Military Coup in Sudan: A Nation at Dagger-drawn with Itself

By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst NEXTMONEY

Introduction       

The much expected military coup in Sudan has finally happened precisely a month after a failed attempt to overthrow the Sudan interim government headed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. For many keen watchers of the Sudanese politics in the last six months, if not more than this, this coup could not have come as a surprise at all. What may have come as a surprise is perhaps the lightning speed with which events unfolded and climaxed into the coup especially after the failed coup attempt on September 21, 2021.

In the early hours of October 25, a month after the failed coup attempt, the military struck again, arresting Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and his wife and putting them under lock and key in a house arrest in Khartoum including other high government civilian officials. The entire Sovereign Council and/or the Transitional Council was sacked and dissolved. The new military strongman, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan who was hitherto the head of the Sovereign Council and the de facto President made a broadcast to the nation announcing the dissolution of the interim government under the pretext of maintaining law and order and preventing chaos from swallowing up the country.

Al-Burhan declared a state of emergency, explaining that the military needed to protect the country’s safety and security. “We guarantee the armed forces’ commitment to completing the democratic transition until we hand over to a civilian elected government,” he said. “What the country is going through now is a real threat and danger to the dreams of the youth and the hopes of the nation.” In short, the coup was hatched and executed to protect the national security interests of Sudan – as defined by General al-Burhan and/or his military faction within the Sovereign Council.

What was surprising about the coup is that nobody had expected that the coup would happen so soon after the failed attempt on September 21. This, however, merely shows the tempest that has been raging within the bowel of Sudan in the last several months and the desperation of the coup plotters to oust the transitional government and grab power for themselves.

The Western governments were also probably caught by surprise especially the United States who’s Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Mr. Jeffrey Feltham, had earlier held a meeting with the warring groups in the early hours of the day in an attempt to diffuse the rising tension. Shortly after his departure from Sudan, General al-Burhan and his henchmen rolled out the armoured tanks and big guns to carry out the coup. The gunpowder barrel has finally exploded. It could be certain that the US did not see the coming of the coup at that point in time.

Nobody also knows that the green snake living under the green grass was none other than the head of the Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, himself. This was not a coup from the middle-ranking soldiers, from below the military hierarchy that could have possibly swept out the Generals from their command posts. It is rather a coup by the Generals themselves, from the very top-echelon command of the military establishment. The Sovereign Council, cobbled together in August 2019 as a hybrid contraption, was the diarchic system of shared power between the military and civilians in a transition government that was assigned the main duty of supervising the transitional process towards election in 2023 that is expected to lead to democratic rule. The Transitional Military Council that was established in April 2019 after Omar al-Bashir was kicked out and which preceded the Sovereign Council was rejected by the Sudanese. Interestingly, since 2019, there has been no central electoral body and/or system on ground to start preparing for the general elections expected in early 2023 as the culmination of the transition process. There is no known election time-table anywhere to be seen. There is no voters’ registration exercise embarked upon at any point in time since the interim government was put in place in August 2019.

But a careful sorting out of facts would reveal that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has been publicly posturing and speaking body language that can only be interpreted to only mean that he does not like the contraption called Sovereign Council of which he was the head; and that he wants to rule unchallenged and to be able to call all the shots across the full political spectrum. Al-Burhan has been travelling overseas a lot, secretly garnering strategic contacts, publicity and other appurtenant of power. He has clearly demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubts that he is another Omar al-Bashir in the making. Only the unwary will not see this trend that has clearly established itself in the last couple of months in Sudan before the jackboot of the military finally came matching down on the Sovereign Council. 

Right from the very beginning, there is no doubt that this diarchic system is bound to fail altogether because of its essential character flaw. Packing wolves and sheep together in a room or “Council” is bound to fail inevitably and in a miserable manner as the civilian preys are being pounced upon and devoured by the hungry military predators. The civilian sheep could only be heard bleating loudly while they were been torn apart by the pack of ferocious wolves sequestered among them. It was not only a huge strategic error but also a very sickening joke.

The situation was similar to what happened in Nigeria in August 1993 when an Interim National Government was hastily set up by the departing Ibrahim Babangida-led military dictatorship. The ING was headed by Chief Ernest Shodeinde Shonekan. The ING included General Sani Abacha who was expected to give a “military muscle” to the ING. On November 17, 1993, it was precisely General Sani Abacha that kicked out Chief Ernest Shodeinde Shonekan, dissolved the ING and subsequently embarked upon a full-blown military dictatorship, the type that has never been witnessed in the Nigerian political history.

The coup has thrown Sudan into another round of crisis that nobody can foresee how it will end. Sudan is consequently standing at an inflection point in its evolution as a Nation-State. Sudan has become an existential threat to itself. While the coup has been overwhelmingly condemned by the international community coupled with loud street protests including killing of protesters by the soldiers, the new military junta has dug itself into power and is not willing to relinquish it by any means. The fumbling and bungling of peace process are coming at a huge cost. All investment in the peaceful resolution of the raging crisis is being seen as a waste.

Since the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan has been roiling and rolling from one crisis to another notably amidst economic crisis. Sudan has almost devolved into a Hobbesian state of nature: brutish, nasty and short, where dog eat dog! The political instability and coupled with the economic crisis that Sudan have had for a long time may have actually pushed the Sudan State to the verge of State collapse. There is a sense in which Sudan can indeed be argued to be a failed state already even with the existence of the Sovereign Council with whatever achievements have been ascribed to it since 2019 when it came into being. This is premised on the inability of the State to protect its citizens from socioeconomic vagaries of insecurity and ethnic-based clashes. The State, through the armed forces and paramilitary forces, that is statutorily and primarily responsible for the protection and safety of the citizens have ended up mowing down the same citizens on the streets of Sudan.

Sudan is now in the eyes of crossfire, caught between anti-democratic and pro-democratic forces thus turning Sudan into a geopolitical or geostrategic battleground between various global power blocs (certain Middle East countries – Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – including Iran, Turkey; Russia and China on the one hand and Western countries including African Union on the other hand). It is a situation akin to being caught on a horn of a dilemma, about to be flung by the bull of the dilemma if it does not quickly find a way to dismount from the bull. Sudan has become a playing ground for all manners of players. The Middle East countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in particular) are still mortally afraid of the haunting ghosts of Arab Spring and do not want to see Sudan as a new bridgehead of democratic rule in the Horn of Africa/East Africa being the largest country in Africa in terms of land mass even though with a meagre demographic strength of about 42 million people. There are also countries like Iran and Turkey with their different agendas. So also are the positions of China and Russia that can be clearly discerned as far as their ideological and foreign policy thrusts are concerned in relation to the United States and other Western European powers. United States and several other Western European countries on the other hand clearly want to see Sudan joining the ranks of democratically-ruled countries in Africa and the world under their sphere of influence. However, nobody is exactly certain of the position of African Union – a rather unfortunate situation.

There is no doubt that a democratic Sudan will have enormous geopolitical impacts in the Horn of Africa. The echoes of its democratic regime will be far-reaching even beyond the immediate region, most probably reaching the Gulf of Aden and the Middle East in general. It is the possibility of this democratic rule being established in Sudan (by 2023) that has largely attracted Western countries which has manifested by the US dolling out $700 million for the transition programmes which has however been withheld until normalcy returns to Sudan. It is this possibility of democratic rule that has also become a source of mortal fear both for the reactionary Sudanese military and its Middle East backers.

Thus there is the sense in which the unfolding crisis in Sudan can be seen and regarded as an archetypal political clash between Sudanese Generals (the Old Guard trying to defend and safeguard the Old Order encapsulated in the interests of Omar al-Bashir-led National Congress Party  on the one hand and the mass of the people whose political consciousness or social awareness has been raised to the highest level by events of the last few years who are now rooting for liberal democracy supported by several Western countries such as the United States on the other hand. It is not so much of a civilizational clash (though very close to it) between certain Middle East countries and their other allies that do not want to see democracy sprouting in Sudan and the Western countries that want to see democracy growing and sustainable in the country. It may be interesting to note that even though the majority of the populace is Muslim, they have, however, rejected political Islamism as represented by Hassan el-Turabi and Omar al-Bashir’ National Congress Party (the dominant Islamic party in Sudan). Of course it is a fierce battle for supremacy between the two different and opposing ideological camps and their worldviews – between political Islamism and Western political liberalism. That is why the Middle East countries are in full support of the military Junkers in Sudan because they are mostly Islamists who are susceptible to threading the path of fundamentalism with all the well-known historical and/or contemporary effects.

This is the broad or panoramic context in which the latest crisis occasioned by the October Coup can be viewed and analyzed in order to bring out its overt strategic implications and subtle nuances.

Statement of the Problem

The Sudanese crisis is more of a crisis of State legitimacy than anything else because of its current diarchic arrangement and character of the transitional government. The Sudanese State is highly suspected not to be performing its main statutory functions of security and welfare of the citizens but only seen to be keeping certain men (and women) power for its own stake. This crisis is historical in origin. The Sudanese State has long ago delegitimized itself by its gross inability to function as a modern State characterized and driven by rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights of its citizens in its governance landscape.

This history started with Omar al-Bashir, if not during the time of Jafaar Numeiri. Of all the post-Independence Sudanese leaders, Omar al-Bashir is perhaps the most prominent. He bestrode Sudan like a colossus. But he ruled Sudan with unparalleled iron fist to his satisfaction and succeeded in bringing the country to its knees, to the lowest depth. Sudan was already practically at the precipice of complete collapse by the time al-Bashir was toppled on April 11, 2019 and later hounded to imprisonment. The same forces that raised him and sustained him in power for almost three decades finally turned against him, threw him out of the Presidential Palace and into Kobar jail.

Omar al-Bashir though much liked by the militants had however become a heavy liability to Sudan. South Sudan has already broken away eight years earlier in May 2011 under his watch and clumsy authoritarian hands. Al-Bashir was increasingly imperiling Sudan.  It is better for Omar al-Bashir to be sacrificed than for the whole Sudan or its military to disintegrate or be brought to total public disrepute. It is better for one man to die than for the whole nation to perish – in accordance with the biblical Caiaphas Principle! This was the fundamental axiom upon which he was finally removed and dumped into jail.

The Western governments, especially the United States were up in arms against Sudan for sponsoring global terrorism and harboring well-known international terrorists. The United States imposed all sorts of sanctions which bit hard at Sudan. But Omar al-Bashir would not budge until it was too late in the day. The fundamental questions have not been asked: what led Sudan under Omar al-Bashir to support international terrorism, to harbor Al Qae’da terrorist organization including Osama bin Laden for many years knowing fully well this will draw the ire of the United States which was already demanding and hunting for the head of Osama bin Laden worldwide as its Public Enemy No 1? Why was Sudan seemingly been supported by certain Middle East countries in its terrorist and criminal enterprise, sending Sudan into the dungeon of hell while they are sunning themselves in Paradise-like developed environments?

One of the factors that led to the overthrow of the former military regime led by Omar al-Bashir, apart from the predilection for hobnobbing with international terrorism, was that it has lost its moral high ground and the basis for its rule on all accounts – as well as previous regimes. Omar al-Bashir had held Sudan by the jugular for nearly three decades. Omar al-Bashir can be singularly held responsible for bringing the Sudanese into a cul-de-sac. The military image was badly tarnished as a result of repressive and authoritarian character of Omar al-Bashir-led military-cum-civilian (hybrid) regime. The National Congress Party which he led became tired of him especially after breaking up with Hassan Abdullah el-Turabi, the Islamic fundamentalist ideologue. Supporters of NCP were abandoning the party in droves. The awe with which the military was hitherto held vanished over time and space. This was what led to huge loud street protests that started in 2018 which led to the climax of the Sudanese state crisis in 2019 that led to throwing out of Omar al-Bashir. Omar al-Bashir himself was thrown into jail without hesitation, pushed into two-year imprisonment after been found guilty of corruption charges; and he is already wanted by the International Criminal Court on the charges of genocide and war crimes in Darfour. Sudan finds itself in a dilemma whether to hand over al-Bashir to the ICC or not.

But reviewing the momentous events of 2019, it can be concluded that the Sovereign Council/Transitional Council was a product of the time. There was no other viable alternative. It could probably not have been otherwise because there seemed to be no substitute at the time as the State was lurching from one crisis to another – ultimately towards State collapse itself. The Transitional Military Council that preceded it was disbanded after it was wholly rejected by the masses of the populace who wanted a clean break from authoritarian or despotic rule under President Omar al-Bashir. The Sovereign Council that replaced the Transitional Military Council reflects the delicate balance of forces or power in Sudan at the time; the deep division within the Sudanese society; and the desperation to hang on to a kind of State structure that can mediate power and prevent the State from complete collapse.

The agreement to divide the government between military and civilians, which followed decades of Bashir’s dictatorship, also offered some hope that it could solve some of the impoverished country’s economic problems, finance its paralyzing external debt and attract foreign investment, especially after it signed a normalization agreement with Israel and former U.S. President Donald Trump removed it from America’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. After the Sovereignty Council was formed [in August 2019], Sudan got several billion dollars from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as recompense for participating in the war in Yemen, and international oil companies expressed interest in exploring for oil there.¹

Yet the ruling clique thrown up by the departure of al-Bashir from power still harbored elements loyal to the disgraced regime. 

The October 25 coup, unlike the coup elsewhere (such as in Guinea), was met with hostility from the streets from the very beginning by thousands of people protesting against the coup and vowing not to leave the streets until the transitional government headed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is restored back to power. Again, this was not only a continuation of the struggle of the masses of ordinary Sudanese that saw the end of Omar al-Bashir-led authoritarian regime in 2019, but also the vow to edge out the military completely from the governance space in Sudan. How this protest would restore Abdalla Hamdok back to power is unknown. Has the coup not thrown up new dynamics? Are we still looking at status quo ante or a new constellation of power?

Soldiers have already fired and killed over score protesters. Fourteen people have reported died from the bullets of soldiers as at November 12, 2021. This showed the readiness of the military to hang on to power at all cost including sacrificing the lives of Sudanese on the streets. It is also obvious that the military is finding it increasingly difficult maintaining itself in power because it does not enjoy popular support coupled with pressures from the international community.

Never before has a military takeover been met with such stiff opposition from the very beginning from the majority of the citizens including the international community in defense of the idealistic principles of democratic rule that is still hanging in the air. Democracy has won the hearts and minds of the majority of Sudanese. Al-Burhan and his fellow military Junkers did not bargain nor make contingency plan for such a poor reception or high-tension opposition to their power grab. Their propaganda machine is exceedingly weak and seemingly overwhelmed by that of the opposition. The military junta can only hang on to power by sheer brute force. The military intervention has lost its moral high ground of legitimacy even before gaining it because the intervention was mis-prioritized, and evil in nature exclusively directed at scuttling the transition process to democratic rule in 2023.

The new military junta is evidently not in control of all vectors of State power up to a point in time, at least a week after the coup. The Ministry of Information, ostensibly under the control of the civilians was issuing counter-narratives and even directives against the military – even though certain media houses were invaded by soldiers and ransacked. The Ministry called on Sudanese to oppose the military attempt “to block the democratic transition”. “We raise our voices loudly to reject this coup attempt,” it said in a statement at the heat of the crisis. While one may speak of temporary existence of dual power in the State, events of few days after the coup clearly indicated that the military has gained the upper hand and is perhaps ready to face all odds and obstacles that may come its way both from within Sudan and from the international community. That was why the military junta shut down the internet in order to disrupt communications among the citizens.

There is need for a united front (as witnessed in 2019) galvanizing the populace against the military Junkers. But this united front must have a clear focus and goals that reflect the genuine interests of the Sudanese. While there are, for instance, Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), the Communist Party, the Umma Party, the Sudanese Congress, and various resistance committees including labour unions and civil society organizations, there does not seem to be a central coordinating committee managing and directing the revolutionary energy of the masses of the populace towards a particular goal thus making the protests look more like a barefoot revolutionary movement. There is no clear revolutionary leadership anywhere to be seen – a major deficit on the part of the civilian populace. This has led the military junta to gain the upper hand in this epochal clash between the military and the masses.

However, the civilian leaders seemed to have enjoyed enormous sympathy and support of the populace initially, the latter that has borne the brunt of military repression, brutality and general insecurity of lives and properties including economic crisis over the decades. Yet these civilian leaders have not shown how to mobilize and harness the kinetic energy of the masses and domicile it within a particular framework for liberating Sudan from the vicious grip of the military Junkers. Sudan has been in the grip of insecurity, economic crisis, political instability and nationalist agitations of its own making over the decades escalated by the incompetence and stinking corruption of the military Junkers while the civilian leaders have not been able to point the way forward. Nationalist agitations, for instance, along religious lines have led to the breakaway of South Sudan in May 2011 till date. The people who have died so far may have done so in vain because of the ineffectiveness of the civilian leadership and not just the brutality of the military.

Why this coup at this point in time?  Even though the military can be said to still be in charge of the country with the facilities of inflicting violence on the populace under its control, the fact that it hitherto has to share power with the civilians under any pretext is abhorrent to it. It is this abhorrence that has contributed to the hatching of the October Coup. Part of the reasons for the coup include the expected changes in personnel to the Sovereign Council where the headship of the council was expected to pass from General Abdel Fattah al-Burham to a civilian figure including other changes. The reasons also include the looming reform of the military and the security sector (especially the paramilitary bodies such as the Rapid Support Forces and the mortal fear among the military high command with which these impending reforms are being regarded.

