as at August due to the insecurity in the region. In the southern Kaduna State, the media reported that gunmen killed at least 43 people between July 21 and 24, and that 178 people were killed between January and July across southern Kaduna communities.

Also affected is the North-central, particularly Niger, Kogi, Benue and Nasarawa States, plagued by bandits and criminal herders who in some cases attack and kill their victims. In April, at least 19 people were killed and about 100 houses burned in fighting between members of different ethnic groups in the northeastern Taraba State who were disputing fishing rights.

The south-east region has now become increasingly volatile due to separatist crisis which has led to many deaths.

In late December (December 22 to be precise) the Presidency acknowledged that 45 farmers were killed in the violence between farmers and herders in Nasarawa State in central Nigeria, while dozens more were wounded. Presidency “expressed grief over the heart-wrenching” killings and said his government would “leave no stone unturned in fishing out the perpetrators of this senseless and barbaric incident, and bring them to justice”. Local police said the violence broke out when armed herders attacked villagers from the Tiv ethnic group over the killing of a kinsman that they blamed on Tiv farmers. The unrest continued for few more days. Deadly clashes between nomadic cattle herders and local farmers over grazing and water rights are common in central Nigeria.

Both the Federal Government including the international community and stakeholders have continually decry the senseless killings in Nigeria. The raging conflict and violence in Nigeria have attracted the attention of several international bodies. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said it is continuing its preliminary examination of the situation in Nigeria, which focuses on alleged crimes against humanity or war crimes committed in the Niger Delta, the Middle-Belt states, and the conflict between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces.

ISWAP launched sporadic attacks on different locations in Maiduguri metropolis just few hours before the arrival of President Muhammadu Buhari who was on a one-day working or “flying” visit to Borno State on December 23, 2021.

The Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) launched multiple rocket attacks on Maiduguri, Borno state capital. The insurgents launched the attacks ahead of President Muhammadu Buhari’s visit to the city to inaugurate projects done by the state government. The explosives landed in several areas which include Ngomari, Bulumkutu, Ajilari and Ayafe communities within the metropolis. The insurgents were said to have launched the attack from the outskirt of Auno which is about 15 kilometres away from the city. Residents within the area scampered for safety amid sounds of explosion. The casualty figure is yet to be ascertained but many houses were destroyed. The president arrived in Maiduguri around 11am as part of a one-day official visit to Borno. The president was received by Babagana Zulum, governor of the state, Usman Kadafur, his deputy, members of national and state houses of assembly, and some top government officials. Other dignitaries that received the president were Faruk Yahaya, chief of army staff, and Christopher Musa, theatre commander of operation Hadin Kai.³²

On January 4, 2022, ISWAP also attacked a military post in Marte. ISWAP has never shown fear in attacking military posts as hard target.

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) claimed responsibility for an attack targeting a military post in Marte, Borno State, Jan. 4. Assailants reportedly used a vehicle carrying explosives before engaging Nigerian soldiers, leaving at least 10 individuals dead, including civilians. Further details are unavailable; authorities are unlikely to confirm the incident. Marte is located 90 km (144 miles) northeast of Maiduguri and 40 km (64 miles) west of the border with Cameroon.³³

Then on January 20, there was another attack on Piyemi village of Chibok Local Government Area of Borno State. It is, however, not certain who carried out the attack – whether it is Boko Haram or ISWAP insurgents, according to news reports. Sometimes, it is simply difficult to distinguish between the two groups that are actually not the same and one.

Armed Boko Haram terrorists suspected to be members of ISWAP group have invaded Piyemi village of Chibok Local Government Area in Borno state wreaking havoc without confrontation, sources have said. Sources said the insurgents at about 7 pm on Thursday invaded the community and started firing gunshots at civilians and burning residential buildings and shops as they loot livestock and foodstuff.  Just last week Friday some insurgents attacked Kautikari village and killed four residents after abducting scores of women and children in Chibok. Piyemi village is located between Chibok- Mbalala -Kautikari axis, predominantly occupied by Christian faiths.  According to a fleeing resident who did not want his name mentioned for security reasons said, “Please stand with us in the place of prayer, ISWAP members are right now in Piyemi village since 7 pm, many people were feared dead and injured, residential houses still on fire, and only God can save and protect the masses as we fled into the bush.”³⁴

In his 2022 New Year speech, President Muhammadu Buhari had assured that insecurity remained a top concern for him and said the government was not only tackling the threat on the battlefield but planned to deploy multifaceted solutions “that will be targeted at addressing human security at the grassroots, before it leads to insecurity.”

But in late January 2022, President Muhammadu Buhari finally confessed that he is completely overwhelmed by the spate of killings by bandits in the North western part of the country. President particularly wondered in lamentation why the same people of the same religion and culture would be killing each other and stealing each other’s property – but without wondering what could have caused such a development of dog-eat-dog.

President Muhammadu Buhari has again expressed displeasure over the spate of insecurity in the country, noting that he is overwhelmed by the security situation in the North-West.³⁵ Buhari, who seized the opportunity of his visit to Sokoto State to inaugurate a new three million metric tons per annum BUA Cement Sokoto Line 4 factory, told the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, whom he also paid a condolence visit at his palace, that he has given specific instructions to the Nigerian military to deal decisively with bandits terrorising the region.³⁶

Buhari said while the situation in the North-East and South-South of the country has improved compared to when he assumed office in 2015, the challenges in the North- West are different. “Every day, we are worried about what is happening in the North-West. When we came, if Nigerians are to be fair to us, they know the condition in the North-East and the South-South, but what is happening now in the North- West is what has honestly overwhelmed me. The same people, the same culture, killing each other, stealing each other’s property. We are going to do our best and the military and law enforcement agencies have been given a clear order that they shouldn’t spare any bandit or terrorist. We are going to hand over a secure country better than we inherited it.”³⁷

Recall that in the outgone year 2021, activities of bandits and kidnappers became common in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara, such that a good number of citizens were abducted in demand for ransom. In Sokoto State, in particular, over 30 travellers were reported to have fallen victims [burnt alive in their vehicles], with many meeting their untimely death and others kidnapped.³⁸

While commiserating with the government and people of the state over the recent loss of lives and property as a result of outrageous attacks by bandits and oth­er criminal gangs, Buhari assured the people that he remains unrelenting in his resolve to put an end to the heinous criminal activities in the state and other parts of the country. Before departing for Abuja, Buhari penned down some messages in the condolence register, “My condolences to the Sultanate, the government, and people of Sokoto State over the recent mindless killings by bandits and terrorists.  Nigeria shall win the battle over evil”.³⁹

What the President is saying is that Government has lost control of the security situation in the Northwest but giving the same military matching order to use maximum force to quell the rising wave of banditry in the region – while leaving the public with many hanging questions or simply wonder what the military has been doing before now. But the President showed no circumspection in his choice of words which is clearly un-presidential. However, it is understandably borne out of frustration and/or increasing helplessness. The President has the choice of committing his orders in writing or passing them through his Service Chiefs. Furthermore, the President can now see clearly that it is easier said than done; it is easy to criticize the opposition or past administrations or some invisible enemies hiding in the backyard or even in one’s cupboard than taking the bull by the horn to effect change that brings new dynamics to the battlefield. 

The Rage of the Bandits

It is not only ISWAP and Boko Haram that are shaking their fists threateningly against the Nigerian State in the north eastern part of the country, their main theatre of operations. Joining the ranks of the violent non-state actors are various hordes of bandits that started their activities from Zamfara State some years back that have now spread their campaign of abductions and death to the entire north western part of the country where they make life miserable in Hobessian manner for citizens and subsequently for the Nigerian State. Today, nobody can really tell the numbers of innocent people that have fell victims to the bullets of the bandits. Nobody can capture the amount of ransom that has been paid under duress or coercion to the bandits. Nobody can quantify the amount of “commission” or “kickbacks” received so far by those unconscionable intermediaries or meddlesome interlopers. Nobody can capture the pains and agonies that have been inflicted on the victims, their relatives and the country as a whole.

From the very beginning of risk analysis of the evolving security situation in the country, let there be a clear distinction between ISWAP and Boko Haram in the North east on the one hand and the hordes of bandits in the North west on the other hand. There is a clear difference between the two parties and they must not be lumped together carelessly. They do not operate on the same level of violence even though violence runs through their activities altogether. They do not have the same aims and objectives even though all their different aims and objectives put the Nigerian State and the citizens in jeopardy and danger of obliteration.

Without equivocations, bandits are not terrorists by any dictionary definition even when they deploy terror methodologies or tactics against their victims and possibly against the State. The aims of the bandits are not in any way directed against overthrowing the Nigerian State unlike the terrorists. The bandits are merely collecting ransoms from their victims, accumulating wealth by primitive means, buying more arms, and carrying out all sorts of illegalities or infamies but not waging insurgency or campaign of terror directly against the Nigerian State. They do not kill their victims directly (because that is quite pointless) since they needed their victims as bargaining chips or tools in negotiation for ransom. They only kill when there is resistance or the security agents attack them to rescue the victims. These nuances need to be clearly stated in contradistinction to the ISWAP or Boko Haram insurgents whose aims embrace killing civilians caught in the crossfires with the Nigerian military.

Even though the bandits have evolved and transformed their ability to shoot down combat planes deployed by the Nigerian State against them, this forms part of their arsenal meant to defend themselves against the State that has decided to counter their criminal activities and wipe them out. Their use of terror methodologies and their growing sophistication have compelled many to argue that they should be classified as terrorists. This was achieved when a High Court, perhaps ignorantly but not without being mindful of the terror methodologies that have become the signature of the bandits, to declare that they are terrorists. This has only generated more confusion as well as arguments.

ISWAP, Boko Haram, Ansaru, Islamic Movement in Nigeria, etc, on the other hand, are directly opposed to the very existence of the Nigerian State as it is presently constituted in their aims and objectives, principally seeking to overthrow it and erect their own version of the State by whatever name they wish to call it at the end of the day. These categories of bodies can be called terrorist organizations when we closely examined their aims and objectives as well as their activities.

But bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers are not terrorist organizations seeking to overthrow the Nigerian State by their aims and objective. The epistemology of these violent non-state actors is needed to help craft the appropriate strategies to counter and defeat them.

Banditry is no doubt a clear and present danger to national security of the country not only by the number of victims recorded so far but also threatening to upend the political economy of the region and also ridicule the Nigerian State in its claim of having control over the levers of national security to safeguard lives and properties of citizens, the State itself and corporate bodies.

Exactly a year ago, Daily Trust newspaper published a damning news report on how Katsina State, the home state of President Muhammadu Buhari, became a hotbed of banditry. The report traced the history of banditry as far back as 2012 and slowly gathered momentum to the point where it has now become a frightful monster.

The report gave the reasons such as farmers/herders clashes, the migration of criminals from other places, i.e. from other adjacent states especially from Zamfara State, to Katsina, failed negotiation with bandits, denial of access to cattle routes, the meddlesomeness of Miyetti Allah and security agents. The major picture accompanying the story was that of the Governor of Katsina State, Alhaji Aminu Masari flanking a bandit leader called Buharin Daji, and unidentified military officer and other government officials.

The report also indicated the impact of hard drugs on the bandits acting as its aphrodisiacs causing mental gyration that finally lead them to commit murders and other infamies. It also indicated that banditry has become a lucrative business franchise of ransom collection and sharing in which many unscrupulous persons have keyed into. There is also the problem of lack of justice meted out to the culprits who were caught for political reasons. There is the role of renegades acting as informants to both sides of the conflict in order to make easy money from the suffering of others – because of lack of jobs, etc. The proliferation of small and medium-sized arms and ammunition through smuggling and other illegal means, the ease of mobile communication, play no small role in the raging conflict. The report also mentioned the worldview and mindset of an average Fulani man which is predisposed to violence in face of challenges beyond his control. Finally, the involvement of political actors behind the scene was said to have contributed immensely to the escalation of banditry in the state and region.

In recent times, mass abductions, rape and killings by bandits in Katsina State have led to the deaths of hundreds of people and the displacement of thousands. As at March 2020, more than 210,000 people were internally displaced while another 35, 000 became refugees. They crossed the borders into Niger Republic to find safety in places like Madaou in Tahoua Region, Dan Dadji Makaou, Garin Kaka and Guidan Roumdji. Today, hundreds of bandits occupy the vast Rugu forest, from where they attack villages and kidnap residents. The 334 students of Government Science Secondary School (GSSS), Kankara, reportedly abducted in December last year, drew national and global attention to the heightened activities of bandits in the state.⁴⁰

Many security analysts told Daily Trust that banditry in Katsina became a major concern in 2014 before it escalated between 2017 and 2018. While some said it escalated as a result of farmers/herders clashes, which first broke out in the state some 30 years ago, others believed a military operation to tackle the menace in other places pushed criminals to Katsina. Muhammadu Bashir Shuaibu Galma, a retired major and intelligence officer, described the situation as a pandemic. “Banditry was in Zamfara before it got to other places in the North-West, including Katsina. There was a time the military conducted a major exercise with the president there. That exercise dispersed the bandits in Zamfara. We called the attention of the authorities that if not well handled, the criminals could spread to neighbouring states and explore safe havens to regroup. That was when they spread to Katsina and other states in the region,” he said.⁴¹

A resident who did not want his name mentioned, corroborated the major’s opinion when he said the bandits arrived the state at the same time when people displaced by incessant attacks in Zamfara fled into Katsina. According to him, they started random raids here and there. “At that time, their activities were majorly in Kankara, Faskari, Danmusa, Safana and a section of Batsari,” the resident said. Vigilante groups arrested several bandits and handed them over to the authorities. This action angered the bandits and triggered a massive reaction. In March 2014, they attacked villages in Faskari Local Government Area and killed 103 people, including women and children, setting their homes ablaze. Following many attacks, the state government decided to negotiate with the bandits through one Buharin Daji, believed to be their leader. This peace deal, the resident said, was a mistake. “When the Katsina State Government entered into an agreement with Buharin Daji, who was considered as the commander- general of the bandits, they used the opportunity to gain access to Jibia forest. And they breached the peace deal,” he said. He said Buharin Daji, who did not respect the peace agreement, was killed in a clash with another group of bandits.⁴²

Recounting how banditry spread in Katsina, Alhaji Lawal Saidu Funtua, a veteran journalist based in the state, who has been covering security matters for  many years and had been invited a couple of times by leaders of the bandits to their hideout said, “We started noticing banditry in this form around 2012 here in Katsina. It got worse around 2014 when they attacked Mararabar Maigora and Maigora towns, during which over 100 people were killed. That was when they started the destructive aspect of it.⁴³

The genesis of this menace is clear for all to see. It started as a clash between farmers and herdsmen, and with time, it snowballed into banditry,” he said. He alleged that a large number of those involved in the crime were Fulani because their cattle routes had been taken over; hence their means of livelihood destroyed. “When I discussed with these bandits when I visited them, they told me clearly that their major concern was how security agencies had cheated them over the years, with the connivance of traditional institutions and others. What happened was that if a Fulani man had 100 cattle and he settled in an environment, these traditional rulers, Miyetti Allah and security agencies would find a way of framing his child or brother so as to extort money from him,” he said. From cattle rustling and isolated attacks in remote villages, banditry is now threatening the entire North- West.⁴⁴

[…] bandits now operate a network of informants in the state and take advantage of the vast forest where they have their camps and can keep hundreds of kidnap victims at the same time. Our source said the influx of weapons from Libya, through the Republic of Niger, had helped the spread of the crime. This claim was also backed by the retired intelligence officer, Major Galma. Also, the Secretary to the State Government, Dr. Mustapha Inuwa, suggested that for the criminals to be subdued, security agents must first cut off their sources of arms supply, which he said mostly, came from Niger Republic.⁴⁵

There are increasing criticisms of the Federal Government even from the Governors of the States belonging to the ruling party as President Muhammadu Buhari and affected by the rampaging bandits.

In one of the strongest criticisms and condemnations of the failure of the Federal Government and the Nigerian military, the governor of Katsina State (the home state of President Muhammadu Buhari) called on its citizens to take up arms to defend themselves against the increasing attacks and abductions from the bandits – even when the law forbade purchasing and possession of firearms. The call by the Governor was an indictment of the Nigerian military in an increasing frustration, hopelessness and loss of faith in the ability of the military to arrest the escalating insecurity in the state and its environ.

The Katsina State Governor, Aminu Bello Masari, has called on residents of the state to arm themselves and confront bandits because security officials alone cannot tackle insecurity in the state. Katsina, like other North-west states of Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto and Kebbi, has witnessed incessant attacks by terror groups. Hundreds of people have been killed or kidnapped in Katsina this year with thousands more displaced from their homes.⁴⁶

Speaking during a media parley with journalists at the Muhammadu Buhari House in Katsina, Mr. Masari said the number of security personnel is not enough to tackle the situation. “It’s Islamically allowed for one to defend himself against attack. One must rise to defend himself, his family and assets. If you die while trying to defend yourself, you’ll be considered a martyr. It’s surprising how a bandit would own a gun while a good man trying to defend himself and his family doesn’t have one,” the governor said.⁴⁷

Mr. Masari said the state government would help those who plan to own arms with the view to help bring an end to banditry. “We’ll support those who come with the initiative to procure arms because residents need to also complement the efforts of security agencies. These people (security agents) don’t have the number to protect the people. When President Buhari came, he even tried by increasing the number of our security agents but it’s inadequate. Count it yourself, how many policemen do we have in this country? How many soldiers do we have?⁴⁸

“Even if we say every policeman should go back to his home state, it’ll still not be enough. So, if we fold arms and decide to do nothing, we’ll be the ones to suffer most,” he lamented. Mr. Masari said the police would register all guns bought by the residents to ensure they are put to the right use.⁴⁹

According to him, “security is everybody’s affair, irrespective of political difference. What the public should know is that in Katsina; you don’t have 3000 police. Therefore, we are calling on whoever wants to protect himself and his family to acquire arms.”⁵⁰ He said “the religion of Islam has allowed a person to protect himself and his property and family. If you die in the course of protecting yourself, you die a martyr. The annoying fact is that bandits have access to guns and good people don’t have access to these guns with which they can use to protect themselves and their families”.  The Governor said government will assist any person who would like to acquire arms in order to stop banditry.  “We will assist those who want to bring in arms because there is a need for the people of Katsina to support the security agents,” he said. The Governor, however, criticised the activities of vigilantes, saying “we do not trust the activities of vigilantes because they are leaving their places of origin to other towns. We prefer people defending their places origin themselves,” he said.⁵¹

Meanwhile, the Governor of Niger State, Sani Bello disclosed that a total of 220 citizens comprising 165 civilians, 25 security personnel, and 30 local vigilantes have been killed by bandits in the state within 17 days alone (i.e. from January 1 to January 17, 2022). That serves as the tip of the iceberg of the number of victims of banditry in the Northwestern part of the country since it emerged on the security horizon or spectrum in the last one decade or so.

This is even as he declared that the bandits were taking citizens on a merry-go-round and only a robust deployment of modern technology will tame their activities properly and police the areas they currently occupy. He spoke with State House correspondents after he met with President Muhammadu Buhari at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, to update him on the insecurity situation in the area including kidnapping and cattle rustling among others. According to him, even though respite was underway but cannot completely eradicate the menace 100 per cent until all hands are on deck.⁵²

He said: “I’m very optimistic with the kind of zeal I have seen from our security agencies and all services. I’m very optimistic that the situation will be addressed. And hopefully, we should get a very peaceful state within the shortest possible time. We share borders with Kaduna, Zamfara, and Kebbi States. And these bandits have the habit of hibernating between forests, moving from Zamfara to Kebbi, and from Kebbi to Niger. They take advantage of the cattle routes which they already know. They move on motorcycles. And most of the areas and communities they attack have no access roads. So, you cannot drive there. So, our response time is slow. But going forward, there will be new strategies which I earlier mentioned. It will help us. But I can’t disclose some of those strategies. But basically, the States of Kaduna, Niger, Kebbi would have to work together to address the situation. What I realize is that they have been taking us on a merry-go-round. When we deal with them in Niger, they move to Kaduna. When Kaduna deals with them, they move to Katsina. They have been hibernating in the forest. Some of these operations need to be handled simultaneously so that we get the result. We are not happy and we are sad with the developments in these states. We are doing whatever we can, using kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to see that we address the present situation. As we go on, we will try to update you from time to time on progress being made in this fight.”⁵³

He said his state recorded 50 attacks and loss of lives between January 1 and January 17, while not less than 300 communities were also invaded by bandits within the same period, while 200 persons, including three Chinese nationals, were abducted. “In January this year alone, we suffered not less than 50 reported attacks and loss of lives, between 1st and 17th January. Within the same period, not less than 300 communities have been invaded by bandits. The number of people kidnapped is 200, including three Chinese nationals. We also lost some security personnel. Their number is 25. Unfortunately, we lost about 165 civilians and 30 local vigilantes. So, it’s a very dire situation that we have been battling since the beginning of this year. We are not happy and we are sad with the developments in these states. We are doing whatever we can, using kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to see that we address the present situation.”^{54, 55, 56}

However, there was a confession made by the Governor that is generally applicable to the entire scenario of insecurity in the country especially by the extreme violent non-state actors like ISWAP, Boko Haram, including the bandits. The Governor said “What I realize is that they have been taking us on a merry-go-round. When we deal with them in Niger, they move to Kaduna. When Kaduna deals with them, they move to Katsina. They have been hibernating in the forest. Some of these operations need to be handled simultaneously so that we get the result.”

This is the asymmetric nature of the ongoing warfare against the Nigerian State, precisely one of the reasons why the Nigerian security forces have not been able to defeat these violent non-state actors and while therefore insecurity will not end quickly as the Governor also confessed. The insurgents, bandits and so on take the Nigerian military and other security agencies on an “Israelite journey” (what the Governor called “merry-go-round”) to wear down the Nigerian State in its ability to defend itself and the people in general. In short, the Nigerian State is trapped or cornered like a rat by its own failure of governance over the decades, a failure that has resulted into accumulated grievances to the extent of angry people taking up arms against the State in order to overthrow it or carve out a safe haven for themselves where they can be doing what they like, establish their various small kingdoms or empires, or caliphates with their corollary governance methods, etc. They want to live as outlaws from the mainstream Nigerian State that has ignored their welfare for a long time.

There was also another confession made by Governor Bello without probably not been aware of its implication. He said most of the rural areas and communities have no access roads. This restricts or slows down motorized response and the deployment of security forces to the areas. The situation confers undue strategic advantage on the bandits which enable them to carry out their nefarious operations and escape into the thick brushes. “They take advantage of the cattle routes which they already know. They move on motorcycles.” “So you cannot drive there”. But the confession is a self-indicting one. Here it is admitted failure of governance to link the urban cities to the rural areas and communities through motorable roads and other transport infrastructures and social amenities.  If after more than 20 years of democratic rule, with all federal government monthly allocations, with all internally-generated revenues, with all loans taken from variety of sources, there are still no link roads between the urban cities and the rural areas and communities, then this can only be regarded as failure of governance and nothing else.

During the same time Governor Bello was lamenting over the alarming security situation in Niger State, Governor Bello Matawalle of Zamfara State was also making his own confession of helplessness. He said he does not see banditry ending soon in his state due to the activities of traitors. This is even as the governor vowed to fish out the collaborators because “we know the people that are pushing them to do so.⁵⁷

Zamfara State has witnessed renewed attacks in recent weeks most notably with the recent killing of over 200 persons in Anka and Bukkuyum local government areas of the state. The killings drew condemnation from both President Muhammadu Buhari and the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres. Bandits have for over a decade been active in the North-west region of Nigeria where banditry is the code word for organised crimes like kidnapping, cattle rustling, killing, rape, abduction and even armed robbery. What started as a communal rivalry between farmers and herders over land use snowballed into a deadly act of terrorism with bandits shooting down an air force jet and kidnapping more than 1000 in 2021 alone. According to an American Security Project Report (2021), 200, 000 people fled their communities last year, with 77,000 of them leaving the country in search of safer places. Attacks have continued despite efforts by security agents and vigilante members to check the bandits. The outlaws have been killing, kidnapping, looting, burning down shops, houses and vehicles, raping women and forcing people to flee their ancestral towns. Aside from the killing, kidnapping and displacement of innocent residents, farmers have also been forced to stay away from their farms with those who braved the odds to work on their farms losing the produce to the bandits.⁵⁸

Speaking to State House reporters after meeting with President Muhammadu Buhari, Mr. Matawalle said some people have been making things difficult for the administration, a reason he said would make the fight against banditry very hard to end soon. “So, you see, with the kind of people we have in Zamfara State, I don’t think this issue of banditry will end very soon. Because already some people are behind it. Some people are using it. And all they need is at least to show Nigerians that both the federal and Zamfara State governments are not serious on the issue of insecurity, despite the fact that some of them are involved in the crisis of this insecurity. But we’re doing our best,” he said.⁵⁹

Speaking more on bandits’ collaborators, the governor said residents of some communities were being “pushed” to spread lies against him. He faulted a claim by protesters from Nahuche in Bungudu local government area that they paid N200, 000,000 to rescue their people. He said, “It is not true. As I said, they have collaborators, and we are working to fish out those collaborators and the law will take its course. Okay, the whole people of Nahuche to say they have given N200 million, how can you believe that? Your Chairman (of State House correspondents) is from Zamfara State. He is from Chafe local government area. He can testify to that. So we know people are just saying that in order [to] blackmail government and the security agencies. But it is not true. We know the people that are pushing them to do so, and we are going to push them out and I assure you that they will be fished out and dealt with accordingly.”⁶⁰

While reiterating that the state and federal governments would continue to work hard to tackle the situation, Mr. Matawalle said people of the state would start witnessing a change in the security situation after his discussion with the president. “You know I do initiate some actions to be taken. And if I initiate some actions, I do inform Mr. President, and I have been getting support from him. So, now, I initiated another option, which I informed him that you know, some issues of security is not something that someone should be talking about on the screen of television or pages of newspapers. But I assure the people Zamfara State that they will see changes very soon and Mr. President is committed to bringing down this issue of insecurity to the barest level and I assure people that we have all it takes to fight these people, and he has motivated me and when we go back on Wednesday, the people will see changes between now and Wednesday because I know what we discussed and I know what is going to happen within this period. So, my people would be happy with the action that the federal government is going to take on the issue of insecurity very soon, inshallah.”^{61, 62}

Matawalle said that banditry in his state has turned into a lucrative venture owing to the influence of politicians. The governor gave this assertion after he met President Muhamma­du Buhari at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, on Monday, to brief him on the security situation in his state. Matawalle, who crossed to the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) from the People Democratic Party (PDP), a plat­form on which he clinched the position, said security situation was bound to im­prove in the coming days be­cause the president has given a directive to the military to quell the crisis. “The president is now determined as a result of the briefing he got from me to strengthen security activities and this will bring changes in the situation by this Wednesday,” he told State House cor­respondents. He debunked reports that over 200 persons were killed in the recent attacks in Bukuyyum and Anka area of the state, saying 58 persons fell victims. The governor buttressed his position, insisting that he personally visited the scenes of the attacks and got firsthand information from the emirs. He blamed those he referred to as “political bandits” as being behind the bandying of unverified figures.⁶³

Commenting on possible solutions to the insecurity in Zamfara, he said: “Well, you know when I assumed duty as a governor I used so many options to bring this insecurity to a minimal level. First of all, I initiated dialogue and reconciliation between the herders and farmers and during that dialogue, we spent more than nine months without any crisis in Zamfara State. It worked.⁶⁴

“But unfortunately, people used politics, because they have collaborators, of course. So, they went back to those bandits, telling them that the government is not serious about this dialogue, that we did not give them anything. So, the bandits decided to go back to their normal busi­nesses. That’s why I backed out from the reconciliation programme. But definitely, it worked for over nine months. But because this is some­thing that I inherited, that has been going on for almost eight years, and you don’t ex­pect it to end within just two years of my administration. Because it is supposed to be ongoing process. So, after I realised that some of them had backed out of this dialogue, then I cut off the programme. I then initiated the cutting off of communications, and some logistics that used to go to the bandits from August 2011 to December 2011. And it worked too. But sometimes those collaborators who are usually happy with what is happen­ing, who are even jubilating if people are being killed, they went back and started again, saying that the gov­ernment is not serious and instigating some of the pub­lic. In fact, they even dragged me to court. So you see with the kind of people we have in Zamfara State, I don’t think this issue of banditry will end very soon because, already, some people are behind it. Some people are using it”.⁶⁵