However, the Sovereign Council has been embroiled in intense internal debate on many issues which include the direction of the transition process and what it demands, the question of how to handle the case of Omar al-Bashir that is already in prison: whether to hand him over to the International Criminal Court for prosecution on charges of war crimes and other ancillary matters or not.  Also in the crucible of debate is the raging economic crisis signposted by skyrocketing inflation, devaluation of currency and imposition (lifting) of fuel subsidies. There was no clarity and clear focus from the office of the Prime Minister and the military adventurists were able to exploit this confusion or lack of direction to their own strategic advantages. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was left like a fish out of water fighting for his life. 

Africa Confidential gave insights into what might have possibly caused so much rancor and/or virulent disagreements within the Sovereign Council, or between the two main factions within the Sovereign Council, i.e. between the military wing and the civilian wing. The first insight perhaps is the economic reforms embarked upon by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the effects of these reforms on the overall economy and how these reforms have impacted on people’s standards of living. The second insight is the plan to restructure and review the accounts of some 600 state companies most of which are in the hands of military men both serving and retired including security sector reform.

Africa Confidential referenced the Paris Economic Summit that took place in May 2021, a Summit superintended by French President, Emmanuel Macron, and many African countries that trooped to Paris like beggars. “The two days of economic brainstorming on African economies in Paris started well on the morning of 17 May when Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok set out his government’s reform plans which could unblock a plan to restructure much of the country’s $60 billion foreign debt”²

France’s Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire added the pledge of a $1.5bn bridging loan to settle Sudan’s arrears to the International Monetary Fund. Britain, Ireland and Sweden have made similar loans to repay Khartoum’s arrears to the African Development Bank, and the United States has provided a bridging loan to pay off arrears to the World Bank.³ That means Sudan could start its debt-relief programme, under the IMF and Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative, late next month [June/July 2021]. It would allow the country to borrow another $2bn from the Bank to fund urgent development projects, and bring in the IMF to finance more economic restructuring.⁴

Those initial economic changes – ending fuel subsidies, raising the power tariffs and liberalising forex policy – have all pushed up prices and are politically risky. The introduction of the government’s Family Support Programme, designed to compensate most Sudanese, is helping.⁵

But the next stage of economic reforms, which includes restructuring and reviewing the accounts of some 600 state companies, may be riskier still.⁶ Many of these companies, which have corruptly benefited from public funds, are in the hands of Islamist acolytes of the former ruling party or the military and intelligence services.⁷

Under new Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, many of these companies are meant to be under treasury surveillance but local anti-corruption activists say that political ideologues and security officials are pushing back hard. This year about 22% of the national budget is allocated to the military whose management is opaque.⁸ But individual officers also get access to funds directly from the ‘military-industrial’ companies such as Giad, which comes under the ministry of defence, as part of a complex network of companies and subsidiaries.⁹

A new report by Sudanese researcher Suliman Baldo, now of the US-based Sentry Group, highlights the role of Al Sabika Al Zahabia, a gold mining company which it says is still controlled by the General Intelligence Service.¹⁰ It adds that Lieutenant-General Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, the second-in-command of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the rebadged Janjaweed militia operating in Darfur, and Deputy Chair of the ruling Sovereign Council has incorporated several private companies in Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. These companies are reported to be carrying out contracts for the RSF under opaque arrangements.¹¹ Depriving the Hamdok government of this revenue adds to the political risks it faces. Should it fail to convince young Sudanese that it is able to resuscitate the economy it could face the same sort of popular protests that led to the toppling of the Islamist National Congress Party regime in April 2019.¹²

It is very clear that the Sovereign Council inherited a financially bankrupt State by the time it took over in August 2019. Sudan was barely coasting along. Sudan can be seen to be lying on a financial stretcher being taken for emergency treatment in the IMF/World Bank “hospital” where there is 50/50 survival chance. Had France, including other European powers, not pledged to bail out Sudan with soft loans to repay IMF loan, Sudan would have buckled under the weight of its suffocating external debt. It is these countries that donated water, oxygen and blood to save Sudan, give a chance for survival. The vultures would have landed to tear apart Sudan financially.

The working relationship between the members of the Sovereignty Council was tenuous, reflecting their sometimes competing interests as well as general ideological divisions in the country. In addition to the primary civilian-military divide, there were also internecine squabbles on both sides. Furthermore, the country’s economy was in crisis, which also fomented discontent among the general population. There were multiple instances of coup plotting or attempted coups during the transition period, including one attempt on September 21, 2021, launched by Bashir loyalists. The military subdued the coup action but also laid blame for the attempt at the feet of the civilian leaders, whom they deemed ineffective, and called for them to be replaced. Civilian leaders accused the military of using the attempted coup as an excuse to try to secure more positions of power in the transitional government. They also reiterated the need to restructure the military, review its business interests, and bring them under civilian oversight—propositions not popular with many in the military. Thus, the level of tension between the military and civilian leaders, which had already been simmering at dangerous levels, further increased in the aftermath of the coup attempt. Several protests were held in October, with some demonstrators calling for the military to oust the civilian leaders while still more called for the military to respect civilian rule and the democratic transition.¹³

On October 25 the military launched a coup with the backing of Burhan and other top military officials. Hamdok and other cabinet ministers were arrested. Burhan dissolved the Sovereignty Council, declared a state of emergency, and pledged to hold new elections in July 2023. In Khartoum, Omdurman, and other locations across the country, protesters rallied against the coup, and several civil and professional organizations called for strikes and acts of civil disobedience. The next day Burhan claimed the military took the actions that it did in order to avoid a civil war; those supporting a return to civilian rule were not mollified by his words, and protests continued. Meanwhile, the military coup was widely condemned on the international stage and jeopardized plans for much-needed aid and debt relief for the country. The AU suspended the country once again.¹⁴

It is evident that the Sovereign Council was sharply divided mostly between the military men and the civilians. Whoever move first and fast enough will definitely gain the upper hand in the struggle for hegemony or domination within the Council. General al-Burhan was the first to move and fast enough to brush or shove aside the civilian members of the Council. He moved like a lightning speed to prevent himself from been removed or dropped as the head of the Sovereign Council. It was a desperate instinctive act of self-preservation from a looming political annihilation. The September 21 attempted coup was a rehearsal. Interestingly nobody knows what has happened to those who allegedly carried out the coup till date. But it is noteworthy that in carrying out the coup, al-Burhan hardly mentioned anything about the state of the economy.

Burhan argued it was incumbent on the armed forces to act after infighting between some political forces and “the striving for power” and “incitement to chaos and violence” in which he himself is involved and is now the main beneficiary. In the televised address, Burhan said infighting between politicians, ambition and incitement to violence had forced him to act to protect the safety of the nation and to “rectify the revolution’s course”. He said Sudan was still committed to “international accords” and the transition to civilian rule, with elections planned for July 2023. Al-Burhan did not per chance mention the raging economic crisis. None of the corpus of his stated arguments can be argued to amount to doctrine of necessity as the basis of the coup. While the Sovereign Council was in crisis of disagreements within itself, there is no evidence to show that the Sudanese State has completely lost focus and is drifting into total chaos. General al-Burhan concocted those arguments as political reasons to help create the crisis to grab power for himself and his coterie of supporters within the military and their external backers.

There is no doubt that the key players especially the civilian leaders in the government are most probably aware that a coup was on its way and that it will happen inevitably one way or the other. But they were seemingly impotent to do anything to avert it. The storm has been gathering momentum since the failed coup attempt on September 21 if not before that time. The storm became a typhoon on October 25 with all the visible ripple effects across the social and national boundaries. It can also be speculated very strongly that General al-Burhan has not only positioned himself as the new grandmaster of Sudanese politics, he was most probably the brain behind the failed coup attempt on September 21 – using his remote control to manipulate events in his favour. The Western intelligence agencies may have only become aware of this fact only too late in the day.

The intervention of the United States through its Ambassador, Jeffrey Feltham, did and could not persuade General al-Burhan from his Manichean quest to become the new sole leader in Sudan. How al-Burhan played this epistemological subterfuge (neuroweaponry) on the Envoy may not be known for a long time to come. Al-Burhan did not believe in the democratic rule scheduled for installation in 2023 despite his lip-service to it. General al-Burhan orchestrated the coup in his interest of self-preservation and not in the interest of the so-called security and stability (the usual excuses). His career is already on the line including the prospects of being called upon to account for his stewardship as one of the key actors behind-the-scene during Omar al-Bashir reign and the arrowhead of the June 2019 Massacre and the shady deals involved with the military-industrial complex.

The above provides the backdrop or contextual problematique that formed the canvass or general context of the coup.

The General Context

Sudan has been unable to find a workable political system since independence in 1956 and has seen numerous coups and coup attempts or general sociopolitical instability. The Transitional Military Council that came into being in April 2019 after the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir later transmuted into a Sovereign Council, the latter which has been struggling to stabilize the country, end the pariah stigma of Sudan, improve the economy that has largely bellied-up and sustain the transition amid bitter factional dogfights between the military and civilian elements within the Sovereign Council, the larger Sudanese intelligentsia and society. The Sovereign Council succeeded in securing a reprieve from the United States when the latter finally bent backward and removed Sudan from the list of global State Sponsors of Terrorism in December 2020 by former President Donald Trump. 

Sudan faced epochal crisis which was largely self-inflicted over the arch of time and space. Sudan has been ruled for most of its post-colonial history by military leaders who seized power in coups. It had become a pariah to the West and was on the U.S. terrorism blacklist under Bashir, who hosted Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and is wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes.¹⁵

To fast-forward, [t]he country had been on edge since last month [September] when a failed coup plot, blamed on Bashir supporters, unleashed recriminations between the military and civilians in the transitional cabinet.¹⁶ In weeks [prior to the coup] a coalition of rebel groups and political parties aligned themselves with the military and called on it to dissolve the civilian government, while cabinet ministers took part in protests against the prospect of military rule.¹⁷ Sudan has also been suffering a grave economic crisis. Helped by foreign aid, civilian officials have claimed credit for some tentative signs of stabilisation after a sharp devaluation of the currency and the lifting of fuel subsidies.¹⁸

Washington had tried to avert the collapse of the power-sharing agreement by sending [its] special envoy, Jeffrey Feltman. [When the coup finally happened] [t]he director of Hamdok’s office, Adam Hereika, told Reuters the military had mounted the takeover despite “positive movements” towards an agreement after meetings with Feltman in recent days.¹⁹ White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre said: “We reject the actions by the military and call for the immediate release of the prime minister and others who have been placed under house arrest.” Democratic Senator Chris Coons, chairman of the Senate subcommittee that oversees foreign aid, said on Twitter U.S. support for Sudan would “end if the authority of PM Hamdok & the full transitional government is not restored”. A U.S. law bars funding governments brought to power by a military coup.²⁰

The United Nations, Arab League and African Union all expressed concern. Sudan’s political leaders should be released and human rights respected, AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat said in a statement. Britain called the coup an unacceptable betrayal of the Sudanese people. France called for the immediate release of Hamdok and other civilian leaders. Egypt called on all parties to exercise self-restraint. Saudi Arabia said it was following developments with extreme concern.²¹

The Sudanese Professionals Association, an activist coalition in the uprising against Bashir, called for a strike. Burhan’s “reckless decisions will increase the ferocity of the street’s resistance and unity after all illusions of partnership are removed,” it said on its Facebook page. The main opposition Forces of Freedom and Change alliance called for civil disobedience and protests across the country.²²

Military forces stormed Sudanese Radio and Television headquarters in Omdurman and arrested employees, the information ministry said on its Facebook page. Two major political parties, the Umma and the Sudanese Congress, condemned what they called a coup and campaign of arrests.²³ Internet access was widely disrupted and the country’s state news channel played patriotic traditional music. At one point, military forces stormed the offices of Sudan’s state-run television in Omdurman and detained a number of workers, the Information Ministry said.²⁴

Since al-Bashir was forced from power [in April 2019], Sudan has worked to slowly rid itself of the international pariah status it held under the autocrat. The country was removed from the United States’ state supporter of terror list in [December] 2020, opening the door for badly needed foreign loans and investment. But the country’s economy has struggled with the shock of a number economic reforms called for by international lending institutions.²⁵

Multiple videos posted to social media on Monday [on the day of the coup] showed hundreds of demonstrators walking towards army headquarters, chanting: “We are walking holding worry in our hearts — and worry sleeps in people’s chests.” Some videos showed protestors removing razor wire that had been placed across a road amid reports of street closures in several parts of the city.²⁶

Bullets were fired at protesters demonstrating against the coup outside Sudan’s General Command in the city, the Ministry of Information said in another statement. The Ministry said there were casualties, but did not clarify how many shots were fired, or who was shooting at demonstrators. The Central Committee of Sudan Doctors, who are aligned with the civil component of the now-dissolved Sovereign Council, said that two people were killed and more than 80 were injured in the incident.²⁷

One eyewitness told CNN demonstrators had blocked three main bridges in Khartoum, including one that connects Omdurman to the capital and leads to the presidential palace. Security forces briefly fired tear gas near that bridge to disperse protesters, the eyewitness said, explaining that the security forces patrolling the streets are mainly military and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. There was minimal police presence on the streets, the eyewitness added. As chaotic scenes played out across the capital, flights from Khartoum International Airport were canceled, and mobile phone networks and internet access were disrupted.²⁸

According to Anne Soy, [r]ecent weeks have seen a rapid build-up of tension in Khartoum. A hostile takeover of power is what many in Sudan and beyond have feared could happen anytime. The signs have been all too clear. A pro-military sit-in right in front of the presidential palace in Khartoum was seen as choreographed to lead to a coup. No attempt was made to disguise its purpose. The protesters demanded that the military overthrow “failed” civilian leaders. It was an unusual attempt at legitimising a military takeover, using the guise of a popular protest. Nearly a week later, a counter-protest was held. This time, huge crowds came out in support of the civilian government.²⁹

According to Joseph Tucker, “[d]isagreements over power wielded by civilian and military components of Sudan’s government led to this moment. On the surface, the planned leadership transfer of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council – the mixed military and civilian body led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – to civilian control likely increased resistance within the military to cede power, as did calls for accountability and comprehensive security sector reform. However, the splintering of civilian political coalitions, increasing overtures to the military from signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and tensions within the security sector all contributed to a volatile political situation ripe for such an action. The military appears to have seen a need to protect its interests, and more importantly, an opportunity to do so.”³⁰

The relationship between the military, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) and the Sudanese public provides the sobering backdrop for the coup. The armed forces have often played an outsized role in Sudanese politics, and the litany of attempted and successful coups attests to this. The military often projects itself as the defender of the nation, and it appears to be reinforcing this narrative after the takeover.³¹

Citizens’ frustration with political deadlock, impatience with the pace of economic recovery and perceived regional support may have led the military to think its action would at least be tolerated. During a press conference on October 26, al-Burhan bluntly noted that the military took action to get the transition back on track and avoid conflict. He expressed frustration that the military had been excluded from key discussions and unfairly targeted. These suggestions were met with derision and anger among many Sudanese, including those protesting on the streets and among the diaspora. While the military tries to recruit members of what will probably be a controversial new government, a central theme will remain: What role should the military have going forward and how can this be shaped given the coup?³²

But the ease with which the coup was carried out showed the fragility of the Sudanese State especially its lack of conflict or coup-prevention institutional mechanisms. The structure of the Sovereign Council, the highest ruling body, makes it easy for the coup to take place. It is evident that General al-Burhan calls all the shots within and from without the Council. But that is precisely the fundamental character flaw of the Council which has a careered military officer as the supreme head and a deputy in the person of Major General Hamdan Dagalo, the head of the Rapid Support Forces and a man with questionable track record, who can easily kick the Prime Minister in the ass or groin and boot him out of the Presidential Palace – precisely what has happened.

The situation is similar to what happened in Mali earlier in the year when  “the Malian military also struck in its own fashion leading to the arrest, detention and forced resignation of the government led by President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, including the Defence Minister, Souleymane Doucoure on May 24, 2021.”³³ Colonel Assimi Goita, who was the Vice President, accused the President of carrying out a cabinet reshuffle that removed his own supporters from the loop of power. But it was also an act of self-preservation, knowing unmistakably fully well that the President was also coming for him inevitably.

On Sunday September 5, 2021, the elite Special Forces soldiers of the Guinean Army announced that they have toppled the “democratic” government headed by 83-year old President Alpha Conde. Thus, another setback to democratic rule was recorded on the African continent shortly after Chad and Mali followed the same route of coup d’état this year.³⁴ In announcing the take-over, the new head of the military junta, Lt. Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, a former French foreign legionnaire, said on national television that “We have dissolved government and institutions.” “We are going to rewrite a constitution together.”³⁵

Within the week of the military takeover in Sudan, the new military strongman, General al-Burhan, was already calling the shots across the national boundary by relieving six Sudanese ambassadors from their posts, including in Washington and Paris, state TV reported on Wednesday [October 27] –thus showing the whole world who is now in charge of Sudanese State. The decision included Sudan’s ambassadors to the US, EU, France, China, Qatar and the head of Sudan’s mission to Geneva. The West has called for Hamdok’s government to be reinstated immediately, stressing that they only recognize the prime minister and his cabinet as the constitutional leaders of Sudan. The African Union suspended Sudan on Wednesday [October 27] until civilian rule is restored, rejecting the military takeover as an “unconstitutional” seizure of power.³⁶

Also as part of the fallouts from the coup (a week after the coup) a number of high-ranking members of Omar al Bashir’s now-dissolved National Congress party (NCP), including its former leader, Ibrahim Gandour, were released by military authorities as demonstrators continued to take to the streets to protest the military coup. Gandour was arrested in June 2020 for allegedly planning sabotage operations against the government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan state TV reported that Anas Omer, the former East Darfur governor, and former intelligence service communications head Mohamed Hamid Tabidi were also released. Mohamed Ali Al-Jazoli, the leader of the State of Law and Justice party (SLJP), a jihadist group, was also allowed to leave prison.³⁷

After the releases were announced, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan dismissed acting attorney-general Mubarak Osman but gave no reason why. Osman had been working on investigations on the Islamists who were released.³⁸

Demonstrations rocked Omdurman and Khartoum on Sunday [after the coup]. Khartoum has largely been shut down as protesters set up roadblocks. Civil servants are refusing to work and shopkeepers have shuttered businesses. The Sudan Doctors Committee said that the overall toll was 12 dead since the coup started on 25 October. At least three people were shot dead and 100 wounded on Saturday (October 30, 2021) during the protests. The police denied using live rounds but doctors report that dead protesters have bullet wounds in the head, chest and stomach. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces remained on the streets of Khartoum and twin city Omdurman on Monday. The group gained notoriety under al-Bashir for its operations in Darfur. It was also part of the bloody crackdown on a sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum in June 2019.³⁹

A Much-anticipated Coup

According to Africa Confidential, prior to the Coup, a shadowy alliance with links to the ousted Beshir regime is calling for a coup against the transitional government.⁴⁰ Efforts to derail Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s reform agenda and oust the civilian-dominated council of ministers have intensified with a military-backed protest in Khartoum on 16 October. This follows an attempted putsch, seen by many as a rehearsal, on 21 September and weeks of orchestrated disruption at Port Sudan ratcheting up the country’s economic woes.⁴¹ The pro-military demonstrators called on General Abdel Fattah Burhan, commander of the armed forces and current head of the joint civil-military Sovereignty Council, to mount a coup against the civilians in the power-sharing government.⁴²

Their timing is critical. This year, Gen Burhan is due to step down as the military’s chair of the Sovereignty Council to be replaced by a civilian appointee. And the council of ministers is organising an international conference next month to raise funds for its economic reform programme.⁴³ Civilian activists suspect collusion between the organisers of the Khartoum protests, and the security forces. Many of the demonstrators were bussed in from outside the city.⁴⁴ Khartoum’s State Governor Ayman Khalid accused an armed group, apparently with links to the military command, of removing guard rails around key government buildings. Police and other security officers meant to protect civilians in the government were withdrawn on the day of the pro-military protests.⁴⁵

This transfer of power was supposed to have taken place next month [November 2021], thereby completing a temporary arrangement that was supposed to lay the groundwork for democracy in the country. But when Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the Sovereignty Council’s vice chairman, asserted that “we’ll never transfer intelligence and the police to civilian management,” it became clear that an orderly transfer of the council’s leadership wasn’t part of the military’s game plan.⁴⁶

Dagalo’s remarks also revealed a deep disagreement within the army’s ranks between those considered loyal to Bashir – including Dagalo himself – and those loyal to al-Burhan, who decided on Monday to dissolve the government and declare a state of emergency. Al-Burhan was primarily afraid of Dagalo’s forces, which are thought to total around 30,000 soldiers, but also of the independent militias, which waged violent battles until an agreement was reached in October 2020 on a cease-fire and division of the spoils.⁴⁷ That agreement, which was signed in and named after Juba, the capital of South Sudan, was supposed to calm the militias and the tribes that opposed the new government. But it also included the seeds of the civil unrest that broke out last month.⁴⁸

Six days before the coup, Middle East Eye also published an article which raised fear about a likely coup.⁴⁹ But it is very doubtful whether Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and his supporters ever paid sufficient attention to this likelihood even with the failed coup of September 21 which served as a serious warning or harbinger of what is to come later.

Pro-democracy protesters, analysts and politicians in Sudan are worried the recent rise in tensions between military and civilian factions of the transitional government could lead to a power grab by the army, warning of a scenario similar to the 2013 coup in Egypt some three years since the ousting of autocrat Omar al-Bashir.⁵⁰

The Sudanese army, backed by paramilitary groups, is strongly pushing for dissolution of the civilian wing of the government headed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, marking the biggest political crisis in the country’s transition to civilian rule.⁵¹

The situation has heated up since [the previous] Saturday, when thousands of military supporters began a sit-in near the presidential palace, sparking sporadic confrontations between the backers of the army and the civilian authorities amid acute shortages of bread and fuel in the entire country.⁵²  Plans for a pro-civilian march on Thursday also raise the possibility of further escalation in coming days, while sources told Middle East Eye that negotiations have already begun to dissolve – or, at least, significantly reshuffle – the current cabinet.⁵³

Since August 2019 – four months after Bashir was ousted by a mass protest movement against his nearly 30 years of rule – Sudan has been led by the Transitional Sovereign Council, made up of five civilians chosen by the leading organisations of the anti-Bashir movement, five military representatives, and a chairperson alternating between the two factions.⁵⁴

However, the two branches of government have been at odds from the beginning, and a failed coup in September – blamed on Bashir supporters backed by armed forces – has heightened fears that the military is seeking to undo efforts to bring democracy to Sudan. The head of the army and current chairman of the Sovereign Council, Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, called for the dissolution of the civilian government led by Hamdok, arguing that the move would resolve the current political deadlock in the country.⁵⁵

Apprehension has only intensified since Saturday, when thousands of former armed militants and supporters of the army first staged a sit-in around the presidential palace in the capital, calling for the immediate dissolution of the civilian cabinet. The streets of downtown Khartoum near the palace and not far from the Council of Ministers were filled with thousands of former members of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/A) rebel group, whose leader Minni Arko Minnawi is also the current governor of Darfur, and of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) headed by Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim.⁵⁶

While the SLM and JEM once fought against Bashir at the height of the VBNM conflict in Darfur in the 2000s, the rebels now hold the civilian factions responsible for delays in implementing the Juba peace agreement, signed in 2020 between the transitional government and the country’s many warring factions. “We won’t leave this square until this government is dissolved,” former Darfuri rebel Ahmed Al-Mukhtar told MEE. “Those civilians have hijacked the revolution and this is the attitude of a dictatorship in itself. They are saying they are against any potential military coup, but let me tell you that the civilians have committed a coup against the revolution and we are here to address that.”⁵⁷

On the other side of the aisle, the current political civilian coalition – composed of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), resistance committees, unions and other civil society organisations – has called for a “million-man march” on 21 October against the military.  “We will fill these streets to show them our power and our representation of this revolution,” a statement by neighbourhood resistance committees in Khartoum read. “We are willing to die like our brothers who were killed by the same forces that now want to return to power.  “We will show those remnants of the old regime, including the army, how the fight for freedom is rooted amongst our people,” the statement added.⁵⁸

Amid the ongoing power struggle in Khartoum, the army scored another advance as pro-military protesters in eastern Sudan, headed by tribal leader Mohamed al-Amin Tirik, shut down ports and blockaded roads leading to the rest of the country, affecting the supply and distribution of food, bread, fuel and other materials. Deputy chairman of the Beja Congress political group, Shaiba Dirar, said that the port and road closures would continue until the demands of the ethnic Beja group were addressed, notably the cancellation of the sections of the Juba peace agreement pertaining to eastern Sudan.  “Our demands mainly are against the eastern Sudan track in the Juba peace agreement, because it’s unfair and doesn’t represent the real and genuine leaders of eastern Sudan,” Dirar told MEE, arguing that the agreement affected “the security, politics and economy of the entire region”.⁵⁹

Supporters of Hamdok’s cabinet have accused Beja leaders of being manipulated by the army, an allegation that has caused anger among the Bejas.  “Eastern Sudan has very fair demands of equality and a stoppage of the historical marginalisation of our region and people,” Dirar stressed. “We are very frustrated with the civilians who are leading the country now, this is why we believe that the military component in the transitional government has a great role to play now to protect the country and defend its sovereignty and its national unity.”⁶⁰

Western diplomats and sources close to Hamdok have meanwhile disclosed that talks have begun between the two sides to broker a solution to the current crisis.  The sources, who requested anonymity because they were not authorised to talk to the media, revealed that the talks were seeking to negotiate a new power-sharing agreement. “It may not be a direct dissolution of the government or major changes to the constitutional declaration signed in August 2019, but a kind of wide reshuffle that can grant a larger percentage of the power-sharing quota to the rebels and pro-military supporters,” the sources said.⁶¹

A Sudanese scholar at an international think tank told MEE they believed Sudan could witness a setback in its transition through a “soft coup” that would allow some former associates of Bashir to take part in the transitional government.  “It may not be a traditional military coup like the Egyptian and Tunisian scenario, but it has a lot of similarities, and in the end it will change the balance of power in favour of the old regime and the military,” the expert, who asked not to be named, predicted. The academic said many factors were at play in the current power struggle in Sudan – including army generals’ concerns over calls for accountability in the mass killing of protesters on 3 June 2019, as well as their economic and political ties to the former Bashir administration.⁶²

Meanwhile, the 2019 constitutional declaration that had paved the way for Burhan to head the Sovereign Council for 21 months meant the general should have handed over the seat to a civilian representative back in May – a transition that has yet to take place. “We are somehow facing a scenario similar to Bashir’s last years in power, when he wanted to secure a safe exit from being tried by the ICC, so dealing with the military needs some flexibility in terms of opening a narrow door for a way out with some guarantees,” the academic concluded.⁶³

Atlantic Council fellow and former US diplomat Cameron Hudson also believes that Sudanese forces are securing means for themselves to evade accountability. “Is any compromise possible here? The security services must have an exit strategy, they are cornered and fearful of what will happen to them if civilian protesters ultimately get their way,” he told MEE. “We also know that these leaders are not going to walk willingly into the arms of the ICC or into Kobar prison. They must feel that if they relinquish power they will survive in a future Sudan; this will require trade-offs that could be unpopular.”⁶⁴

In recent weeks, there have been concerns that the military might be planning a takeover, and in fact there was a failed coup attempt in September. Tensions only rose from there, as the country fractured along old lines, with more conservative Islamists who want a military government pitted against those who toppled al-Bashir in protests. In recent days, both camps have taken to the street in demonstrations.⁶⁵

Amid the standoff, the generals have called repeatedly for dissolving Hamdok’s transitional government – and Burhan, who leads the ruling Sovereign Council, said frequently that the military would only hand over power to an elected government, an indication that the generals might not stick to the plan to hand leadership of the body to a civilian sometime in November. The council is the ultimate decision maker, though the Hamdok’s government is tasked with running Sudan’s day-to-day affairs.⁶⁶

As part of efforts to resolve the crisis, Jeffrey Feltman, the U.S. special envoy to the Horn of Africa, met with Sudanese officials over the weekend, and a senior Sudanese military official said he tried unsuccessfully during his visit to get the generals to stick to the agreed plan. The arrests began a few hours later, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief media.⁶⁷

In recent weeks, the military has been emboldened in its dispute with civilian leaders by the support of tribal protesters, who blocked the country’s main Red Sea port for weeks. The most two senior military officials, Burhan and his deputy Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also have close ties with Egypt and the wealthy Gulf nations of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.⁶⁸

The first reports of a possible military takeover emerged before dawn, and the Information Ministry later confirmed them hours later, saying Hamdok and several senior government figures had been arrested and their whereabouts were unknown. Internet access was widely disrupted and the country’s state news channel played patriotic traditional music. Hamdok’s office denounced the detentions on Facebook as a “complete coup.” It said his wife was also arrested.⁶⁹

Sudan has suffered other coups since it gained its independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956. Al-Bashir came to power in 1989 in one such takeover, which removed the country’s last elected government.⁷⁰

Among those detained Monday were senior government figures and political leaders, including the information and industry ministers, a media adviser to Hamdok and the governor of the state that includes the capital, according to the senior military official and another official. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to share the information with the media.⁷¹

After news of the arrests spread, the country’s main pro-democracy group and two political parties issued appeals to the Sudanese to take to the streets. The Communist Party called on workers to protest what it described as a “full military coup” orchestrated by Burhan.⁷²

What became apparent was that Sudan has run into a political gridlock even when the Sovereign Council was still in charge. But what caused this gridlock might not unconnected with crisis of governance or administration, again with active involvement of the Sovereign Council in this crisis. Sudan is sharply divided into a binary opposite: those who want military rule and those who want civilian democratic rule. It is apparent that the military would not take orders from the civilian leaders and this inevitably led to breakdown of authority with the consequence of “everybody taking law into their hands” thus returning the State into a kind of Hobbesian state of nature where every man is for himself God for everybody!

It was equally evident that Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is not in any way in control of any vector of State power. He saw the handwritings on the wall but could do nothing to prevent the handwritings from coming into materialization. He could not single-handedly sack General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan but preferring to wait till he was legally replaced by a civilian in accordance with the internal agreement about rotation of the chairmanship of the Sovereign Council between the military and the civilians. Al-Burhan moved first and kicked Hamdok in the ass out of the Presidential Palace. Hamdok could only engage in knee-jerk protests.

What can also be deduced from the events before the coup was that the coup was already afoot despite the pretension to the contrary. There have been maneuvering and counter-maneuvering among the governing elites jockeying for vantage positions or battling for supremacy. The pro-military demonstrators were the first to come out to the streets calling for a coup and/or the dissolution of the Sovereign Council. This could not have taken place without the knowledge of the military high command. It in fact can be accused to have encouraged it to prepare the ground for its eventual strike. The pro-civilian demonstrators were evidently caught napping because they had no premonition of what was looming on the horizon until the pro-military demonstrators came out to the streets. The pro-civilian demonstrators were caught off-side on the “football field”. In short, the military putschists carefully planned the coup, orchestrated it by using the pro-military demonstrators as auxiliary forces and alibi to mount their coup. It is the Western intelligence community that failed to see the coup coming at the time it did. 

Justifying the Military Coup with Specious Arguments

General al-Burhan defended the military takeover of government at the same time double-speaking that the takeover was not a coup but that the Army was [only] trying to rectify the path of the political transition. Burhan says Army ousted the transitional council to avoid civil war but did not show the evidence of this looming civil war.

In an address to the nation on October 25, coup leader Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan justified his actions and reiterated his commitment to “the constitutional path” and the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement with various rebel groups. On the latter front, he called on the last two rebel holdouts – Abdel Wahid al-Nur of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Abdelaziz al-Hilu of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), based in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan – to fully join the peace process and help usher in “a new Sudan…of freedom, peace and justice.” Burhan, who was previously the country’s de facto head of state before spearheading the coup, sought to portray the military’s action as a “correction” to the transitional process, emphasizing that the revolution was in danger and pledging to appoint a technocratic government that will guide the country to democratic elections in July 2023. Yet the essential question to be decided on the streets of Sudan in the coming days is clear: will the military solidify its rule enough to make and unmake governments for the long term, or will its power decrease in accordance with the framework guiding the post-Bashir democratic transition?⁷³

While speaking at the first news conference after the announced takeover, General al-Burhan accused politicians of incitement against the armed forces as if the armed forces are a sacred cow that cannot be blamed. “Burhan is trying to craft a narrative that posits the military as the savior of an ineffectual and divided civilian government. On Monday he claimed that he only wants the military to hold power until democratic elections can be held in July 2023. This is a lie. The goal here is for the military to retain power in perpetuity”.⁷⁴

While devastating, there is nothing surprising in Monday’s developments. Opponents of democracy in Sudan’s military and security services have been trying to thwart Sudan’s transition since it began. There have already been several attempted coups, with the latest foiled by Hamdok’s government just last month [September 21]⁷⁵ “The whole country was deadlocked due to political rivalries,” Gen. Burhan said on Tuesday. “The experience during the past two years has proven that the participation of political forces in the transitional period is flawed and stirs up strife.”⁷⁶

However, shortly after Gen. Burhan spoke, Mr. Hamdok’s office issued a statement, voicing concerns about the safety of the premier and other detained officials. It did not say where the politician was being held. The statement accused the military leaders of acting in concert with Islamists, who have argued for a military government, and other politicians linked to al-Bashir’s National Congress Party, which was dissolved in 2019. Mariam al-Mahdi, the Foreign Minister in the government that the military dissolved, was defiant on Tuesday, declaring that she and other members of Mr. Hamdok’s administration remained the legitimate authority in Sudan. “We are still in our positions. We reject such coup and such unconstitutional measures,” she said. “We will continue our peaceful disobedience and resistance.”⁷⁷

Western governments and the UN have condemned the coup and called for the release of Mr. Hamdok and other senior officials. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration announced the suspension of $700 million in emergency assistance to Sudan.⁷⁸

Middle East Eye has noted five strange contradictions in Burhan’s speech at the first press conference which “have raised eyebrows amongst those who have been watching events unfold in Sudan”.⁷⁹