Matawalle had earlier said part of the reason for the persistence of banditry is the non-punishment of the apprehended criminals, saying many times bandits are released without being charged. Matawalle spoke when he received the Federal Government delegation on sympathy visit to the state over the recent attacks on some communities in Anka and Bukkuyum Local Government Areas of the state. The members of the delegation, which was headed by the Minister of Defence, Major-General Bashir Salihi Magashi (rtd), were the National Security Adviser, Major-General Babagana Munguno rtd, Inspector General of Police, Usman Baba Alkali. Others are Minister for Police Affairs Alhaji Maigari Dingyadi, Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Sadiya Umar Farouk, and Special Adviser to President Muhammadu Buhari on Media Garba Shehu. “Another problem we have noticed is that despite the remarkable zeal of our troops, they lack modern equipment with which to prosecute modern warfare. Prosecution of modern warfare depends largely on modern war equipment and gadgets. It is very vital for these modern war instruments to be provided to our troops if we are to win this fight against banditry in Zamfara and the North West”⁶⁶

“It is evident that unless enough modern equipment is provided to our security forces to fight the war effectively, the country faces the danger of anarchy. This could be foreseen from the recent calls by some leaders for their people to take up arms to defend themselves. It is a recipe for lawlessness when the state loses its monopoly over the instruments of coercion. As a matter of urgency, the Federal Government should procure Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and deploy them across all parts of the country. If 1000 APCs could be made available, they would go a long way in turning the tide of the war against the bandits in a short period of time, Insha Allah.⁶⁷

“I want to draw the attention of the Federal Government to the fact that the pockets of insurgencies in many parts of the north are interrelated. In some instances, evidence has been found of connection between Boko Haram and some of the bandit groups operating in the northwest.⁶⁸

“There should be a comprehensive review of our strategy of fighting insurgency. We need a more workable plan of action tailored explicitly in tune with the realities on the ground. This is a clarion call for us to step up efforts in this fight before the dreadful monster consumes our region and the country as a whole.⁶⁹

“I would like to add that any strategy to be drawn for fighting banditry and all forms of insurgency should focus greater attention on Zamfara State. Our forests have become fortresses for bandits, from where they plan and launch attacks to other parts of the northwest,” he added.⁷⁰

He said as part of the strategy, Special Forces should be deployed to some black spots, particularly identified to be more dangerous centres of activities of the bandits. Matawalle said in his administration’s search for peace, he built cooperation not just with the affected states but with the authorities of the Niger Republic. They had also employed Service Hunters and provided them with motorcycles and allowances. He said they had paid the Service Hunters the sum of N53 million, in addition to their full upkeep. In the aftermath of the recent attacks in Anka and Bukkuyum Local Government Areas, they had expended the sum of N250 million to provide vehicles, and allowances for both the Civilian JTF and the conventional security outfits.⁷¹

Magashi [had earlier] said the federal government is all out to bring an end to killings plaguing the country, adding that they are on top of the situation. He said the federal government is doing much better in order to secure the country assuring that killings of this magnitude would never happen again and that federal would come to the aid of the victims of the attacks.⁷²

[So also was] Matawalle [who] disclosed that the state reversed the decision to dialogue with bandits because the government was deceived. Matawalle had previously said dialogue is the best option to tackle banditry in the country. He had also asked his colleagues to endeavour to negotiate with bandits in the interest of promoting peace. But while attending a Juma’at service on September 10 [2021], the governor said the state will no longer offer amnesty to repentant bandits.⁷³

Speaking while fielding questions from state house correspondents after a meeting with President Muhammadu Buhari, held at the presidential villa in Abuja, Matawalle said the state now enjoys relative peace. He said the state government remains committed in the fight against banditry, adding that the measures put in place to restore peace have yielded results. “They have deceived us. Some of them did not follow what we agreed with them. We thought it was something we could continue with them, but we later realised that they had deceived us. So, we had to back out of it and decide to fight them to a logical conclusion,” he said. “As you know, we are there fighting and we have taken a lot of measures in order to curtail this problem of insurgency. We thank God it’s yielding a lot of results. We’ve recorded a lot of successes from what we have done. As you are aware, we have a lot of security personnel that were deployed to Zamfara state and they are working seriously.”⁷⁴

On the current situation in the state, Matawalle said there is calm and people are going on with their daily activities. “It’s just that we have cut a lot of things, particularly moving of foodstuffs, animals and selling of petroleum products,” he said. We have imposed a lot of measures and the people are happy with the measures, because the people had suffered a lot; people were being killed and kidnapped every day before, but today we have succeeded. We don’t have many of such issues in Zamfara state.”⁷⁵

Zamfara, in recent times, has recorded numerous attacks by bandits on communities across the state. In an effort to curb insecurity, the Zamfara government recently announced a temporary ban on the transportation of livestock beyond the state’s borders. The state has also ordered the closure of weekly markets, while transportation of food items will be subject to verification.⁷⁶

The three governors quoted above, however, did not tell us the social identities of the bandits: whether they are Nigerian citizens or not and whether they are fellow Muslims or not. This is very crucial in understanding how the phenomenon emerged that citizens now kill fellow citizens or kidnap them to wrest, by coercion, ransoms from the families of the individual victims and the State governments themselves. Governor Matawalle of Zamfara State did not also disclose the identities of the so-called traitors or collaborators thus leaving the public to start wondering or speculating who the traitors or collaborators might be. The governors did not in any way admit their own failure of governance as a prelude to the explosion of conflict and violence that now pervade the entire area. They are blaming the bandits, just like many other unwary apologists, for taking up arms when have been finally pushed to the wall. In this atmosphere, it is easy to how one can be swayed by the one-sided propaganda of the Federal Government without considering the other side of the coinage about the possible legitimacy of the violence by the bandits. These bandits were not born to become bandits. Something led them into banditry. It is that “something” that the shameless propaganda of the Federal Government refused to disclose. Thus the Federal Government wants the public to be looking and treating the symptoms but not the root-causes of the phenomenon.

While bandits and kidnappers are ravaging the Northern part of the country, the security forces are mowing down innocent citizens in the South eastern part of the country.  A human rights group, International Society for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Inter­society) based in Onitsha, Anambra State, has alleged that soldiers killed at least 1,400 defenseless citizens between October 2020 and December 2021, a period of 15 months. In its report which it said is based on extensive investigation, the group led by Comrade Emeka Umeag­balasi said that in addition over 4,800 civilians were arrested, while another 1,000 went missing. These are mostly Christians, the report said. In all, 100 Igbo communities were invaded, and 1,000 homes attacked leading to a loss of property worth N40 billion.⁷⁷

Few days after the presidential lamentation, the bandits struck again in Kaduna and Niger States. In the attacks, dozens were killed while many houses were razed down.

Gunmen Sunday morning [January 30, 2022] attacked Atak Mawai in Zaman Dabo Village and Kurmin Masara in Atyap Chiefdom, Zangon Kataf local government area of Kaduna state, killing 13 people, including a pre-teen boy. But the state government confirmed 11 residents killed, and some inflicted with gunshot injuries. Several people were injured in the attack just as 40 houses were razed by the gunmen. Chairman, Zangon Kataf local government area, Hon. Francis Angwa Sani confirmed the attacks, but declined comment on the number of casualties and houses burnt, saying  he was yet to receive the report.  “Yes, there was attack, but I don’t have complete details. I learnt people were killed and houses burnt but I’ve not gotten the report yet,” Sani said.⁷⁸

However, a source, who preferred anonymity, said a young boy between five and 10 years and two women, were among the 13 people killed, adding that the gunmen came around 3:00am and started shooting sporadically killing anybody at sight. “I was at home sleeping when I heard gunshots at 2:58am. I found somewhere to hide for safety. I learnt that the soldiers in charge of Zonkwa were called immediately but they didn’t come.  Around 3:45am, the commandant was called again that the situation is worse, then, he switched off his phone.  The attacks happened in Kurmin Masara and Zaman Dabo, this morning we went to the place and discovered 13 corpses.  There was a young boy of between five and 10 years who was shot in the leg and later died, two women were also killed in the attack. They burnt down almost 40 houses in the two villages. When the soldiers came early this morning, they said they were pinned down by some gunmen, that the gunmen blocked the road,” he said.⁷⁹

When contacted, Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO) of the Kaduna state command, ASP Muhammad Jalige said he would confirm and get back to journalists. But he couldn’t get back as at the time of this report. The source further said apart from the houses burnt, the villagers’ foodstuffs and other valuables belonging to residents of the communities, were also destroyed. But in a statement, the state Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Mr. Samuel Aruwan said: “Security forces have reported to the Kaduna state government that Kurmin Masara general area of Zangon Kataf LGA was attacked in the early hours of today. “According to the reports, troops of the Nigerian Air Force Special Forces who responded to distress calls from the area also fell into an ambush as they mobilized to the scene of the attack. The troops cleared the ambush and reached the general area, along with troops of Operation Safe Haven (OPSH).⁸⁰

In a related development, bandits carried out fresh attack on Galadima community of Shiroro local government of Niger state killing no fewer than 12 people.  In the incident that occurred weekend, sources said many other people were injured in the attack with several others still missing. Coordinator of Concerned Shiroro Youths Sani Abubakar Yusuf Kokki confirmed the attack Sunday in Minna, adding that it took place in broad day.  He said:  “Preliminary findings indicate that, about twelve (12) people were gruesomely massacred, many more injured through multiple gunshots and yet to be ascertained numbers of people are still missing.” Kokki said the bandits took advantage of the withdrawal of military personnel from the community to launch the attack.  He said, “Hitherto yesterday’s broad daylight attack, Galadima Kogo was relatively peaceful and secured due to the presence of security personnel stationed in the town. Yesterday’s tragedy that recorded wanton killings among other casualties could have been avoided if those security personnel had not been withdrawn previously.” In view of the calamity at hand, the youth called with the loudest voice on the authorities concerned to restore the withdrawn security personnel to Galadima Kogo area of the state.  They also called for the deployment of additional security personnel to other areas prone to insecurity with immediate effect. Efforts to get reaction from the Police was not successful as the PPRO, DSP Wasiu Abiodun could not be contacted.^{81. 82}

Looking deeper into what the governors said, they actually exposed the fundamental weakness of the nation’s entire security apparatus viz: its inexplicable gross incapacity to stem the tidal wave of banditry and other forms of insecurity in the area. They just stopped short calling the security agencies including the military incompetent fools and other unprintable names – despite the billions of naira allocated to the defense and security sector year-on-year and despite the indubitable fact that the virtually all the security agencies are under the firm grip and control of elements of Northern extraction including religion. It is an epochal agony of a nation that its entire security apparatus has suddenly become leprous in the face of rising tide of insecurity capable of upending the entire political system and social order.

They just stopped short calling the President, who is also a northerner and a Moslem, dirty names they secretly harbored in the deep inner recess of their hearts. Of course, they fulfil all political righteousness by trooping to Aso Rock to brief him but also to register their mounting displeasures at what is going on in their respective individual states. 

But the lamentation or wailing by the President that he has become overwhelmed by banditry in the Northwest has wiped out all the specious claims by the Governors.

None of the governors ever told the public whether any bandit has ever been arrested and prosecuted. Neither have they ever had the courage to disclose the identities of their collaborators and/or sponsors. The politics of “identity disclosure” or the threat to disclose the masquerades behind the bandits, insurgents and terrorists has been ongoing for long, even predating the current administration.  It has yielded no positive result except to feed the imagination of the public. Rather, the public is told about how government entered into negotiation with the bandits (whether as a group or individuals) (and which also meant that government knows the identities of these bandits), the failure of negotiation because of the insincerity of one party or the other. The bandits have grown into a frightful monster that now tyrannizes both the populace and the government. They issue their own commandments (or fatwas), collect taxes or tithes, select girls to abduct, rape, forcefully marry or kill when met with resistance. Banditry has become a lucrative racket, a sheer criminal enterprise, a business franchise actively promoted by its tacit acceptance or incompetence of the Nigerian State to stamp it out; actively promoted by certain Moslem clerics on the basis of religious and ethnic consideration and/or irredentism. Some even promoted them as new breed of public servants. This is the ugly optics obtained when the security landscape is viewed or mirrored, a landscape scotched and blighted by the ignominious failure of an incompetent State.

Bandits are human beings. They are not aliens from another planet. They are largely the neglected and ignored, previously used as cannon fodder for all sort of mischievous political purposes. They are mostly the uneducated in the northern part of the country: they refused to go to school or they are not compelled or persuaded to go to school. They do not see education as liberation of the mind from the evils of Hobessian state of nature. They mostly considered education, especially Western education as a sin. The bandits have now cut themselves from the society, from the State or government. They are now outlaws. They take decisions to launch attacks on the State and the citizens without reference to the consequences of their actions because they no longer feel bind by the laws of the land anymore. They are no longer afraid of what the law will do to them. They do not obey the law because the State has not embarked on the process of punishment for their crimes against the State and the person.

Banditry has become an insatiable Moloch, devourer of men and women, young and old, and destroyer of destinies. And it is mostly the same poor people that are victims of this evil phenomenon. It is a genie let out of the bottle that is now difficult to put back despite all the promises to do so by the Nigerian State. The failure of the State in this regard in turn further emboldens, promotes and sustains this new-breed phenomenal criminality.

Going by the aggregate sum of insecurity in the northern part of the country, it would not be too far from reality to suggest that the region is gradually on the road to self-destruction through implosion. The implosion will definitely not happen tomorrow or in few days’ time. But it may become inevitable if the Nigerian State continue to play politics with the situation.

One need not engage in astrology, augury or clairvoyant prognostication to see that the hemlock which the Northern political nomenklatura seeks to force down the throat of the South in the mindless irredentist geopolitics or political brinksmanship has now rebound to poison it. It is the Lance that turned to wound it and would not heal. The North is now crying, lamenting its terrible fate that is awaiting it if it does not reverse itself. The spectre of implosion is now haunting it. The high risk or possibility of this implosion is now staring at its face. The realization is slowly awakening with the concomitant growing conscience culminating in the increasing loud crying and lamentation even by elected and appointed officials. Banditry was weaponized, in the wrong-headed belief it could be used politically to frighten Southerners and cow them into submission to the hegemony of the North. Unfortunately, this has turned out to be a mirage as the Frankenstein Monster reared from its midst is now on rampage devouring everything in its path. 

One does not need to be a Nostradamus or Asimovian soothsayer too to know that the Northern part of the country is facing the clear and present danger of imminent implosion with its domino effect of spreading chaos throughout the entire North including the South in terms of mass displacement and forced movement of people. Of course, there is always hope somewhere that it may or should not get to this implosive point. The North is not sitting on a gunpowder keg. The North is the powder keg itself waiting to explode by allowing insecurity to have gone to this extent. The triggers are already there. “Something” only needs to pull the triggers and the gunpowder will start exploding. The North need to pull back from the brink or precipice before it is too late – instead of pushing itself closer to the brink with the danger of tumbling headlong over.

Zamfara State has become the weakest link in the chain of those Northwestern states currently haunted by banditry while Borno State in the Northeastern part is the hell-hole of insurgency and terrorism respectively. In classical terms, Zamfara State is a failed state while other Northwestern states such as Sokoto, Kebbi and Niger states are already on that course of becoming failed states.

The greatest irony of all, and the source of all worries, is how assorted groups of bandits can become so powerful over the arch of a short time to constitute such a monstrous threat to the State. It is such an irony. How did the transformation in terms of arms in their possession and the capsule of mentality take place, matching and surpassing that of a State with its entire arsenal of weapons and mental materials in terms of those capable of doing the strategic thinking for the State? How can we match side-by-side the quality of thinking of bandits and that of a State for a critical evaluation without falling into an incongruous situation of comparing ants and an elephant in their thinking?  

ISWAP

Bandits are not a threat to the Nigerian State. The Islamic State for West Africa Province (ISWAP) is more of a mortal enemy of the Nigerian State than all other groups of insurgents and terrorists put together. What is ISWAP? Where did it come from?

ISWAP is a break-away faction from Boko Haram, a break-away that took place in 2016. But it is more than just a break-away faction. ISWAP represents the most deadly and virulent faction of Boko Haram in its implacable bellicosity or stand against the Nigerian State.

But to understand the Islamic State for West Africa Province as a break-away faction from Boko Haram is to understand its physique, persona, psyche, universe, worldview, mindset and operational methodologies or methopraxy through critical interrogation and cutting-edge analytical tools. Perhaps, most important is to understand its resilience through its adaptation methodologies to the changing environment in the battle against the Nigerian State or its rivals. Also important is the understanding of the factors and forces including processes that led to its emergence in the first place. Dozens, if not hundreds, of researches have been carried out and published on some of these critical points.

However, since its formation in 2016, ISWAP has also gone through its own internal evolution that was shaped by both internal dynamics (struggle for power or commanding position by its top-echelon commanders) and external environmental factors (the pressure from other pair groups).

Was the break-up of Boko Haram into two factions inevitable? Was the formation of ISWAP inevitable? Till date the Nigerian State or the Federal Government has not been able to tell the Nigerian public precisely how these deadly bodies emerged, tell the public its own side of the story different from what the public already know through media reportage. This is one of the greatest disservices from the Nigerian State in its major epistemological deficit about how these terrorist organizations came into existence. The Federal Government of Nigeria has obdurately and consistently refused to publish the reports of various panels established and commissioned to investigate these terrorist bodies and how they come into being.

To fill in the gap in the official knowledge, various national and international scholars were forced to rise about the market noise of both the praise-singers of the past and current administrations including angry wailers or traducers of the administrations, pull away from the riotous crowd and detach from the gullible sentiments of the moment – to conduct rigorous examination of past and unfolding events to enable us have a glimpse of the arcane world from which these bodies emerged.

From Nigeria to Somalia, Tunisia to Egypt, and Algeria to the Sahara, between 2014 and 2016, various other Islamic State ‘cells’ —either official wilayat or unofficial affiliated groups—emerged on the African continent.⁸³

While the presence of these cells has caused concerns in its own right, they have received more attention, at least in popular discourse, following the late 2017 collapse of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq after the liberation of Mosul. Still, with few exceptions, there has been little analysis of the strength of the Islamic State’s African cells from a comparative perspective.⁸⁴

Yet, despite its still relatively large fighter base, Barnawi’s ISWAP cell today has (as would be expected) lower fighter numbers than when the Barnawi and Shekau groups—which today are highly distinct in various ways – were unified under the moniker of Boko Haram before their 2016 split. In spring 2014, the U.S. Department of State estimated that the number of Boko Haram fighters, before the group had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, ranged from “hundreds to a few thousand.” When Boko Haram emerged on most people’s ‘radar screens,’ following the April 2014 Chibok kidnappings, estimates of fighter numbers verged on the ludicrous: the Cameroonian Ministry of Defense suggested in July 2014 that the group had between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters; a Nigerian journalist suggested that it had 50,000 fighters. By the end of 2014 Boko Haram had surpassed the Islamic State to become the world’s deadliest terrorist group, with estimates from February 2015 – just prior to Shekau’s pledge – placing Boko Haram at between 7,000 to 10,000 fighters by one estimate in which the group was perhaps speciously compared to “other, similar groups,” and a lower 4,000 to 6,000 “hard-core fighters” the same month, according to estimates from U.S. intelligence officials. For their parts, researchers Daniel Torbjörnsson and Michael Jonsson note that in interviewing security officials in Nigeria in May 2017, consensus existed that the Barnawi faction was significantly larger than the Shekau faction, with an estimated 5,000 fighters compared to Shekau’s 1,000 fighters. As previously noted, the authors take 3,500 as the best estimate of the Barnawi faction’s number of fighters as of July 2018.^{85, 86}

According to Madeleine Vellturo, a policy analyst with the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, violent Islamist groups based in northern Nigeria remain some of the deadliest and most formidable jihadist groups operating in the world today. Estimates suggest that conflict with these groups has killed more than 37,500 people since 2011. A decade-long preliminary investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) found reasonable basis to believe that these militant Islamist groups have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁸⁷

Following several setbacks in 2016 and 2017, violent Islamist groups in northern Nigeria have made a resurgence in recent years. In the context of growing militant Islamist violence in several regions of West Africa, the following factsheet explores the current array of organized violent Islamist groups operating in northern Nigeria and throughout the broader Lake Chad Basin, the religious freedom violations they have committed in the past year, and the state of counterterrorism efforts in the region.⁸⁸

Following this split, ISWAP tactics shifted from targeting civilians to focusing primarily on attacking military targets and state actors. However, more recently this approach appeared to be shifting again. The group recently attacked Muslim civilians and executed aid workers, which some analysts interpret as a hardening of ISWAP tactics against civilians.⁸⁹

Since March 2019, ISWAP has been led by Abu Abdallah al-Barnawi (no relation), more commonly known as Ba Idrissa. According to recent estimates, ISWAP has roughly 4,000 fighters, making it the largest Boko Haram faction operating today. In addition to controlling areas of northeast Nigeria, ISWAP also has been expanding its influence into the northwest, claiming attacks in Sokoto State and forging relationships with communities on the border with Niger.⁹⁰

ISWAP also routinely engages in violations against Nigerian citizens’ rights to freedom of religion and belief. Reports indicate that within its area of control, ISWAP compels people to attend prayer, prohibits smoking and the use of drugs, and implements harsh Quranic punishments, including amputations for thieves and killings for adulterers.⁹¹

ISWAP has also abducted and executed individuals based on their faith or belief. The group continues to hold 17-year-old Leah Sharibu hostage for her unwillingness to convert to Islam – the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) advocates for Leah Sharibu’s release through its Religious Prisoners of Conscience project. In January, ISWAP abducted and executed Ropvil Daciya Dalep, a Christian university student, stating “Christians all over the world must know that we will never forget their atrocities against us, until we avenge the bloodshed visited on us.” In July, ISWAP soldiers executed five aid workers as a warning to “all those being used by infidels to convert Muslims to Christianity.” The U.S. government has also designated ISWAP an “entity of particular concern” for engaging in severe, ongoing, and egregious violations of international religious freedom in its area of operation.⁹²

Combating violent Islamist groups in northern Nigeria is a top priority for many governments in the region. The Nigerian government has conducted several military operations in northeast and northwest Nigeria aiming to neutralize militant Islamist groups and stop their expansion. These have included ground assaults like Operations Deep Punch I & II into the Sambisa Forest, as well as air assaults like Operation Rain of Fire.⁹³

In some instances, neighboring countries have supported the Nigerian military in this endeavor through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is an ad-hoc mechanism through which the military forces of countries affected by these groups (Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin) collaborate in joint military planning and operations and allow for cross border pursuits by counterterrorism forces into each other’s territory. Recently Chad deployed Operation Bakouma In April 2020 to dismantle violent jihadist strongholds near its borders.⁹⁴

In other instances, Nigerian security forces have partnered with community militias and informal vigilante armed groups in counter-Boko Haram activities. The most prominent of these—the Civilian Joint Task Force—trains and arms local recruits in Borno state to serve as the first line of defense against attacks by violent Islamist groups. This approach has yielded both successes and challenges. Community militias have both protected and harmed civilians in northeast Nigeria, and Nigerians face significant barriers in seeking redress for rights abuses perpetrated by informal militia fighters.⁹⁵

Counterterrorism forces have also been responsible for human rights violations and violence against civilians. In its preliminary investigation in northeast Nigeria, the ICC found reasonable basis to believe the Nigerian counterterrorism forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Research conducted by the Center for Civilians in Conflict found that community militias supported by the Nigerian government to protect local populations from militant Islamist violence have committed abuses against civilians, including arbitrary detention, harassment and sexual assault, and extortion.⁹⁶

Regional approaches continue to put pressure on violent jihadist groups operating in this region, primarily through military operations. However, militant Islamist groups in Nigeria demonstrate remarkable staying power and threaten to coopt and “Islamize” other violent conflicts in Nigeria and throughout the region. Thus, these groups will likely continue to pose threats to religious freedom in Nigeria and elsewhere in the future if efforts do not adapt to address the challenges facing the current approach.⁹⁷

The annus horribilis Islamic State Central suffered in 2019, during which the group lost the last stretch of its “territorial caliphate” in Iraq and Syria and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed, does not appear to have had a discernible impact on the overall operational trajectory of the Islamic State threat in Africa. Post-2019, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province sustained around the same high level of violence while Islamic State provinces in Libya, Sinai, and Somalia remained pernicious, though generally contained, threats. In some parts of Africa, the group grew as a threat. Both wings of the Islamic State’s new Central Africa Province as well as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara wing of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province escalated their violent campaigns post-2019.⁹⁸

The Islamic State’s West Africa Province, or Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, comprises two groups that operate independently in the Lake Chad basin and Liptako-Gourma regions of West Africa. For the purposes of clarity, the authors will refer to the Lake Chad Basin-based movement as the Islamic State West Africa Province Core (ISWAP Core) and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara when speaking of its Liptako-Gourma-based counterpart.⁹⁹

Since its emergence in March 2015, ISWAP has been the Islamic State’s largest, most deadly, and most governance-capable province on the African continent, a trend that continued after the death of al-Baghdadi. When Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad (colloquially known as “Boko Haram”) leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on March 7, 2015 and Islamic State Central accepted the pledge six days later, elevating the group to official provincial status – it marked the formal affiliation between two of the world’s deadliest extremist organizations.¹⁰⁰

While in the years that followed counterterrorism pressure bore down on the newly branded “Islamic State West Africa Province” (ISWAP Core), internal ideological divisions to an equal degree threatened the group. Notably, it was announced in the August 2, 2016, edition of the Islamic State’s Al Naba publication that ISWAP Core had replaced Shekau with a new wali, or governor, identified as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of slain Boko Haram founding leader, Muhammed Yusuf. In a series of audio tapes and of violence, largely indistinguishable from the modus operandi of the Islamic State Central-disavowed Shekau faction, highlights the possibility that, as of June 2020, more extreme members of ISWAP Core may be gaining the ascendency over their moderate counterparts within the movement.¹⁰¹

Despite these ideological divisions, the frequency of ISWAP’s Core’s violence have been largely unaffected by al-Baghdadi’s death. This was reflected in recent analysis featured in this publication, which assessed violence committed by Islamic State-affiliated groups on the African continent. As per the cited analysis, ISWAP Core claimed some 177 attacks in 2019, which were distributed quite evenly across the year.¹⁰² 

Following the August 2016 fracturing of ISWAP Core between al-Barnawi and Shekau loyalists, each faction has pursued its insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin via unique methodologies. For ISWAP, the group pursued the Islamic State’s directives by projecting a self-image of its engagement with civilians through proselytizing and outreach activities, and by focusing its violence against hardened military targets (as highlighted by the group’s overrunning of more than 20 military bases in northeastern Nigeria between 2018 and 2019) rather than civilians as had been the case broadly under Shekau’s tenure.¹⁰³ 

While outwardly it may appear that since 2017 ISWAP Core has been adopting the ideological and political framework promulgated by Islamic State Central, internally, the reality has seen ISWAP in a state of ideological flux. On August 21, 2018, ISWAP Core experienced a mutiny that led to the death of a key commander, Mamaan Nur, and the replacement of al-Barnawi as leader with Abu Abdulla Idris (commonly referred to as “Ba Idrissa”) While ISWAP Core did not reveal the reason for these two developments, Nigerian government reports assessed that the group’s rank-and-file had grown frustrated with al-Barnawi and Nur’s ‘moderate’ ideological leadership. Indeed, although it re-pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s new overall leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Quarayshi, on November 8, 2019, ISWAP Core appears to be veering away from Islamic State’s ideological framework. Under the leadership of Ba Idrissa, ISWAP Core has continued its acts of violence against civilians, counter to Islamic State Central’s requests, as highlighted when suspected ISWAP Core combatants massacred as many as 81 villagers in the town of Gubio on June 9, 2020. This act of violence, largely indistinguishable from the modus operandi of the Islamic State Central-disavowed Shekau faction, highlights the possibility that, as of June 2020, more extreme members of ISWAP Core may be gaining the ascendency over their moderate counterparts within the movement.¹⁰⁴

The decline-cementing calamities suffered by Islamic State Central in 2019 do not therefore appear to have affected the trajectory of the Islamic State jihad in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The group’s ability to maintain (and indeed, increase, if its claims are taken at face value) its operational tempo, combined with a newfound willingness to include civilians in its target profile, could see the worsening of what is already a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in northeastern Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Region.¹⁰⁵