1. ‘This is not a coup,’ says coup leader: Burhan, the leader of the army who on Monday dissolved the government and the Sovereign Council in charge of the country’s transition to democracy since 2019, denied in his speech that the operation carried out by the military constituted a coup.  Instead, he chose to describe the move as an attempt to “rectify the path” to democratic transition by taking matters into the armed forces’ own hands. Civilian leadership in Sudan – as well as swathes of the international community – have strongly denounced the move as a coup. Army forces raided television and radio headquarters and shut down the internet in Sudan, a textbook approach for a putsch – while Burhan vowed that the internet would be restored “in phases”.⁸⁰
2. Premier not kidnapped, but ‘at my home’: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and five ministers and civilian members of the country’s ruling council were disappeared in the early hours of Monday. But according to Burhan, there is nothing concerning about that.  “Yes, we arrested ministers and politicians, but not all,” he said in the news conference in Khartoum, claiming that all detained officials would have access to due process. Burhan went on to say that Hamdok was “at my home” and “in good health”, adding that the arrest of a sitting prime minister in the middle of the night was “for his own good”. It remained unclear whether Hamdok was indeed being held in the general’s home. Although the premier’s statement from detention on Monday, calling the moves by the military a “complete coup d’état”, cast doubts that Burhan was hosting the politician over for tea. The international community has, meanwhile, called for Hamdok’s immediate release.⁸⁹
3. An army takeover against ‘racism’: Burhan insisted that the coup had to be done to avoid a civil war ignited by a “racist and sectarian” political class, arguing that the seizure of state powers was meant to fulfil the people’s demands and revive the 2019 revolution that toppled longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir. Burhan stressed that telephone and internet networks were shut across the country due to worries about “misinformation and racist behaviour online”. While the military has sought in recent weeks to ratchet up animosity against the civilian leadership among rebel groups across the country, thousands of protesters have taken to the streets since Monday to denounce the coup, chanting one of the slogans of the 2019 uprising: “Freedom, peace and justice.” Patchy internet access has also meant that footage of violent repression against demonstrators – which is reported to have killed several people – has come out of the country in fits and starts.⁹⁰
4. It’s not political: Despite dissolving the country’s political bodies, Burhan said that the decision to seize power was “a national duty, not an agenda”. He vouched that by Wednesday, a new, technocratic governmental structure would be in place to replace the Sovereign Council and that the military would lead the country until elections set for July 2023 – a year later than initially scheduled. However, recent history casts doubts on Burhan’s willingness to follow a timeline. Under a 2019 power-sharing agreement with the civilian leadership, Burhan was supposed to serve as head of state for 21 months before handing over the seat to a civilian representative. The military leader was due to pass the baton in May, but instead held on to the position.⁹¹
5. Coup seeks atypical politicians: Eager to prove his magnanimity, Burhan said he was open to civilian rule – as long as those leaders wanted to collaborate with the military and were not “typical” politicians.  He vowed that the new legislature would include young people from the revolution and would respect democratic principles. “The armed forces will continue completing the democratic transition until the handover of the country’s leadership to a civilian, elected government,” Burhan said. It remains to be seen whether members of Sudan’s popular pro-democracy movement will decide to join forces with the military. But for now, it certainly does not look like any are buying it.^{92, 93}

It is interesting to note that al-Burhan did not state specifically what are his goals apart from the specious arguments mounted as raison de’tre for the coup. He did not state how he is going to tackle the economic problems facing Sudan even though he did not repudiate any of the existing agreements reached with the multilateral financial institutions and country donors. Nothing can be inferred from all his initial statements that can be interpreted to mean his ideas about the Sudanese State as an “engineering vehicle” or “solution provider” to the whole gamut of contemporary or epochal crisis facing Sudan. Rather, it can be deduced that he see the State as a mercantilist or transactional machine to protect the narrow interests of the military faction that is not interested in democratic rule at all.

The military takeover has effectively and inevitably brought the Sudan’s transition to democracy to a grinding halt despite the assurances by General al-Burhan. The $700 million promised by the United States has been suspended pending the resolution of the crisis. And if the crisis remains unresolved for a long time, there is likelihood that the money will be completely withdrawn and it is very unlikely that any Middle East country or Russia or China will give out such a huge sum for installation of democratic rule.

With all the contradictions clearly thrown up by the coup, nobody can be sure of how they will be resolved. It is, of course, Either-Or. If the military finally gains the upper hand, the contradictions will be “resolved” in its own way by deploying brute force. On the other hand, if the civilians were restored back to power, a very unlikely event, they will have a hard time resolving those contradictions because the military Junkers will resist very stoutly.

Unresolved Contradictions

Indeed something grave must have gone wrong within the Sovereign Council to have not only caused the coup but for the new helmsman, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, not to want to have anything to do with the overthrown Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. This is evident by al-Burhan’s promise to appoint a new “technocratic” Prime Minister as reported by Arab Weekly on October 29, 2021. Bowing down to appoint a “technocratic” Prime Minister is evident of the fact that al-Burhan may not have the expertise knowledge to administer the daily affairs of the State especially the knowledge required to pull the Sudanese economy out of the woods it has been for decades.

According to Arab Weekly, “[a]s international pressure mounted on military rulers to restore a civilian government, Abdel-Fattah Burhan who seized power in a coup this week said the military he heads will appoint a technocratic prime minister to rule alongside it within a week. In an interview with Russia’s state-owned Sputnik news agency published Friday, Burhan said the new premier will form a cabinet that will share leadership of the country with the armed forces. “We have a patriotic duty to lead the people and help them in the transition period until elections are held,” Burhan said in the interview.⁹⁴

The army chief said that he had installed himself as head of a military council that will rule Sudan until elections in July 2023. The United States and United Nations dialled up the pressure on Sudan’s new military junta as confrontations between soldiers and anti-coup protesters took the death toll to at least 11. After the 15-member U.N. Security Council called for the restoration of Sudan’s civilian-led government, US President Joe Biden said his nation like others stood with the demonstrators. “Together, our message to Sudan’s military authorities is overwhelming and clear: the Sudanese people must be allowed to protest peacefully and the civilian-led transitional government must be restored,” he said in a statement. “The events of recent days are a grave setback, but the United States will continue to stand with the people of Sudan and their non-violent struggle,” said Biden, whose government has frozen aid.⁹⁵

On Thursday night, Burhan said in a speech to groups who helped remove dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019 that consultations were underway to select a prime minister. He said that the army is negotiating with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok of the now dissolved transitional council to form the new government. “Until this night, we were sending him people and telling him … complete the path with us, until this meeting with you, we were sending him people to negotiate with him and we are still having hope,” Burhan said. “We told him that we cleaned the stage for you … he is free to form the government, we will not intervene in the government formation, anyone he will bring, we will not intervene at all”.⁹⁶

Sudan is in the midst of a deep economic crisis with record inflation and shortages of basics. Improvement relies on aid that Western donors say will end unless the coup is reversed. More than half the population is in poverty and child malnutrition stands at 38%, according to the United Nations.⁹⁷

Burhan’s move reasserted the army’s dominant role in Sudan since independence in 1956, after weeks of friction between the military and civilians over issues including whether to hand Bashir and others to The Hague to face charges of war crimes. Burhan has said he acted to prevent civil war and has promised elections in July 2023 [but with an added revelation that the military struck with the approval from Kremlin]. Western envoys had warned Burhan that assistance, including a now frozen $700 million in US aid and $2 billion from the World Bank, would cease if he took power. Sources said he ignored those warnings under pressure from inside the military and with a “green light” from Russia.⁹⁸

Aftermath the coup Sudan appeared to be at a stalemate between the putschists and the overthrown civilian leaders.  There seems to be no assertive central authority as the orders from the military putschists are being ignored while the civilian leaders are not in position to issue orders or counter-orders.

On the other hand, Abdalla Hamdok said he is ready to negotiate on the formation of a new government on condition that the military reverses its coup and releases detainees, sources who met with him said on Friday. Coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had appeared to leave the door open for Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to lead a new government in comments broadcast on Thursday, saying he would be free to form the cabinet of his choice. The sources who met Hamdok said he wants dialogue but on condition the situation be returned to the way it was on the eve of Monday’s coup, which derailed Sudan’s transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.⁹⁹

The conflicting positions point to the difficulty of reaching any mediated way out of the crisis: the army told mediators it would only release detainees who were not facing criminal charges, the sources said, echoing remarks by Burhan this week. Western states have cut off hundreds of millions of dollars in desperately needed aid to Sudan since Burhan dissolved Hamdok’s cabinet and soldiers rounded up government ministers on Monday, demanding the civilian-led cabinet be reinstated. Opponents of the coup have called for mass protests on Saturday under the slogan “Leave!” At least 11 protesters have been killed in clashes with security forces so far this week, and residents say they fear a full-blown crackdown. “I am scared that this country will catch fire. We’re scared these people will kill our children. There’s been enough death,” said a Khartoum woman in her 70s on condition of anonymity.¹⁰⁰

A senior U.S. State Department official said the protests would be a test of the military’s intentions going forward and urged the army to refrain from any violence towards protesters. Washington was relieved to see that Hamdok has been allowed to return home but he was still under house arrest and unable to resume his work, said the official, who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity. Several mediation efforts emerged on Friday, including one by neighbouring Egypt, but there has been no sign of progress. In Khartoum, a committee of national figures has been formed to mediate and has met with the army and civilians, a member told Reuters. But a Western diplomat said it would be difficult for the public to accept a compromise that returns to the pre-coup status quo. “It may be the reasonable way out, maybe even the only way out that doesn’t involve a higher level of violence. But would it last and would it be accepted? My personal thought is no on both counts.” A European diplomat also said that Western states are not looking to engage with the military or mediate any negotiations until detainees are released and the military shows a commitment to power sharing as set out in the transitional constitutional declaration.¹⁰¹

This is because the military commanders, despite all their efforts, are still not yet in control of the populace as their orders are not being obeyed. Sudanese protesters continue to barricade the roads in the capital, Khartoum, even after three more people were killed on Saturday when security forces opened fire and shot tear gas to disperse the protesters in the nearby city of Omdurman. Saturday saw the biggest demonstrations yet, with tens of thousands marching across the country with Sudanese flags and chanting, “No to military rule!” “These protests are going to continue being peaceful even when faced with the guns,” Shaheen al Shaheef, a member of the Khartoum Resistance Committee, told the BBC.¹⁰²

What may again be deduced from the above scenario is that all sides to the conflict do not seem have a firm handle on what they want precisely. While there were visible partings of the ways among the power blocs, unfortunately however, none of the power blocs knows precisely what it want to achieve with its ideological position. Each bloc did not seem to premise its position on a cogent body of reasons for taking their particular individual ideological position. There was only visible scrambling for positions of authority. This is why the military junta is willing to go into negotiation with the very clique that it overthrew – because the military junta does not seem to know precisely what it want. The only exception is that al-Burhan and his co-travelers wanted power at all cost and this preclude democratic rule. On the other hand, Abdalla Hamdok is also willing to enter into negotiation with its avowed enemy on the pre-condition that it revert back to the status quo ante that has led to the conflict and parting of ways in form of the coup in the first place.

The understanding of the nuanced epistemological scenario in this situation of conflict is hard to grasp – if viewed from the positions of the parties involved in the conflict. The situation conveys the impression of rascally children at play – rascally children that are willing to start riot like adult fans in a soccer game when the game is not visibly in their favour. One way of understanding the scenario is to anchor analysis on the confusion that Sudan has plunged itself into in the quest for resolution of this epochal crisis confronting the Sudanese State.

Analysts should find the answer to the question why al-Burhan was willing to enter into negotiation with the overthrown Prime Minister (Abdalla Hamdok) to search for and appoint a new “technocratic” Prime Minister – whatever is meant by this. This is part of the unresolved contradictions involved in this coup. Analysts may, therefore, have to confront and reconsider why the military struck and disbanded the Sovereign Council in the first place other than the reasons that have largely been peddled publicly.

Offshore condemnation

The new military junta did not most probably bargain for the votaries of international condemnation that trailed the coup at all. It perhaps thought that after a few conventional words of condemnation and after few days, the international community would stop bothering the junta. Although the international community is visibly divided on how to view the coup, it still did not stop the gale of condemnation. The Western countries were visibly outraged by the coup, were strong in their words of condemnation and were adamant in their demands for restoration of the status quo in Sudan – i.e. a return to the pre-coup political arrangement. The Middle East countries have been largely reticent in their condemnations ostensibly because they are in moral support for the coup. They demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that they care less about what happens to the Sudanese as a result of this coup. Russia and China, probably including Iran and Turkey have been largely ambivalent ostensibly they want to avoid being seen to clash with the Western countries. They also demonstrate the same carefree attitude towards the ordinary Sudanese who have to bear the brunt of the coup in the short, medium and long term.

Western countries including some multilateral financial institutions have been more hostile than hitherto anticipated. The vehement opposition to the coup is comparably much unlike that of Chad, Mali and Guinea recently. The military junta can be seen trying futilely to assuage the injured feelings of the international community especially the Western countries. The Western countries can be visibly seen crying more than the bereaved in this case. They are trying to convince the rest of the world that they love the Sudanese more than they love themselves. Why were the Western countries so visibly hostile to the new military junta in Sudan? The answer may probably be found in the regional strategic position of Sudan which the coup has perceptibly upset. This will be discussed in the next section below.

World leaders have reacted with alarm to the military’s move.¹⁰³ The UK’s special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Robert Fairweather, tweeted that military arrests of civilian leaders was “a betrayal of the revolution, the transition and the Sudanese people”.¹⁰⁴

The African Union, of which Sudan is a member, said it had learned with “deep dismay” of the situation, and called for the “strict respect of human rights”.¹⁰⁵

The US has rejected the military’s actions and said those under house arrest must be released, White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre said. “I condemn the ongoing military coup in Sudan… The UN will continue to stand with the people of Sudan,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres tweeted.¹⁰⁶ The EU and Arab League have also expressed deep concern.¹⁰⁷

US President Joe Biden demanded that Sudan’s military immediately restore the nation to civilian rule, joining European and UN calls for an end to violence against peaceful demonstrators and the release of detainees. “Our message to Sudan’s military authorities is overwhelming and clear: the Sudanese people must be allowed to protest peacefully and the civilian-led transitional government must be restored,” Biden said in a statement published by the White House. “The events of recent days are a grave setback,” the president said, referring to the military coup earlier this week that plunged the poverty-stricken African country into chaos, “but the United States will continue to stand with the people of Sudan.”¹⁰⁸

Washington joined world powers, the UN Security Council, the African Union and Arab League in what Biden said was an “international chorus” of condemnation of the military takeover. “I urge Sudan’s military leaders to immediately release all those detained and restore the institutions associated with the transitional government,” Biden said. “Freedom, equality, government under rule of law, and respect for human rights must be the foundation for future security and prosperity in Sudan, just as they are all around the world,” he added.¹⁰⁹

Sudan has been on edge since a failed coup plot last month unleashed bitter recriminations between military and civilian groups meant to be sharing power following the toppling of the country’s longtime leader Omar al-Bashir two years ago. The coup also comes just weeks before the military was supposed to hand the leadership of the council that runs the country over to civilians.¹¹⁰

The Sudanese military’s takeover of the transitional government will have lasting consequences on relations with the United States and it should reverse course immediately, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Menendez said. “The Sudanese military’s takeover of the state apparatus is completely unacceptable and will have long-lasting consequences with respect to US- Sudanese relations,” said Menendez, who called for the immediate release of government officials.¹¹¹

Britain said the military coup in Sudan was an unacceptable betrayal of the Sudanese people and called on security forces there to release the country’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. “Today’s military coup in Sudan is an unacceptable betrayal of the Sudanese people and their democratic transition. Security forces must release PM Hamdok and other civilian leaders, and those who do not respect right to protest without fear of violence will be held to account,” Britain’s Africa minister Vicky Ford said on Twitter.¹¹²

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said in a statement that the right of peaceful protest must be respected, and violence and bloodshed avoided at all cost in Sudan. “The actions of the military represent a betrayal of the revolution, the transition, and the legitimate requests of the Sudanese people for peace, justice and economic development,” he said. “We call on the security forces to immediately release those they have unlawfully detained,” Borrell said.¹¹³

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for the immediate release of Sudan’s prime minister and all other officials after the Sudan military seized power in the nation. “I condemn the ongoing military coup in Sudan. Prime Minister Hamdok & all other officials must be released immediately. There must be full respect for the constitutional charter to protect the hard-won political transition. The UN will continue to stand with the people of Sudan,” Guterres wrote on Twitter.¹¹⁴

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) strongly condemns the military coup in Sudan, which took place in the early hours of October 25, 2021.  The Endowment is deeply troubled by and rejects the detention of Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian transitional authorities, excessive use of force against peaceful protestors, and the disruption of the country’s communications infrastructure.¹¹⁵

“Sudan’s historic democratic transition must not be derailed,” said NED President & CEO Damon Wilson. “The December Revolution was driven by a powerful grassroots citizen movement opposed to decades of repression, violence, and corruption. NED stands with the peaceful protestors who demand a civilian-led democratic transition in Sudan that respects freedom, peace, and justice.”¹¹⁶

The National Endowment for Democracy urges the Sudanese military to: immediately release Prime Minister Hamdok and all detained ministers, government officials, and civilian political and civil society leaders; respect freedom of speech and assembly; respect peaceful demonstrations; and restore communications.¹¹⁷

“NED was honored to recognize the civil society groups, leaders, activists, and the Sudanese people who led the December Revolution bringing forward a democratic transition with its 2020 Democracy Award,” said Wilson. “NED will continue to support our Sudanese partners, the Sudanese people, and their democratic leaders as they bravely resist this coup and continue their struggle for a legitimate democratic government in Sudan.”¹¹⁸

The intervention and mediation of the United States in the brewing crisis in Sudan has not yielded the expected results. Shortly after the US Envoy, Jeffrey Feltman, left the Presidential Palace in Khartoum, al-Burhan and his co-commanders struck by kicking out the civilian leaders and dissolving the Sovereign Council.  This is like throwing ice-cold or hot water on the face of the United States. It is akin to a dirty slap on the cheek! Jeffrey Feltman was hardly in Doha when the news broke that a coup has taken place in Khartoum where he has just left few hours back. His shuttle diplomacy has failed. But worst of all was the fact that neither the envoy himself nor the intelligence services back home in Washington (especially the CIA) probably have an idea that a coup was already behind the close door while the envoy was mediating among the warring factions in the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. The CIA including the State Department probably underestimates the high tension level already reached as a result of the irreconcilable disagreements among the warring factions.

The U.S. has been trying to help Sudan emerge from decades of a brutal regime that was accused of genocide and terrorism. [T]he U.S. envoy for the region thought he was making progress in keeping a transitional government on track. But Sudanese generals had other ideas and launched a military coup just as he left.¹¹⁹

The October coup can only be understood in a broad historical context. Omar al-Bashir authoritarian regime of nearly 30 years has deeply and badly split Sudanese society into irreconcilable camps and/or factions. Broadly, there are two main camps: those who still support the Old Guard (the military and/or remnants of Omar al-Bashir regime) on the one hand and those who want total end to military rule in whatever guise in favour of democratic rule. The pro-democracy supporters temporarily gained the upper hand in early 2019 when there was a spontaneous revolutionary upheaval that led to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir regime in April 2019. The military then reluctantly moved against Omar al-Bashir in order to safeguard the overall interests of the Sudanese Military with the active support of certain Middle East countries. Omar al-Bashir, despite his powerful position as the President of the country, was made a sacrificial lamb in order to dampen the kinetic revolutionary fervor of the time.

A transitional military council was set up consisting of equal number of military and civilian leaders – thus reflecting the balance of forces prevailing at the time. But it did not take long before the military showed its brutal fangs with which it sought to tear apart the revolutionary flag. In early June 2019, less than two months after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, the military launched attack on the civilian pro-democracy supporters who were still on the streets trying to keep the flame of the revolution alive. Over hundred protesters were killed in cold blood by forces affiliated with Rapid Support Forces headed by Major General Hamdan Dagalo aka “Hemedti”.

Thus, it is generally correct to regard the overall protest that overthrew Omar al-Bashir as a revolution that erupted spontaneously in revolt against the repressive and authoritarian regime of Omar al-Bashir. The current protests against the al-Burhan-led military junta are a continuation of the previous spirit of protest against Omar al-Bashir in an unbroken chain.

The Geopolitical Context

It would be wrong to assume that the coup occurred happenstance, by coming like a thunderbolt from out of the deep blue sky of Sudan. No. The coup came as a product of confluence of factors and interplays of forces from within Sudan itself and from without which include regional and global.

The whole geopolitical environment has become an inducement for the coup itself, ranging from the unending internal crisis with Sudan itself which serve as the primary factor, to the crisis already raging in Ethiopia (including the Ethiopian-Trigayan conflict), South Sudan with its own authoritarian regime and Eritrea also with its own authoritarian regime. Libya is yet to attain internal stability that can serve as a discouragement to such a coup in Sudan not to talk of military coups that have taken place in Chad and Mali in April and May this year alone including the coup in Guinea in early September. 

Apart from the above, there are equally several visible power blocs at play in the Sudan crisis, as already mentioned above. Special investigation of these power blocs is probably required to unravel the tenor of relationship between the various external power blocs and the internal Sudan power blocs, and the strategic issues involved or at stake.

The first power bloc is the group of Middle East countries mainly consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates that ostensibly abjure the possibility of democratic rule in Sudan come 2023 or any other time. These countries can be seen making overt and covert efforts to steer Sudan away from the possibility of democratic rule. Evidence of this can be deduced from the lack of wholesale condemnation of the coup. Alongside the Middle East countries are also Iran, Turkey and Qatar with their different or similar agendas. The second power bloc is Russia and China – again with their individual agendas which are not easily decipherable but rooted in their foreign policy thrust of global power projection mainly against the West. The third power bloc is the immediate neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa that have one or other issue to settle with Sudan – this includes Ethiopia, South Sudan and Eritrea. The fourth bloc is the Africa Union with its hazy idea or notion of what it want Sudan to be as a member of the African Union. The final bloc is the United States and its Western European allies that are generally in agreement of the necessity of establishing democratic rule in Sudan that probably best protect their strategic interests in the country and the Horn of Africa in general. 

However, it is rather difficult to define and determine the relative strength of these power blocs and their involvement in the current face-offs in Sudan. Their relative strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and their successes or failures are dependent on contingent variables and/or balance of forces on ground.  But the situation looks more like a bitter struggle between the Middle East countries and the United States and its Western European allies. The role of other blocs seems relatively weak in comparison with the two major blocs already mentioned. What this ideological face-off is telling us in this strategic scenario is that there are no permanent friends but permanent interests in modern statecraft.

David Hearst, co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye, may already have a premonition of what was to happen on October 25, 2021, when he wrote as far back as May 2019 shortly after Omar al-Bashir was overthrown. “There are obvious dangers to turning the Sudanese revolution into a proxy struggle between the Saudis and Emiratis supporting the generals and secular forces, with Turkey and Qatar backing the Islamists.”¹²⁰

It will be up to those banging the rails on that railway bridge and refusing to move from the centre of Khartoum to avoid it. Sudan has had its fair share of coups and civil wars. Islamists brought Bashir to power and then one faction regretted it. The same happened with the Communists. Dictators serve only themselves. This time, it is up to the protest movement to ensure that a genuinely representative democracy is established in the name of all trends and factions of the Sudanese people. To exclude one is to put the replay of the past on a never-ending loop. Otherwise they will be following the same script that was used to such effect in Egypt. Exactly the same could happen in Sudan. The next Sisi or Haftar of Sudan is already primed, ready and waiting.¹²¹

Ismail Numan Telci, an Associate Professor at Sakarya University and deputy director at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), was of the view that “[w]hile domestic factors have a major impact on the process, there are also a number of international dynamics regarding the developments in the African country. The developments in a country like Sudan, which is of critical importance not only in African but also global politics, cannot be explained without reference to the international dimension. In fact, Sudan has a key position in the rivalry between the United States and China, the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia, the rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the struggle for influence between Britain and Russia. Therefore, U.S. support and the regional interactions of Sudan with countries like Egypt and Israel, who are among Washington’s allies in the region, might have played a role in the recent military takeover.¹²²

In this context, it is clear that military cadres in Sudan are in close contact with regional actors, particularly those attuned to U.S. foreign policy. While al-Burhan held meetings with the leaders of the UAE and Egypt, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s visit to Israel in early October [2020] was critical. It was also reported on Nov. 1 that an Israeli delegation also paid a visit to Sudan in order to meet with Dagalo. When these dynamics are considered on an international scale, one could argue that the U.S. tried to convey positive messages to the military actors in Sudan, especially through its regional allies, and that it aims to prevent Khartoum from getting closer to Moscow and Beijing, both of whose influence is increasing in the country.¹²³

In fact, hours before the decision to seize control, the U.S. special envoy to the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltman, arrived at Khartoum and had a meeting with al-Burhan.¹²⁴ The main motivation for the U.S. in this regard was increasing concern about the rising influence of Russia and China in Sudan. Indeed, it was claimed that the U.S. was seriously disturbed by Moscow’s agreement with the military administration in Sudan, and offered large-scale financial and military aid to Khartoum in order to cancel that agreement. The agreement was giving Russia the opportunity to increase its military presence in Sudan and to establish a military base on the Red Sea, thereby arousing serious concerns for not only the U.S. but also other regional actors. However, it can be seen that these concerns are still in place – in a recent interview with a Russian news agency, Al Burhan stressed that the military leadership would approve the Russian naval base plans.¹²⁵

Another dimension of the U.S. involvement in the Sudanese process might be related to China. In this sense, it was of great importance for Washington to render Port Sudan dysfunctional, which was considered by China to be an important location on its Belt and Road Initiative, as one of the entry ports for Africa. Such a developed port in Sudan would also disturb regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although the UAE has partnerships with China, it would not favor another strategic port in the region because of its potential to negatively affect the Jebel Ali Port in Dubai, an important transit point for trade from China to Africa.¹²⁶

It can be observed that Russia and China were seriously disturbed by the developments in Sudan. While they implicitly criticize the U.S., Bejing and Moscow also preferred to make statements that would not disturb Khartoum. In order to show their balanced position, Russia and China vetoed the draft resolution against the military coup in Sudan at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and ensured that the statement was written in more general terms. It is clear that both countries would not like to risk their political, military and economic investments in Sudan and the Red Sea region. Such actions are indications that the two countries will try to remain relevant in the fight for influence in Sudan.¹²⁷

A final actor to mention in this equation is Turkey. It is clear that a recent change had been observed in Sudan’s approach to Turkey. While the first indicator of change was the visit of Dagalo to Ankara in May, the positive relations between the two countries developed further with the arrival of al-Burhan to Turkey in August. One could argue that Sudanese authorities are likely to accept Turkey as a crucial actor. It is also likely that a constructive approach by Ankara toward the developments in Khartoum will be welcomed by political or military actors in the country.¹²⁸

This situation also hints that Turkey’s position in Sudan is somehow attuned to that of the U.S., the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. The careful language in Ankara’s statements after the developments shows its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in Sudan in particular, and in Africa in general. At this point, the Washington administration, which aims to balance China and Russia in the region, does not seem to have a rational option other than cooperating with Turkey, whose influence and power are increasing at the expense of France, whose influence is rapidly decreasing in Africa.¹²⁹

As for the Western countries expressing shock and dismay at the upheaval in Sudan, Rama [Yade Director of the Africa Center of the Atlantic Council] recommends they look in the mirror, considering the strictures that came with Sudan’s International Monetary Fund loans in recent years. “On the economic front, they should perhaps have supported this government rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup,” she [says].¹³⁰ 

The military’s power grab will reverberate far beyond Sudan, Will [Wechsler, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs of the Atlantic Council] says. Most regional powers “with interests in Sudan have never fully shared Washington’s commitment to a democratic transition,” he notes, and “some neighbors will undoubtedly quietly welcome the coup and its supposed promise of greater stability” in a country that has now suffered some sixteen coup attempts since 1956.¹³¹ It also throws into question the country’s much-vaunted normalization with Israel, Will adds. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari met with Israeli officials on the margins of N7 Conference earlier this month, “the first multilateral gathering between Israel and the six Arab states that have announced normalizations,” Will point out.¹³²

[On January 25, 2021] Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen led a delegation to Khartoum, months after Sudan and the Jewish state struck a deal to normalise ties. “I am confident this visit lays the foundations for much important collaboration that will assist both Israel and Sudan as well as security stability in the region,” Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen said in a statement after returning home.¹³³

The visit marked the first time an Israeli minister headed a delegation to the Arab-African state, Cohen’s office said. Sudanese state media did not report the visit. The Israeli intelligence ministry said members of the delegation met head of state General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Defence Minister Yassin Ibrahim for talks on “diplomatic, security and economic issues.” “A first-ever memorandum on these topics was signed between the Sudanese defence minister and Cohen,” it said.¹³⁴

The sides also discussed “deepening intelligence cooperation.” “The Sudanese authorities briefed the Israeli delegation on their progress on cancelling the law boycotting Israel, and amending the law imprisoning Sudanese migrants, including to Israel, who return to Sudan,” the ministry added.¹³⁵

Sudan agreed to normalise ties with Israel in October last year and an Israeli delegation visited Khartoum the following month. On January 6, Sudan signed the “Abraham Accords” normalising ties with Israel, making it the third Arab country to do so after the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain last year. Morocco also normalised its ties with Israel in December. Khartoum signed the accords less than a month after Washington removed it from its “state sponsors of terrorism” blacklist as part of a quid pro quo.¹³⁶

But protests against normalisation have continued in Sudan. On January 17, dozens of protesters gathered outside the cabinet office in Khartoum and burned the Israeli flag. Until last year, Egypt and Jordan were the only Arab countries to have recognised Israel, in bilateral peace deals struck decades ago. Other Arab governments refused to normalise relations until Israel reached a comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinians and its other neighbours.¹³⁷

According to Joseph Tucker, the coup comes at a time of unprecedented conflict and political crisis in the greater Horn of Africa. Without civilian diplomacy, the military might take on more contentious stances on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the regional feud over Nile water access. The coup also cripples Sudan’s already limited ability to effectively chair the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the regional bloc tasked with confronting regional crises.¹³⁸

The interests of Egypt and Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have undoubtedly impacted the trajectory of the transition, and it is possible Sudan’s military thought that they would turn a blind eye to a takeover. Any financial and diplomatic support from these countries could have played into the military’s calculations and, in the wake of actions such as the U.S. government’s decision to suspend $700 million of assistance and the World Bank doing the same after the coup, may be critical to the country’s strained economy. Further punitive measures are likely being considered by international actors depending on how the situation evolves.¹³⁹

We hear from Sudanese that they have access to little information about how the interests of regional countries may have impacted the situation to date. More transparency is needed about how the region and international community engages with Sudan. So far, many statements by international actors have condemned the coup with boilerplate language and called for a return to the transition, but it is their use of leverage and actions behind the scenes that carry weight. The African Union (AU) is poised to play a significant role in both public and private efforts, and this should be supported by the United States. The AU has already suspended Sudan’s membership following the coup.¹⁴⁰

But Samy Magdy and Isabel Debre were of a view that painted a different picture of General al-Burhan. Magdy and Debre said “[t]he general leading Sudan’s coup has vowed to usher the country to an elected government. But Abdel-Fattah Burhan has powerful allies, including Gulf nations and a feared Sudanese paramilitary commander, and he appears intent on keeping the military firmly in control.”¹⁴¹

Magdy and Debre said “Burhan’s record was relatively clean and he was not indicted by The International Criminal Court like al-Bashir and others for crimes against humanity during the Darfur conflict of the early 2000s. He was a rare non-Islamist among the top generals during al-Bashir’s military-Islamist regime. That helped Sudan emerge from the international pariah status it had under al-Bashir.”¹⁴²

Premising on the promise by al-Burhan that the military will hand over power once a government is elected in July 2023, Magdy and Debre further stated that “[c]ivilian control would not only undermine the military’s political power, but also threaten its extensive financial resources and could lead to prosecutions for rights violations in the past 30 years.”¹⁴³

Burhan has been backed in recent years by Egypt, led by a general-turned-president, and Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates. He trained in Egypt’s military college and has made multiple visits since 2019 to the Emirates’ de-facto ruler, Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.¹⁴⁴

In a sign of the decisive behind-the-scenes role of Gulf countries, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with the foreign minister of regional heavyweight Saudi Arabia about Sudan on Tuesday. A State Department statement said both men condemned the military takeover.¹⁴⁵

On Monday, Egypt and some of the Gulf countries had avoided criticizing the coup, calling instead for calm and dialogue. “There’s a general preference for a strong military leader who is very transactional. That fits Gulf interests more than a democratic government,” said Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. State Department official and Sudan expert at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.  “They’re fearful of what an Arab Spring success story looks like,” he said, referring to the uprisings in 2011 that helped inspire the Sudanese protests.¹⁴⁶

Also standing behind Burhan is another general, one who is more feared: Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, commander of the Rapid Support Forces — a paramilitary unit that grew out of the al-Bashir-backed Janjaweed militias notorious for atrocities and rapes during the Darfur conflict. RSF fighters were prominent in Monday’s coup, taking part in arresting Hamdok and other senior officials and clamping down in the streets. The force is virtually a “de facto parallel army of tens of thousands of battle-tested fighters,” said Suliman Baldo, senior adviser at The Sentry, an investigative and policy group focusing on war crimes in Africa.¹⁴⁷

Burhan has a long connection with Dagalo, who is also known as Hemedti. Burhan was a commander in Darfur, where the military and RSF waged a brutal campaign to crush an insurgency, Baldo said. As many as 300,000 people were killed and 2.7 million were displaced in a campaign of mass rape and abuse. He distanced himself from the atrocities, once telling the BBC, “I am not responsible for any bad actions in Darfur… As far as I’m concerned, I was fighting an enemy just as all regular forces do.”¹⁴⁸

In 2015, Burhan and Dagalo coordinated the deployment of Sudanese troops and RSF fighters to Yemen to fight with the Saudi-led coalition against Iranian-aligned Houthi rebels. Their forces received hefty payments from the Saudis and Emiratis, building those countries’ connections to the two commanders.¹⁴⁹ In the uprising against al-Bashir, Burhan and Dagalo refused orders to violently disperse the protesters and even met with them at their sit-in camp. Behind the scenes, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates encouraged them to push out al-Bashir.¹⁵⁰

But protests continued after al-Bashir’s fall, with demands for the military to give up. On June 2, 2019, security forces and RSF fighters attacked the protesters. More than 100 people were killed, and soldiers raped dozens of women. Prosecutors blamed paramilitary forces, but the bloodshed stained Burhan and Dagalo in the eyes of protesters. “Burhan was responsible because he was the leader, it’s that simple,” said Osman Mirgany, a Khartoum-based columnist and editor of the daily al-Tayar. “He promised not to touch the sit-in and then a massacre occurred. From that point on, people realized he would never keep his promises.”¹⁵¹

For the military’s opponents, that skepticism hangs over Burhan’s promises of civilian rule. Baldo, of the Sentry group, said the general and Dagalo are intent on remaining free from civilian oversight. Moreover, he said, they are “concerned about being held accountable for atrocity crimes committed under their command” — in Darfur and in the 2019 sit-in killings and rapes.¹⁵²

The coup comes as a blow to U.S. strategic interests in northeastern Africa, according to Becky Sullivan. For two years, Sudan had looked to be on the path to democracy — leaving behind decades of violent military dictatorship to become a pocket of stability in the turbulent but strategically important Horn of Africa region.¹⁵³ But Monday’s military coup d’etat has turned that on its head, taking U.S. officials by surprise and sparking fear that a failure of democratic transition there could encourage coups elsewhere and lead to a loss of U.S. influence in the region.¹⁵⁴