According to Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner, [w]hile al-Qa`ida set the stage for the long durée of jihadism on the continent, in the past seven years, the Islamic State has taken up the mantle. Islamic State Central has actively worked to stand up, create, and support various regional groupings (which it grandiosely calls “provinces”) around the continent, whose members carry out violence in its name. Beginning in 2014, jihadi insurgent groups around the continent began pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State, becoming new wilayat, or provinces, of the Islamic State in Africa. While each province undertook Islamic State-approved activities—violence against their adversaries and varying degrees of attempts at governance and territorial control—one unifying theme was their mutual commitment to the ideals, at least ostensibly, of a global caliphate.¹⁰⁶

As of September 2021, the Islamic State boasts six official African provinces. These are found in Libya (created in 2014), Algeria (2014), Sinai (2014), West Africa (2015), Somalia (2018), and Central Africa (2019). However, because the West Africa Province has two “wings”—one in the Lake Chad Basin (ISWAP-Lake Chad) and one in the Sahel (ISWAP-Greater Sahara)—as does the Central Africa Province—with “wings” in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo—the Islamic State has touchpoints in at least eight African locations. In addition to these formal provinces, the Islamic State has supporters around the continent who, though not part of official Islamic State provinces, have undertaken attacks in its name in places ranging from Tunisia to Morocco to Kenya to South Africa. The Islamic State’s six formal provinces (or eight branches) reflect its critical role in the proliferation of African jihadism in the post-9/11 period.¹⁰⁷

No matter how one looks at it, the effort to counter jihadism in Africa is at a dangerous crossroads. The threat has reached unprecedented levels with no signs of abating. While the United Nations and Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State have recognized the need to prioritize Africa, international investment in countering the threat is rapidly diminishing. The combination of a metastasizing threat paired with reduced interest from the major international actors that have sought to mitigate violence portends dangerous times ahead in Africa. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet now that the threat has deepened and spread as significantly as it has.¹⁰⁸

In looking back over the past 20 years, did the U.S.-led efforts to minimize the threats of violence by jihadi actors on the African continent succeed? Unfortunately not. Jihadi violence in Africa has significantly increased in size, scope, and depth, and is now at a level far beyond what it was prior to September 11. Moreover, the continent is more unstable and more dangerous than it was before. To explain this alarming situation, the authors have suggested four phenomena—the resilience of al-Qa`ida affiliates; the introduction of Islamic State branches; the enduring socio-political climates in many African countries; and unsuccessful counterterrorism approaches—that underpin the worsening of jihadi violence on the continent.¹⁰⁹

What then should be done? Above all, though it runs counter to the current political winds, the authors argue that it is premature and unwise to reduce investment in countering jihadi groups in Africa in favor of prioritizing great power competition. The already unprecedented threat from jihadism to U.S. interests in Africa, other Western governments, as well as partner nations in Africa is poised to increase further. In fact, the authors maintain that the United States will struggle to effectively compete with other great powers if it does not prioritize countering jihadism in Africa.¹¹⁰

Second, to bring the level of jihadi violence on the African continent to a manageable—rather than unconstrained—level, the United States should rebalance its counterterrorism approach to prioritize political and economic engagement over the traditional military and security emphasis that it has held. The approach of the past 20 years has highlighted that although some military operations will be needed to counter threats from al-Qa`ida- and Islamic State-affiliated groups, a security-centric strategy failed to stem the exponential growth of jihadism. In January 2020, AFRICOM acknowledged that “The international community is not making durable progress to contain priority VEOs [Violent Extremist Organizations] in Africa, mainly because… [of a] lack a ‘whole of coalition’ balance between military and non-military investments.”¹¹¹

On the other hand, the current U.S. and French military drawdown comes at the worst possible time. Instead of swinging the pendulum so dramatically, military operations should continue but shift into being only one facet—a supporting facet—of what would essentially be a political surge, rather than military actions being an end unto themselves or the centerpiece of any strategy. Instead, efforts to improve governance, in particular adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption initiatives, security sector reform, and an equitable and reliable provision of justice, should be the central focus.¹¹²

Ultimately, African governments countering jihadi groups need to be seen as legitimate by the populations from which these organizations recruit. This gets back to a basic notion: to the extent that other organizing social paradigms can supersede the utility of membership in jihadi groups, they should be encouraged. The goal, more plainly, is to reduce the appeal of jihadi ideology. In addition, economically, the provision of sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities can lessen the appeal of membership in such groups.¹¹³

First, the figures quoted above as regard the physical and numerical strength of ISWAP and its brother, Boko Haram, can only be taken as tentative. There can be no accuracy as to the exact figures of the numerical strength of the insurgent groups: it is always fluctuating because of casualties suffered from time to time including desertion which is never known to the public through proper documentations. They are also presumably recruiting to replenish their losses. Thus most the figures are speculative. But the fact remains that whatever the case has been, the groups remain deadly in their operations. It is never appropriate to plan strategies with consideration of figures in mind because no one can ever get their accurate figures. It is more appropriate to plan with their destruction in mind as the ultimate goal because they in turn do not go to the battlefield with numbers of the federal troops in mind but their ability to attack and destroy by deploying whatever weapons available to them in their arsenal.

Second is the role of foreign powers in the unfolding crisis. Despite the pledges and promises to assist Nigeria, the superpowers are secretly afraid of getting too deeply involved the way they have probably done in other African countries especially the G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso). Nigeria is perhaps more a complex entity than even all the above-mentioned countries put together. The superpowers are also mortally afraid of the Nigerian Press, arguably the most vibrant and critical on the African continent. The superpowers do not want media insurrection against them from the Nigerian Press that they cannot control. Therefore, for these reasons, among other strategic considerations, the superpowers are very careful to meddle overtly in the internal affairs of Nigeria where the security crisis is concerned. All they do is mostly behind the scene or door – so as to avoid being dragged into public debate where they would be forced to account for their actions or inactions and consequently forced to face the threat of moral condemnation.

All their policy supports, advisories and material supports have had little or no impact at all on the raging insurgency. In fact, the situation seems to be worsening. Western powers’ apologists, even their vociferous critics, can speak all the high-falutin grammars available in the English language reservoir. The decisive issue is the net-result expected of Western powers’ claims of support for the Nigerian State to defeat the insurgency. No such result is visible till date. The situation is even seen to be worsening.

In a policy brief by International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague,  E.J. Hogendoorn noted that the European Union is wary of getting too deeply involved in what may be considered “internal affairs” of Nigeria, but acknowledged that the root-causes of the crisis is the failure of governance over the years particularly in the regions concerned and Nigeria in general. But that is usually the refrain that the Nigerian State does not want to hear and/or listen to at all.

Boko Haram remains a major security challenge for Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin neighbours, and the conflict in the north east has triggered a tragic humanitarian crisis affecting more than seven million people in the region. The EU has commendably increased its humanitarian support to the affected population, but wisely refrained from becoming too involved in the direct counter-terrorism response. Although Boko Haram has links to the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Africa, the main drivers of its insurgency are internal and should be addressed by the country’s federal and state-level governments. These drivers include: governance failures in the North East in particular, and Nigeria in general; a poorly coordinated, mainly military, response; multiple security challenges that stretch the army to the breaking point; and elite unwillingness to address the unsustainable status quo.¹¹⁴

The Boko Haram insurgency remains a huge security challenge for Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin neighbours, and a major African foreign policy priority for the European Union (EU) and its members. The conflict, which broke out in 2009, has triggered a tragic humanitarian crisis affecting more than seventeen million people in the region. In September 2018, donors pledged another $2.17 billion in humanitarian and development assistance, including approximately $275 million directly from the EU. But the European Union has wisely refrained from becoming too involved in the direct counter-terrorism response.¹¹⁵

The EU has commendably provided consistent short-term humanitarian support, but this paper argues it could do more to push Nigeria to addressing the drivers of the insurgency. These drivers include: governance failures in the North East in particular, and Nigeria in general; a poorly coordinated, mainly military, response; multiple security challenges that stretch the army to the breaking point; and elite unwillingness to address the unsustainable status quo. It then provides some recommendations to the EU on how it can help Nigeria more effectively address the Boko Haram insurgency.¹¹⁶

Although Boko Haram has links to the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Africa, the main drivers of its insurgency are internal and should be addressed by the country’s federal and state-level governments. Nigeria is a middle-income country, with a large if sometimes dysfunctional government. Therefore, the EU has only limited influence and should carefully calibrate its assistance to support organizations and institutions promoting accountability and good governance. It should also pursue a discrete if sophisticated advocacy strategy with the Nigerian elite to create the political will for better governance and to tackle systemic corruption, which are the root causes of the insurgency and the country’s wider instability.¹¹⁷

Politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence are linked in Nigeria. With massive oil reserves, Nigeria is a potentially wealthy country, but 63 per cent of its estimated 193 million people are classified as absolutely poor. Patronage and corruption drives the country’s political economy, and leaves many destitute and marginalised. The resulting frustration and alienation felt by many have bred the emergence of numerous militant groups based mainly on ethnic and religious identities.¹¹⁸

ISWAP is not only a product of frictions and/or antagonistic contradictions within Boko Haram as regard its allegiance or loyalty to the IS or Al Qae’da, its insurgent strategies and tactics, its own goals. It is also a product of the larger environment where ISWAP readily find recruits and followers of its own specific goals. With what has happened, it is not impossible that another faction may still break out in the nearest future either from within ISWAP or Boko Haram. The way things are going on for Boko Haram, it is not implausible that Boko Haram may completely disintegrate and disappeared from the scene to be replaced by a new body.

The leadership of Islamic State-backed faction of Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), has declared Gudumbali, a town in Borno State as its Manhaja Jundun Khilafah Wylaya West Africa (Caliphate headquarters). SaharaReporters can confirm this from a post shared by the terrorists’ group on Monday. Gudumbali is the headquarters of Guzamala Local Government Area of Borno State, Nigeria. It’s located approximately 125 kilometres north of the state capital, Maiduguri. Since the death of JAS leader, Abubakar Shekau, ISWAP has been consolidating its grip in locations around Lake Chad. Just recently, it appointed Wali Sani Shuwaram, a 45-year-old as the new Leader (Wali) of ISWAP in Lake Chad. The sect’s membership has swollen with the defection of hundreds of Boko Haram fighters under late Shekau. The Nigerian Army has repeatedly claimed that insurgency had been largely defeated and the military frequently underplays any losses. The terror group has caused over 100,000 deaths and displaced millions of individuals mainly in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states.¹¹⁹

If the President says he is overwhelmed by the conditions in the Northwest, how does he feel about the conditions in the Northeast where ISWAP has now openly announced the establishment of its headquarters in Gudumbali, Guzamala Local Government Area of Borno State, right inside the soil of Nigerian sovereign territory? ISWAP has hoisted its Caliphate flag and all the paraphernalia of governance right under the nose of the Nigerian State while the Nigerian military continue to chase “rats” of banditry all over the Northwestern part of the country and while the President lamented to the high heavens that he is overwhelmed. He did not call for divine intervention but gave the Nigerian military a matching order to use maximum force to crush the bandits before he leaves office in May 2023 so that he can leave a stable and secured country for the incoming administration in 2023.

 Boko Haram/ISWAP Dynamics and the Battle for Supremacy

For years, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was a dreaded figure in Nigeria’s insurgency, terrorising local communities with attacks, bombs and kidnappings. Today, [June 4, 2021] this once-dominant figure seems to be leaving the scene after being badly wounded – or perhaps killed – last week in clashes with rival Islamic State-allied jihadists. If so, a major shift in Nigeria’s 12-year-old jihadist insurgency appears to be developing as his enemies consolidate their grip, analysts say.¹²⁰

[But] Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is now targeting Boko Haram’s soldiers after raiding Shekau’s stronghold in Sambisa forest in Borno state, local and security sources said. ISWAP has intensified attacks on Boko Haram factions, appointed its own chief in Shekau’s enclave and executed 10 captured commanders who had refused to surrender, the sources said. As ISWAP absorbs Shekau’s fighters and territory, Nigeria’s army potentially faces a more unified jihadist force, analysts say. But ISWAP may also struggle to control or persuade Boko Haram factions loyal to Shekau outside Sambisa, especially in border areas. “It may not be over yet, ISWAP will have to subdue or convince these camps to coalesce (them) into its fold to fully consolidate its control,” said one security source.¹²¹

Shekau was badly wounded after he shot himself last week to avoid capture by ISWAP fighters as they invaded his forest enclave, according to intelligence sources. Two local Nigerian security sources said Shekau’s men evacuated him badly injured, while local media reported he had died from his wounds, though his situation remains unclear. Neither ISWAP nor Boko Haram has released statements and the Nigerian military said only that it is investigating.¹²²

On Wednesday, ISWAP jihadists in speedboats raided Boko Haram camps in Bosso in neighbouring Niger, leading to a battle with huge casualties, intelligence sources said. “There was heavy fighting in Agadira, Lelewa and Kwatar Bauna between ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters which was bloody,” said one intelligence source who asked not to be identified. The two groups are also fighting in Mandara Mountains along Cameroon’s border, where Boko Haram fighters are holding out, according to local intelligence sources.¹²³

Nigeria’s two jihadist factions never resolved their differences — mostly over Shekau’s indiscriminate targeting of Muslim civilians and use of children suicide bombers. Even before the Sambisa battle, ISWAP emerged as the more dominant force, carrying out large-scale attacks against the Nigerian military. According to security sources in the Lake Chad region, ISWAP appointed Abu Mus’ab Al-Barnawi as its commander in Sambisa to replace Shekau. Al-Barnawi is the son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf and was chosen to replace Shekau after Boko Haram paid allegiance to IS. Shekau rejected the change, prompting Al-Barnawi along with a bulk of fighters to split and form ISWAP in 2016.¹²⁴

Following its takeover of Sambisa, ISWAP sent messages to locals in the Lake Chad region, telling them they were welcome to its self-declared “caliphate”, said Sallau Arzika, a fisherman from Baga. Locals were chased out of the lake islands after ISWAP accused them of spying for the military. Al-Barnawi said they could now return for fishing and trading after paying tax, with the assurance they would not be harmed, Arzika said. ISWAP told locals they declared a ceasefire on Nigerian troops to focus for now on fighting “tyrant” Boko Haram until they submit to its leadership or are killed, he said. Al-Barnawi rounded up 30 Boko Haram commanders including two of five being considered to replace Shekau, according to intelligence sources and locals with knowledge of jihadist activities.¹²⁵

Jihadist infighting may give Nigeria’s army opportunities to take advantage. But should ISWAP absorb part of Shekau’s men, jihadists gain resources to cut off roads around Borno state capital Maiduguri and further test troops already heavily reliant on air power, Peccavi Consulting, a risk group specialising in Africa, said in a note. “If ISWAP convinces Shekau’s forces to join them, they will be controlling the majority of the enemy forces as well as having a presence in most of the ungoverned spaces in the North East,” it said.¹²⁶

Since 2019, Nigeria’s army has pulled out of villages and smaller bases to bunker down in so-called “supercamps”, strategy critics say allows jihadists free roam in rural areas. Taking Shekau’s enclave strengthens ISWAP, but expanding too quickly may also prompt a major military response like in 2015 when Chad troops crossed the border to help oust Boko Haram. “ISWAP may be smart enough not to expand too far, too fast,” Alexander Thurston, assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, wrote in the Lawfare blog. “As long as it does not significantly upset this status quo, ISWAP retains influence over millions of lives, the ability to extract taxes from some rural populations, and a considerable amount of autonomy and freedom of movement.”¹²⁷

Infighting between Nigeria’s two major jihadist factions has left scores dead, raising the possibility of a prolonged internecine conflict between the two forces, civilian and security sources told AFP.¹²⁸

Islamic State West Africa Province or ISWAP has emerged as the dominant faction in Nigeria’s conflict, especially after the death of rival Boko Haram commander Abubakar Shekau in May during infighting between the groups. His death marked a major shift in the grinding 12-year insurgency that has left 40,000 people dead, but security sources say Shekau loyalists have held out against ISWAP’s bid to consolidate.¹²⁹

Boko Haram jihadists on Monday launched an attack on rival ISWAP militants on the Nigerian side of Lake Chad, ISWAP’s bastion, seizing a strategic island, fishermen and a security source said. Large numbers of heavily armed Boko Haram insurgents in speed boats invaded Kirta Wulgo Island after dislodging ISWAP security checkpoints in an hours-long fight, those sources said. The seizure of Kirta Wulgo would be a huge setback to ISWAP as the island served as a port for importing weapons and supplies into its territory, according to security sources and local fishermen. “It was a mutually destructive fight that lasted for more than nine hours, from 4 pm yesterday to early hours of this morning,” said one fisherman in the area. He could not give a figure for casualties, but his account was backed by two other fishermen in the region.¹³⁰

A local security source confirmed the clashes to AFP. According to the security source, Boko Haram mobilised its fighters from camps in Gegime and Kwatar Mota on the Niger side of the lake and Kaiga-Kindjiria on the Chadian side. “They gathered at Tumbun Ali Island in the Nigerian side of the lake and dislodged six ISWAP checkpoints before taking over Kirta Wulgo,” the security source said. “It was a deadly fight. We are talking of more than 100 dead,” the source said.¹³¹

Since Shekau’s death in May following infighting with ISWAP militants in his Sambisa forest enclave, ISWAP has been fighting Boko Haram remnants who have refused to pay allegiance to it to consolidate its grip in the northeast. More than two million people have been displaced by Nigeria’s conflict since it began in 2009, and the violence has spread over the borders to Niger, Chad and Cameroon.¹³²

After Shekau’s death, Boko Haram rebels led by Bakoura Buduma, a former Shekau lieutenant, fled Sambisa to the territory under his control in Niger’s Gegime-Bosso axis of Lake Chad, according to security sources. Last month Boko Haram suffered heavy casualties in a failed bid to invade Kirta Wulgo where they were beaten back by ISWAP, two sources in the area told AFP. “This is just the beginning of an internecine battle between the two factions. It’ll be a battle to the finish,” said the local security source.¹³³

Boko Haram may want to assert their presence on the Nigerian side of the lake to get its share of fishing revenues accruing to ISWAP from levies on Nigerian fishermen. With this sudden setback, ISWAP may look to push out the invading Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram is now within striking distance from ISWAP’s major strongholds of Sabon Tumbu, Jibillaram and Kwalleram, according to a source familiar with the area. “ISWAP leader Abu Musab Al-Barnawi is known to reside in Sabon Tumbu where high-profile captured Boko Haram commanders are being held,” the source said. Al-Barnawi’s deputy lives in Jibillaram along with other high-profile lieutenants while Sigir and Kusuma islands close to Kirta Wulgo house many of the group’s senior commanders. “All these islands are now under Boko Haram threat,” the source said. “ISWAP would use every means to ensure their safety from Boko Haram fighters who would go to any length to see they fall under their control.”¹³⁴

Nigeria’s military has announced the death of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of the West African branch of the Islamic State group. “He is dead and remains dead,” said Chief of Defence Staff General Lucky Irabor. Gen Irabor did not give any details of the circumstances of Barnawi’s death, which was first reported in September.¹³⁵

The Islamic State West Africa Province (Iswap) has not commented on the claims. Iswap has been seen as the strongest jihadist group in Nigeria since the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau earlier this year. Since then, thousands of Boko Haram fighters have surrendered both to the military and reportedly to Iswap.¹³⁶

Who was Barnawi? Little is known about Barnawi, including his age and appearance. Born Habib Yusuf, it is believed he was the eldest son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf. He was seen as a relatively moderate, shunning Boko Haram’s more extreme policies like using children as suicide bombers, and the indiscriminate targeting of Muslims. After his father’s death in police custody in 2009, Shekau was appointed as the group’s new leader. Barnawi served as a spokesperson for Boko Haram, but frequently clashed with Shekau and other senior leaders and in 2013 he defected to Ansaru – a Boko Haram offshoot with ties to al-Qaeda. Despite their differences, the two groups worked closely together at times. To help raise Boko Haram’s international profile, Shekau aligned the group with Islamic State (IS) in 2015. The following year IS named Barnawi as Boko Haram’s new wali (Arabic for governor), causing a major internal feud. Analysts believe the change of leadership was prompted by ideological clashes between Shekau and IS’ central leadership.¹³⁷

IS newspaper al-Nabaa published an interview with Barnawi in August 2016. In the article, he described the group’s battle with West African states as one against “apostates” and “crusaders”. He threatened, as leader, to order the killing of Christians and the bombing of churches. But in a major shift in strategy for the group, he pledged to end indiscriminate attacks on mosques and markets.¹³⁸

The high-profile change of leadership was not welcomed by everyone, and Shekau accused Barnawi of fomenting a coup. As a result of this infighting, those loyal to Islamic State joined the breakaway Iswap, led by Barnawi, while Shekau stayed on as head of Boko Haram. The groups have since been staunch rivals. Iswap announced that Shekau died in May after fleeing a battle with Iswap fighters – choosing to detonate a suicide vest instead of surrendering. Iswap said the operation, in Nigeria’s Sambisa forest, was directly ordered by Islamic State’s central leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.¹³⁹

According to Nigerian outlet HumAngle, Barnawi shared news of his death in an audio recording in June, saying that Shekau had committed “unimaginable terrorism.” “When it was time, Allah set out brave soldiers after receiving orders from the leader of the believers,” Barnawi reportedly said. Later that month, alleged Boko Haram militants confirmed Shekau’s death in a video published by Nigerian news outlets and security analysts. IS has also confirmed the details of Shekau’s death, and boasted that “thousands” of Boko Haram fighters have since defected.¹⁴⁰

Under Barnawi’s leadership, Iswap made territorial gains in northern Nigeria, and the wider Chad Basin, during recent years. It is also active in neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali. The group has captured several military bases, securing weapons and supplies from regional military forces. Taxes on local residents have also provided it with a source of income, along with its involvement in commercial enterprises like fishing.¹⁴¹

In August 2021, it was reported that ISWAP has, once again, reshuffled its leadership.

The Islamic State in West Africa Province, ISWAP, in Nigeria has reshuffled its leadership and Shura council over the mass surrender of Boko Haram fighters to the Nigerian Military.¹⁴² According to a PRNigeria report, the leaders were sacked following a directive from the Headquarters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, for failing to sustain the reunification of ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters, after the death of Abubakar Shekau. Mr. Aba-Ibrahim who replaced Abbah-Gana was appointed as the new ISWAP leader while Malam Bako, Abdul-Kaka a.k.a Sa’ad, Abu Ayun and Abba Kaka, were appointed as the new members of the Shura Council for the ISWAP. Other appointments include Muhammed Mustapha who was appointed as the New Amir of Marte, Muhammed Malumma, Muhammed Maina and Abubakar Dan- Buduma- who were to maintain their former positions as Commanders.¹⁴³

It is unclear if it represents a change in strategy or a momentary attempt to capture the goodwill of more fighters willing to lay down their arms. Impeccable sources with deep knowledge of the terrorist activities told PRNigeria that the ISWAP were forced to reshuffle its cabinets due to the sorry state of the organisation in terms of desertions, depletion of fighting militants. The massive surrender has also thrown confusion and apprehension within the camps of the ISWAP terrorists in Kirta, Wulgo, Sabon Tumbu, Jubularam, Kwalaram, Sigir, Kayowa and Kurnawa, as many other fighters were left with the option to either surrender or flee from the Lake Chad.¹⁴⁴

The source told PRNigeria that the large-scale and heavy bombardment campaign targeting infrastructure, armouries, camps and high valued locations of the terrorists had forced the terrorists to go into hiding while plunging hunger and hardship living conditions in the terrorists’ camps. The source said: “The massive surrender of Boko Haram fighters is largely due to loss of confidence, maltreatment, and growing insurrections between the ISWAP and Member of the Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād or JAS after the death of their leader Abubakar Shekau.¹⁴⁵

“Many JAS fighters have been arrested and incarcerated in an ISWAP prison at Tumbum Kayowa for committing various crimes while those that were former Commanders and Amir’s were reduced as Junior fighters and marabout slaves within the ISWAP enclaves.¹⁴⁶

 “Some JAS Commanders and fighters would prefer to renounce their participation in terrorism campaign and surrender to Nigerian troops than remained with ISWAP to continue facing humiliation in the camps,” he concluded.¹⁴⁷

While Boko Haram is still fighting its own insurgency and campaign of terror, it is evident that ISWAP has gained ascendancy in the battle for supremacy between the two groups. However, there is difficulty in distinguishing between the two bodies in their attacks as often reported by the media because of the inability oftentimes to distinguish between the two by reporters and editors. Juxtaposing the two leads only to confusion and/or lack of clarity about who is doing what or not doing anything at all.

An Eye for an Eye: The Battle for Supremacy between ISWAP and the Nigerian Military

The battle between ISWAP and the Nigerian military has been raging, going forward and backward since 2016 when ISWAP came into existence in the broad spectrum of escalating insecurity in the country by breaking away as a faction from the existing mainstream Boko Haram terrorist and insurgent group – not to talk of the battle against Boko Haram, bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers and separatists.

ISWAP has come to add more headaches to the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military has not successfully defeated Boko Haram before ISWAP came into being to lay siege to the same military. It is the greatest shame of the century that the Nigerian military can no longer claim it has monopoly of force and/or violence. It is only the “bloody civilian populace” that the Nigerian military can bully or kick around. There are now other well-groomed, battle-hardened and well-armed non-state actors who can even claim superiority in monopoly of force, coercion or violence.

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram, is growing in power and influence. From its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, this jihadist group is waging a guerrilla war across north-eastern Nigeria and elsewhere on the lake’s periphery. By filling gaps in governance and service delivery, it has cultivated a level of support among local civilians that Boko Haram never enjoyed and has turned neglected communities in the area and islands in Lake Chad into a source of economic support. If Nigeria and its neighbouring Lake Chad states want to sever the bond between ISWAP and these communities – and they should – then they cannot stop with countering ISWAP in battle. They will need to complement military action by filling the service and governance gaps that ISWAP has exploited.¹⁴⁸ 

Displacing ISWAP will not be easy. Although the group’s methods are often violent and coercive, it has established a largely symbiotic relationship with the Lake Chad area’s inhabitants. The group treats local Muslim civilians better than its parent organisation did, better than its rival faction, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), does now, and in some ways better than the Nigerian state and army have done since the insurgency began in 2009. It digs wells, polices cattle rustling, provides a modicum of health care and sometimes disciplines its own personnel whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians. In the communities it controls, its taxation is generally accepted by civilians, who credit it for creating an environment where they can do business and compare its governance favourably to that of the Nigerian state.¹⁴⁹

ISWAP’s approach appears to have paid dividends in terms of recruitment and support. With estimated 3,500-5,000 members according to Crisis Group’s sources, it overshadows JAS, which has roughly 1,500-2,000, and appears to have gained the military upper hand over the latter. It has also caused real pain to the Nigerian military, its primary target, overrunning dozens of army bases and killing hundreds of soldiers since August 2018. As its name suggests, ISWAP is affiliated with the faded Islamic State, or ISIS, caliphate in Iraq and Syria, whose remnants count ISWAP victories as their own. ISWAP appears to be working hard to gain greater favour from its namesake organisation, and it has obtained some support already, notably in the form of training, though it is not clear how significant a boost this will afford.¹⁵⁰

ISWAP’s deepening roots in the civilian population underscore that the Nigerian government (and, to a lesser extent, those of Cameroon, Chad and Niger) cannot look purely to military means to ensure its enduring defeat. Instead, they should seek to weaken ISWAP’s ties to locals by proving that they can fill service and governance gaps at least in the areas they control, even as they take care to conduct the counterinsurgency as humanely as possible and in a manner that protects civilians.¹⁵¹

To combat impunity among the security services, they should release the report of the panel that President Muhammadu Buhari appointed in 2017 to investigate alleged military abuses and implement those recommendations that advance accountability. They should enhance public safety in towns that are under government control in Borno and neighbouring states where ISWAP is building influence.¹⁵²

They should take care that in seeking to cut off ISWAP’s access to local markets they do not alienate locals by also strangling their ability to trade. And even though negotiations to end hostilities may not be a realistic prospect at this time, they should keep lines of communication open with ISWAP, focusing on practical issues such as how to get more humanitarian assistance to local communities.¹⁵³

These strategies certainly do not guarantee victory for state authorities over ISWAP – but they could help counteract important sources of the organisation’s strength, provide a useful complement to ongoing efforts to degrade it militarily, and at the same time channel important support to communities in the region, which sorely need it.¹⁵⁴

What follows below is an attempt to capture the intensity of the conflict between ISWAP and the Nigerian State. What was captured below is the tip of the iceberg of the deadly attacks and agonies inflicted upon the Nigerian State and notably the innocent people who were caught in the crossfires.