The U.S. knew of “tensions” between between the camps, said Jeffrey Feltman, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. Concerns about a military takeover had been expressed in recent weeks, with a failed coup attempt in September. Still, Feltman told NPR, he did not “[see] this coming.”¹⁵⁵

Over three decades, al-Bashir’s brutal Islamist regime was accused of corruption, violence, harboring terrorist groups and stealing billions of dollars. He oversaw the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur at the hands of government-aligned military groups. He was finally toppled two years ago when pro-democracy protests gained enough steam that the military agreed to remove him from power. At that time, Sudan’s military agreed to share power with the leaders of the pro-democracy movement. The agreement called for a transitional government to last through 2022, with Prime Minister Hamdok, a civilian, overseeing a council composed of both civilians and military leadership.¹⁵⁶

Their goals were mutual, they said then — stabilization, improvements to its economy and putting Sudan on a path to democracy, with elections scheduled in 2023. “Sudan has a strategic position bordering seven countries. If we get it right in Sudan, this has an extremely strategic impact and effect in the entire region,” Hamdok told NPR in an interview in late 2019, in which he made the case for greater U.S. support of Sudan. Its removal from the U.S. State Sponsor of Terrorism list in December 2020 opened the country to foreign investment and paved the way for a massive debt relief deal with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.¹⁵⁷

Sudan also agreed to pay U.S. victims of the USS Cole incident and bombings at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, and took steps toward normalizing relations with Israel. Now, much of that progress is in question, as the military leadership tossed out the former agreement and detained civilian leaders in the coup Monday. The military says they still intend to hold the 2023 elections.¹⁵⁸

The coup comes as a blow to U.S. strategic interests in northeastern Africa.¹⁵⁹ Some 30% of the world’s shipping containers travel through the Red Sea each year on the way to and from the Suez Canal, the shortest path from Asia and the Middle East to Europe and the eastern U.S.¹⁶⁰  Sudan, with more than 400 miles of coast, has long represented potential strategic promise to world powers like the U.S., Russia and China — especially as its neighbors in the region, including Ethiopia, have descended into internal warfare and instability. “Today’s coup is both a reflection of the limits of the U.S.’ leverage and its ability to shape outcomes in this region, but also a measure of the rising influence of Russian and Gulf State actors who were never fully supportive of the democratic transition in Sudan,” said Cameron Hudson, who served as the National Security Council’s Director of African Affairs during the Bush administration.¹⁶¹

If elements of the previous regime are able to retake control of the country, Hudson warned, Sudan could “again emerge” as a hub for weapon smuggling and human trafficking.¹⁶²

Geography and even religion may not have even been kind to Sudan. This is why one can argue that there is a kind of conspiracy in this regard in which Sudan is seen to be flatulently unable to manage, control or dominate such a complex environment – a situation akin to the Nigerian scenario. Sudan has had plenty of dictators or authoritarian rulers since early independence years to date which have allowed them to destroy the country but does not seem to have a strong State (with corollary institutions of governance) capable of defending the State against these dictators and to manage its affairs successfully.

Sudan is located precisely at a flashpoint for different world systems or types of politics: where North Africa with its predominant Muslim population and Islamic civilization meet with East and South Africa with their respective mixed-up Christian and traditional religions in a syncretic brew that serves as fillip for tension. Sudan is both part of what is regionally and strategically called the Horn of Africa and abutting to the Gulf of Aden via the Red Sea – a very strategic choke and volatile point for contending global superpowers. Sudan, unfortunately, has not been able to manage this diversity and/or strategic assets of place and people of different temperament and their respective peculiarities or specificities. This is amply demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt when South Sudan with its predominant Christian population broke and bolted away in May 2011 because it could no longer live side-by-side with the shenaniganism of its Muslim counterpart that unfortunately turned its religion into political Islamism. Sudan has been strategically weakened as a result of this fundamental flaw in the character of the Sudanese State making it to lurch from one crisis to another, further falling down the scale of minimum standards and benchmarks required of modern governance and statecraft.

The coup has introduced new power dynamics into the Horn of Africa. Sudan’s position on the ongoing Ethiopian-Tigrayan conflict is a delicate matter of concern. For instance, if the Tigrayan rebel forces should overrun and overthrow the Abiy Ahmed-led government in Addid Ababa, it can be speculated that it will have adverse effect on the strategic position of Sudan. The victory of Tigrayan rebel forces will definitely alter the balance of forces in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden and this will most probably have Sudan thrown into a very weak position. This is why a complete State collapse or failure in Sudan is unthinkable because of its wider ramifications across Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. The scenario is more worrisome in this regard because of Ethiopia that is also tottering on the edge of collapse on account of its own internal crisis.

Western powers indeed since Sudanese independence in 1956 have been trying to steer Sudan on the path of democratic rule but with resounding failure at each critical turning point. Part of this calamitous failure first of all has to do with the political selfishness of Western powers themselves in which their sincerity has been largely suspect or questionable. Another powerful factor is the exclusive fact of religion – in this case, Islam that gradually grew to become politicized in its fundamentalist or extremist variant which predate Omar al-Bashir rule. In this particular case political Islamism rose to its zenith under al-Bashir rule after succumbing to the stupefying influence of Sheik Hassan el-Turabi and his fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Political Islamism is virulently opposed to Western civilization and its idea of democratic rule in preference for theocratic rule of the Islamic State or Caliphate.

Even when the average Sudanese may be argued to have largely rejected political Islamism today because of what has been largely perceived as its venality, political Islamism still pose a major burden and historic obstacle on the path of democratic rule. This situation is highly nuanced even. The current situation has pitted Sudan against the Middle East countries with their monarchies and anti-democratic ideological opposition on the one hand and Western countries on the other side with their avowed declaration for democratic rule, rule of law and respect for fundamental rights of the citizens. 

It is indeed a complex situation as noted by International Crisis Group:  Sudan has gripped the attention of Western, Gulf and African observers who are concerned, among other things, by the prospect of the Sudanese state’s implosion. External actors have had to grapple with a complex crisis, notable for deep schisms between the key actors who will determine the country’s future as well as divisions within the negotiating blocs themselves. Consistent, unified support for Sudan’s political negotiations is necessary to avoid a breakdown of the civilian-military transitional administration on whose shoulders Sudan’s near-term fate now rests. Indeed, without substantial external pressure, it is unlikely that the junta would have acceded to the concessions necessary to arrive at the deal adopted 17 August.¹⁶³

All African militaries – without exceptions – and in the Third World countries in general are not oriented towards serving to protect the citizens in any material particular at all. It is the least of their considerations. They pretend to be practicing democracy to show the world they are also “democratic” but not as a matter of conviction or political culture. Rather, they protect or seek to protect the State as the aggregate sum of the interests of the ruling class or the dominant clique. That is why African militaries are gladly ready to kill their fellow citizens on the street, indeed have done so times without number in order to protect the State machine when challenged by the poor masses of the populace as did by the Sudanese in early 2019 when they rose up finally against the authoritarian regime of Omar al-Bashir. That is what account for the frequent military intervention in government and governance – or when the ruling clique has to be toppled for variety of reasons. Military rule has not brought the much-anticipated development as envisaged by the poor masses of the populace. Rather, social tension has increased to the high heavens cause mainly by conflicts generated by poor governance under military rule. Insecurity, civil wars, political instability, economic crisis, ethnic divisions, etc, have either erupted collectively or individually because of poor governance metrics or ineptitude of military rule despite the often arrogant claims by the military juntas.

In a significant number of African countries, military leaders also transformed themselves into civilian leaders thereby compounding by elongating their authoritarian rule over the decades to the ultimate detriment of the countries concerned. Sudan has not been spared the scourge of authoritarian military rule and all its negative sequels since early independence years till date especially from the time of Jafaar Nimeiri to Omar al-Bashir.

The crisis has run so deep that South Sudan has to break away in May 2011. The Darfour question is still haunting Sudan while ethnic divisions remain unsettled not to talk of crisis of governance and the corollary political instability. When Omar al-Bashir was finally toppled in April 2019, a Sovereign Council was later set up with a timetable of four years for restoration and installation of democratic rule. This was the best that the Sudanese elite could come up with to save Sudan from implosion and collapse. Abdalla Hamdok, a former United Nations chief emerged and was drafted as Prime Minister to help save Sudan from itself: its State prebendalist character, the brutal and venal military Junkers, its messy legacy of inability to manage the economy, its gross inability to manage its own diversity or complexity, etc.

Abdalla Hamdok took office at perhaps the most difficult time, a critical turning-point, in the history of Sudan. He probably may not have been suited for the job of a Prime Minister as this can be argued to be the reason for his poor performance in office despite being praised to the high heavens by the Bretton Woods Institutions and Western media. But he was the personality thrown up by the warring forces in Sudan through negotiation after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir when there was no other visible person to fill the vacuum in the power loop in the Sovereign Council in 2019.

But Sudan has not confronted its sordid past. It rather avoided doing so in the wrong belief that the ghosts of its sordid past would go away by themselves. It has not done any visible self-soul examination. It rather wants to gloss and glide over all the rotten apples or Augean stable lying like a mountain before it. It has not bothered to establish a sort of Truth Commission (like South Africa or Oputa Panel in Nigeria) to confront its unwholesome past. It has not brought to book and ultimately justice all the past military and civilian officials (except Omar al-Bashir that can be seen as a sacrificial lamb) to account for their stewardship suspected or accused to have committed heinous crimes and caused to so much agonies to Sudanese that have brought shame to Sudan, that have literally brought Sudan to its knees in the international community earning it a pariah status, economic doldrums, social insecurity and apprehensions, etc.

Michelle Garvin advised that “External actors with influence in Sudan should remain engaged without unwittingly muddying the waters, and leaders across Sudanese society will have to reckon with difficult truths to find a path that moves the country forward rather than returning it to oppression, isolation, and precipitous economic decline.”¹⁶⁴

But the waters have already been muddied.

Some of Sudan’s realities are as undesirable as they are inescapable. Those with a monopoly on the use of force in Sudan will not simply abandon all of their priorities—particularly their interests in impunity or exclusive, lucrative economic opportunities. They are essentially holding the Sudanese people hostage in order to protect those interests, and dislodging them will require changing their calculations and comfort level. The international pressure applied thus far, including suspension of assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors and the setting aside of debt relief agreements, makes it plain that Sudan as a whole will not sustainably emerge from the economic decline that sparked the revolution if the military has its way. But many odious regimes have found ways to enrich the powerful few while the overall country’s condition deteriorates. Supporters of a democratic Sudan should be ready to deploy more targeted and specific pressures to the individuals most responsible for derailing the transition. Right now, those in power expect their needs and desires to be accommodated in any resolution to the current stalemate. It is past time for a direct expression of the downside risks of their actions.¹⁶⁵

Consequently, the regional Arab governments and Sudanese politicians who support the new military rule will be unmasked in the coming weeks, and as they are, Washington and other parties need to make clear that there are consequences for supporting a rogue regime. Initial public comments from Cairo, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh have been muted. But all of these states will need to balance between their individual agendas for Sudan and their complicated relations with the West.¹⁶⁶

One thing is certain: Sudan will be inherently unstable if its leaders ignore the stated interests of Western governments and the demonstrators who massed on the streets just a week ago. Twice in the country’s recent political history, concerns about such instability have driven unpopular ruling generals to embrace political Islam as a vehicle for some sort of legitimacy. The current military leadership is divided—Burhan may not be in full control, or may have acted in competition with military rivals, while Hemeti has been maintaining a suspiciously low profile since the coup.¹⁶⁷

In any case, the brewing clash will likely follow the model of escalation often practiced by the Bashir regime, of which Burhan and Hemeti were a part before they helped remove it. That is, Khartoum would make some outrageous decision, and the international community would engage it in an effort to make the decision less bad. The usual result was a focus on “process” over actual results, thereby giving the regime vital breathing space time and time again. The Biden administration may face the same potential trap in the next few weeks if the generals dangle the prospect of a substitute civilian puppet government.¹⁶⁸

Prior to the coup, Sudan’s democratic transition was important not only for Africa, which has seen several military coups in 2021, but also for the Middle East, which has been plagued by disappointing democratic transitions in Algeria, Tunisia, and Iraq and outright disasters in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen. In that sense, the crisis for the Sudanese people is also a crisis for American diplomacy. Whatever the Biden administration pushed in Sudan two days before the coup either backfired or, more likely, proved irrelevant to a plot that was already in play while Feltman met with the generals.¹⁶⁹

Washington’s best course of action now is not to waver, but to openly take a hard and clear line against the rule of Sudanese military strongmen (and their civilian enablers once their identity becomes known). Initial steps in that direction have been taken, with the Biden administration suspending bilateral aid and publicly condemning the military. In addition, the generals need to be quietly warned that things could get worse for them if the situation on the ground deteriorates further. The moral way forward—full defense of Sudan’s 2019 democratic revolution and besieged transition—is also the best one for U.S. policy.¹⁷⁰

Moving forward, it is also recommended that regional and international actors address the key priorities of the post-crisis phase in their support of the Sudanese Transitional Government by addressing the root causes of the crisis. These actors should also address the need for economic stabilisation, recovery and improving social service delivery; institute proceedings to investigate human rights abuses committed during the post-coup crisis; build strong and resilient institutions of governance; reform state institutions, including the security sector; and support initiatives to build sustainable peace across the country, including Darfur, especially at a time when the country is ranked as the eighth most fragile state in the world. Having said this, the success and effective delivery of the Sudanese Transitional Government is dependent upon the willingness of South Sudanese to work together harmoniously and constructively engage in the development of their own country. More importantly, the various actors that assisted in different ways to resolve the post-coup crisis in Sudan need to continue to invest efforts towards ensuring that the transitional government delivers its functions and mandate effectively. The Sudanese case presents vital and instructive lessons on how to facilitate and improve the efficacy of regional and international interventions during times of crisis and conflicts in Africa.¹⁷¹

From the above, it can be seen clearly that the Sudanese State has abjectly rendered itself a pawn in the hands of many power blocs, kicked here and there at the expense of Sudan. It has little room to maneuver expose to concede more space to the power blocs in their quest to carve out Sudan into different units of influence. The profundity of the crisis rocking the Sudanese State especially in its foreign policy can be captured in the fact that Sudan has little to offer in return for the interference of so many external power blocs except its soul battered for a pot of porridge. Its oil resource value, for instance, is of little consequence by today’s international measurement standard because Sudan has lost over 70 percent of its oil resource to South Sudan when the latter broke away as an independent sovereign country in May 2011. International oil companies have not return fully to Sudan to continue carrying out exploration for oil. The seeming importance of Sudan is that it is a strategic bridgehead not only in the Horn of Africa but also as an outpost projecting to the Gulf Aden via the Red Sea that is considered one of the strategic chokepoints the world both for the West and East. Red Sea is where all the oil tankers from the oil-producing Middle East countries pass through on daily basis on their way to the world market. Red Sea is an international gateway.  

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (in which Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt and even the United States are involved), is another strategic project that both Western powers (especially the United States) and Middle East countries (especially Egypt) including Ethiopia as the focal point have locked horns in a battle for supremacy not only over the project but by extension the entire region. Ethiopia that is the originator of the project is currently facing its own existential crisis as a result of the Ethiopian-Tigrayan conflict and if the conflict tilts against Ethiopia, the balance of forces and/or power might shift in favor of Sudan. But a military junta that has come into power illegitimately is not been perceived as a reliable partner in the strategic scenario unfolding in the Horn of Africa.

Monday’s military coup in Sudan crippled the nation’s leadership and could have sweeping regional implications, including inflaming already bitter disputes among Sudan’s neighbors, analysts say. “I would say key in today’s considerations really are questions of the ongoing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” said Jonas Horner, a senior analyst and Sudan expert at the International Crisis Group.¹⁷²

The longstanding dispute over Ethiopia’s hydroelectric dam stems from Ethiopia’s insistence on building and filling the dam to help alleviate poverty in the country, and Egypt and Sudan’s opposition to it, Horner said. Egypt favors military rule in Sudan, while Ethiopia will likely back a civilian transition in hopes that the potential for improved relations will move the needle on the dam, Horner told VOA. “Egypt is very keen to see a military dispensation in Sudan because they believe that they will take care of their interests best when it comes to representing Egyptian concerns over the dam,” Horner said.¹⁷³

The coup in Sudan could also affect Ethiopia’s ongoing crisis in the Tigray region, which is spreading and has seen a recent escalation. The Ethiopian government may have cause to worry if the Sudan military remains in power, Horner said. “The concern is that the military, if it is indeed in the ascendancy and there is no mediation from civilians, that they will more robustly perhaps support the Tigrayans as they fight against the central government in Addis Ababa,” he said.¹⁷⁴

The military takeover looks hurried and poorly planned, according to Hudson, and may have dangerous consequences, including street violence, which escalated Monday. “It’s a very dangerous situation, because you have the military trying to assert its control, and now you have people taking to the streets in protest,” he said.¹⁷⁵

Sudan’s neighbors are watching closely, possibly fearing a spillover effect, Horner said. “There are plenty of autocratic governments that are in Sudan’s immediate neighborhood and then even across the Red Sea and elsewhere, too, who will concern themselves with what inspiring effect a successful civilian transition might have to their own populations,” he said.¹⁷⁶

Indeed, the unfolding scenario in the Horn of Africa does not in any way look good at all. The region is in a state of convulsion. The crisis in Ethiopia in which it is now in a battle for its life from the Tigrayan and other assorted rebel groups already matching down on Addis Ababa; the simmering crisis in other countries in the region has raised the regional stakes to the stratosphere. Sudan is an added trouble to the already troubled region. This is partly why the crisis in Sudan must be diffused as quickly as possible so as to prevent it from spreading its negative effects across the region even into the Gulf of Aden. 