On January 11, 2021, thirteen soldiers died in an ambush by jihadist fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) group in volatile northeastern Nigeria, two army sources said.¹⁵⁵ Heavy gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades hit a military convoy in Gazagana village, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from Yobe state capital Damaturu on Saturday. “We lost 13 soldiers in this ambush and several were injured,” an officer said. The convoy was headed for a military base at Buni Yadi, another 20 kilometres from Damaturu, said the second army source, who gave the same death toll. “It was a fierce battle and the terrorists also suffered casualties,” he said, without giving a figure.¹⁵⁶

The ISWAP group carries out regular attacks in Buni Yadi region on soldiers and travellers, with the violence spilling over into Borno state.¹⁵⁷

On April 26, 2021, at least 31 Nigerian soldiers were killed when IS-aligned fighters ambushed a military convoy escorting weapons and overran a base in northeast Nigeria’s Borno state, military sources said. Fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacked the convoy with rocket-propelled grenades on Sunday in the town of Mainok outside the regional capital Maiduguri before storming the nearby base, the two sources said. The attack was the deadliest this year [2021] against Nigeria’s army which has been battling a decade-long jihadist insurgency in the region that has killed 36,000 people and displaced around two million from their homes. “We lost 31 soldiers, including their commander who was a lieutenant colonel, in the ambush by the terrorists,” a military officer said about the attack which happened around 1100 GMT.¹⁵⁸

The convoy was transporting weapons to Maiduguri when it came under attack, said a second military source who gave a similar toll. “The terrorists came in several trucks, including four MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles) and engaged the convoy in a fierce battle,” the second source said. The militants overwhelmed soldiers, leading to the “colossal loss” of troops, he said. “We lost a lot of men in very gruesome way.” The jihadists seized weapons and two MRAPs in the attack before overrunning and partially burning the base outside the town, the two sources said.¹⁵⁹

Mainok, about 50 kilometres (30 miles) from Maiduguri, has been repeatedly targeted by the jihadists. ISWAP has frequently set up bogus checkpoints along the 120-km highway linking Maiduguri and Damaturu in neighbouring Yobe state on which Mainok lies, killing and abducting travellers.¹⁶⁰

ISWAP split from the mainstream Boko Haram faction in 2016 and rose to become a dominant force in the northeast as Nigeria’s conflict has spilt over borders into neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon.¹⁶¹

Images of bedraggled jihadists and families surrendering to the military have sparked heated debate over the Nigerian army’s claims of success in its long war and the future of fighters who lay down their guns. Scores of Boko Haram members have been shown in army images this month surrendering to soldiers in northeast Borno state, some given hand-written signs to hold asking Nigerians for forgiveness. Nigeria’s army describes these as mass defections — the success, it says, of an intensified campaign to end a 12-year conflict that has killed around 40,000 people and displaced around two million more.¹⁶²

But analysts and security sources say the surrenders are probably driven more by Boko Haram’s recent losses in infighting with rival jihadists from the Islamic State West Africa Province or ISWAP. ISWAP has emerged as the dominant force since battles between the two factions led to the death of Boko Haram chief Abubakar Shekau in May and a dramatic shift in power.¹⁶³

Surrenders are also deeply sensitive in Nigeria. Angry residents in Borno fear jihadists responsible for years of mayhem will escape punishment or just slip back into war. Defections are not uncommon in Nigeria. But for the army, battling Boko Haram and ISWAP, the recent surge in surrenders is proof of success. “We are making headway and we are achieving results, and if we continue, and we should, we will conclude this episode in the northeast,” said Chief Army Staff Lt. Gen. Farouk Yahaya said at a recent event. “Those others in the bush, we call on them to also come and surrender their arms like their colleagues.” Nigeria’s military says around 1,000 repentant Boko Haram members and their families have surrendered recently, according to army statements.¹⁶⁴

Vincent Foucher, a fellow at France’s CNRS research institution, said ISWAP control after Shekau’s death was the key to new defections, both for civilians forced to live under Boko Haram and for its fighters. “They have lost power to ISWAP and they feel they cannot maintain their established livelihoods under ISWAP control,” he said. “It is plausible that some senior commanders have surrendered, as they are the ones who stand to lose most under ISWAP.”¹⁶⁵

Nigeria’s conflict has ebbed and flowed since it erupted in 2009. But the Boko Haram chief’s death in May appears to be a major shift in the conflict. Security sources say ISWAP commanders have been steadily consolidating over Boko Haram factions, killing those who resist and offering those who stay a choice of living under ISWAP command or leaving. One security source said the ranks of Boko Haram members who handed themselves in — conscripted youth and families with no ideological ties or hardline jihadists — was also a crucial factor. “I have mixed feelings on the sudden wave of surrenders by Boko Haram fighters,” said the security source working in the northeast. “It will be naive to think Adamu Rugu-Rugu, who was a notorious Boko Haram commander and a ruthless killer, would surrender just like that,” the source said referring to one reported defector.¹⁶⁶

Nigeria has a state-run “Operation Safe Corridor” program meant to rehabilitate former jihadists as one of the incentives for fighters to leave the war. [Borno State Governor Professor Babagana] Zulum said many who had surrendered recently were those conscripted against their will. “Unless we want to continue with an endless war, I see no reason why we should reject those who wish to surrender,” he told reporters. But bringing militants back has left many in Maiduguri with bad taste even for those who cautiously welcome the surrenders. “They will rehabilitate these terrorists, they will give.. a certain amount of cash to restart their lives. We are graduates and what did the government do for us?” said one Maiduguri resident, Guru. “You cannot kill my father, kill my mother, kill my brother and the government says they will pardon you and you can come and resettle in the town. You cannot rehabilitate a terrorist in just six months.”¹⁶⁷

On September 1, 2021, at least 17 people, including a soldier and aid worker, were killed in the latest attacks by Islamic State-aligned jihadists in northeast Nigeria’s Borno state, security and militia sources said Tuesday.¹⁶⁸

Hundreds of fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) stormed the town of Rann on the border with Cameroon on Monday, pushing troops out of a base and occupying the town for several hours. The attack prompted a mass exodus of residents towards Cameroon before ground troops reclaimed the town with aerial support.¹⁶⁹

Heavily-armed fighters “came in around 1:30 am (00:30 GMT) on foot like a swarm of locusts and overwhelmed soldiers who had to abandon their base”, said an anti-jihadist militia leader in the town. “The insurgents killed 11 people in the attack,” said the source who asked not to be identified. The jihadists stole weapons before setting fire to buildings and vehicles, added the militia leader, in an account supported by a second militia member in the town. A United Nations security source in the region said a soldier and a local volunteer with a foreign aid agency were among the dead. The Nigerian military confirmed the attack on the base, saying troops restored calm after they were initially dislodged. Earlier on Monday, the jihadists attacked nearby Ajiri town, killing six residents, the two militia sources said. Rann, home to 35,000 people displaced by the jihadist violence, has been repeatedly targeted by ISWAP and rival Boko Haram. In May, ISWAP attacked the town and killed 35 people, including five troops and 15 militia members.¹⁷⁰

On September 22, 2021 or thereabout, nine people died in an attack on a village in the Lake Chad area that is plagued by violence led by jihadist groups, a local governor and an NGO said on Tuesday.¹⁷¹

The region borders Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon and fighters from Boko Haram and a rival splinter group, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), have used it for years as a haven from which to attack troops and civilians. “Elements from Boko Haram attacked Kadjigoroum and killed nine people and set fire to the village” on Sunday night, regional governor Mahamat Fadoul Mackaye told AFP by telephone.¹⁷²

In August 26 soldiers died in a Boko Haram raid on marshy Lake Chad’s Tchoukou Telia island, about 190 kilometers (120 miles) north of the capital N’Djamena. In March 2020, 100 Chadian troops died in an attack on the lake’s Bohoma peninsula, prompting an offensive the following month led by Chad’s then-president Idriss Deby Itno. After pursuing the militants deep into Niger and Nigeria, Deby said there was “not a single jihadist anywhere” on the Chadian side of the lake region.¹⁷³

In late September 2021, at least 20 fishermen were killed accidentally in a Nigerian military strike on a jihadist camp in northeast Nigeria, two security sources and locals told AFP.¹⁷⁴

A Nigerian fighter jet bombarded Kwatar Daban Masara in Lake Chad, which straddles Nigeria and neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, the sources said. The area is a bastion for the IS-affiliated Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).¹⁷⁵ The reports of casualties came less than two weeks after officials say another air strike on a village killed nine civilians in Nigeria’s northeast where the military is battling a 12-year Islamist insurgency.¹⁷⁶

ISWAP recently lifted a ban on fishermen in its territory, allowing them to move in and fish in the freshwater lake for a fee. That led to an influx of fisherman who had abandoned the area. “Any fisherman that goes to that area does so at his own risk because it is an enemy territory and there is no way of differentiating them from the terrorists,” one local intelligence source said.¹⁷⁷

The intelligence source who works with anti-jihadist militia in the region said the strike was based on “credible information” of a gathering of ISWAP fighters in the village since Wednesday. He said aerial surveillance and reports from other sources revealed terrorists were amassing in Kwatar Daban Masara and it was obvious they were planning an attack, the source said.¹⁷⁸

According to another security source, the village was subjected to surveillance in the past 10 days after scores of men suspected to be foreign fighters arrived in several vehicles and were ferried to camps inside the lake. “It was a preemptive strike to destroy whatever plans the terrorists were making,” said the security source. “You don’t expect an innocent civilian to be at that location and whoever is found is certainly part of the terrorists,” he said.¹⁷⁹

On September 16 a Nigerian airstrike on a village in nearby Yobe state killed at least nine civilian residents, according to officials. The Nigerian air force said at the time its fighter jet was pursuing a group of jihadists in the area and it was investigating the incident.¹⁸⁰

Since 2009, Nigeria’s armed forces have battled a grinding jihadist insurrection in the northeast that has killed more than 40,000 people and displaced nearly two million from their homes. The conflict spilled into neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, prompting a regional military coalition to end the violence.¹⁸¹

In January 2017 at least 112 people were killed when a fighter jet struck a camp housing 40,000 people displaced by violence in Rann near the border with Cameroon. The Nigerian military blamed “lack of appropriate marking of the area” for the bombardment in a report it issued six months later.¹⁸² In July 2019 at least 13 civilians were killed when a Nigerian fighter jet hit Gajiganna village, 50 kilometers from Borno state capital Maiduguri, as it targeted fleeing jihadists after they attacked a nearby base.¹⁸³

Suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants have reportedly ambushed security forces in the vicinity of the Tamsukawu village near the Damatury-Maiduguri highway, Borno State Nov. 8. There have been no reported casualties and it remains unclear whether armed clashes are still ongoing. Uncorroborated reports suggest that authorities have deployed the Nigerian air forces.¹⁸⁴ In recent days, there has been increased activity of ISWAP along the Damatury-Maiduguri corridor. Insurgents dressed as regular soldiers ambushed a civilian convoy along the Maiduguri-Damaturu highway near Ngamdu the afternoon of Nov. 2. Northeast Nigeria is highly susceptible to attacks and kidnappings by Islamist groups, including ISWAP and Boko Haram. Militants will continue to pose a significant threat to security in the border areas with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, with regular attacks on civilian settlements and security forces positions almost certain to continue.¹⁸⁵

A Nigerian army general and three soldiers were killed during an attack by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants in the northeast of the country, the army and sources said.¹⁸⁶ Army spokesman Brigadier General Onyema Nwachukwu said troops had encountered ISWAP fighters in Borno state’s Askira Uba local government area, where a fierce battle took place and several militants were killed. “Sadly, a gallant senior officer Brigadier General Dzarma Zirkusu and three soldiers paid the supreme sacrifice … as they provided reinforcement in a counter offensive against the terrorists,” Nwachukwu said in a statement.¹⁸⁷

Borno state is at the center of the Islamist insurgency, which has spilled into neighboring Chad and Cameroon and has left about 300,000 people dead and millions dependent on aid, the United Nations says. Military sources and residents said ISWAP fighters attacked Askira Saturday morning with at least 12 gun trucks, burning houses, shops and a school, and forcing some residents to flee.¹⁸⁸

The army had brought in reinforcements but the battle was still ongoing as evening approached, the sources said. Askira is about 150 kilometers south of Borno state capital Maiduguri and lies along the fringes of Sambisa Forest, the operational base of both Boko Haram and ISWAP. Security sources said ISWAP fighters also had separately attacked troops near Maiduguri town, but there were no immediate details on casualties.¹⁷⁷ Nigeria’s army said last month it had killed the new ISWAP leader in a military operation, weeks after announcing the death of the group’s former head Abu Musab al-Barnawi.¹⁸⁹

[In late December 2021] more than 100 jihadist fighters were killed in air strikes by the Nigerian military, security sources and residents told AFP.¹⁹⁰ Fighter jets bombarded three Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) camps in Nigeria’s northeast, killing more than 100 fighters including several senior commanders, the sources said.¹⁹¹

ISWAP has been consolidating its power in the Lake Chad region since the death in May [2021] of the leader of rival Islamist group Boko Haram during infighting between the two groups earlier this year.¹⁹² ISWAP split from Boko Haram in 2016 and has since become the dominant jihadist force in Nigeria’s conflict, frequently striking at troops in an insurgency that has killed more than 40,000 since it began in 2009.¹⁹³  A military officer in the region said “100 terrorists were killed” during “surgical air raids” in Marte, a district in the country’s far northeast. “The air strikes followed meticulous planning after intelligence reports established the presence of large numbers of terrorists in the three locations,” the officer added.¹⁹⁴

A Nigerian intelligence source in the region said it was difficult to give an exact toll but confirmed “well above 100” fighters were killed. Huge numbers of ISWAP jihadists had moved to the three camps days earlier following fighter jet attacks on other villages. They had taken 20 vehicles including mine-resistant trucks, the intelligence source said, adding that “all the vehicles were destroyed in the strikes along with several heavy weapons.”¹⁹⁵ A local fisherman in the region said the militant group suffered huge casualties. “They have been hard hit by the recent attacks. They buried the more than 100 dead bodies in Tudun Giginya village, which took them almost the whole day,” said the fisherman, who asked not to be identified for personal safety.¹⁹⁶

Combined troops of the Nigerian armed forces reportedly executed a top commander of the Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP), identified as Modu Kime.¹⁸⁵ PR Nigeria, an online news platform with close ties with the military, reported that Kime who is also known as Abou Maryam (father of Maryam) was killed in airstrikes coordinated along the fringes of Lake Chad in Borno State. The airstrikes were reportedly launched at the river banks of Bisko and Tumbum Tawaye in Abadam Local Government Area of Borno State. The death of Abou Maryam comes a few months after the military announced the death of a factional leader of the terrorist activities organisation, Abubakar Shekau.¹⁹⁷

PR Nigeria quoted an unnamed source as saying that the operation was conducted after Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions revealed the location of the terror kingpin. After an assessment from the spots of the air bombardment, it was discovered that scores of the terrorists and the commander were killed in the process, it said. The source also said Abou Maryam had been on the radar of intelligence services. ”For some time we had been intercepting his communication and his coordination of attacks by his terror group, mostly in Borno State. He had operated around the axis of Tumbum Tawaye, Bisko, Garere, Arkumma and Dumbawa, Zari and Gundumbali LGA. Abou Maryam coordinated attacks on military troops and soft-targets mostly around Damasak, Nganzai and Gajiram and sometimes on outskirts of Maiduguri…”¹⁹⁸

There was wild jubilation in Biu town following the defeat of suspected members of the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP) by combined team of the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Taskforce (CJTF), in an attack on Yamarkumi, five kilometres away from Biu town in southern part of Borno State.¹⁹⁹ In two separate videos obtained by LEADERSHIP in Maiduguri, the state capital, the residents were seen waving and hailing troops and members of the CJTF as they move through Biu township roundabout after their success against the insurgents.²⁰⁰

A CJTF source who spoke on condition of anonymity, told our correspondent that the insurgents came with about six gun trucks around 4:05pm “We overpowered the terrorists group less than 45 minutes. It was the best outing in recent times, we killed more than four Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists,” the source said.²⁰¹ Our correspondent reports that the attack occurred barely 20 hours after suspected ISWAP terrorists attacked Kautikari community near Chibok and killed three villagers and burning down several houses. Another source said the terrorists stormed Yamarkumi village and started shooting sporadically. The source added that troops swiftly moved in to tackle the attackers with a fighter jet hovering over the demobilised gun truck belonging to the suspected ISWAP fighters.²⁰²

From the above cited cases from both sides of the battle lines, it is obvious that it has been a running battle for supremacy and victory on both sides of the divide. There is palpable strategic stalemate. Therefore, there can be no justification whatever for any of the rival parties to claim it is “winning” the “war” against the other. However, what is apparent is that the strategies adopted by both sides are not working.

For instance, it is apparent that the conventional strategies adopted by the Nigerian military are not working as they are not effective. The more the Nigerian military high command claims they have degraded the insurgents the more the insurgents metastasized and increase their attacks on the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military strategies are based on old and tired conventional methodologies of warfare, a Third Generation Warfare methodology against the Fourth Generation Warfare methodology adopted by ISWAP. There is even no space to talk about fifth or sixth generation warfare because they do not come into the equation for consideration at all. While the Nigerian military has an air force which it has deployed against the insurgents recently, there have been no precision strikes to knock out the strategic strongholds of the insurgents, for instance in Sambisa Forest. Yes. The Nigerian military has launched air strikes against ISWAP or Boko Haram bases but without the effect of lowering the fighting morale of the insurgents in any descriptive manner whatsoever. The insurgents, even though suffering heavy casualties in such air strikes, are quickly able to recover, recoup and re-consolidate in new places to plan and launch fresh attacks on the Nigerian military or other soft targets. Interestingly, since Nigeria acquired some Super Tucano combat aircrafts, there have been no reported cases in the media of their deployment to the battlespace in the Northeast – probably mainly because of the prevalent fear of being shot down by the insurgents that have been largely agreed to have sophisticated anti-aircraft artillery guns in their arsenal. Whereas Nigerians were earlier told in propaganda campaign that once the country acquires the Super Tucano aircrafts, the end of Boko Haram and ISWAP would have arrived. Such false claims!

There have been several cases of clashes between the federal troops and the insurgents but with no decisive victory especially on the part of the Nigerian Army.

Even the combined regional force (the Multinational Joint Task Force) has not been able to achieve the expected victory against the insurgents. The regional force is not only beset by internal wrangling mainly of political nature, the countries have “decided” to go solo in the war against the insurgents. This has led to uncoordinated approach to the war, to the advantage of the insurgents. This lack of coordination has also increased the material and financial cost of the war by each country. Closely connected with this unwholesome situation is the lack of effective backing from the superpowers (United State, Britain, France and others) which prefer the African countries to shoulder the heavy responsibility of prosecuting the war against the insurgents all alone. This is not unconnected with the barely concealed fact they are covertly or overtly profiting from the raging insurgency. They without have their fears or phobias of getting too deeply involved. They do not want to become mired in an internecine crisis. They probably have no means of gauging the depth of the crisis thus preferring to stay and play by the edge. Even when many of these superpowers have expressed their wishes to help the endangered countries, they never really wish to do so but prefer to let the situation fester so that they can continue to profit from it. This aspect will be examined in the next section.

Sambisa Forest is perhaps the strongest stronghold of the insurgents. But what has prevented the MNJTF from ringing the Forest for a concentric attack remains a mystery till date. Sambisa Forest has been allowed to remain the hiding place/safe haven for the insurgents. If all the Air Force of the MNJTF launch aerial attack on the Forest, there is no doubt that the insurgents would have been smoked out and deprived of their safe haven. Unfortunately, all the countries seem to be mortally afraid of the Forest.

There is also the failure of proactive intelligence gathering on the part of the Nigerian military, a situation that has led to many failures on the battlefronts instead of successes. One has often wondered the type of intelligence gathering methods that the Nigerian military has so far claimed to have used to presage their attacks on the enemies’ strongholds over the years. There have been no actions behind the battle lines to launch surprise attacks on the insurgents. Its recent use of aerial surveillance of the insurgents’ positions came about after some of the foreign powers supplied the surveillance aircrafts.

On the other hand, the Fourth Generation methodologies adopted by ISWAP is not working effectively as expected against the Nigerian military because of the fundamental flaws embedded in them notably the vast expanse of battle space it has to traverse to launch attacks on the Nigerian military – a vast space that equally allows the Nigerian military to consolidate its position in various strategic places. ISWAP has not been able to overrun and overwhelm the 7^th Division Headquarters located in Maiduguri. There are reported “super camps” by the military in the state which ISWAP has not been able to take over. ISWAP has no air force with which to launch air strikes against the military bases or movement of the troops in the war zone by the Nigerian State.

This is part of what has produced the strategic stalemate between it and the Nigerian military. But the implication is that the Nigerian State and its military wing have jointly willy-nilly evolved into an entity that is currently difficult to capture with appropriate adjectival terminology. It is, however, more of a mongrel that runs at the sight of a hyena because it is too starved to give a fight!

The Regional Context and International Connection

The battle between the Nigerian State and ISWAP and Boko Haram cannot be comprehended without situating it within the regional context of the countries affected by the raging battle. The very locational base of the ISWAP and Boko Haram and their collective activities make it imperatively regional because the bases and their activities (insurgency and campaign of terror) straddle four countries viz: Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

It is this regional context that has brought the four countries together in cooperation culminating in the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force in 2014 in order to combat the threat posed first by Boko Haram and later by ISWAP. The MNJTF provides the overarching military framework and the concomitant military strategies with which the insurgents could have been successfully defeated within a short time. But this was not to be as the MNJTF has become a useless and therefore ineffectual in the battle against the insurgent groups.

Interestingly, by the time ISWAP came into being in 2016, the MNJTF was already weakened by its internal political wrangling and lack of proper coordination, and therefore has lost the verve to continue to fight both Boko Haram and ISWAP. Most poignantly strategic is the fact that the situation has allowed the insurgent groups to consolidate their bases in the dreaded Sambisa Forest, a Forest also dreaded by the MNJTF and particularly the Nigerian military. This situation has so far prevented the MNJTF to ring or surround the Sambisa Forest for a coordinated attack including air strikes from the four air forces of the MNJTF. This unsavoury situation has thus allowed both Boko Haram and ISWAP to consolidate their bases in Sambisa Forest and operate untrammeled in the four countries concerned and thus have resilience to continue to fight the Nigerian State in particular.

What follows below is a snapshot of some of the attacks by ISWAP against the four countries.

[Around mid-January 2021], an attack by hundreds of Boko Haram fighters on a town in Niger’s jihadist-plagued southeast killed 16 soldiers and wounded nine others, Defense Minister Alkassoum Indatou told AFP on Wednesday.¹⁹² In the assault late on Tuesday “the positions of our defense and security forces in Baroua, in the Diffa region, were attacked by several hundred Boko Haram elements who came from Lake Chad,” the minister said in a statement. Nigerien soldiers “neutralized around 50 terrorists” and “secured a large quantity of arms and ammunition,” he added.²⁰³

The attack came only two months after around 6,000 people returned to the Baroua area in June after fleeing jihadist attacks in 2015, under a program to encourage around 26,000 inhabitants in the region to go back to their homes. Authorities had said that 19 villages like Baroua where more than 26,000 had returned recently were under “reinforced” protection — although Diffa governor Issa Lemine also hailed the “positive development of the security situation” as he welcomed returnees. Those who fled had been living in safer villages, UN camps, or with relatives elsewhere in the region.²⁰⁴

Around 300,000 displaced people from Niger or neighboring Nigeria have found shelter in the Diffa region from jihadist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State group affiliate ISWAP, according to the UN. Earlier this month, Niger said it would build an airbase there to step up its anti-jihadist fight. But it must also contend with jihadists who commit regular bloody attacks in the wider Sahel region stretching across the southern fringes of the Sahara, including the IS affiliate ISGS.²⁰⁵

On August 16 at least 37 civilians including women and children were killed in an attack on a village by attackers who arrived on motorbikes. Two weeks before, 15 soldiers were killed in an ambush.²⁰⁶

The world’s poorest country by the benchmark of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), Niger is facing jihadist attacks on two borders. The southeast of the country near the marshy Lake Chad region is being hit by jihadists from Nigeria’s Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The Diffa region hosts around 300,000 Nigerian refugees and locally-displaced Nigeriens. Western Niger, meanwhile, is battling bloody cross-border raids from insurgents in neighboring Mali, who include followers of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).²⁰⁷

[In early August 2021], [t]wenty four Chadian soldiers were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists in the troubled Lake Chad region, a senior local official said Thursday. “Troops from a returning patrol were resting when they were attacked by Boko Haram” on Wednesday, the region’s deputy prefect, Haki Djiddi, told AFP. “Twenty-four troops were killed, several were wounded and others have scattered into the countryside.” Army spokesman General Azem Bermandoa Agouna confirmed that an attack had taken place at Tchoukou Telia, an island 190 kilometers (118 miles) northwest of the capital N’Djamena, but refused to give any toll.²⁰⁸

Lake Chad is a vast area of water and marshland bordered by Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon as well as Chad. Jihadists from Boko Haram and a rival splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province, have been using the region for years as a haven from which to attack troops and civilians. The Chadian authorities tend to call the jihadists “Boko Haram” regardless of their affiliation.²⁰⁹

[Earlier] [i]n March 2020, around 100 Chadian troops were killed in an overnight attack on the lake’s Bohoma peninsula, prompting an offensive led by Chad’s then president, Idriss Deby Itno. Deby was killed in April 2021 during fighting against rebels in northern Chad and was succeeded by his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, at the head of a military junta.²¹⁰

Boko Haram launched a revolt in northern Nigeria in 2009 before extending its campaign into neighboring countries. According to UN figures, more than 36,000 people, most of them in Nigeria, have died and three million have fled their homes.²¹¹

Meanwhile, [on August 13, 2021, it was reported that] US troops have conducted a “strategic” exercise in Niger, the commander of the US regional force commander said.²¹² The engagement across West Africa into Niger enabled the US North and West Africa Response Force (NARF) “to exercise its readiness by testing its operational reach throughout the region,” said Major General Andrew Rohling.²¹³ The “strategic engagement” in Niger took place, from last Saturday to Monday. The NARF’s mission is “crisis and contingency response in North and West Africa, including to protect US interests,” the US army said in a statement. Rohling is commander of the US army’s Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF).²¹⁴

More than 420 civilians have been killed in jihadist attacks in western Niger this year and tens of thousands of people have fled their homes, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on Wednesday. Atrocities have also been committed in southeast Niger by Nigerian jihadists from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)²¹⁵

While in Niger, US troops met informally with French military counterparts in Niamey. “The French are important, longstanding allies who share our commitment to address complex security concerns in Africa,” said Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Ward, a battalion commander who attended the French-hosted meeting. It was estimated in 2017 that 800 US troops, mainly Special Forces, mainly active against jihadist groups, were operating in Niger.²¹⁶

France has announced a gradual reduction of its military presence in the Sahel region. President Emmanuel Macron announced in June that he would start removing much of the 5,100-member Barkhane force in the Sahel after eight years of helping local forces stave off the threat from Islamist rebels linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. After the drawdown, France will still have “2,500 to 3,000” soldiers in the region, he said then.²¹⁷

More than 420 civilians have been killed in jihadist attacks in western Niger this year and tens of thousands of people have fled their homes, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said. The estimate comes after an 11-day trip in which members of the watchdog traveled to Niger to meet witnesses, traditional chiefs, local authorities, foreign diplomats, and Nigerien rights activists. “Armed Islamist groups appear to be waging war on the civilian population in western Niger,” said Corinne Dufka, HRW’s Sahel director. “They have killed, pillaged, and burned, leaving death, broken lives, and destruction in their wake,” she said in the HRW statement.²¹⁸

The groups have also destroyed schools and churches and imposed restrictions based on their harsh interpretation of Islam, the rights group said. Nine attacks documented by HRW took place between January and July in towns and villages in the western regions of Tillaberi and Tahoua. “Since 2019, this area has experienced a dramatic spike in attacks against military targets and, increasingly, civilians by armed Islamist groups allied to the Islamic State and, to a lesser extent, Al-Qaeda,” HRW said in its report.²¹⁹

On August 17, 2021, armed men killed 37 civilians in a flashpoint region of western Niger where hundreds have died in jihadist attacks this year, local sources said Tuesday. The assailants “arrived on motorbikes” in the village of Darey-Daye in the Tillaberi region on Monday afternoon as people were working in the fields, a local official said. “The toll is very high — there were 37 dead, including four women and 13 children,” the source said.²²⁰

A local journalist confirmed the toll and described the attack as “very bloody.” “They found people in the fields and shot at anything that moved,” he said. The deaths bring the unofficial death toll from jihadist attacks in western Niger to more than 450 since the start of the year. It is also the fifth attack in this area of Tillaberi in as many months, claiming 151 lives.²²¹

Rated the world’s poorest country by the UN’s Human Development Index, Niger lies in the heart of the arid Sahel region of West Africa, which is battling a nine-year-old jihadist insurgency. The bloodshed began in northern Mali in 2012 and then spread to the center of the country before hitting neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso. Tillaberi has borne the brunt of the crisis. Darey-Daye, located 40 kilometers (25 miles) east of the town of Banibangou, was already reeling from a bloody assault on March 15. Suspected jihadists killed 66 people in attacks on the village and on vehicles of shoppers returning from the weekly market in Banibangou.²²²

According to a toll issued by Human Rights Watch (HRW), more than 420 civilians have been killed in jihadist attacks in Tillaberi and the neighboring region of Tahoua this year [2021]. Tens of thousands of people have fled their homes. “Armed Islamist groups appear to be waging war on the civilian population in western Niger,” Corinne Dufka, HRW’s Sahel director, said in the report. Among those killed were village chiefs, imams, people with disabilities, and “numerous children,” some executed after being ripped from their parents’ arms, HRW said. The groups have also destroyed schools and churches and imposed restrictions based on their harsh interpretation of Islam.²²³

The Banibangou department lies in the so-called “tri-border” area where the frontiers of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali converge. The area is notorious for attacks by highly mobile jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group. Three attacks by gunmen on motorbikes were carried out in the Banibangou area on July 25 and 29 and August 9, killing 48 people, according to the authorities. Atrocities have also been committed in southeast Niger by Nigerian jihadists from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).²²⁴

From the above, it is clear that it is not only Nigeria that is the victim of ISWAP and Boko Haram attacks. Cameroon, Chad and Niger have suffered attacks from these insurgent groups from one degree to the other. This shows how resilient these insurgent groups are.