Thus the internal situation within Sudan itself, and the hegemonic quest for controlling force in the Horn of Africa are all interwoven or part of the jigsaw puzzle in which several state actors are key players. But in this scenario, the position of Sudan and/or the military junta is relatively weak vis-à-vis other external players. Sudan has boxed itself into position of weakness because it is unable to solve its internal problems and project power. Rather other key players are projecting power unto Sudan, further weakening it and rendering it impotent to solve any problem on its own. Sudan has thus become a pawn on the strategic chess board. 

A Nation at Dagger-drawn with Itself

The Sudanese crisis lay deeply rooted in the fragility of the Sudanese State despite the military authoritarian rule over the decades, showing lack of institutions capable of defending democratic principles and rule – except the masses of the populace which are not institutions. The Sudanese media is also sharply divided. The Sudanese State has long been hijacked and taken out of reach of the inputs of the people capable of sustaining democratic values. Sudanese society has been largely decimated by military rule since the early independence years. The State has not been able to respond to the yearnings of the people. Neither has it been able to solve any specific problem challenging or afflicting it over the years.

Despite the venality and brutality of the Sudanese State, it has also allowed itself to be pushed hither and tither by certain power blocs in Middle East countries that did not want to see democracy established in Sudan but preferred an Islamic State subject to interpretations of fundamentalist ideology and jurisprudence. This was what partly accounted for Sudan’s support for global terrorism especially under Omar al-Bashir military rule and the willingness to harbor Osama bin Laden and his entourage for about five years. 

With every military coup, nothing has changed in the essential character of the Sudanese State especially in its fundamental weaknesses. However, with every coup, the Sudanese State is able to flex its muscles against the populace. The fundamental responsibility of the State to protect its citizens is conveniently discarded, while the willingness to brutalize the populace comes to the fore. The primary responsibility of government anywhere is the security and welfare of the citizens including the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The Sudanese State has failed on the basis of these primary responsibilities. The military and its paramilitary ancillary or auxiliary bodies have become the instrument of inflicting violence and brutality on the populace. The latest coup was no difference. Thus the Sudanese State has to contend with the unwholesome legacy of the past which has become an albatross on its soul.

International Crisis Group noted as far back as 2019 that Sudan faces a crushing economic crisis, insurgencies and political polarization, with a security establishment bent on keeping power and an opposition movement determined to install a fully civilian administration. The 17 August agreement represents the best pathway both to achieving reform and to averting spiraling violence.¹⁷⁷

Sudan has swung between hope and despair since 11 April [2019], when the most sustained civilian protest movement in the country’s modern history swept Omar al-Bashir from power. Many Sudanese celebrated Bashir’s ouster, seeing him as responsible for economic ruin and severe rights abuses. But the generals who sought to placate the demonstrators by deposing Bashir have shown reluctance to cede power.¹⁷⁸

In Sudan’s lopsided, patronage-driven economy, the top brass has a clear interest in clinging to political power.¹⁷⁹ That is just one challenge among many. In addition to being a potential spoiler, the security establishment is fragmented, unaccountable and subject to dangerous internecine rivalries. The once-dominant army has lost its primacy to the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group formed from the remnants of the Janjaweed militia of Darfur infamy and run by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, who may be the most powerful man in Sudan. The country’s primary military and paramilitary organisations should be unified under one command, but that project will require patience and encouragement from outside powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).¹⁸⁰

Then there is the challenge of maintaining the unity of the extraordinarily broad civilian coalition – named the Forces for Freedom and Change – that has been at the vanguard of the uprising. Comprising professional associations, civil society groups, unions, political parties and armed groups, the coalition has had its own internal struggles.¹⁸¹ There are also wars on the country’s periphery – in the Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur regions – that tear at national cohesion.¹⁸²

As the anti-military protests sprouted across the country and calls for civil strike grew louder, a familiar sense of dread and collective fear began to grow. A state-endorsed internet blackout silenced friends and colleagues who were sounding the alarm online.  The last time this happened was in 2019, on the day that followed the massacre of pro-democracy protesters.¹⁸³

At a moment’s notice, the Sudanese community was jolted back to a place of dark desperation. A wound that had barely managed to heal over the past two years feels deeper than ever. Any hope of a successful democratic transition suddenly seems bitterly naive. We have been here before — but so have our parents and grandparents. Since Sudan’s hard-won independence from the British in 1956, its people have seen three revolutions and five military takeovers including the two coup d’états in the last three years.¹⁸⁴

Sovereignty, whether in the face of colonisers or our own despotic rulers, is an ideal that has been fought for and stolen back, time and again.¹⁸⁵ Nearly three years on, little has changed. Petty party politics, continued corruption and routine displays of military violence have littered the so-called “transitional period”. This summer, two teenagers were shot dead by soldiers while commemorating the massacre.¹⁸⁶

Meanwhile, undeterred by the brutality, pro-democracy protesters continue to flood the streets nationwide. Neighborhood roads have been barricaded by local resistance committees since the announcement of the coup. Despite the disconnected internet, calls echo across the country for a mass protest to mirror the hundreds of thousands that marched against the military on October 21. Beyond Sudan, demonstrations have sprung up in Washington DC, London, Toronto and New York. Sudan seems stuck in a cycle of never-ending grief and shoddy politics.¹⁸⁷

Our attempts at self-governance are routinely thwarted by military men being swayed by influence from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Yet these milestones are marking moments for a people that have never stopped fighting for democracy — a community whose experience of resistance and revolt is as ingrained as its pain.¹⁸⁸

Since 2019 not much progress has been made even with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok being praised to the high heavens for taking those policy decisions to pull Sudan out of the woods. For instance, the $700 million has not actually been released to Sudan by the United States. This is probably because the central coordinating electoral body is not yet on ground, for instance, to produce an electoral timetable, begin voters’ registration exercise, etc. Neither has the World Bank released the $2 billion it has earlier promised. Little help has come from the Middle East countries that actually do not want to see Abdalla Hamdok as the Prime Minister especially because of his pro-Western worldviews and/or inclinations. The Russians and the Chinese do not similarly want to see his face that arguably represents Western interests especially those of the multilateral financial institutions and other Western-dominated global condominium.

According to Arab Weekly “[s]upport for Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s transitional government of technocrats has waned, in large part due to economic reforms that have taken a heavy toll on many Sudanese households. Moreover, delays in delivering justice to the families of those killed under Bashir and even during the 2019 protests following his ouster, have left the government open to further criticism. “Foot-dragging by the military on key aspects of the transition … has stunted progress,” said Jonas Horner of the International Crisis Group. “Internal divisions and a dearth of capacity have hurt the civilians’ ability to keep the transition ticking over,” he added. The 2019 accord initially outlined a three-year transition, but that period was reset when Sudan signed a peace deal with an alliance of rebel groups last October. The military and civilian camps only work “in sync sporadically”, Horner said. “The military has effectively retained its power.”¹⁸⁹

More than two years after Sudan’s power-sharing deal was inked, analysts say the role of civilian leaders is receding while the army remains dominant. Sudan’s military ousted and detained long-time autocrat Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 after months of mass protests against his rule. The country’s powerful generals and key civil society factions signed a deal four months later for a civilian government and legislature to spearhead the post-Bashir transition. A “sovereign council” of military and civilian figures would constitute the ruling body. But the legislative assembly has yet to materialize and splits have deepened within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the main civilian alliance which led the anti-Bashir protests.¹⁹⁰

First, there is no way any developing country in crisis such as Sudan would take IMF or World Bank support facilities that they will not come with bitter conditionalities and will not hook its throat like bone. IMF/World Bank facilities are a bitter pill that is hard to swallow. They are often a hemlock. Abdalla Hamdok has signed in to swallow this hemlock on behalf of Sudan and Sudan has been reeling from one economic illness to another with no immediate hope of recovery. IMF/World Bank facilities are often first-aid medicines that kill the patient before the main treatment. Such is the situation with Sudan in the last two and half years of Abdalla Hamdok serving as the Prime Minister. Hamdok has not been able to point to anything positive and concrete as achievement since he took office.

Second is that the wounds viciously inflicted on Sudanese by military rule during Omar al-Bashir have not been attended to at all. This is by far a serious problem. It is a festering issue that refuses to heal. This is a major failure not just on the part of the Prime Minister and the Sovereign Council but also on the part of Western powers. While there was a kind of grand alliance that toppled Omar al-Bashir and gave birth to a new government with the name “Sovereign Council” there have been no visible attempts to heal the wounds and reconcile all warring factions within Sudan. Peace (except peace of the grave) remains elusive. Insecurity of lives and properties still remains high. The economy is not visibly improving except the assurances that things will soon improve with the help of Western aids, etc.

With the above the atmosphere for political bickering remains volatile.

According to International Alert: “The military coup in Sudan today (October 25) represents the sad and familiar legacy of repressive rule, uneven economic development, and socio-political factionalization. The events are not unexpected following two fraught years of partnership between the civilian and armed forces representatives tasked with managing democratic transition.¹⁹¹

“The suppression of non-partisan civil society groups and the inability of opposition politicians to unite around common objectives allowed the armed forces to maintain a tight grip on Sudan’s governance, a grip they have been reluctant to release despite the overthrow of al-Bashir in 2019.¹⁹²

“Things have been brought to a head by the deepening economic crisis, which has led to sharp divisions among the population over the effectiveness and value of the transitional government.¹⁹³

“For any hope of a return to a peaceful and legitimate transition process that the Sudanese people can have confidence in, Sudan’s leadership must first ensure that civilians are secure and can express themselves without fear of violence.¹⁹⁴

“In the longer term, institutions must be strengthened in order to break the recurrent cycle of coups. Sudan deserves a governance system that is reflective of the civilian population’s voices and needs. Sudan can benefit from inclusive civilian oversight of the armed forces, an equitable and accessible justice system, and strong anti-corruption frameworks. Sudan requires economic measures that meet the wellbeing needs of citizens.¹⁹⁵

“We know that the dividends of democratic governance are rarely felt immediately. While today’s events are a setback, we must continue to support the principles for which hundreds of thousands of Sudanese men and women bravely faced the threat of death in demanding revolution in 2019.¹⁹⁶

“International Alert calls on the African Union, Arab League, the UN and other international powers that have invested in resetting relations with Sudan over the past two years to support its people and facilitate the establishment of an inclusive agenda, timeline and process for instituting a civilian-led government.”¹⁹⁷

The People versus the Army

A significant development in the last couple of years is the visible increase in political consciousness and/or social awareness of the masses of the populace especially in Khartoum and Omdurman. The masses have trooped out on nearly every occasion there is a major political conflict to the settled. The situation is not different aftermath the October Coup which witnessed thousands of Sudanese trooping out to confront the might of the military junta led by al-Burhan and Dagalo.

It is indeed a whole new political phenomenon. Rarely in recent decades has such a phenomenon been witnessed in Africa where the most politically active and fully conscious section of the civilian populace took it upon itself with minimal direction or influence from a revolutionary political vanguard to stand up to the might of the military establishment without fear, let or hindrance. This can be understood in the general context of what the people themselves have gone through over the decades in the very hand of the same military. They have thereby lost the awe and fear of the military and what it can do in reaction to its revolutionary quest for a new political order under democratic rule. They have also lost the fear of death through military-orchestrated violence. This is the circumstantial context in which the people’s reactions lately have been correctly referred to as “revolutionary”.

After Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and his wife were kidnapped and the transitional government dissolved by military decree on Monday, a call went out from the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Sudanese Communist Party for countrywide protests and civil disobedience, with the latter calling for a political strike. There was an immediate, tremendous response from the masses, who poured out onto the streets to repel the coup. Most of the protestors mobilised in Khartoum, but there were also huge crowds in Bahri, Omdurman, Atbara, Dongola, El-Obeid, Port Sudan, Gezira, Al Fashir, Madani, and the Red Sea State, with people throwing up barricades and burning tyres, creating smokescreens to protect themselves from the security forces.¹⁹⁸

Workers’ organisations also answered the call, with strikes launched by at least 20 trade union and professional bodies. These organisations represent doctors and pharmacists, civil servants, engineers, miners, university lecturers, schoolteachers, and food production workers. The pilots’ union has declared a strike, grounding flights from the national carrier and Sudan Airways, as well as local carriers Badr and Tarco. Workers with the state oil company Sudapet announced they would join the movement, followed by the entire petroleum sector. Railway workers in Atbara have abandoned the rail yards to join the protests, as have employees at the Central Bank. Additionally, small businesses all over the country have closed their doors in solidarity with the resistance movement. Many of these strikes and closures were launched spontaneously from below, rather than following the call of any national leadership.¹⁹⁹

The masses have learned lessons from the experience of the 2019 revolution and are applying them in their spontaneous self-organisation. “I think the past two years… a very dynamic political environment [has developed] in the country, where people took the streets more than they went to schools and universities,” said Ahmed. “People, just citizens, are communicating with each other. The internet is out. Phone connection is very poor. I think one network is working. But still, people are going door to door, talking to each other, you know, encouraging each other to take the streets. Remember that we didn’t have social media [in] December 2018 to April 2019. We didn’t have internet totally for over three weeks after the massacre in June 2019. So, people have developed not only the resilience but also the skills of communication beyond technology.”²⁰⁰

At the discussion circles organised by these committees, the masses are planning their strategy to link up with the workers’ movement in their fight against the coup. A “March of Millions”, coupled with a general strike, is being planned for Saturday. The following speech was delivered at a meeting in Atbara: “Raising consciousness is important, and it is the task for all of us, from the youngest to the oldest. The revolution united everyone out of necessity, young, old, experienced, inexperienced, we are all one when we are on the streets. We all came out to defend our civilian democracy… The professional bodies, unions of workers in the Nile Valley and other local governmental organisations, declared that they will join the civil disobedience. We, the revolutionaries, will monitor these strikes, we will march at 8am, we will go into these organisations, one by one, if they are not striking, we will make sure they strike. This is for all Sudanese people who will go out on Saturday, and here in Atbara we will follow. Just how we taught Bashir and his gang a lesson, we will teach Burhan and his gang a lesson too. We will go out in the streets that day, and until then, we will hold these speeches at night, every night.”²⁰¹

These activities show the ingenuity and organisational capacity of the masses, who have emerged stronger and wiser following the many ebbs and flows of the 2019 revolution. The SPA has now made a nationwide call for these committees to expand their ranks; and organise bodies for gathering funds; acquiring medical resources and expertise; and setting up bodies responsible for maintenance, communication, and security. These bodies must be developed, and generalised.²⁰²

As a matter of urgency, these bodies should also establish self-defense committees and organise a systematic campaign to win over the rank-and-file soldiers in the army. The counter-revolution, spearheaded by the RSF, will not spare any means to protect their interests. The only way to guarantee another massacre does not happen is to prepare the people to defend themselves, in a disciplined way, arms in hand.²⁰³

Rebecca Hamilton says that the power of “the street” is the one advantage that Sudanese people have over the military. Across generations, they have demonstrated the courage with which they can wield that power. Knowing this, Burhan and his allies shut down the Internet before announcing the coup, hoping to limit the ability of protesters to organize. But grassroots activists have experience with prior Internet shutdowns and have planned for this scenario. As rumors circulated of the coup early on Monday morning they already began working by word-of-mouth through tightly organized neighborhood committees, and protests grew throughout the day.²⁰⁴

Anticipating the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 and the critical role of the mass movement in the coming storming events in Sudan, Taghreed Elsanhouri wrote that “another notable achievement of the uprising has been the discrediting of the political Islam narrative. Former Vice President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha recently came out of semi-retirement to proclaim on state television that the sons and daughters of the Sudanese Islamic revolution are ready to give their lives to safeguard it.”²⁰⁵ 

Moments later, an eloquent letter by a former party member refuting Taha’s proclamation was circulating on WhatsApp: “Do not speak for us,” it stated. “We are no longer your sleeping army. We will not be dying for your phony slogans in the name of God as we were fooled into doing in the civil war with the South. Let those who have profited from the Islamic revolution defend it.”²⁰⁶

Many political Islamist supporters of the regime are reconsidering their position or distancing themselves from the ruling party. Yet, just as it is a mistake to categorise Sudan’s civil wars in terms of binaries, it would be wrong to think of the political divisions underpinning this uprising in terms of secularist/Islamist schisms.  On the whole, the Sudanese public is religious and spiritually focused. For those of us on the secular spectrum, the hope is that now that the moral bankruptcy of political Islam as implemented over the past 30 years in Sudan has been exposed, the people will be less susceptible to its influence.²⁰⁷

Reflecting on the lessons of October 1964 can prepare this generation for the opportunities that this uprising will present, if it succeeds in toppling the government.  In 1964, it was trade unions and professional associations who led the uprising and maintained its discipline, and ultimately its success, through civil disobedience. This time around, the people are organising through social media, in particular WhatsApp, and overwhelmingly urging each other to keep the uprising peaceful. Keeping this peace in the face of violent provocation from the state will take resolve and discipline, but the alternative could mean the collapse of Sudan.²⁰⁸

The tired old politics of privilege, religion and money would be a betrayal to those who have lost, and are losing, their lives for a better Sudan. Perhaps the most important lesson of 1964 is for the leaderships of the Sudanese political elites in waiting. Uprisings are as much about ideas as about political and economic discontent.  The youths putting their lives on the line every time they step out on the streets to protest deserve a seat at the table – they deserve to be active participants in forging a new political agenda. The tired old politics of privilege, religion and money would be a betrayal to those who have lost, and are losing, their lives for a better Sudan.²⁰⁹

The political awakening and the corollary mass movement have turned the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman into fierce political battlefield every time there is political crisis or upheaval. Novels can be written about this phenomenon on its own.