The Strategic Context

According to Wikipedia, the Islamic State for West Africa Province is a militant group and administrative division of the Islamic State (IS), a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised proto-state. ISWAP is primarily active in the Chad Basin, and fights an extensive insurgency against the states of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. It is an offshoot of Boko Haram with which it has a violent rivalry; Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau killed himself in battle with ISWAP in 2021. ISWAP is the umbrella organization for all IS factions in West Africa including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), although the actual ties between ISWAP and IS-GS are limited.²²⁵

ISWAP’s origins date back to the emergence of Boko Haram, a Salafi jihadist movement centred in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The movement launched an insurgency against the Nigerian government following an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, aiming at establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, and neighbouring regions of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Its de facto leader Abubakar Shekau attempted to increase his international standing among Islamists by allying with the prominent Islamic State (IS) in March 2015. Boko Haram thus became the “Islamic State’s West Africa Province” (ISWAP).²²⁶

When the insurgents were subsequently defeated and lost almost all of their lands during the 2015 West African offensive by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), discontent grew among the rebels. Despite orders by the ISIL’s central command to stop using women and children suicide bombers as well as refrain from mass killings of civilians, Shekau refused to change his tactics. Researcher Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi summarized that the Boko Haram leader proved to be “too extreme even by the Islamic State’s standards”. Shekau had always refused to fully submit to ISIL’s central command, and the latter consequently removed him as leader of ISWAP in August 2016. Shekau responded by breaking with ISIL’s central command, but many of the rebels stayed loyal to IS. As a result, the rebel movement split into a Shekau-loyal faction (“Jama’at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da’wa wa-l-Jihad”, generally known as “Boko Haram”), and a pro-IS faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (which continued to call itself “Islamic State’s West Africa Province”). These two groups have since clashed with each other, though they possibly occasionally cooperated against the local governments. In addition, Shekau never officially renounced his pledge of allegiance to IS as a whole; his forces are thus occasionally regarded as “second branch of ISWAP”. Overall, the relation of Shekau with IS remained confused and ambiguous.²²⁷

In the next years, Barnawi’s ISWAP and Shekau’s Boko Haram both reconsolidated, though ISWAP grew into the more powerful group. Whereas Shekau had about 1,000 to 2,000 fighters under his command by 2019, the Islamic State loyalists counted up to 5,000 troops. It also changed its tactics, and attempted to win support by local civilians unlike Boko Haram which was known for its extensive indiscriminate violence. ISWAP begun to build up basic government services and focused its efforts on attacking Christian targets instead Muslim ones. However, the group also continued to attack humanitarian personnel and select Muslim communities. In the course of the Chad Basin campaign (2018–2020), ISWAP had extensive territorial gains before losing many to counter-offensives by the local security forces. At the same time, it experienced a violent internal dispute which resulted in the deposition of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the execution of several commanders. In the course of 2020, the Nigerian Armed Forces repeatedly attempted to capture the Timbuktu Triangle from ISWAP, but suffered heavy losses and made no progress.²²⁸

In April 2021, ISWAP overran a Nigerian Army base around Mainok, capturing armoured fighting vehicles including main battle tanks, as well as other military equipment. In the next month, ISWAP attacked and overran Boko Haram’s bases in the Sambisa Forest and Abubakar Shekau killed himself. As a result, many Boko Haram fighters defected to ISWAP, and the group secured a chain of strongholds from Nigeria to Mali to southern Libya. Despite this major victory, ISWAP was forced to deal with Boko Haram loyalists who continued to oppose the Islamic State. In August 2021, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was reportedly killed, either in battle with the Nigerian Army or during inter-ISWAP clashes. Later that month, ISWAP suffered a defeat when attacking Diffa, but successfully raided Rann, destroying the local barracks before retreating with loot. In October and November, there were further leadership changes in ISWAP, as senior commanders were killed by security forces.²²⁹

ISWAP’s central command is subordinate to IS’s core group headed by self-appointed Caliph Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Initially, ISWAP was headed by a single commander, termed the wali (governor). The group’s first overall wali was Abubakar Shekau who was succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi in 2016. The latter was replaced by Ba Idrisa in March 2019 who was in turn purged and executed in 2020. He was replaced by Ba Lawan. In general, the shura, a consultative assembly, holds great power within the group. This has led researcher Jacob Zenn to argue that the shura gives the group an element of “democracy”. The shura’s influence has allowed ISWAP to expand its popular support, yet has also made it more prone to leadership struggles. Appointments to leadership positions such as the shura or the governorships are discussed internally and by ISIL’s core group; IS’s core group also has to approve new appointments.²³⁰

In May 2021, the shura was temporarily dissolved and Abu Musab al-Barnawi was appointed “caretaker” leader of ISWAP. By July 2021, the shura had been restored, and ISWAP’s internal system had been reformed. The regional central command now consists of the Amirul Jaish (military leader) and the shura. There is no longer an overall wali, and the shura’s head instead serves as leader of ISWAP’s governorates, while the Amirul Jaish acts as chief military commander. “Sa’ad” served as new Amirul Jaish, while Abu Musab al-Barnawi became head of the shura. However, non-IS sources still claim that a position referred to as the overall “wali” or “leader of ISWAP” continues to exist. This position was reportedly filled by ex-chief wali Ba Lawan (also “Abba Gana”) before passing to Abu-Dawud (also “Aba Ibrahim”), Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Malam Bako, and Sani Shuwaram in a matter of months in late 2021.²³¹

In March 2019, IS’s core group began to portray ISWAP as being responsible for all operations by pro-IS groups in West Africa. Accordingly, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) was formally put under ISWAP’s command. ISWAP and IS-GS maintain logistical connections, but the former’s actual influence on the latter is limited.²³²

In general, ISWAP is known to maintain substantial contacts with IS’s core group, although the exact extent of ties is debated among researchers. ISWAP aligns ideologically with IS, and has also adopted many of its technologies and tactics. ISWAP uses suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and drones typical for IS. Researchers consider these as proof of support and advice by IS members from Syria and Iraq. IS’s core group has probably provided ISWAP with not just technical, but also financial aid.²³³

In contrast to Boko Haram which mostly raided and enslaved civilians, ISWAP is known for setting up an administration in the territories where it is present. As IS maintains to be a state despite having lost its territory in the Middle East, ISWAP’s ability to run a basic government is ideologically important for all of IS. Despite not fully controlling the areas where it is present, ISWAP maintains more control over large swaths of the countryside than the Nigerian government and has created four governorates. These governorates, centered at Lake Chad, Sambisa Forest, Timbuktu, and Tumbuma, are each headed by a wali and have their own governing structures. Each governorate has its own military commanders, and sends at least two representatives to ISWAP’s shura.²³⁴

ISWAP collects taxes on agriculture and trade in its territories, and offers protection as well as some “limited services” in return, including law enforcement. The group appoints its own police chiefs, and its police also enforce the hisbah. The group makes considerable efforts to win local grassroots support, and has employed a “hearts and minds” policy toward the local communities. It encourages locals to live in de facto rebel-held communities. Among its taxes, ISWAP also collects the zakat, a traditional Muslim tax and form of almsgiving which is used to provide for the poor. ISWAP’s zakat has been featured in propaganda distributed by IS’s newspaper, al-Naba. ISWAP’s “Zakat Office” is known to operate fairly systematically and effectively, raising substantial funds to support both ISWAP as well as local civilians. Experts Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner have described ISWAP’s taxation system as being locally less corrupt and fairer than that of the Nigerian state; some local traders argue that ISWAP creates a better environment for trade in rice, fish, and dried pepper. At the same time, ISWAP is known for targeting agencies providing humanitarian aid, thereby depriving locals of basic necessities in government-held areas.²³⁵

ISWAP’s strength has fluctuated over the years, and estimates accordingly vary. In 2017, researchers put its strength at around 5,000 militants. By the next year, it was believed to have shrunk to circa 3,000. The group experienced a surge and regained much power in 2019, resulting in researchers estimating that it had grown to 5,000 or up to 18,000 fighters. By 2020, the United States Department of Defense publicly estimated that ISWAP had 3,500 to 5,000 fighters.²³⁶

ISWAP is known to employ inghimasi forlorn hope/suicide attack shock troops as well as armoured fighting vehicles (AVFs). Throughout its history, ISWAP has repeatedly seized tanks including T-55s, VT-4s, FT1s, and armoured personnel carriers such as the BTR-4EN, and then pressed them into service. The group also relies heavily on motorcycles, technical, and captured military tactical/utility vehicles such as Kia KLTVs.²³⁷

But why must ISWAP be afraid of?

According to the United Nations Security Council, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) was listed not only as an affiliate of a well-known international terrorist organization, Islamic State, it is also considered as one of the most dangerous terrorist organization in Africa capable of destabilizing the entire West African region.²³⁸

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) was listed on 23 February 2020 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017) as being associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to”, “recruiting for”, “otherwise supporting acts or activities of”, “either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting”, and “other acts or activities indicating association with” Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).²³⁹

In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau’s (QDi.322) group, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) (QDe.138), pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), and changed the group’s name to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). ISIL accepted the pledge the same month, as ISIL spokesman Abou Mohamed al Adnani (QDi.325) released an audio message directing individuals who could not enter Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic to travel to West Africa.²⁴⁰

In August 2016, ISIL Leadership recognized and appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the de facto leader of ISWAP, which Shekau refused to accept. Due to infighting, ISIL-West Africa split into two factions, al-Barnawi’s faction (ISWAP) and Shekau’s faction (Boko Haram). It is estimated that ISWAP has approximately 3,500-5,000 fighters.²⁴¹

ISWAP has carried out numerous attacks in Nigeria, since its formation: In June 2019, the group attacked two military bases in the towns of Marte and Kirenowa, near the Borno state capital Maiduguri, Nigeria, ransacking weapons and pushing Nigerian troops back; In May 2019, the group conducted an attack on a military base in the town of Gubio, north of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing at least three Nigerian soldiers; In December 2018, the group conducted a series of attacks, taking over the commercial town of Baga, Nigeria, near the border with Chad as well as a nearby Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) base; On 18 November 2018, the group attacked an army base in the village Metele, in northeastern Borno state, Nigeria, killing over 100 Nigerian soldiers. In September 2018, the group captured a town in Borno state after sacking and occupying a military base in northeast Nigeria; In April 2018, the group conducted attacks on the outskirts of Maiduguri, Nigeria, killing 18 people and leaving 84 wounded; In February 2018, the group abducted 110 schoolgirls in Nigeria and in March kidnapped three aid workers during an attack that killed dozens of other people; In January 2017, the group conducted a midnight attack against Nigerian troops in the village of Kamuya, Nigeria resulting in the death of three Nigerian soldiers.²⁴²

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram, is growing in power and influence. From its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, this jihadist group is waging a guerrilla war across north-eastern Nigeria and elsewhere on the lake’s periphery. By filling gaps in governance and service delivery, it has cultivated a level of support among local civilians that Boko Haram never enjoyed and has turned neglected communities in the area and islands in Lake Chad into a source of economic support. If Nigeria and its neighbouring Lake Chad states want to sever the bond between ISWAP and these communities – and they should – then they cannot stop with countering ISWAP in battle. They will need to complement military action by filling the service and governance gaps that ISWAP has exploited.²⁴³

Displacing ISWAP will not be easy. Although the group’s methods are often violent and coercive, it has established a largely symbiotic relationship with the Lake Chad area’s inhabitants. The group treats local Muslim civilians better than its parent organisation did, better than its rival faction, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), does now, and in some ways better than the Nigerian state and army have done since the insurgency began in 2009. It digs wells, polices cattle rustling, provides a modicum of health care and sometimes disciplines its own personnel whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians. In the communities it controls, its taxation is generally accepted by civilians, who credit it for creating an environment where they can do business and compare its governance favourably to that of the Nigerian state.²⁴⁴

ISWAP’s approach appears to have paid dividends in terms of recruitment and support. (Ibid) ISWAP’s deepening roots in the civilian population underscore that the Nigerian government (and, to a lesser extent, those of Cameroon, Chad and Niger) cannot look purely to military means to ensure its enduring defeat. Instead, they should seek to weaken ISWAP’s ties to locals by proving that they can fill service and governance gaps at least in the areas they control, even as they take care to conduct the counter-insurgency as humanely as possible and in a manner that protects civilians.²⁴⁵

To combat impunity among the security services, they should release the report of the panel that President Muhammadu Buhari appointed in 2017 to investigate alleged military abuses and implement those recommendations that advance accountability. They should enhance public safety in towns that are under government control in Borno and neighbouring states where ISWAP is building influence.²⁴⁶

They should take care that in seeking to cut off ISWAP’s access to local markets they do not alienate locals by also strangling their ability to trade. And even though negotiations to end hostilities may not be a realistic prospect at this time, they should keep lines of communication open with ISWAP, focusing on practical issues such as how to get more humanitarian assistance to local communities.²⁴⁷

These strategies certainly do not guarantee victory for state authorities over ISWAP – but they could help counteract important sources of the organisation’s strength, provide a useful complement to ongoing efforts to degrade it militarily, and at the same time channel important support to communities in the region, which sorely need it.²⁴⁸

According to Malik Samuel, Researcher, Lake Chad Basin Programme at the Dakar-based Institute for Security Studies, the death of Abubakar Shekau, long-time leader of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah lid-Da’wati wa’l-Jihad (JAS), has opened the space for a reconfiguration of forces in the Lake Chad Basin. It could allow Islamic State (IS) to consolidate its position in the region through its local affiliate, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).²⁴⁹

According to ongoing Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research, IS proposes to set up four caliphates in Borno State, north-east Nigeria, to oversee its activities in the Lake Chad Basin area and beyond. The proposal to ISWAP was reportedly made in June, with plans for new caliphates (states) in Lake Chad, Sambisa, Timbuktu and Tumbuma. Each will have its own wali (governor) and ‘governing’ structure.²⁵⁰

However all four caliphates will be under the control of the Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi-led IS core, suggesting a closer control of franchising rights by IS central. Some positions will therefore remain central in the Lake Chad Basin and not be replicated in each caliphate.²⁵¹ These include the Shura Council (consultative assembly) and Amirul Jaish (military leader) positions. Each caliphate will have at least two representatives at the Shura Council and military commanders of its own. They will report to the Amirul Jaish, who will oversee all the region’s military activities.²⁵²

Presently there is reportedly one new appointed wali – Ba Lawan, who is in charge of Tumbuma. ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who’s been in Sambisa since Shekau’s death, will be elevated to head the new Shura Council. All four walis will also report to him. Sa’ad, the current Amirul Jaish, oversees the Lake Chad islands pending the appointment of a wali there. Appointments are done by ISWAP leaders, with inputs, recognition and acceptance from IS.²⁵³

As part of the consolidation, former Boko Haram fighters who left for Libya over the years for different reasons are returning to the Lake Chad Basin to rejoin ISWAP. Interviews with individuals familiar with these movements revealed that about 80 fighters in two batches arrived in Nigeria from Libya in April. Among other reasons, some fled after the 2016 Boko Haram split, having been disillusioned by what they saw as the selfishness of leaders in both factions, JAS and ISWAP.²⁵⁴

With support from IS, ISWAP relies on an elaborate network of contacts and routes cutting across West and North Africa (Libya-Algeria-Mali-Niger-Nigeria) to facilitate the movements of fighters. About 120 more, including Arabs who will be permanently based in the region as part of the leadership, are now expected from Libya.²⁵⁵ Key informants told the ISS that some of the returned fighters – Nigeriens, Nigerians and Malians – were part of the ISWAP team that attacked Sambisa in May, resulting in Shekau’s death.²⁵⁶

After their return from Libya, the first set was based in Shuwaram in Kukawa Local Government Area of Borno State, Nigeria, for verification. They were then deployed to Timbuktu (Alagarno Forest) in Damboa Local Government Area, where fighters from the Lake Chad islands later joined them.²⁵⁷

ISWAP has over the years proved to be one of the biggest and most successful IS affiliates, with prominent acknowledgements from the central leadership. Shekau’s death has given ISWAP access to more territory, fighters and weapons.²⁵⁸

Former fighters’ return and the increased role IS are seeking to play present problems for stabilisation efforts and plans to address violent extremism in the region and beyond. The group persistently attacks humanitarian and government initiatives, killing and abducting humanitarian workers, looting and burning their offices. This has resulted in increased numbers of displaced people, 54% of whom are female, particularly in north-east Nigeria.²⁵⁹

In Borno State, the worst-hit state in the Lake Chad Basin region, 19% of the territory remains either totally or mainly inaccessible to both state and humanitarian actors because of insecurity.²⁶⁰

IS is also championing reforms within ISWAP to satisfy its fighters and secure their loyalty. This includes taking steps to ensure they are treated fairly by commanders. Fighters can now also choose what to do with their share in the spoils of war, increasing the economic incentive to fight for the group.²⁶¹ Reforms also include protecting and supporting livelihoods for civilians in areas it controls. These are seen as strategic, as better local livelihoods translate to more revenue through taxes. They also lend more legitimacy to the group and its activities.²⁶²

The group may also view humanitarian and stabilisation efforts as a direct threat to its goal of presenting itself as the only credible government to civilians. Such initiatives cannot take place or succeed where there are continued attacks and insecurity.²⁶³

More practical collaborations between states in and outside the Lake Chad Basin are needed. Intelligence gathering and sharing, joint investigations and research are becoming increasingly crucial – states cannot deal with these problems individually.²⁶⁴

Better border management and security can also help. Extremist groups are known to take advantage of porous and unsupervised borders for movement and sanctuary. Because it is practically impossible to oversee these long borders physically, technology like drones, sensors and artificial intelligence can play vital roles. However they must be deployed as a complement to human intelligence and improved state-society relations.²⁶⁵

Equally important is investing in prevention efforts that thwart ISWAP’s recruitment drive, both ideologically and non-ideologically, and its ongoing efforts to create a parallel state in the region. Governments must realise that the threats posed by ISWAP won’t go away until there’s no more space for it to operate. Thus there must be credible and better alternatives to what the group is offering to win the hearts and minds of civilians.²⁶⁶

States should take a hard look at their social contracts with the people. Strengthening these is critical to preventing more people from joining extremist groups. This requires increased government presence in remote areas, which should translate into more security, provision of alternative livelihoods, respect for human rights and access to basic and quality services like healthcare, education and potable water.²⁶⁷

The Nigeria Police as a Lilliputian

The Nigeria Police is another sorry sight, an eyesore, a sad story of how a primary security agency could derail from its core statutory mandate to become an extractive institution and thus making life more difficult for the citizens.

With a numerical strength of about 360, 000 personnel, it is even higher than the military. But the Nigeria Police has been publicly acknowledged to be the most dysfunctioning among all security agencies in the country. In fact, it is alleged to be the worst police force on the African continent, if not in the world. It has progressively turned itself into an extractive institution with the helpless and hapless citizens as its main target of extractive activities, i.e. fleecing the people at the slightest opportunity. To say that the Nigeria Police is corrupt is to be generously benevolent or very liberal in the use of adjectival terminologies to describe its public image.

To say the least, the Nigeria Police is worthless because it is completely ineffectual as a fighting machine against the rising crescendo of crimes across the full spectrum of insecurity in the country. The Police is completely helpless in the face of rampaging assortment of extremely violent non-state actors. It has both philosophically and physically failed as an institution in its core mandate as a combat machine against criminality in the country.

According to World Internal Security and Police Index for 2016, Nigeria has the worst police force on earth. “Terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to internal security. Terrorism has increased dramatically over the last three years, with more than 62,000 people being killed in terrorist attacks between 2012 and 2014. The biggest rise in the last year occurred in Nigeria, the worst performing country on the WISPI”²⁶⁸ Nigeria performed worst on the Index, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda, and Pakistan. However, countries with protracted civil conflicts are not eligible for the Index.²⁶⁹ Corruption has been increasing around the globe in the last 20 years. In many countries, bribe payments to the police are still commonplace. The Index average for bribe payments to police was 30 per cent, with more than 50 per cent of respondents admitting to having paid a bribe to police in 33 of the 127 countries in the Index.²⁷⁰

The World Internal Security and Police Index were first conducted in 2016. The situation in Nigeria has worsened since then, almost eight years later.

In April 2019, Taiwo Ojoye of the Punch newspaper penned a damningly indicting piece on the state of the Nigeria Police bringing the farcical state of the Police into sharp focus.

At the risk of becoming fatalistic, the acting Inspector-General of Police, Mohammed Adamu, has restated the salient points behind the farcical state of the Nigeria Police Force. In his defence of the agency’s 2019 budget proposals before the House of Representatives Committee on Police Affairs, Adamu laid the blame for the NPF’s wretched state on staff strength deficiency and meagre funding. This is not surprising; certainly not to the National Assembly, which considers the police budget annually or the public that endures the incessant security breaches.²⁷¹

Over time, policing in Nigeria has diminished – in standards and operational competence. In a country close to the 200 million-population mark, the rot sticks out like a sore thumb. The operational strength of its police force is just 301,737 personnel, Adamu affirmed. At that rate, it translates to one police officer to secure about 662 citizens, though the figure may not reflect its true operational strength as some personnel are traffic wardens and civilian staff. It falls short of the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:400. In contrast to the situation in Nigeria, Singapore has a ratio of 1:137, Egypt 1:186 and South Africa 1:366, statistics by the UN show. These are countries where professionalism is given a pride of place in policing.²⁷²

The police are also weakened by elite interest. A chunk of the core personnel — close to 200,000 by different accounts — are deployed to secure VIPs and those who can foot the bill. Shamefully, no IG —including the incumbent — has been brave enough to withdraw these officers and properly reassign them. In addition, the police are miserably under-funded. There is a huge gap between needs and releases. Adamu’s immediate predecessor, Ibrahim Idris, told the National Assembly in 2018 that the force required N1.3 trillion annually for its operations. But in 2016, the NPF received N10.02 billion out of a capital appropriation of N16.1 billion. For overheads, it got N6.34 billion from a vote of N9.25 billion. It had proposed to spend N331 billion and N90.6 billion on capital and overhead costs respectively that year. Adamu told legislators last week that from a capital budget estimate of N342.9 billion for 2018, the force received only N25.2 billion.²⁷³

This partly accounts for the pathetic situation of the force. Officers are poorly compensated and ill-equipped: Outwardly, they look ragged. Many police stations lack basic tools and weapons to fight crime. In this era of sophisticated crime, this is a recipe for gross failure. Several Nigerian communities are left un-policed: bandits have hijacked states like Zamfara, Katsina, Rivers, Taraba, Kebbi and Sokoto. The Abuja-Kaduna Expressway has become a den of armed robbers and kidnappers. So overwhelming is insecurity that the military have been drafted to 33 states for police duties.²⁷⁴

Nonetheless, blaming the rot in the police on funding alone misses the point. For one, many state governments like Lagos (through its Security Trust Fund), Enugu, Borno, Ogun and Cross River allocate huge funds to support the police. Corporate organisations and individuals do the same, but, largely, this has not worked principally because of the flawed centralised policing system. In this incongruous structure, governors are the “chief security officers” of their states only in name, unable to give simple directives to the police. Allocating massive funds to this dubious structure through the Police Trust Fund Bill passed by the legislature, as the incumbent IG and his predecessor had canvassed, is a futile mission. This will only treat the symptoms of the disease; it will not change anything significantly. The bureaucracy will only get bigger and swallow scarce funds.²⁷⁵

The police system is rather in need of a major overhaul. The deployment of technology is paramount. The United Kingdom has between 4.2 and 5.9 million CCTV cameras, or one camera for every 14 Britons, says the British Security Industry Association. It is unfortunate that a $470 million Chinese CCTV project for Abuja and Lagos conceived in 2010 failed. The federal and state governments have to establish forensic operations, automatic registration number recognition systems and adequately fund the police. The current recruitment process that allows criminals to become police officers has to be swiftly reformed in line with the aspiration to promote efficiency.²⁷⁶

In all this, the biggest issue bedeviling policing is the subsisting single agency structure. Some elite interest groups have resisted all attempts to review this anomaly. Ideally, a federal political entity like Nigeria ought to have several layers of policing: Policing must be devolved as a first major step. This is the practice in the United States (with a federal, state, county, community, schools policing system), Belgium, Germany and Australia. On its part, the United Kingdom, though a unitary entity has devolved policing to 43 constituent forces. There, even the appointment of the police chief is anchored on merit. It is based on rigorous interviews, not seniority and loyalty to the president or ethnic considerations. Nigeria will continue to be a hostage to criminals until a policing system that is appropriate for a large and divergent society is established. According to the late statesman, Obafemi Awolowo, “police is a residual subject, because the immediate problem of maintaining law and order can only be properly and more effectively tackled by the state governments.”²⁷⁷

Meanwhile, state governors should stop being indifferent to insecurity and creatively take charge of security in their domains. Without constitutional amendment, states in the North operate religious police outfits. Nothing stops other states from operating their own mini- security forces. Governors should boldly test the limit of the constitution on state police.²⁷⁸

In late February 2020, the then Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Adamu, finally disclosed that the Nigeria’s police personnel strength cannot cope with the security challenges confronting the country then – and as well as now.

The Inspector General of Police, Mr. Mohammed Adamu has decried that the personnel strength of the Force cannot cope with the current security challenges facing the country. Adamu, who was represented by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) Operations, Mr. Abdulmajid Ali, disclosed this yesterday in Abuja at a public hearing organised by the House of Representatives Committee on Police Affairs, with the theme ‘Repositioning the Nigeria Police for an Enhanced Delivery’.²⁷⁹

 He said that an a aggregation of the reports of the various Police Reform Committees under the current democratic dispensation indicated that the major challenges inhibiting optimal police service delivery included gross underfunding, inadequate personnel, poor remuneration and welfare regime, among others. Adamu explained that a comparative analysis between Nigeria and South Africa Police showed that while in 2018 the South African police got 46.87 billion rand or N1.1372 trillion for visible policing programme with a 6.89 per cent growth projection up to 2021/2022 financial year, the Nigeria Police had to do with N35 billion appropriation and an eventual release of N20 billion for capital and overhead expenditure. He stated: “Inadequate personnel to cope with the expanding and increasingly complex requirements of policing Nigeria’s growing population and crime profile. Strength of about 302,000 police officers police a population of about 200,000,000 is definitely inadequate.”²⁸⁰

Adamu noted that this runs short of UN standard for policing, stipulating a ratio of 1:350/400 people and called for “a sustainable recruitment of at least 50,000 personnel every year for the next 10 years to address the manpower inadequacy.” He added that in Kenya for example, a Police Constables take home earning is about 34,907 Shilling or N126,000, whereas his Nigerian counterpart earns unfortunately less than N50,000, stressing that pitiably, this earning comes down to N12,000 to N18,000 of retirement. Adamu said that the paucity of funds has over the years made it impossible for an average Police Officer to be adequately trained and retrained for an enhanced service delivery, saying that an improvement in this area would no doubt enhance professionalism in terms of weapons handling, investigation and human rights observance operational equipment deficiency.²⁸¹

Adamu noted that not less than 1,000 Amoured Personnel Carriers (APCs); 250,000 assault rifles/corresponding ammunition, 2,000,000 tear gas canisters/smoke grenade, 200,000 Riot Gunners and Smoke Pistols, 1,000 Tracking Devices, 774 Operational Drones, among others are needed to cover the length and breadth of the nation’s infrastructural and Logistics Deficit Gap between the citizens and the Police.  He further called on the lawmakers to review obsolete laws regulating police functions and enactment of requisite laws to aid the police institutional and human capacity orientation, as well as optimal police service delivery in line with modern dictates.²⁸²

So the lamentation of the three Northern governors earlier quoted amounts to nothing less than begging the question of how to strengthen the Police to serve as the first line of defense against criminality such as banditry that is now on rampage in most Northern states – or consider the alternative of how to secure lives and properties of the citizens, corporate bodies and the State itself.

A Giant with Clay Feet

The contemporary problems facing the Nigerian military are many as well as complex or complicated. And the problems are very profound.

A state sets up its security institutions to meet its core remit of protecting its citizens from both internal and external aggressions. This role is challenged as Nigeria is increasingly under threat from criminals and conflict entrepreneurs. While the nation’s security agencies speak about containing and eliminating these threats, scores of lives are lost every day to preventable insecurity. About 2 million Nigerians – almost the population of Gambia – are internally displaced by the insurgents in the Northeast region. In fact, attacks appear to have intensified despite deployment of security forces to these conflict areas.²⁸³

Compared with its neighbors, Nigeria possessed overwhelming military strength. Its sizeable and relatively well-equipped armed forces were capable of defending the country against any likely external threat and of projecting power in the region. In fact, prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1989-90, Nigeria was the only country in west-central Africa to mount and sustain military operations abroad. Although the army had been cut by more than one-half since 1970, its firepower and mobility have increased considerably. The other services have grown little, but their combat systems increased in number and sophistication. The navy expanded its mission from coastal defense to sea-lane protection and acquired modest amphibious and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Likewise, the NAF developed and improved its capacity for ground attack, air support, interdiction, air defense, airlift, and air mobility operations.²⁸⁴

Nigeria’s military capabilities were subject to several systemic constraints, however. Economic difficulties and budgetary limitations slowed the pace of military modernization, delayed new equipment procurements, hindered defense industrial growth, reduced training, and magnified logistical and maintenance deficiencies. The diversity of equipment of foreign origin precluded standardization and compounded logistics and maintenance difficulties. Indeed, in the 1980s it was estimated that, at any given time, one-third of Nigeria’s major systems was operational, another third could be made operational within a few weeks, and the remainder was indefinitely unserviceable. Moreover, the top military echelons had become politicized, engrossed in government functions, and preoccupied with internal security at the expense of professional military development. Inefficiency and corruption exacerbated these problems, all of which combined to hurt operational readiness and effectiveness. However, the progressive withdrawal of the military from politics during the transition to the Third Republic (expected to begin with the completion of the return to civilian rule in late 1992), the restructuring of the armed forces, and the emphasis on professionalism since the late 1980s were intended to remedy these problems.²⁸⁵

According to the World Bank, Nigeria has a total strength of 230, 000 armed forces personnel as at 2018.²⁸⁶ However, the number is hardly the issue but well trained and the equipment available to it including their fighting morale, and superior strategies and tactics learned as part of their overall advanced education.

According to Global Firepower, for 2022, Nigeria is ranked 35 of 140 out of the countries considered for the annual GFP review. It holds a PwrIndx* score of 0.5745 (a score of 0.0000 is considered ‘perfect’). This entry last updated on 01/13/2022.²⁸⁷ In the African Military Strength (2022) ranking, Nigeria was rated No 4.²⁸⁸

More telling is the issue of fighting morale of the military. The situation has not been what it seems to be following the propaganda of the Nigerian State and/or the Nigerian military.

There are different factors that result to soldier’s morale in wartime. This includes positive family relations where wives positive attitudes would influence their husband’s morale both directly and indirectly. Additionally, morale is also associated with a soldier’s personal motivation and perception of the work. Second are good leadership styles that do not strain soldiers, which would reduce their morale. Lastly, is facilitating the belief that senior military leaders are concerned for their soldiers welfare, which will increase on their morale. These factors are significant in facilitating morale among soldiers during war, which will reduce the chances of situations such as in the French War of 1917, or Yossarian’s actions in Catch 22. With this information, military Bureaucracy and counselling units can apply the factors to increase on military morale among soldiers. It is apparent that soldier’s morale is connected to their environment including family, leaders, personal beliefs and perceptions, interactions, and dedication to work.²⁸⁹ 

One of the most significant factors, of any effective fighting force, including the military, is the morale of the soldiers that make up the fighting force during a war. The degree to which the morale is felt determines an army’s ability to fight and defend its position. This shows that lack of morale among soldiers can affect their capability to win a battle.  One of the most recognized situations where soldiers had a low morale in war, which rendered the army ineffective, was the rebellion that occurred in the French Army in 1917. The need to establish the factors is significant considering the consequences of a low morale that include the death of large numbers of soldiers in wartime.²⁹⁰

The essence of morale among soldiers is that it should have different foundations with the most significant being spiritual, intellectual, and material and that is the chronological order of their significance. The first is spiritual considering that only strong spiritual backgrounds can endure severe strain. The second is intellectual, which outlines reason and feeling considered as significant factors among soldiers while the last is material conditions that are low but motivate soldiers to work. Leaders and their leadership styles influence the impact that stressors have on soldiers, which affects their morale. This means that leaders in the army have the capability to motivate soldiers and increase on their morale during wartime. It will be easy for leaders to minimize on negative factors and increase on positive factors that facilitate morale.^{291, 292}

The problem of low morale in the Nigerian military as it affects the counter-insurgency war in the North east part of the country was admitted by the former Chief of Army Staff, retired Lt. General Tukur Yusuf Buratai in June 2019.

The [former] Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, lamented that some officers and men’s insufficient commitment is affecting the success of the counter-insurgency operations in the country. Buratai who spoke at the opening of a five-day leadership workshop for mid-level officers and soldiers in Abuja, said the rising terrorist attacks were due to “insufficient commitment to a common national and military cause by those at the frontlines.” The army chief noted that there were proven cases of soldiers unwilling to carry out assignments given to them, adding that reluctant troops should leave the service as the army would no longer tolerate them. Buratai said, “It is unfortunate, but the truth is that almost every setback the Nigerian Army has had in our operations in recent times can be traced to insufficient willingness to perform assigned tasks or simply insufficient commitment to a common national and military course by those at the frontlines. Many of those on whom the responsibility for physical actions against the adversary squarely falls are yet to fully take ownership of our common national or service cause. And this is the reason why I have always ensured that the promotion of army personnel is essentially based on professional considerations only. But we all know that professional capacity is not a sufficient condition to succeed in a task; willingness to perform the task is equally necessary. We all know that leadership is core to military professionalism; hence all military professional courses include aspects of military leadership skills acquisition.”²⁹³

Buratai added that an effect of modernisation, globalisation and Information and Communications Technology in the last decades had [s]een the “decline in nationalistic enthusiasm.” “Hence the theme of the workshop has been aptly chosen as ‘Lead, follow or get out of the way,’” he said.²⁹⁴

Buratai’s allegations might not be far from the truth as Boko Haram fighters backed by the Islamic State West African Province have attacked at least four Nigerian Army bases [during the period]. This has already been raising concerns among the troops of the Operation Lafiya Dole in the North-East. The army has lost a yet-to-be-ascertained number of soldiers when Boko Haram fighters attacked its bases in the Mobbar, Damasak, Monguno and Gajiram areas of Borno State. Also, the acting Director of Army Public Relations, Col. Sagir Musa, has yet to confirm the number of casualties in any of the attacks.²⁹⁵

In the attacks on army bases by the insurgents within the [period], ammunition worth at least N20m was carted away by the fighters. On June 12, while the Democracy Day celebration was ongoing nationwide, Boko Haram insurgents attacked a military location at Kareto village in the Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno State. The terrorists reportedly killed the Commanding Officer of 158 Battalion and an undisclosed number of soldiers. On Saturday, June 15, Boko Haram terrorists attacked another troops’ location in Damasak, Borno State, during which an unconfirmed number of soldiers were injured. On Monday, the Boko Haram fighters attacked another military base in Monguno, Borno State, killing at least five soldiers. The terrorists reportedly invaded the location in many utility vehicles in an attack, which occurred on Monday around 6pm. Sources said before reinforcements came to Monguno, the terrorists had made away with the military’s ammunition and set a section of the base on fire.²⁹⁶

[What happened next, a year later, was that] no fewer than 356 soldiers in the North-East and other theatres of operation applied to the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Tukur Buratai, for voluntary retirement, citing “loss of interest” as their reason for disengagement. The soldiers wrote to the army chief on July 3, 2020, under Reference NA/COAS/001, quoting the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service soldiers/rating/airmen (Revised) 2017.²⁹⁷

The approval of the voluntary disengagement of the 356 soldiers was contained in a 17-page circular from Buratai, AHQ DOAA/G1/300/92, signed by Brig Gen T.E. Gagariga for the army chief and obtained by our correspondent on Saturday. Also, the document was copied to Headquarters, Theatre Command, Operation Lafiya Dole, Borno State, the Headquarters of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 81, and 82 Divisions of the Nigerian Army and other formations.²⁹⁸

[T]he majority of the soldiers applying for voluntary disengagement and citing loss of interest are from the North-East theatre of operation – a development which military sources attributed to loss of morale, poor weapons, unimproved allowances and the continuous loss of soldiers to Boko Haram attacks.²⁹⁹

Since the beginning of 2020, Boko Haram onslaughts on military locations in the North-East have also intensified with large casualties on the part of troops of the Nigerian Army. In March [2020], the Defence Headquarters, Abuja, said 47 soldiers were killed by a bomb explosion triggered by Boko Haram in Gorigi near Allargano Forest area in Borno State. In the same month, the army confirmed losing three soldiers while others were injured in a Boko Haram attack in the Damboa Local Government Area of Borno. In May, the insurgents also attacked an army location belonging to the 156 Battalion in the Mainok area with at least 10 gun trucks, killing five soldiers, while others were injured. In June, the Boko Haram terrorists became emboldened and shot dead an acting Commanding Officer of the army, Major K. Yakubu, during a gun battle in the Doron Naira and Magaji areas of Borno State. The late CO, who was in charge of 401 Special Forces Brigade, also lost some of his troops in the terrorist attack.³⁰⁰

The 356 soldiers who applied for voluntary retirement citing loss of interest are Master Warrant Officers, Warrant Officers, Staff Sergeants, Sergeants, Lance Corporals, Corporals and Privates. The total number on the list of voluntary disengagement is 380; while 356 cited loss of interest, 24 cited “to take a traditional title.”³⁰¹

Writing on behalf of the army chief, Buratai, in the document, Gagariga said, “In compliance with the provisions of Reference A, the COAS vide Reference B has approved the voluntary and medical discharge of the above named MWO, and 385 others listed as Annexes A and B. “The soldiers are to proceed on terminal leave December 3, 2020, while their disengagement date takes effect from January 3, 2021, in accordance with the Nigerian Army Administrative Policy and Procedures No 27 Paragraphs 3 and 4. Accordingly, I am directed to request formations and units to release all affected soldiers to report at the Headquarters, Garrison, with their unit service documents for documentation. All forms of military-controlled items, arms, ammunition, and items of combat kits are recovered from the soldiers prior to their disengagement date and certify that they are properly de-kitted. Please acknowledge.”³⁰²

A military source said the mass disengagement was indicative of the general discontentment in the army, and against the leaders. Soldiers in recent times have also appeared in viral videos complaining about the poor quality of their fighting equipment in the North-East and how the Boko Haram terrorists are able to attack and kill troops due to alleged insiders’ connivance.³⁰³

It appears it has taken a decade of jihadist violence and other internal security issues for one of Africa’s strongest military forces to be considered tested. For some reasons, Nigeria’s military warfare against terrorists in its North-east region is not yielding the expected result – ending the terrorism. Although the North-east conflict is an ideological war fought by jihadists who have employed guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run to prolong total victory, there may be other reasons why Nigeria is not winning the war. Agreeably, there has been a nationwide spike in security issues continually begging for the attention and engagement of Nigeria’s military forces already stretched thin in the war against terror in the North-east region. … Nigeria with no reserve has her troops deployed in almost all the states across the federation to support Nigeria police force. However, the security personnel is largely inadequate, considering the country size and inherent security challenges.³⁰⁴

For a country bridled by security challenges, Nigeria spends less than one per cent of her GDP on defense. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank recommend at least 1.5 per cent of a nation’s GDP on security for countries even without security issues. Even as funding inadequacies remain a big issue, corruption in the system has also worsened the situation as budgeted resources are never effectively used for its purposes. [It has been reaffirmed by several analysts] that corruption within the defense sector weakens the military’s capacity to respond to security threats swiftly. The issues that exist within the Nigerian military ultimately affect the perception and morale of soldiers in waging wars for the Nigerian state.³⁰⁵

The trend of disenchanted soldiers needs to be stopped. There have been reports of soldiers complaining about poor weapons, unimproved allowances and continuous losses to the insurgents. In June 2019, Nigeria’s [former] Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai lamented that some officers’ insufficient commitment was affecting the success of counter-terrorism operations in the country. One year after, the challenges are yet to be addressed. For Nigeria to do better in the North-east armed conflict, it must examine the problems within its military organisation. The concerns of disenchanted soldiers must be investigated. The Boko Haram insurgency is a war that must be won but not without addressing the issue of low morale in soldiers fighting the battle. The Nigerian army should commission independent investigation that will examine the reasons for recent lamentations by some soldiers, the low morale within the ranks and other issues that may be posing problems for military engagements.³⁰⁶

Nigeria must also commit to a defence sector reform. The reform should be hinged on three prongs. First, it must address issues within the military; deployment and leave, structural imbalances, remunerations and welfare benefits for soldiers and their families and inadequacy of military equipment. There should also be periodic psychosocial support for active personnel to help them through the travails of the war. This will help to cultivate and communicate a sense of purpose and belonging. Second, there should be a review of military tactics employed in the counter-terrorism battle to ensure that it is in touch with human rights and current realities in the North-east. This should also capture investments in promoting civil-military relations that will restore the disconnect between the military and society. Third, military reforms should also include accountability measures that will ensure that budgeted resources are not embezzled. In essence, the Nigerian state should conduct a periodic independent audit for military budgets and expenditures. It will help to curb the corruption in the system. Boko Haram’s ideological war may be a difficult battle, but it becomes even harder with disenchanted soldiers, insufficient weaponry, among other inherent challenges.³⁰⁷

First, the complaint about poor equipment calls to question what types of weapons are in the arsenal of the military over the years in the first instance. It is a contradiction to assert that Nigeria has one of the largest and most powerful militaries in Africa when it has no corresponding sophisticated equipment to match that assertion and consequently to fight the insurgents with much lesser numerical strength which put the army on the run every time. It is well known that numerical strength is always never the main criteria or factor of a powerful military but the type of weapons in its arsenal. After all, China has the largest man-army in the world while the US with less numerical strength is acknowledged to be the most powerful principally because of sophisticated weaponry in its arsenal far beyond what China and Russia can match in the next one or two decades.

The second issue, when examined closely, is the problem of alleged corruption in the top-echelon command of the military which explains the lack of appropriate remuneration and welfare for the fighting soldiers on the battlefield which in turn also explain their low morale. While the rank-and-file soldiers are being deprived of their salaries and other entitlements, the top-echelon commanders never have any cause to complain of similar deprivation of salaries and legitimate entitlements. While the rank-and-file soldiers are losing their lives on the battlefield and while their families have to mourn their loved ones and go hungry aftermath, the top-echelon commanders are building castles in form of Universities and academies in their respective villages and rewarded with ambassadorial posts to foreign countries when they have no record of heroic performance in the war theatres.

The third is the lack of reflective remorse on their awful performance as commanders in the face of existential threat to the nation and people. There are no less drawn for the incoming commanders. They left service as business-minded military-politicians for want of better adjectival terminologies to describe this sordid performance and aberrations in behavior that is very hard to explain from the standpoint of behavioral science.

The fourth factor is a very critical one. Everybody has been clamoring for victory for the Nigerian military in the battlefield with the insurgents. Victory is indeed very sweet as it brings praises for heroism where such heroic deeds have been achieved or recorded. But the critical question is this: does the Nigerian military actually want victory now given its secret mindset that can easily be disambiguated for all to see? Victory would mean an end to the war. Is that what the military want now when and where it will no longer be relevant in the public or political space? The war against the insurgency, terrorism and banditry unavoidably keep the military relevant (at least in terms of cheap publicity for what it is doing or not doing) in the political space. In addition, victory would mean stoppage of flow of money to the military specifically meant for the prosecution of the war because the war is now seen as a very lucrative business franchise which serve dual purpose. The first is that it is as good as being in power itself. The second is that they are relevant in the political equation because the military is constantly visible even if it is not winning the war. Thus it can be inferred that the military does not really want victory, at least for now, because of what it would inevitably mean. So a victory does not favour the military in any material particular even if it means the country should go or is going under. So unbeknown to the largely gullible public is the secret or covert wish by the military high command not to see the war coming to an end quickly because victory will mean being taken or pulled out of relevance and/or political equation. It is a subtle high-wire politics played with equally high risks which impact directly on the sovereign destiny of the country. It is a balancing act, a precarious one for that matter because by not achieving victory, the war is necessarily prolonged to the benefit of the enemies of the Nigerian State. Lives of Nigerian soldiers are also continually put at risk as a sacrificial lambs or cannon fodder on the battlefield for the high-power game between the politicians and the military high commanders. 

The final factor is on the philosophical plane which has largely remained unexplored so far. It is that Nigeria military is not fighting an external aggression but internal security crisis. Therein lays the philosophical conundrum. Nigeria military has not been challenged and tested by external aggression that threatens to imperil the national security interests or sovereignty of the nation. In fact it has never been challenged and threatened by external aggression of any description. Since 1966, and after the Civil War ended, the Nigeria military has been directly involved in governance of the country and thus becoming tainted by all negativities of politics – instead of insulating itself and focusing on professionalizing itself into a modern fighting military. Indeed, there is no reason whatsoever why the Nigerian military should not have been numero uno in Africa – instead of being currently relegated to Number 4.

But by the contrivance of the geographical location of Nigeria, sandwiched between and bordered by much weaker countries, the threat of external aggression from any of its neighbours is reduced to zero level. This is what has secretly contributed to the complacency of the Nigerian military and thus grow progressively weakened to the point where it cannot even fight internal security aggression successfully anymore. The Nigerian military, like the foolish ostrich, not only bury its head in the sand but actually went to slumber, because it does not perceive threat of external aggression.

Thus, instead of external aggression, it is internal aggression that has now come to challenge and test the strength of the Nigeria military. The progressive evolution of this internal aggression and ultimate threat to its own legitimacy has reached the point where outbreak of insurgency and terrorism including banditry now put it on the run for its dear life. In short, the Nigerian military has become extremely so weakened over time that it is largely seen to be unprepared for the broad spectrum of insecurity now confronting the country. The wave of insecurity came as a strategic surprise, as a rude awakening from its slumber over the decades. It is perhaps already too late to reverse the tidal wave threatening to overwhelm it. Or it is not too late, to be on the optimistic side.

But the fact must be stated without fear or hindrance that the Nigerian military has grown fat and lazy over the decades and is now finding it difficult to cope with the workload of protecting the State and the country from being overwhelmed by insecurity – especially where other sister security agencies are completely at loss on how to help. The military has unknowingly suffered structural deformities, corrupted by politics because it has been involved in governance of the country for too long thus making it to have vested interests in virtually everything – other than protecting the internal security of the country and against external aggression.

However, in a reverse engineering in epistemology, one can say that external factors and forces have been allowed to infiltrate the country through various violent non-state actors that have emerged from within the womb of the country primarily because of failure of governance over the decades not just under the civilian leaders but most poignantly under military leadership. The civilians are packing the feces deposited by military rulers. These violent non-state actors have pledged their loyalties or have alliances with equally violent international non-governmental organizations (i.e. international terrorist organizations such as IS, Al Qae’da, etc). Thus Nigeria is inevitably facing or is exposed to external aggression through internal or hybrid extremely violent non-state actors such as ISWAP and Boko Haram.

Scanning the Horizon with Bleary Eyes

Another devastating impact on the Nigerian military is its inability to project into the future by what is known in the academia and business community, including the military and intelligence community, horizon scanning. The reason for this is not far-fetched. The Nigerian military has grown fat and lazy (physically and mentally) and as a result narrowing down its own horizon.

Horizon scanning is “the systematic examination of potential threats, opportunities and likely future developments which are at the margins of current thinking and planning’ and, continuing, horizon scanning ‘may explore novel and unexpected issues, as well as persistent problems or trends.”

• Horizon scanning helps in assessing whether one is adequately prepared for future changes or threats.
• If performed consistently and effectively, horizon scanning, when combined with other forecasting tools, can assist in policy making by identifying important needs or gaps.
• Horizon scanning is also an effective tool for bringing experts in different subject areas together to discuss a common issue and develop viable solutions.
• All horizon-scanning processes involve some iteration of the cyclical actions of scanning, analyzing, synthesizing, and communicating information.
• Expert input from a variety of credible sources is critical to the success of a horizon-scanning process.³⁰⁸

Integrating horizon scanning into a broader foresight process will enable better policy making in the near term, providing for the ongoing timely identification of additional strategies that may be needed to safeguard new technologies and data, and for assessment of their implications for innovation and biosecurity.³⁰⁹

A range of tools can be used to think about future risks and opportunities in a structured manner. As noted by Daniel Flynn from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, these tools “are for future planning in a world where the future cannot be known.” Such tools are commonly used to help shape policy so that entities (such as governments or organizations) are more resilient and better placed to take effective action. As explained by the UK Cabinet Office: “It’s not about making predictions, but systematically investigating evidence about future trends. Horizon scanning helps government to analyze whether it is adequately prepared for potential opportunities and threats. This helps ensure that policies are resilient to different future environments.”³¹⁰

Horizon scanning is therefore not about predicting the future, but focused on the early detection of weak signals as indicators of potential change.^{311, 312, 313, 314, 315}

In 1996, a study called “Air Force 2025” sought to make those determinations for three decades into the future. It became the foundation for more than 40 research efforts and multiple new capabilities – including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – that have given the U.S. Air Force unparalleled domination of air and space.³¹⁶ In 2007, a new program to maintain a continuous look into the future was begun by the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air University at Maxwell AFB, Ala. The first report – “Blue Horizons II” – was concluded in 2008, although the broad outlines were not made public until recently.³¹⁷

Blue Horizons II began with a look at four possible scenarios for future conflict, evaluated the capabilities likely to be available to both sides – including some considered highly futuristic – and then outlined the basic technologies the Air Force needs to pursue to bring those capabilities – and, where necessary, fieldable countermeasures – into reality. Overall, researchers evaluated 58 candidate concepts and 172 key enabling technologies, with specific recommendations on focusing scarce research dollars into critical technology areas.³¹⁸

The four scenarios upon which the study was based were the rise of China as a full military and economic peer of the United States, a growing Middle East jihadist insurgency, a resurgent Russia and a major “failed state” – a nation of significant importance to the United States that can no longer govern itself nor provide for internal security or the basic needs of its people.³¹⁹

Closely aligned with current National Security Strategy regarding what challenges the United States is likely to face in the next two decades, each scenario would place considerable stress on Air Force capabilities, often creating unique requirements demanding special resources. To meet those challenges – and also taking into consideration the original “Foundations 2025” model and the USAF Chief of Staff’s “White Paper on Global Vigilance, Reach and Power” – Blue Horizons II identified a top 10 list of technology concepts.³²⁰

Perhaps the most interesting conclusion was that “the key technologies in which the Air Force needs to invest do not change with the type of war expected to be fought in the future”. However, each concept proposed also is considered highly vulnerable to a failure to pursue underlying technologies, making continued support for laboratory research and development programs – regardless of budget constraints – mandatory. “If they are not, then there is significant risk that concepts or systems needed for future conflicts may not be able to be procured when needed,” the report concluded. “The fact that all of the future concepts explored, except for the Joint Strike Fighter, have technologies that rank poorly in the technology model indicates that the only way to be prepared for all contingencies is to invest in the full spectrum of technologies.³²¹

“Nine of the top ten concepts operated at speeds above Mach 1.0 . . . Speed, range and persistence – a combination of traits not found in modern combat aircraft – are all needed in future conflict scenarios. As current combat aircraft are replaced, this study recommends procurement focus on these traits. The Internet is seen as an important new domain of warfare, where both information operations as well as destructive attacks are likely to occur. The vulnerability of military and civilian critical infrastructure is of concern and information warfare needs greater emphasis in future planning.”^{322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330}

 [For instance, while] each spring, a select group of Air War College students [in the United States] meet for BOGSAT sessions and collaborate in “murder boards” to help Air Force leaders make decisions on how the service will adapt to technological changes in the next quarter of a century³³¹ nobody knows precisely what the Nigerian counterpart is doing in such domain.

For the past years, Blue Horizons has investigated a future described as the “Age of Surprise.” BOGSAT refers to an informal deliberative process Blue Horizons participants call a “Bunch of Guys/Gals Sitting Around Talking,” while the “murder boards” are opportunities for Blue Horizons participants to present their ideas to their classmates and faculty, who then “do everything they can to tear it apart,” said Col. Edward Vaughan, Air National Guard advisor to the commander and president of Air University and a mentor for Blue Horizons students, as well as a former participant himself in 2008. “You have to have thick skin and be ready to hear somebody tell you that brilliant idea you thought you had when you walked out the door this morning wasn’t so brilliant,” said Lt. Col. Hans Miller, a current Blue Horizons participant and Air War College student. “At the end of the day, everybody’s there to help you out. I think that was one of the best things for your (writing) because you’ve got 16 really bright guys listening to you and giving you honest feedback.”³³²

Vaughan said Blue Horizons isn’t designed to serve as the Air Force’s personal crystal ball. It’s meant to help the service’s leaders plan to respond to a rapidly changing technological world, as depicted in the CSAT video, “Welcome to 2035 . . . the Age of Surprise.” “You’ve got the Bronze Age, the Iron Age and the Industrial Age, and people talk now that maybe we’re in the Information Age,” Vaughan said. “Things change so fast, and if you believe in the exponential acceleration of technology, then what’s going to happen tomorrow is a complete surprise. So the question becomes how is the Air Force going to remain relevant in an era when what the enemy and our allies might do is a surprise, as is what happens on the world economic scale. While we can’t predict all of those outcomes, we can prepare ourselves to be as agile and flexible as possible, so we can quickly react.”³³³

Since 2007, Blue Horizons has been the Air Force’s most long-range plan to produce annual briefings for senior leaders to anticipate future technological development. It is intended to answer questions like those addressed in “Air Force 2025,” an Air University study done in 1996, and another technology study completed in 2007, said Harry A. Foster, CSAT deputy director. “What didn’t we talk about in 2007?” Foster asked. “We didn’t talk about Facebook, and we didn’t talk about Twitter because they both were still very new that year. We certainly didn’t talk about an Arab Spring that would arise out of technologies or would employ the technologies heavily as enablers three years later. That’s sort of the problem with this technology forecasting – you don’t know what you don’t know. But what we do know is that cyber will continue to rebuild itself. It’s the technology that’s moving so quickly and is the most difficult to forecast.”³³⁴

CSAT’s Blue Horizons program recruits student volunteers from the cream of Air War College in-residence students for Blue Horizons, a process also applied to its sister program Cyber Horizons and the AWC Grand Strategy Program, said Col. Thomas D. McCarthy, CSAT director. “The most important outcome of Blue Horizons and Cyber Horizons efforts are their students,” McCarthy said. “They may not become experts in any specific field, but they graduate with a broad and integrated understanding of technology, an understanding they will apply to research and strategy in the future.”³³⁵

“(Our students) are little pieces of yeast that you throw out into the dough of the service, and they continue to bubble away and produce good things,” said Ted Hailes, transformation chair for the Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology at Air University. Hailes is credited with contributing the “Age of Surprise” term. The five main areas of technological advancement by 2035 that Blue Horizons is currently investigating are biological and nano technologies, directed energy, additive manufacturing or 3-D printing and cyberspace, McCarthy said.³³⁶

Each year, students like Miller and Navy Cmdr. James Wiest produce papers and group technology assessments from more than 100 scheduled hours of instruction and research, and collaboration with classmates, not to mention many hundreds of more hours on their own time. The CSAT faculty then integrates student work into one briefing and sends it first to Headquarters Air Force Operations, Plans and Requirements, and then to the chief of staff. Some of the work is published on the CSAT website, but the benefits of Blue Horizon aren’t just in what the students offer in their research, but also in what they take themselves to their next assignments and throughout the rest of their military careers. “The chief is getting blue-suit views on blue-suit issues,” Hailes said. “But more importantly, although we’re doing a study they can put on the shelf, we are also returning to the officer corps 16 to 32 officers who have gone through this program. That’s where the real power of the program is – Airmen we put back into the officer corps who will become the senior leaders who will be making the decision as to where the Air Force should be going and what systems it will procure.³³⁷

Our role is taking superb officers, giving them an exposure to an educational area they have not previously explored, and better equipping them to deal with what the future’s going to hand them as future leaders of the Air Force.” The ultimate purpose for Blue Horizons is to help inform and prepare the service’s leaders to handle whatever surprises that might be waiting in the next 25 years.^{338, 339. 340}

Why no Victor No Vanquished

From the above, it can be conjectured how difficult to win a counter-insurgency campaign and banditry by such a military structured the way it is as described above. The fundamentals for achieving victory are missing from the arsenal of the Nigerian military.

According to Chris Akor, Nigeria is into its 12th year of fighting the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency. Yet, there appears to be no sign of victory. It is safe to say the military and the insurgents are at a stalemate. Perhaps, the only time in the 12-year long war that it looks like victory was near was shortly before the 2015 elections when President Goodluck Jonathan secured the services of South African mercenaries or defense contractors to advise, train Nigerian soldiers and even lead the war against the insurgents both from the ground and air. With the change of government in 2015 however, the contract was revoked and most of the gains made in late 2014 and early 2015 have been reversed.³⁴¹

Although the military has engaged in devious propaganda, claiming to have ‘technically defeated’ the insurgents or to have killed its leader, time and again, all those claims have been proven to be false. Although the leader of Boko Haram is now dead and the group is in disarray, it wasn’t the doing of the Nigerian army. It is rather the result of a takeover by a more violent but methodical and systematic terrorist organization – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). When the takeover is complete, Nigeria should expect a more deadly, well-trained, and formidable opponent than the rag-tag Boko Haram.³⁴²

The often-cited reasons for the failure of the Nigerian army to defeat Boko Haram include poor equipment, demoralization of the troops fighting, and corruption in the top echelon of the military. As much as all these are true, they do not account for why the Nigerian military has been unable to defeat Boko Haram. The real reasons lie in the nature of the army itself. Nigeria’s army is so unprofessional, unethical, unskilled, and riddled with patrimonialism, cronyism and corruption.³⁴³

Chris Akor further writes that “what distinguishes a real professional army from a bush militia, as identified by military historians and theorists such as John Hackett, Carl von Clausewitz and Samuel Huntington are, first, highly specialized knowledge and skills in the use of arms and armed conflicts and the observance of strict codes of conducts, often based on rigorous ethical and moral obligations. Secondly, the army must be institutionalized in the Weberian sense, meaning it is rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic. In the words of Eva Bellin, “it has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between the public and private that forbids predatory behaviour vis-à-vis society, and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy.” An unprofessional army, on the other hand, is characterized by “cronyism, patrimonialism, and lack of ethics; the distinction between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; and discipline is only maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, often relying on the balanced rivalry between different ethnic groups.” What is more, it operates in a classic ‘bush militia’ style with absolutely no regard for professional code of conduct or laws of armed conflict as defined by international conventions. Such an army is rotten and can only be used for the purpose of repression. Its incapacity, unprofessionalism, indiscipline, and inherent lack of organisation are easily exposed when it faces an equally armed group or a professional army in battle.³⁴⁴

The Nigerian army, we all know, is not a professional one. Decades of coup d’états and exposure to politics have completely hollowed it out. But Nigeria is a master of isomorphic mimicry – making institutions act in ways to make themselves look like institutions in other places that are perceived as legitimate, but which, in reality, are not. What we currently have is a shell, a deeply decayed and unfit band of militia, armed by the state to protect and defend the government from its people. Beyond that, it is unfit for any other purpose, the least of which is fighting a determined and ideological terrorist organization that is ready to die in defence of its beliefs. The Niger Delta militants were the first to expose how woefully incapacitated the Nigerian army was. They successfully held the Nigerian state by the balls until a multibillion-dollar amnesty deal was negotiated. The government has equally been chasing Boko Haram with offers of mouth-watering amnesty to no avail.³⁴⁵

The real reasons lie in the nature of the army itself. Nigeria’s army is so unprofessional, unethical, unskilled, and riddled with patrimonialism, cronyism, and corruption.³⁴⁶

Even under civilian administrations, the army has only been used to kill and harass its own citizens – often peaceful, unarmed civilians protesting one form of injustice or another. How does a professional soldier with any training whatsoever, accept an order to shoot at or harass unarmed civilians – a clear war crime/crime against humanity? It’s very simple: no professional soldier will ever accept to carry out an illegal order. It is against every training, discipline, orientation, and strict moral code required of a soldier and gentleman. Soldiers who shoot at, harass or rape unarmed or defenseless civilians are no different from the typical bush militia, terrorists, and criminal gangs. Sadly, that has been the hallmark of our military over the last 55 years. And anyone with a little knowledge of psychology knows this is a typical behaviour of cowards and weaklings who compensate for their utter lack of strength by harassing and killing unarmed civilians. Nigerian troops always complain of demoralization when fighting Boko Haram, but they never complain of demoralization when sent to harass, rape, and kill unarmed civilians. They do it with joy and glee!³⁴⁷

I anticipate some objections; with someone pointing to one or two brilliant individuals they know in the military. Sadly, it is not an individual thing. It is a systemic issue. The very training of the Nigerian army is designed to produce cowardly and unthinking zombies that prioritize and celebrate brawn over brains. Many Nigerians and even those within the military establishment know this but cannot openly acknowledge it. But it needs to be said. The sooner Nigerians realise the army is only fit for internal suppression and cannot defend the country or its citizens, the better for everyone.³⁴⁸

In April 2015, Amnesty International acknowledged that Boko Haram has killed thousands of people, abducted at least 2000 and forced more than a million to flee their homes since 2009. Through a campaign of almost daily killings, bombings, abductions, looting and burning, Boko Haram has crippled normal life in north-east Nigeria. Towns and villages have been pillaged. Schools, churches, mosques and other public buildings have been attacked and destroyed. Boko Haram is brutally mistreating civilians trapped in areas under its control. Amnesty International’s research shows that Boko Haram has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity with impunity.³⁴⁹

On June 3, 2015, just few days after President Muhammadu Buhari assumed power, Amnesty International released its damning report of the Nigerian military, accusing it of engaging in extrajudicial execution of people in the North east without recourse to rule of law governing war situation. The report was a stinging one that the Nigerian authority and particularly the Nigerian military reacted like a wounded lion.

In the course of security operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, Nigerian military forces have extra-judicially executed more than 1,200 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military detention. Amnesty International has concluded that these acts, committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict, constitute war crimes for which military commanders bear both individual and command responsibility, and may amount to crimes against humanity.^{350, 351}

There are two main important issues raised by Chris Akor in the above write-up. The first is that the Nigerian military is not structured to fight a guerrilla/asymmetric warfare presented by the various insurgent groups in the country. This point is very important as it goes straight to the root-cause of its inability or impotence to contain and/or defeat the insurgent groups. ISWAP and by extension, Boko Haram, fight mainly through the methodology of guerrilla/asymmetric warfare of hit-and-run tactics which indeed is a very potent and resilient method in modern warfare because it essentially wears down the ability of the opponent (in this case the Nigerian State and its military machine) to fight back successfully. Nobody really can tell where the next attack will come from, whether the target will be a hard or soft type. On the other hand, the Nigerian military is structurally based on the Third Generation Warfare methodologies in which an opponent (in this case a foreign military) is met by another foreign army. The fight in this category of warfare is radically different from when Third Generation Army is faced with a Fourth Generation Army as is the case between the Nigerian military and the hordes of the various insurgent groups.

Thus it is not surprising that with the rated global, continental and regional military firepower, the Nigerian State has not been able to defeat Boko Haram, ISWAP insurgencies in the last eleven and seven years respectively, not to talk of banditry in the last eight years or thereabout.

The Nigerian military has not demonstrated any form of superiority in war strategies and combat tactics in the war against ISWAP or Boko Haram, or bandits.  Gallantry by individual soldiers has been demonstrated but this is never a substitute for superior strategies and tactics in warfare that fetch victory in Sun Tzu or Carl von Clausewitz manner. Nigerian military is trying to fight the insurgents the same way it fought and prosecuted the Civil War in 1967-70, a situation that is no longer applicable in the current security scenario or battlefield. Nigerian military can no challenge and call out the insurgents because the insurgents can only come out to attack based on their own strategies, planning and timing. Nigerian troops have to wait for the insurgents to strike first before responding in the same haphazard manner that has not fetch it victory. Occasionally, it is able to attain temporary victories by crushing a group of insurgents by the Army or air strikes. But there has been no decisive victory that tilts the balance of terror in its favour and against the insurgents. But the Nigerian Army has not been reported to have laid ambush for the convoys of the insurgents that deal fatal blow both on equipment and morale of the insurgents. But the insurgents regularly lay ambush for Nigerian military convoys, too numerous to mention, and deal devastating blows on the Nigerian military.

Additionally, the Nigerian military presumably did not have sophisticated weaponry, the type needed to defeat the insurgents. For instance, it has no drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) with which it can launch to destroy the locational hideouts of the insurgents either in Sambisa Forest or elsewhere. This is because no foreign power is willing to sell such sophisticated military hard wares to Nigeria for variety of reasons. It is not also known whether the Nigerian Army has armored tank rocket launchers. Nigeria does not also have the scientific and technological prowess (knowledge base) to manufacture such categories of weapons. Nigeria has recently purchased turbo-fanned Super Tucano combat aircrafts from the United States. But it is reluctant to deploy them on a regular basis against the insurgent groups because of the mortal fear of losing them to the acknowledged anti-aircraft artillery guns already in the possession of the insurgents. Nigerian army’s armored personal carriers and tanks are regularly ambushed and destroyed by the insurgents. At any rate, these vehicles are mostly useful in urban warfare or where the two opponents are facing each other as examples of war between Israel and several Arab nations have shown in the past. We can read up the lessons of one of the greatest tank battles in modern history between Israel and Egypt or between Israel and Syria or between Israel and Jordan. We can also learn from US invasion of Iraq during the two wars. But these lessons are only applicable from a two-dimensional perspective when two enemies are facing each other on the battle field. This is unfortunately not the case in the battle between Nigeria and the insurgent groups because the insurgent groups would not come to face the Nigerian military machine in a direct confrontational manner. Rather, they will sneak out, launch surprise attacks on their specific targets, and retreat and/or capture territory that will take time to retrieve from them. That has been the pattern of the war between the Nigerian State and the insurgent groups. This type of analysis is missing in Chris Akor’s write-up cited above.

From air combat perspectives, Nigerian Air Force is another awful example of how not to win a war through aerial warfare. Till date, Nigeria has no independent satellite in the space (exclusively managed by it) that can be used as “eagle-eyed” surveillance of the hideouts of the insurgents in Sambisa Forest or elsewhere. Till date, Nigeria has no satellite imagery of the entire Sambisa Forest. Thus some of the occasional bombing raids against the insurgents have always ended up missing their actual targets and in the process kill innocent civilians. It would have been better if there were no such bombing raids at all because they have always elicited hilarious laughter in strategic quarters. They are ridiculous as well as perverse to the overall aims of defeating the insurgents.

Looking further into the arsenal of the Nigerian military, it is obvious it has no short-range missiles which can be launched from land or air not to talk of sea (warships or submarines). Nigerian military has only armoured tanks, anti-aircraft artillery guns, some serviceable combat aircrafts of the antiquated types – but not modern tanks like M1 Abram tank from the US, T-72 from Russia, etc. Nigeria has no air superiority jet fighters such F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Strike Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-18 Hornet of the American types and/or their European equivalents.  Nigeria has no stealth combat aircraft like F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II or their modified versions. It has no submarine. With this type of empty armory, Nigeria cannot project military power beyond its borders. Worst of all, it has even demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that it has no power to contain snowballing internal security crisis in the last twelve years since Boko Haram made it its debut on the Nigerian security plane. Enough said!

The Nigerian military high command has a very simplistic notion, embedded in its philosophy of war, of waging war viz: once you throw sufficient number of men and arms into the battlefield, one is assured of victory. Unfortunately, that notion is fundamentally and fatally flawed. It is a suicidal recipe for defeat, destruction for a military to go into the battlefield with that notional and operational mindset. Of course, the experience of the last twelve years has sufficiently put a lie to such notions. Such a notion is applicable only to an enemy that has exhibited fear of the military. But there is no evidence anywhere to suggest this is the case with Boko Haram, ISWAP and bandits. They have never shown any iota of fear of the Nigerian State and its military machine. In actual fact, they hold it in absolute contempt because of its contemptible character. It is even the case that these groups understand the Nigerian State and its military machine very well – and they make all the contingent plans around such an understanding. By striking at the Achilles heel of the Nigerian State, these hordes of extremely violent non-state actors hope to bring the Nigerian State to its knees.

One has also wonder about the role of the so-called Special Forces of the Nigerian Army. Special Forces are trained and designated often as behind-the-enemy-line striking force, a Pincer from behind that takes the enemy by total surprise. In the ancient war between the Greek coalition forces and the Trojan military, it was a unit of Special Forces loaded into the famous “Greek Gift” of a wooden horse that changed the dynamics of 10-year war and helped to crush the Trojan military (Army and Navy). It was too late before the Trojans realized what has happened. Its city-fortress was burnt down overnight, their war Commander, Hector, has been killed by Achilles in a single combat. Paris, the younger brother of Hector would later kill Achilles by an arrow-shot. These are all ancient lessons for modern times. Like the American Navy Seals, nobody see Special Forces coming at all until it is too late, and by that time, the enemy is already dead before knowing what hit him on the head. There are too many modern examples of Special Forces raid on the enemies’ strongholds: the Raid on Entebbe by Israeli Special Forces, the raid on Osama bin Ladin in Abbottabad, etc. The Nigerian Army Special Forces tragically has not been able to bring home a war trophy by been seeing as victorious or heroes in any combat engagement. They have not been able to kill a buffalo!

It is not just that the Nigerian military is not fit for purpose for this type of modern warfare (4^th Generation Warfare) its structural and mental limitations have precluded it from crafting out superior strategies and tactics for winning essentially a 4^th Generation Warfare. In short, the Nigerian military has no superior mental firepower to win this war. It lacks the mental firepower to match the doggedness, the dexterity, the perseverance of the insurgent groups –  their ability to reproduce themselves even with their heavy losses on the battlefields, the long-range views and their preparedness to fight on to the last man standing.

This can be combined with the quality of political leadership from the very top-echelon political command. In the last seven years or thereabout, several national security meetings have been held at the instance of the President and Commander-in-Chief, with such meetings presided over by the President himself or the Vice President in his absence. Some of these meetings even lasted several days, thus turning them into security summit by their characteristic features. In the last seven years or so, the President is fond of saying he had issued orders or instructions to the military high command (i.e. the Service Chiefs) on how to go about the war, etc. Yet, in looking at the battlefield scenario in the last several years, one can hardly see any fundamental change in the dynamics at the battle fronts where the balance of terror has been preponderantly seen to be against the Nigerian State or military. This is a very crucial point that cannot be ignored in the consideration of all the factors and forces involved in this epochal crisis. It is one thing to issue orders or instructions; it is another thing whether the orders or instructions are even relevant at all or faithfully executed by the military commanders on the battlefield. Can we then have the manifest or list of such orders or instructions to match them against the battlefield scenario to see how relevant they are? Can we do critical evaluation (even if it is only conceptual evaluation) of such orders or instructions to see the quality of thinking involved in them?

Every war involves imaginative or creative thinking that is of the highest quality. Once this is lacking or missing in the equation, the war is as good as lost even from the very beginning. This is what the picturesque of the ongoing war between the Nigerian State and ISWAP, Boko Haram, banditry is conveying to the critical minds. There is no quality of thinking that places the Nigerian military behind enemy’s lines to deal deadly blows to the enemies from behind. There is no quality of thinking that penetrates and counters the strategic thinking of the enemy – but abject reliance on lucks or chances that do not come often into play in the battlefield. There is no visible application of war principles by strategic thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, etc. 

It is in this sense or context that it may be argued that the fight against ISWAP and Boko Haram including the bandits is not over yet at all. It may be argued further that the fight may just be starting afresh going by the pattern of attacks and by the evidence of overwhelming the current administration that is hitherto expected to crush the insurgents. Part of the reasons is that there has been no major upgrade to the Nigerian military to boost its fighting capabilities not to talk of internal reforms that the military is long overdue for. Purchase of individual weapon items like Super Tucano combat aircrafts are definitely not enough. If the annual budgetary allocations have been judiciously applied such a major upgrade would have been achieved within a reasonable time frame, for instance, in the last ten years. The Army in particular is in need of new modern armored tanks, rocket launchers, short range missiles, and other modern habiliments of war.

In summary, there is perceptible strategic stalemate between the two enemies with no one gaining decisive victory over the other. It has been a forward and backward movement, advances and retreats, small victories and large defeats. From this signature pattern, it will only get to the point when one party gets tired and create the conditions for its rollover and crushing defeat and/or surrender. For instance, some Boko Haram fighters have been reported to be surrendering to the Nigerian military. But this is no basis to think and believe that the war is over with Boko Haram because its core fighters are still fighting on doggedly not to talk of ISWAP with its more resilient fighting spirit.

Another important issue is the type of national and local politics that has come to play out since Boko Haram insurgency and campaign of terror against the Nigerian State broke out in July 2009.  The politics was weaponized, turned into missiles thrown at each other by the political grandmasters and gladiators. In the epic battles, there were no prisoners of war taken. It’s winner-takes-all. The victor swept the polls, polling the highest votes in a war-torn zone. Such an electoral miracle has not been witnessed anywhere before. From 2009 to 2015, the ruling party then, the People Democratic Party, used the insurgency as a political weapon to hold the political opposition at bay. However, the 2015 general elections turned out a different result of which the escalating security situation then formed part of the corpus of reasons why the ruling party was defeated – because essentially, the opposition party was able to turn the table of insecurity against the ruling party.

The Nigerian State, from the time of President Goodluck Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari, claimed that it knows the sponsors or financiers of insecurity in the country but has no courage to disclose their identities. What this means is that all the security agencies, including the Nigerian military, know the sponsors but have not been authorized by their political masters to disclose their identities. Indeed, the Nigerian Army said categorically that it is not its duty to reveal the identities of the sponsors, who in the media have been speculated to be within even the government.

The Nigerian Army has said it is not their duty to expose those sponsoring Boko Haram in the country. Coordinator of Defence Media Operations, John Enenche, stated this at a media briefing on Thursday. Enenche admitted that the Army knows that some criminal groups have heavy financial backing, but its major task is to fight “terrorism and other criminality”. He explained that the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of State Services (DSS) were responsible for revealing the sponsors. “It is not the duty of the military to uncover the sponsors. Our duty is to remain in the frontline and defeat terrorism and other criminality and that is what we are doing. We have the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of State Security (DSS). It is their responsibility to gather intelligence on the sponsors of the terrorists and not the military,” Enenche maintained.³⁵²

Till date, the Nigerian Army has not also disclosed the report of the panel that was set up to investigate the attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy on August 24, 2021.

According to a report in the Punch, Maj-Gen Ibrahim Yusuf, Commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), has briefed the House of Representatives Committee on Defence on the recent attack by suspected bandits on the academy. During the attack on Aug. 24, two officers were killed and one abducted. The briefing was done behind closed doors, as the commandant said that the documents to be presented to the committee members were classified. Yusuf had before the meeting went into close door, said he would brief the committee on the ongoing effort of the military to rescue the abducted officer. He disclosed that the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt Gen. Lucky Irabor had visited the scene of the attack the day it happened, adding that many other serving and retired military officers also visited. The Committee Chairman, Babajimi Benson (APC-Lagos), therefore, asked journalists present to leave, but said the committee would find out about efforts being made to rescue the abducted officer.³⁵³

There has been no rousing “war” oratory, a kind of motivational speech, to galvanize the soldiers to perform the expected. There have been no incentives for the soldiers. The soldiers are even cheated of their welfare packages and entitlements by the military high command.

Another powerful reason why Nigeria is not winning the war is the ability of the insurgents to reproduce themselves not despite their high number of casualties but through their abilities to fund their activities.

A specialized institution of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has revealed that the Islamic State’s West Africa Province(ISWAP) has been consolidating on its deadly activities in Nigeria as a result of the financial inflows it gets which amounts to N14,822,640,000 ($ 36 million) annually.³⁵⁴

The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) disclosed this in its August report on terrorism financing seen by our correspondent. The report says ISWAP is sustaining itself through collection of tax and trading within the Lake Chad region. The group’s other means of survival include kidnapping for ransom, extortion and raiding. The report, however, stated that the proceeds generated in Nigeria are significantly higher than whatever obtains in other countries in the Lake Chad region. “As with other forms of illicit financial activity, pervasive use of cash enables these groups’ funding. A study estimated ISWAP’s revenues, deemed larger than Boko’s, at up to USD 36 million annually, much of it from trading activity and taxation in the Lake Chad region,” it stated.³⁵⁵

GIABA further stated that Boko Haram and ISWAP have jointly killed 36,000 people since 2010 making them one of the deadliest and destructive terrorist threats in the world. The report noted that although Nigeria has improved its legal and institutional frameworks to combat terrorism and terrorism financing, the menace is still being aided by corruption in the country. The report also observed that agencies of the federal government have not fully understood how terrorists operate and have not prosecuted suspects in line with the country’s risk profile. “Nigeria’s understanding of its TF risks requires improvements in material respects, including through enhancing awareness of Boko/ISWAP’s international linkages and activity through the formal financial sector,” it added.³⁵⁶

But the Nigerian Government denied the allegation.³⁵⁷ In a statement, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit described the report by ECOWAS as “totally outdated and based on a 2019 country evaluation report which is literally stale and irrelevant today”. The statement signed by Ahmed Dikko, Chief Media Analyst of NFIU, read, “It is to the knowledge of the international community, our populace and the formal media organisations that several arrests were made through the ongoing ‘Operation Service Wide’ approved by President Muhammadu Buhari at the Defence Intelligence Agency. The exercise is continuing and far from over. “In addition, all funding of violence from all sections of the country are being evidently analysed and reported to all relevant authorities according to law. It’s true that recently Nigeria fell victim to illicit financial flows but overt and far-reaching efforts are being executed by the government to stem the bad practice. The ECOWAS body released its report to justify putting Nigeria’s financial system under enhanced review process alongside other countries in the Sahel. We had formally faulted the report to the ECOWAS body while agreeing to partner with them to carry out further review processes to jointly attain global best practices on all counter measures against local and cross-border violent crimes disturbing the entire West Africa presently. All our neighbours have proofs of our exchange of terrorist financial intelligence with them real time.”³⁵⁸

It would also be recalled how the huge sum of about N24 million levies was imposed on a number of communities in Zamfara State.

The alleged N24 million levy imposed by bandits on nine communities of Bukkuyum Local Government Area of Zamfara State is an old issue, the state police command has said. This was stated by the spokesperson for the state command, Mohammed Shehu, while reacting to the story published in some national dailies that the levy was imposed recently. Shehu, who spoke to The PUNCH, declared that the issue occurred over a month ago, adding that the police command had since taken action by deploying security personnel to those areas. “This is an old issue and when the command got information that the bandits had written letters to the nine communities, we acted quickly and sent security personnel to those villages. It is never true that the said letters were sent to those villages after the bandit attacks on some communities in Anka and Bukkuyum local government areas. The letters were sent more than a month ago and the police command has since addressed that issue,” Shehu said.³⁵⁹

In the above police statement, it is neither confirmed nor denied that the ransom was paid. But going by antecedents in this type of scenario there was no plausible deniability that the levy was paid.

The fundamental axiom is that no nation wins an insurgency the type that is raging in Nigeria today when its military cannot distinguish between enemies and friends; when it acts without accountability for their actions; when it commits egregious atrocities against the citizens it is meant to defend and protect; when it goes about with an attitude and altitude of impunity and “I am-holier-than-thou”; when it does not respect the fundamental human rights of the citizens; when it is alleged to be corrupt and venal internally without discharging these weighty allegations beyond reasonable doubts; when it is too arrogant to apologize for its evident gross misconducts or even dereliction of duties in many cases; when it is unwilling to admit incompetence and unprofessional acts by its personnel; and when it elevates itself above and does not respect the law of the land and it is unwilling to face supreme justice for allegations of war atrocities. Nobody can help such a military! Only idiots will continue to support such a military!

Nigeria has clearly bungled the opportunity to crush ISWAP by allowing it to come into being in the first instance. Boko Haram has been exposed to influence of international terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’eda from the very beginning which allow its members to choose sides between some of these fearsome international terrorist organizations. In other words, if Nigeria has been able to crush Boko Haram or “sufficiently degraded” it before 2016, ISWAP may not have had the chance to emerge to become the monster that it is today. But because, right from the very beginning, Nigeria was playing political game with the existence and threat represented by Boko Haram, it was allowed to grow into a festering sore that eventually created the internal conditions factions and maggots to break out from within the festering sore.

Why Nigeria has not Collapsed

The debate whether Nigeria has failed as a nation, or is failing or could fail, has been on the front-burner for some years now. It is indeed a fairly long and sad story of how a country hitherto globally acknowledged as an African continental giant over the arch of time became labelled as a failure, as a dwarf or pigmy, stunted in growth, as a result of self-inflicted woes particularly failure of governance accompanied by venal corruption the type that has also placed the country among the five most corrupt countries in the world.

Of course, it is nice to be called a failure whether justified or not. Of course too, a failure would always resist being called such. But it has become inevitable in the evolution of time as a result of incontrovertible objective conditions that have become impeachable reality in the country. The cracks on the wall of the Nigerian State became very visible from the beginning of the Fourth Republic after the military handed over power to the civilians second time in the political history of the country. However, from 1999 till date, the situation became worsened as well as increasingly worrisome on daily basis because Nigeria does not seem to show the capacity to overcome the woes that have been betiding it since independence. Worst of all is the unarguable inability to fulfil or discharge the primary duties of government: security and welfare of the citizens. Life has regressed into Hobessian natural state where everything is brutish, nasty and short. Storm of insecurity is raging everywhere. It has now been reported that 91 million Nigerians live in poverty according to the Nigerian Economic Submit Group (NESG)³⁶⁰ Nigeria has for long been classed as the poverty capital of the world. Thus Nigeria is a country greatly troubled in body and soul from its past to the present.

But what led to the cracks on the wall can be traced to the untrammeled disastrous military rule for over four decades in the country’s political history.

The debate started when two scholars from The Brookings Institution wrote a report which included Nigeria as a fragile state susceptible to failure.

In 2008, less than a year after President Olusegun Obasanjo handed over power peacefully to President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, two scholars from The Brookings Institution in the United States published a research report that generated controversy then. It should be quickly added that Obasanjo handed over the fallouts of destruction of Zaki Biam in Benue State and Odi community in Bayelsa State including Niger Delta militancy, Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) to Yar’Adua as a testament to crisis and especially fragility of the Nigerian State.³⁶¹

According to Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick: “In this report, we examine state weakness among all developing countries, focusing in particular on the weakest two quintiles. The results provide a current assessment of each developing country’s individual and relative performance in each of the four core areas (and 20 sub-indicators) of state competence.  Ours is thus a descriptive model, providing a snapshot in time of relative state effectiveness. Subsequent, updated versions could enable policymakers to identify trends in a country’s relative performance. The Index is not intended to predict which states will collapse into conflict, or conversely, emerge from weakness.³⁶²

By carefully assessing and ranking all 141 developing countries on the basis of their relative weakness, we provide policymakers with a new tool to examine and better understand the unique dynamics and drivers of performance in each of these states and, in principle, to tailor and target their policy interventions more effectively. We also provide insight into which countries should command the attention of U.S. and international policymakers, given the nature and extent of their weakness.  In some cases, weak states may not be receiving adequate focus or resources.³⁶³

Nigeria was ranked No 28 with scores of 4.88 (Overall score), 5.39 (Economic), 3.51 (Political), 5.37 (Security), 5.24 (Social Welfare) 640 (GNI Per Capita).234 Overall, the Index suggests that there are multiple typologies of weakness. Many of the critically weak states—including the Central African Republic (#7), Guinea (#23), Haiti (#12), and Nigeria (#28)—exhibit across-the-board weakness in all four core spheres of state performance.³⁶⁴

According to the authors, the key policy implications are as follows:

• Poverty alleviation should be given higher priority in U.S. policy, because poorer countries tend to be weaker ones, and the consequences of state weakness can be significant for U.S. national security.
• U.S. assistance to the world’s weakest states should be increased and targeted to address unique performance gaps in these countries.
• Among failed and critically weak states, U.S. and international efforts should focus on improving security and, in parallel, to the extent possible, on the other drivers of weakness.
• Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the world’s highest concentration of weak and failed states and requires increased U.S. attention and resources.
• The United States should pay due attention to severe performance gaps even in better-performing states.
• U.S. efforts to strengthen weak states cannot succeed in isolation but must be augmented by and coordinated with the actions of other partners, institutions, and, most importantly, the policies of the concerned countries.³⁶⁵

In 2011, some US air force officers wrote a highly controversial joint paper titled “Failed State 2030: Nigeria – A Case Study” in 2011³⁶⁶

A nation with more than 350 ethnic groups, 250 languages, and three distinct religious affiliations—Christian, Islamic, and animist, Nigeria’s 135 million people today are anything but homogenous. Of Nigeria’s 36 states, 12 are Islamic and under the strong and growing influence of the Sokoto caliphate. While religious and ethnic violence are commonplace, the federal government has managed to strike a tenuous balance among the disparate religious and ethnic factions. With such demographics, Nigeria’s failure would be akin to a piece of fine china dropped on a tile floor—it would simply shatter into potentially hundreds of pieces.³⁶⁷

Poor investment in the nation’s critical infrastructure and underinvestment in health care, education, science, and technology are all leading to a “brain drain” in which Nigeria’s most talented and educated citizens are leaving the country. This will leave a future Nigeria even poorer.³⁶⁸

Nascent attempts to address electoral and governmental corruption are meeting with some success and hold promise for the future. Recent meetings between the president and insurgent groups may, over time, help resolve some of Nigeria’s most intractable and dangerous internal conflicts. The population’s disappointment in its government has not appreciably shaken its faith in democracy. Elections are and will likely remain an important part of Nigerian life as they, despite the odds, provide the people hope that they can make a difference as Nigeria struggles to succeed.³⁶⁹

Nigeria becoming a failed state is not a foregone conclusion.³⁷⁰

However, should the oil-rich state of Nigeria, a nation likely to provide up to 25 percent of US light, sweet crude oil imports by 2030, fail, then the effect on the United States and the world economy would be too great to ignore. The threat that failure poses to a quarter billion Nigerians in terms of livelihood, security, and general way of life could quickly spread and cause a humanitarian disaster of previously unimagined proportions. Regardless of the extent of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the wake of failure, the hard work to repair the damage could take two generations to make Nigeria viable again.³⁷¹

Less well known in the United States, but no less important, is Nigeria. Although not possessing nuclear weapons, Nigeria has the potential to dramatically affect the United States and the global economy if it fails. Africans are fond of saying: “As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa.” Nigeria’s geographic and political position in Africa, its single-commodity and soon-to-be-top-20 oil-rich economy, extraordinarily complex demographics, culture of corruption, poor and failing national and human infrastructure, long history of dangerously destabilizing religious and ethnic violence, repeated and potential for future military coups d’état, endemic disease, and its growing importance to the global and US economy present researchers with a myriad of vexing and intractable problems and challenges. … Unlike Southwest Asia, Africa is often overlooked by political and military planners until a problem presents itself such as those found in Libya, Egypt, Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. While each African nation is important, none likely has the potential to dramatically alter the strategic environment both in Africa and the world. Thus, Nigeria is a tantalizing research challenge.³⁷²

Fast-forward to August 2019. A former Ambassador of the United States to Nigeria and South Africa, Princeton Lyman, issued a stern warning that Nigeria is fast becoming a strategic failure and irrelevant to the rest of the world. The issuance of the warning was on the occasion of Achebe Colloquium at Brown University, USA, on the topic, “The Nigerian State and US Strategic Interests”. The warning circulated on social media for a long and it is still occasionally popping up. However, the warning was vehemently refuted by many in Nigeria especially by government officials responsible for refuting such claims and their apologists in the public domain (through the media).

Lyman claimed that Nigeria, which had continued to pride itself on its past glory, was slipping down the precipice of failure and irrelevance while its leaders folded their arms, as they could not discern the disastrous situation ahead for the country. Lyman went ahead to cite several areas of concern to the US strategic interests which Nigeria has not been managing well to the detriment of Nigerians and the US.  He drew particular attention to the structure of Nigerian political economy which is anchored mainly on oil, noting that in the next few years to come Nigeria may find itself heavily shortchanged because of the unfolding international and continental dynamics in the oil and gas sector. Nigeria is being increasingly challenged in its dominant position as the largest producer of oil in Africa by other African countries with their individual oil deposits, exploration and production. Many other African countries are now exporting oil to the world market in high competition with Nigeria thus narrowing down its own export.

Superjacent to the extant conditions in the oil sector is the calamitous de-industrialization that has taken place in the country over the last four decades in which many manufacturing conglomerates and hubs have closed shops thus escalating the unemployment rate in the country and thus creating a vast reservoir for crimes and criminals to fester and mushroom. It is out of this pool of the jobless (35 percent unemployment rate, one of the highest in the world), the declassed elements in society and especially where illiteracy is above 70 per cent in the northern part of the country that have produced legion of insurgents, terrorists, bandits, kidnappers and herdsmen killers. The parlous state of the political economy has earned Nigeria the unflattering sobriquet “poverty capital of the world”. Added to this is the miserable state of infrastructure in the country. Insecurity has now become a permanent feature of the country.

Lyman said: I know all the arguments: it is a major oil producer, it is the most populous country in Africa, it has made major contributions to Africa in peacekeeping, and, of course, negatively if Nigeria were to fall apart the ripple effects would be tremendous, etc…  But I wonder if all this emphasis on Nigeria’s importance creates a tendency of inflate Nigeria’s opinion of its own invulnerability.³⁷³ Among much of the elite today, I have the feeling that there is a belief that Nigeria is too big to fail, too important to be ignored, and that Nigerians can go on ignoring some of the most fundamental challenges they have, many of which we have talked about: disgraceful lack of infrastructure, the growing problems of unemployment, the failure to deal with the underlying problems in the Niger-Delta, the failure to consolidate democracy and somehow feel will remain important to everybody because of all those reasons that are strategically important.³⁷⁴

And I am not sure that that is helpful.³⁷⁵

The point is that Nigeria can become much less relevant to the United States. We have already seen evidence of it. When President Obama went to Ghana and not to Nigeria, he was sending a message, that Ghana symbolised more of the significant trends, issues and importance that one wants to put on Africa than Nigeria.³⁷⁶

And when I was asked by journalists why President Obama did not go to Nigeria, I said, “What would he gain from going? Would Nigeria be a good model for democracy, would it be a model for good governance…?³⁷⁷ No he would not, so he did not go.³⁷⁸ So, the handwriting may already be on the wall, and that is a sad commentary.³⁷⁹ Because what it means is that Nigeria’s most important strategic importance in the end could be that it has failed.³⁸⁰ And that is a sad conclusion. It does not have to happen, but I think that we ought to stop talking about what a great country it is, and how terribly important it is to us and talk about what it would take for Nigeria to be that important and great.³⁸¹

Adam Ragozzino asked in March 2021 whether Nigeria is becoming a failed state. He cited the growing kidnapping in the northern part of the country especially as it affects school children.  “The government’s inability to protect schools is part of a growing list of state security failures.”³⁸²

Many of the country’s land borders, especially in the north, lack proper control measures. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Abba Moro, Nigeria’s former minister of the interior, estimated that there were almost 1,500 illegal trafficking routes that the government was aware of, compared to 84 legal routes into the country. These illegal routes produce economic losses, and they are also exploited by groups like Boko Haram in order to move weapons into the area.³⁸³

The seaports are not much better. The port at Lagos and the area around the Gulf of Guinea are the world’s worst waters for piracy. In 2014, an entire tanker of oil was stolen. More often though, just the ship’s crew is held hostage, knowing the transportation company or its insurance will pay the ransom. Even oil in pipelines is hijacked and held for ransom or just stolen right out of the pipe.³⁸⁴

In 2015, Boko Haram began using girls as young as 10-years-old to carry out suicide attacks. The attacks continued through 2017. Last year, at least 76 farmers were murdered by the group. In each case, the government was unable to mount an effective counter-response. Worse, last year’s End SARS protesters were fired upon by their own military—the exact type of violence the movement was protesting. It didn’t help that the military denied the incident and was never held accountable.³⁸⁵

The Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), a mostly Christian and Igbo separatist movement formed its own armed militant wing. The Eastern Security Network (ESN) has been fighting with the Buhari government, whom they say favors Muslims, and against the mostly Muslim Fulani people, whom they accuse of attacks on the Igbo people.³⁸⁶

These security issues are compounded by rising poverty, unemployment rates, wealth disparities, ineffective governance, and a distrust of the government. When combined with the demographics of a growing youth population, they conspire to create an environment not unlike what exists in the Sahel, where these very same trends have allowed VEOs to thrive in the outlying regions, despite almost a decade of military interventions.³⁸⁷

The government has lost control over certain aspects of national security. The military has been fighting Boko Haram for over a decade.³⁸⁸ Over the course of the year, the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center logged 44 crews kidnapped off the coast of Nigeria. By 2020, the number of crews kidnapped rose to 62.³⁸⁹

The security architecture and security strategy of Nigeria, unfortunately, does not have that element of coordination… There’s a school of thought that the entire security architecture in Nigeria lacks proper monitoring and evaluation. In other words, there are no mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation that would allow anyone to understand what they’re doing.³⁹⁰ The lack of security creates a vicious circle of failed development opportunities. For example, the Buhari administration announced plans to expand the mining sector to 3% of GDP by 2025. It is a natural choice for providing more jobs and diversifying the economy away from oil. But as was the case in the Sahel, without adequate state security, non-state actors and armed gangs began to compete with corporations for control of mine resources. A continued weak economy drives theft in the GoG, and banditry on land. But inadequate security is unable to prevent thefts, which continue to weigh down the economy.³⁹¹

In late May 2021, Robert I. Rotberg, the founding director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict and president emeritus of the World Peace Foundation, and John Campbell, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, wrote an indicting article on Nigeria describing it as a failed state.

“Nigeria has long teetered on the precipice of failure. But now, unable to keep its citizens safe and secure, Nigeria has become a fully failed state of critical geopolitical concern. Its failure matters because the peace and prosperity of Africa and preventing the spread of disorder and militancy around the globe depend on a stronger Nigeria.”³⁹²

This designation of repeated failure is not a knee-jerk, casual labeling using emotive and pejorative words. Instead, it is a designation informed by a body of political theory developed at the turn of this century and elaborated upon, case by case, ever since. Indeed, thoughtful Nigerians over the past decade have debated, often fervently, whether their state has failed. Increasingly, their consensus is that it has.³⁹³

Most of all, failed states are violent. All failed states harbor some form of violent internal strife, such as civil war or insurgency. Nigeria now confronts six or more internal insurrections and the inability of the Nigerian state to provide peace and stability to its people has tipped a hitherto very weak state into failure.³⁹⁴

Indeed, few parts of Nigeria are today fully safe. In 2020 and so far in 2021, according to weekly tracking reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, about 1,400 Nigerians have lost their lives to Islamist insurgents in northeastern Borno state and neighboring areas.³⁹⁵

Boko Haram, a fundamentalist-inspired militia of possibly 5,000 attackers, also raids neighboring Chad and northern Cameroon, and is believed to shelter in the Sambisa forest along Borno’s mountainous border with Cameroon. Exactly why a Nigerian Armed Forces of 300,000 troops and a $2 billion budget has failed to extirpate Boko Haram is not clear; corruption in the military is allegedly a major factor, as well as inconsistent leadership from officers and politicians. (And, like Afghanistan’s Taliban, Boko Haram seems to have some limited local support.)³⁹⁶

According to political theory, the government’s inability to thwart the Boko Haram insurgency is enough to diagnose Nigeria as a failed state. But there are many more symptoms.³⁹⁷

Then on May 31, 2021, both authors dropped another bombshell of an indicting article. They highlighted the growing feelings of frustration with the current administration particularly in its gross inability to keep Nigerians safe from hordes of extreme violent non-state actors. As a result of the perceptible growing conspiracy of these factors and forces collectively an unknown quantity and in quality within a highly volatile environment of vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity on the one hand and palpable failure of the current administration in town, the authors stated that: “Increasingly, prominent Nigerian opinion-makers are calling for an alternative to the current administration—whether through a national convention to rebuild the state from scratch, the breakup of Nigeria into smaller countries, or a domestic military takeover of the kind Nigeria has experienced repeatedly since independence in 1960. Many other Nigerians decry the government’s inability to keep citizens safe but support its calls for external assistance in the form of economic and military aid.”³⁹⁸

The Guardian of London similarly sounded the alarm: A series of overlapping security, political and economic crises has left Nigeria facing its worst instability since the end of the Biafran war in 1970.³⁹⁹

With experts warning that large parts of the country are in effect becoming ungovernable, fears that the conflicts in Africa’s most populous state were bleeding over its borders were underlined last week by claims that armed Igbo secessionists in the country’s south-east were now cooperating with militants fighting for an independent state in the Anglophone region of neighbouring Cameroon.⁴⁰⁰

The mounting insecurity from banditry in the north-west, jihadist groups such as Boko Haram in the north-east, violent conflict between farmers and pastoralists across large swathes of Nigeria’s “middle belt”, and Igbo secessionists in the south-east calling for an independent Biafra once again, is driving a brain drain of young Nigerians. It has also seen the oil multinational Shell announcing that it is planning to pull out of the country because of insecurity, theft and sabotage.⁴⁰¹

Those security issues are in addition to a series of other problems, including rising levels of poverty, violent crime and corruption amid an increasing sense that the central government, in many places, is struggling to govern.⁴⁰² All of which has prompted dire warnings from some observers about the state of Nigeria’s democracy.⁴⁰³ Aggravating the sense of a state being hollowed out is an under-resourced and overwhelmed judicial system that has left ordinary Nigerians with little expectation of access to justice.⁴⁰⁴

Why the above extent to prove, at least academically, that Nigeria is most probably already a failed state? It is because, despite the rebuttals by the apologists of the current administration and the misgivings of many others as regard the prima facie motives of this category of indicting articles by Western scholars, the Nigeria situation cannot be said to have improved in any fundamental manner. This is why it is quite a convincing argument that Nigeria has actually become a failed state even though it has not collapsed on its face by the roadside.  The reasons why the country has not collapsed are, in turn, because of the following reasons that can serve as a grace to prevent the country from tumbling over the cliff edge into the valley of self-destruction or perdition.

Huge Land Mass: The huge land mass of the country especially in the northern part of the country coupled with the relative national identity and/or unity among the various ethnic groups has played an invisible critical role in the war principally serving as a buffer against collapse from the pressure of the attacks by the insurgents and others. However, it is both an advantage and disadvantage to the two parties engaged in this epic battle for supremacy. To the Nigerian State, it is a strategic advantage because the attacks from the insurgents are concentrated and at the same scattered. If the land mass has been smaller than what it is today, then the attacks would have been more concentrated and profoundly impactful than what they are today. But the huge land mass is also a drawback for the Nigerian military in this case because it is analogous to chasing several rats at the same time of which the net-result is that no rat is killed or caught at the end of the merry-go round which the current security crisis has thrown up: from insurgency in the North east to banditry in the North west, from herdsmen killing in the North central to separatist-motivated killings in the South east. That is the meaning of the argument that the military is already overstretched while chasing up and down insurgents, terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, separatists and all sort of criminal gangs threatening to upend the suzerainty of the Nigerian State.

However, with the pattern and manner of attacks by the violent non-state actors, it is also really and practically impossible to get to the throat or heart of the Nigerian State, i.e. at the centre of authority in Nigeria and overthrow it. Abuja is the heart and soul of the Nigerian State. Even though some attempts have been made in the past through bombing campaign such as the bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters in 2011 and bombing of the UN Headquarters in 2012, it is still extremely difficult to cause major explosion capable of tilting the balance of political power or balance of terror in favour of the insurgents. Such a scenario will present a fight-to-death in defense of the Nigerian State or to overthrow it. Furthermore, in consideration of this type of scenario, the central authority can relocate physically to elsewhere, for instance, back to Lagos, on emergency but temporary basis – and Lagos is like a fortress which cannot easily be overwhelmed like the famous Troy.

But really, if it comes to a big fight, how is the military going to protect Abuja from air attack with its old arsenal of combat aircrafts? Nigerian military has no Iron Dome over Abuja!

Population: Every life matters. The number of people killed so far in these insurgencies, banditry, kidnapping, herders/farmers clashes, and ethnic clashes though put together are not anywhere near the numbers of people killed during the bloody Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) are deeply regrettable. There is no part of the country that has not been touched by these killings in recent years. The ultimate responsibility for these killings lay squarely at the doorsteps of the Nigerian State for failure to create an enabling environment that fosters peace and harmony among the various ethnic groups and classes in the country. The numbers, however, hide the pains and agonies of the bereaved families at untimely losing their loved ones. They hide the incompetence of the government at protecting each and every one of the citizens. They showed, on the other hand, the lack of social justice that served as social redress mechanisms for various categories of grievances thrown up by the failure of the government over the arch of time and space. It is this type of cosmic failure that served as combustible material for all these killings. They showed the extent of evil ways some categories of human beings are willing to go and commit against their fellow citizens when pushed to the brick wall – under the guise of seeking redress for their grievances and fighting the government.

However, the important point here is that the Nigerian population estimated to be over 200 million is largely able to absorb the shock of losing thousands of people over the arch of time (for instance, over two decades since the return to democratic rule in 1999) and space (across the length and breadth of the country). Even if more thousands are to be killed, the large population will still absorb it and as the saying goes: “life goes on”! This may sound like the Caiaphas principle that it is better for one man to die than for the whole nation to perish. In the same vein, it is a pity that thousands have to die, but due to no fault of theirs, than for the whole nation to perish. Thus, they are sacrificial lambs, collateral damages suffered in the course of combat between two mortal enemies. 

Crude or cruel as the above may sound, it is one of the reasons why the country is still standing and has not collapsed up till date even with the high intensity of the conflict and violence going on in Nigeria today. The big population of Nigeria is a saving grace in an inverted manner. 

Political Economy: Even though the political economy of Nigeria is nothing to write home in terms of qualitative development, it still offers the material basis for the existence of the Nigerian State.

The Nigerian Intelligentsia: The Nigerian intelligentsia, especially the Southern-based intelligentsia has not abandoned the Nigerian State to its fate. It is still overwhelmingly in support of the so-called experimental Nigerian Project. This is overwhelmingly visible in the media where the apologists of national unity or cohesion are in the majority. There are, of course, critics of the Nigerian Project. There are even nationalists rebels that are agitating for separation such as Oodua Republic and Biafra Republic agitators. The House has not fallen even though its roof is leaking very badly. The leaking roof is being patched up by the four-year electoral cycles.

Last but not the least is the 4-year electoral cycle that has continue to provide hope that things can be still be turned around for the better once a better leadership emerges than what we have had in the last two decades – a truly national leader devoid of all ethnic scruples, a leader that embraces the nation as a unit of a family, a development-minded leader with a vast mental horizon strong enough to rise above ethnic prejudices and irredentism to engineer a new economic development. Even though the whistle has not been blown on political campaign for 2023 general elections, candidates are already emerging, masquerading and positioning themselves for one political office or the other. However, most important of this unfolding political scenario is that all the agitations for self-determination have suddenly taken a back burner suggesting that perhaps the previous noises and grandstanding are for political purpose. Nothing more. 

Conclusion

This article does not capture the timeline of attacks on the Nigerian State and its military machine by ISWAP, Boko Haram, bandits and other violent non-state actors in the last one year. That task is deferred for another time. But from what has been put together in the preceding sections, it is obvious we are looking at a military that is both theoretically and practically not likely to win this war in the nearest future – except a miracle happens along the lines. However, it is also known that miracles rarely happen in war. Such miracles must be a product of combination of factors and forces that form a convergence of variables for victory.

President Muhammadu Buhari has cried out that he is overwhelmed by the spate of bandit attacks in the North western part of the country, asking the military to use maximum force to quell the threat posed by the bandits. Did it mean that the military has been using rubber bullets or kid gloves before? Is he only overwhelmed by banditry in the Northwest? What of ISWAP and Boko Haram in the North east?

Worst of all, President Muhammadu Buhari could not travel to Zamfara State, as he was scheduled to do, just shortly after the above lamentation, because of the palpable fear of bandits waylaying and shooting at his presidential convoy, not even with the so-called might of the Nigerian military at his disposal acting as protective shield for his convoy. This showed clearly how a President can be become restricted in his freedom of movement within the same country he is leading and held hostage by mounting insecurity in his own country. It is an ugly turn of events.

There is no more doubt that there is a strategic stalemate in the war against ISWAP, Boko Haram and bandits in the country as being currently prosecuted by the Nigerian military and its allied security agencies with the “war template” they are using. This inexorably means that the war has not ended at all and will most probably not end very soon. By logical corollary too, it also mean that this administration will pass on or bequeath the current security crisis to the next administration, the very same way it was passed on or bequeathed to it by past administration.

This administration has not in any way significantly altered the balance of terror in its favour in the ongoing war that actually threatens the existential basis of the Nigerian State, the nation and the people. By extension too, this administration has failed on its promise made in 2015 when it came into power to restore peace and hope for a better future for the country given the security challenges it has had to face in the last two decades. In fact, this administration is a failure considering its inability to defeat the insurgents and bandits and restore hope to the people.

Analysts, however, are not unmindful of the so-called frenetic current efforts being made by this administration including its propagandist pronouncements by the President to bring the war to an end by the time it leaves office in May 2023. But closer scrutiny of these efforts and pronouncements would reveal that no fundamental difference has been made from what have been the extant conditions in the immediate past. What analysts should rather focus more is the current pattern of engagement and whether such would produce new dynamics in the battlefield and disrupt the current balance of terror in the country. However, in all objectivity, the only thing on the table is the frequency of air strikes against the insurgents and bandits. But the morale of the insurgents and the bandits has not been seen to have been broken so far to the extent of their surrender or retreat. That takes us back again to the same strategic stalemate.

The Nigerian military and its allied security agencies are largely perceived publicly to be the most deaf and dumb to public advisories, selfish, arrogant and unwilling to listen to well-meaning advisories, act with impunity in the most repulsive or repugnant vulgar manner. They are technically averse to suggestions that run contrary to their ingrained silo mentality shaped over the decades by conservative ideas or stuck in the mental grooves of 2^nd or 3^rd Generation Warfare methodologies. In examining their public pronouncements through press releases or off-the-cuff individual remarks, it is evident they have no avante-garde orientation in matters of modern warfare or security challenges especially of hybrid characters. Indeed, Nigerian military cannot be regarded as a modern fighting machine despite being rated as Number 34 or thereabout in the world. There is no empirical ground for this rating given what has been happening to it in the country since full-fledged insurgency and terrorism broke out through Boko Haram in July 2009. Nigerian military is not on the list of top-20 world fighting machines which should arguably be the criteria for such rating.

No doubt something must be fundamentally wrong where insurgent groups estimated to be around 5, 000 in the case of ISWAP and 7, 000 in the case of Boko Haram are holding or facing down a military with a strength of over 250, 000 personnel for the past six and eleven years respectively. Guerrilla armies use to their greatest advantage their small numbers with the greatest war skills or artistries in inflicting the maximum damage or crushing a mighty army. Vietnam with its small but smart and efficient guerrilla warriors sent the almighty US military fleeing with its tail behind its hinds in the now famous Vietnam War. US lost 58, 000 of its men in that bloody war.

The Nigerian military need to go back to the war situation room to reassess its strategies and tactics, craft out new ones that meet the requirement of modern insurgency, terrorism and banditry that have been thrown on its face in the last decade by all these extreme violent non-state actors such as ISWAP, Boko Haram and hordes of bandits across the length and breadth of north west part of the country.

Stop Press

As this article was being uploaded unto our website on February 4, 2021, the media (many newspapers and online platforms) reported with screaming headlines the alarm raised by the Governor of Borno State, Professor Babagana Zulum, that ISWAP is massively recruiting and that it has become obvious that ISWAP now constitute clear and present danger to the very existence of the Nigerian State and may overthrow the Nigerian State and take it over completely in the nearest future if nothing serious is done now to curb the unfolding scenario – despite series of assurances by President Muhammadu Buhari that insurgency and terrorism particularly in the Northeastern part of the country will soon become a thing of the past as the Nigerian military will soon crush the insurgents and terrorists. Such a wishful thinking – that if wishes are horses, beggars will like to ride!

This article need not be amended in any form whatsoever from what has earlier been written above to reflect the alarm being raised by the Governor who has been a living witness to the ongoing campaign of terror against the Nigerian State by ISWAP and Boko Haram and who has actually been bearing the full brunt of ISWAP and Boko Haram attacks in Borno State since he was elected in 2015 general elections. His alarm merely reinforced what had earlier been asserted that the fight with ISWAP, Boko Haram and other violent non-state actors is actually just starting. Victory from either side of the battlefield is solely dependent on certain factors or variables but most importantly the seriousness of commitment to win the war from either party to the raging conflict. Readers will inevitably notice that this article did not “pray” for either of the parties to the conflict as legions of similar articles have done out of gushing sentimentality. The reason is that historically, prayer does not win battle or war. War is won by superior arms (the bigger the gun the better), strategies and tactics. Prayer is for those who are stupid enough and cannot to see the balance of terror or where and how the winds of war are blowing. One notable characteristic feature of ISWAP and Boko Haram is their ability to adapt to changing environment, even an increasingly hostile ideological environment. Their recent pattern of attacks shows how they are changing their strategies and tactics in this broad context of hostile environment. It is only the Nigerian military that seem to remain stuck in the same mental grooves in the prosecution of the war and therefore does not seem to be making any headway or breakthrough whatsoever because it continue to use the same worn-out strategies and tactics in facing the insurgent groups.

In the meantime too, the Federal Government announced, perhaps with fanfare, that it had uncovered 96 major financiers of terrorism, 123 companies and 33 Bureaux de Change as conduits for channeling fund to ISWAP, Boko Haram, including 424 associates or accomplices in Nigeria despite the previous denials and counter-denials. The announcement also attracted screaming front-page headlines in many newspapers. The issue of sponsorship of terror and other acts of illegality in the country has been long in history which can be traced to the era of Goodluck Jonathan-led administration. Essentially, however, no administration has had the courage to unveil the identities of the alleged sponsors thus making the public to think and believe that the issue is more of a political statement to gain cheap popularity or sympathy than the real intention to help put an end to the campaign of terror and insurgency in the country. The last administration was blamed to no end for its inability or failure to unveil the identities of this group of national enemies or evil-doers. Indeed, several political actors under the current administration were part of the legion that took the last administration to Golgotha over the issue. Now, the table has turned. The current administration is now facing the same pressure its key allies put the last administration under. But most important of all, nobody knows the mind and thinking of this administration over this issue other than the noise it has been making on it. This administration has no standing policy position that can be referenced to allow an analysis of the worldview and mindset of the administration over the issue. One also wonder why the administration decided to make this noise at this point in time when it has actually remained deaf to it in the recent past. What are the political gains expected to be made from it when there is no body language to indicate it is ready to unveil the identities of the alleged sponsors and dummy companies? Would the expected disclosures not cause political uproar and backlash against the administration itself?