Africa Confidential provides the historical background to this political mass movement of the people which has come to play a very crucial role in reshaping the political landscape, redefining the political narratives but without yet achieving its ultimate goal of instituting democratic rule, etc.

The millions of Sudanese activists taking on one of the world’s most ruthless regimes, forcing two of its leaders from power in a couple of days, say they have started a revolution. Without doubt, the broad social movement which started its campaigning in the hinterland just four months ago has made a series of palpable hits, breaking the mould of opposition politics in the region and beyond. So far, its diverse leadership, including many women and activists from marginalised regions such as Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, has held together.²¹⁰

As mass protests continued across the country, representatives of the forces of the Declaration for Freedom and Change, the broad coalition steering the protests, held substantive meetings with the new junta on 13 and 14 April about the shape of the transition. They set out their demands for civilian technocrats to run the transition, draw up a new constitution and hold elections but with the military and police restricted to maintaining public order and national defense.²¹¹

The determination by the ruling junta to be the sovereign power during the transition is a main sticking point. Some officers are arguing that the military should stay in charge for six months while it pushes through reforms and resolves the factional disputes within the security system. Trust between the broad opposition and military interlocutors is low. Veteran apparatchiks from the regime are likely to try to exploit differences within the opposition between the civic activists and veteran politicians.²¹²

For now, much of the credit for the dizzying pace of change in Sudan must go to the opposition’s determination and courage in the face of a regime willing to kill unarmed civilians en-masse. Along with the opposition, it was the pressure of the economic crisis on the Sudan Armed Forces and its commanders’ fears that the factionalised security system was splitting at the seams.²¹³

The demonstrators, numbering one million at times, camped outside Alqiyada al Amaah, the military headquarters complex on the northern edge of the airport, have become a symbol of the power of disciplined and peaceful mass protest. They are an autocrat’s nightmare.²¹⁴

Espousing a cultural as well a political revolution, activists organised food, water and sanitation for the hundreds of thousands lining the streets outside Alqiyada al Amaah. Bands of poets, violinists and drummers wound their way through the crowd keeping up morale. On a grimmer note, the activists run security checkpoints to stop undercover security agents bringing in weapons.²¹⁵

Opposition movements have been bludgeoned or co-opted by the security state over three decades. So, the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change tried a new organisational and ideological tack. They used the power of community, cultural and trading networks to build a powerful resistance movement, hugely boosted by the commitment of young Sudanese, most of whose lives had been dominated by the absolute rule of President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir and the ruling National Congress Party.²¹⁶

Farmers, workers, and traders joined forces with doctors, lawyers and engineers from the Sudan Professionals’ Association to push Beshir from power as the economy crashed. It shrank by over 2% last year and inflation was running at 80% at the beginning of the year. Economic mismanagement, grand corruption and the strictures of Islamist rule had stripped the regime of legitimacy in the eyes of Sudanese many years ago.²¹⁷

That switch in army sympathies as the opposition massed in Khartoum triggered President Beshir’s exit in a palace coup on the night of 10 April. Then it took just another 30 hours for the first leader of the junta, Lt Gen. Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Auf, to stand down after his first faltering press conference in the morning of 11 April.²¹⁸

Lt Gen Burhan, the new leader of the transitional military council and a former Chief of the General Staff, is more acceptable to the opposition. Burhan had met some of the activists before the ousting of Beshir and had did not crack down on the officers seen as sympathetic to the opposition in recent weeks.²¹⁹

Thousands of protestors were marching across Khartoum within hours of the coup in the early hours of 25 October, some setting up barricades of burning tyres. Many were heading towards military headquarters, site of the mass occupation which preceded the toppling of President Omer el Beshir’s Islamist regime in April 2019. Hundreds of soldiers and militia fighters have been patrolling the area, some firing live rounds and others lobbing tear-gas canisters at the activists.²²⁰

The Sudan Professionals’ Association and Resistance Committees across the country, which led civil activists in the 2019 revolution, added their own call for mass protests and a general strike. Local groups are distributing timetables for street protests and preparing for mass nationwide demonstrations.²²¹

Given widespread domestic and international opposition to the coup, and the probability it will further damage living standards in the country, rivalries between the separate factions of the military and security services might worsen. So far, the usually taciturn Gen. Burhan has been the front-man for the coup.²²²

In turn, Egypt wants a government in Khartoum that will unambiguously side with Cairo in its dispute with Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. So far, President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi seems to have calculated, like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that open support for Burhan’s putsch could backfire.²²³

First, there is the awkwardness of Burhan copying so obviously from Sisi’s route to power via a coup d’état in July 2013. But there are critical differences in Sudan. Most importantly, there is mass support for civilians in the transitional regime in Khartoum and widespread distrust of the army’s high command and the Islamist factions aligned to it.²²⁴

The next few days will prove critical for Burhan and his new junta. There is little sign that it has a plan other than regime survival in the face of widespread opposition. That suggests something akin to the junta in Myanmar but presiding over a more volatile situation and a crashing economy. Even the obvious supporters for Burhan’s junta – China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – are yet to offer any diplomatic support, let alone hard cash.²²⁵

Sudanese security forces [have] launched sweeping arrests of anti-coup protesters on Wednesday, tightening the regime’s grip while the international community ramped up punitive measures. The World Bank froze aid and the African Union suspended the East African country over this week’s military takeover.²²⁶

Armed forces deployed in large numbers after overnight protests saw clashes in the capital Khartoum, when officers fired tear gas and arrested several leading pro-democracy activists, including from Sudan’s largest political party, the Umma Party. “Police forces have removed all the barricades since Wednesday morning and arrested all the people who stood near them,” said Hady Bashir, a protester, after AFP correspondents saw security forces clear rocks and tyres blocking major streets in Khartoum.²²⁷

Beyond the capital, protesters have stood their ground to decry the country’s latest military coup, setting up blockades in Port Sudan in the east, Wad Madani to the south, and Atbara to the north. “Sporadic protests erupt every now and then demanding the government’s return,” said Osama Ahmed, a witness from Wad Madani, about 186 kilometres (115 miles) south of Khartoum. Since top General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on Monday announced the dissolution of the government and declared a state of emergency, thousands of citizens have maintained protests, chanting “No to military rule”. Shops have remained closed following calls for a campaign of civil disobedience, and pro-democracy movements ratcheted up calls for “million-strong protests” on Saturday.²²⁸

Analysts had warned that the putsch could put at risk much-needed international assistance unlocked under Hamdok’s government to rescue Sudan’s economy, battered by decades of US sanctions and by mismanagement. In a joint statement, Western diplomats called for an urgent face-to-face meeting with Hamdok. “We continue to recognise the prime minister and his cabinet as the constitutional leaders of the transitional government,” read a joint statement by US, UK and Norway, the European Union, and Switzerland. It was the latest putsch in one of the world’s most underdeveloped countries, which has experienced only rare democratic interludes since independence in 1956.²²⁹

The central contest remains between the opposition formations and the state’s security apparatus.  What has changed the situation is the determination and resilience of the demonstrators in 15 states in the country, and then the organisation by the professional groups of doctors, lawyers, teachers and journalists who organised strikes in Khartoum, El Obeid, Medani and several other cities. They started on 19 December and are still building support.²³⁰

Using different means of organisation – mass protests, small assemblies, sit-ins, strikes, speeches in markets, and quick ad-hoc protests – this new opposition movement has quickly gathered mass support and wrong-footed El Beshir and the security agencies. This flexibility and agility of the protestors has inspired the fast-growing movement in Algeria which demands the departure of four-term President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.²³¹

Unfortunately, there is a fundamental and incurable weakness with the mass movement. The weakness is its lack of leadership. Until this weakness is overcome, there can be no foreseeable solution to the Sudanese crisis. In the current events, the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) which was the arrowhead of the “revolution” in 2019 has been unfortunately sinisterly absent. Its voice has largely remained weak if not completely silent. What happened or went wrong this time around?

According to Joe Atard and Mathani Ahmed, “despite the power of the revolutionary movement, it has a major weakness. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) at its head has insisted upon ‘peaceful civil disobedience’, even in the face of the most brutal repression. This call was echoed by the neighbourhood resistance committees and remains popular on the ground, with one of the main chants being “peaceful” (referring to the nature of the protests).”²³²

This was the same approach the SPA adopted during the 2019 revolution. Even when the reactionary tribal Janjaweed militias were slaughtering dozens of people in Khartoum during the terror in June 2019, the SPA continued to call for ‘peaceful’ protest and ‘pressure from the international community’ – in other words, relying on support from the imperialist nations and institutions like the UN.²³³

We must be honest: this naïve insistence on non-violent methods puts the revolution at dire risk. There are no levels of brutality to which the counter-revolutionary generals will not stoop in defence of their power and privileges. They demonstrated this again yesterday. It is not entirely clear which security forces took part in repression during the march of millions, although allegedly the Central Reserve Forces (Abu Tera) and Tamazuj (3rd Front), as well as riot police, were involved. In any case, the RSF – Janjaweed militias – were the spearhead. On Saturday afternoon, lines of uniformed militiamen fired teargas and live ammunition to break up the demonstrations, while plainclothes troops infiltrated the protestors’ ranks to attack them behind their lines. The crackdown was especially brutal in Khartoum and Omdurman, with images emerging of armoured vehicles on the streets and troops firing indiscriminately on unarmed protestors, who could only respond by fleeing or throwing stones.²³⁴

With the casualties mounting and momentum swinging in the direction of the counter-revolution, the neighbourhood resistance committees made a call for protestors to retreat to their homes and barricade their communities. But even now, after yet another vicious crackdown, a statement issued by the SPA, while condemning the bloodshed at the hands of the army, continued to call for “peaceful resistance, the occupation of the streets… and mass civil disobedience.” The leadership has also made further appeals for support from the “international community”. Shaheen al Shaheef, a member of the Khartoum Resistance Committee, told the BBC: “People here are very peaceful. These protests are going to continue being peaceful even when faced with the guns.”²³⁵

This is not a strategy for peace, but a recipe for defeat and death on an even greater scale. Unless the masses are prepared to defend themselves, arms in hand, they will simply be mown down. The counter-revolution is perfectly willing to restore the old military dictatorship on a throne of bones. The only way to defeat the coup, once and for all, and prevent further massacres, is for self-defence committees to be immediately established, the masses drilled and armed and a general appeal made to win over any sympathetic army ranks as soon as possible. This is the only way to repel the military.²³⁶

It seems that General Burhan, the coup leader, is mostly relying on the most-reactionary section of the security forces to facilitate repression. In 2019, there was a lot of sympathy for the revolution from the ranks of the normal soldiers. The SPA was unwilling to agitate for support from the rank-and-file troops, because they knew this would result in an armed clash with the generals.²³⁷ The Sudanese ruling elite will not give up its power without a fight. Confining the revolution to street protests and limited general strikes only emboldens the counter-revolution, while demoralising the revolutionary masses.²³⁸

What has “killed” the revolution is the leadership’s extraordinary lack of the exact vision of what it wants for the Sudanese people. While it has mouthed revolutionary slogans here and there, it actually did not see itself as taking over power because it is fundamentally afraid of the military. The FFC-SPA alliance lack ideological focus and substance. It was not able to exploit the opportunity the 2019 revolution afforded it to make fundamental changes to the State structure while in power through the Sovereign Council. In most cases, it collaborated with the military warlords within the ruling Sovereign Council to inflict pains on the masses through its economic policies orchestrated by the IMF-World Bank condominium. In the final analysis, it created the very opportunity by its lack of vision for the military to kick out the representatives of the FFC-SPA alliance within the Sovereign Council.

The leadership went further to complicate its position by adopting the same weak methodologies for taking the revolution further: peaceful dialogue with the military junta that has exhibited its utter hatred for the revolution and is ever ready to unleash terror on the populace. In short, the leadership stymied its own efforts, whatever they are, by being pusillanimous and flatulent in relation to the military junta. 

The Heart of the Beast

At the core of the Sudanese State crisis is the role of the military (including other security establishments) over the years since independence. The Sudanese military has been playing dominant role in its State affairs – yet without viability or stability including economic dividends. The Sudanese State has lurched from one hegemonic crisis to another over the arch of time. However, the military has turned itself into a “state” within a State or what may be regarded as the “Deep State”. In other words, instead of being the Praetorian Guardian or Sentinel of the State, the military has turned itself into a hungry Alsatian dog that is ready to attack, kill and devour its master. The military has become a parasitic proto-bourgeoisie within the overall Sudanese bourgeoisie with its poor handle on the commanding heights of governance. The Beast is the military-security condominium and their apostate civilian supporters. It is this condominium that constitutes the “Deep State” feeding upon the Sudanese State.

The military has amassed enormous wealth unto itself over the years. According to Africa Confidential, intrinsic to the Islamist regime of President Omer el Beshir, the security structures were the best-resourced arm of the state, having the deepest roots as well as an extensive surveillance network throughout the country and the region. It also spread to countries with substantial Sudanese populations such as Britain, France, Canada and the United States. It will take more than the secularist ambitions of opposition politicians to dislodge it.²³⁹

A determined restructuring and re-professionalisation of the armed forces and security services will be key to any sustainable political change. Gauging the commitment of the military leadership towards such reforms will be a key indicator of the transition’s viability.²⁴⁰

But the irony or paradox of the Sudanese military is, despite been well-resourced even serving as mercenary hirelings in Libya and Yemen, that it has not been able to win any of its own internal war without coming to the negotiating table. The Sudanese military is impotent to solve its own crisis – except to compound or escalate such crisis. This is the premise on which the clarion calls have been made for the reforms of the military and other security establishments to bring them into alignment with modern practice where it will be able to help solve crisis while subordinating itself to the authority of democratic government.

As part of the intended reform of the military and the security sector as a whole is the intendment to merge the Rapid Support Forces into the regular army. But this has been stoutly resisted especially by the RSF which grew out of the much-dreaded Janjaweed militia that has wrecked so much havoc in Darfour. RSF has a broken record of egregious violations of human rights since the political upheaval in 2019 which ended the reign of terror of Omar al-Bashir authoritarian regime.  The RSF has emerged as one of the most feared paramilitary groups in the Horn of Africa in the wake of Darfour crisis during the era of Omar al-Bashir authoritarian rule. Indeed it was Omar al-Bashir that established and funded Janjaweed militia that transformed into the Rapid Support Forces – under the same Omar al-Bashir. RSF has accumulated influence and clout to the extent where it can reject any attempt to bring it under the authority of a superior body such as the Sudanese Armed Forces or the State. This issue has quietly loomed writ large in the background to the current political crisis.

But merging the RSF into the regular army has become one of the greatest headaches in reforming the entire Sudanese military and security establishment. Part of the agreement in the Transitional Military Council/Sovereign Council in August 2019 was the integration of the RSF into the regular Sudanese Army. But this has become difficult to achieve mainly because of the resistance from the RSF itself that want to continue to exist as an independent unit with less supervision from the Sudanese Armed Forces. “Integrating a powerful paramilitary force into the army has emerged as the latest stumbling block in Sudan’s transition to civilian rule following three decades under ousted autocrat Omar al-Bashir.”²⁴¹

The RSF largely drew its members from Arab nomads and camel-herding Janjaweed militias whom rights groups accuse of atrocities in Darfur. Tensions between the RSF and the army have reportedly been simmering in recent weeks but appeared to peak after paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo openly rejected a merger with the armed forces. “Talk of RSF integration into the army could break up the country,” warned Dagalo, commonly known as Hemeti, in a speech that went viral on social media. “The RSF is established under a law passed by an elected parliament. It’s not a battalion … to be integrated into the army,” he said.²⁴²

Military officials have repeatedly denied any rift, but civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has pointed to “deeply worrying” fractures among powerful blocs of Sudan’s security system. He has called for a unified army that includes the RSF and warned that unresolved splits among political factions at the helm of Sudan’s transition could result in chaos and civil war. “The question now for Sudan is to be or not to be,” Hamdok told journalists [in June 2021].²⁴³

War broke out in Darfur in 2003 when African minority rebels complaining of discrimination took up arms against Bashir’s Arab-dominated government in Khartoum. The years-long conflict killed 300,000 people and displaced 2.5 million, according to the UN.²⁴⁴

Military expert Amin Ismail said the RSF’s integration into the army “is a must at this point”. “The RSF was formed for a specific purpose under Bashir, but now that his regime is gone, it should be part of one unified army.” A Sudanese military source told AFP that integrating the RSF into the army was “linked to pressures from the West and international institutions”. Failing to do so could “affect Sudan’s international relations”, the source said, requesting anonymity.²⁴⁵

Jonas Horner, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said reform of the security sector was “a fundamental requirement of Sudan’s transition”. But he warned that any attempt to forcibly integrate the RSF or disarm it “would potentially catalyse serious urban warfare”. Before agreeing to integrate his forces, “Hemeti will likely seek assurances over his role in a post-transition Sudan and over calls for his prosecution” over the Darfur conflict, Horner said.²⁴⁶

Hemeti was involved in the army’s April 2019 ousting of Bashir following mass demonstrations against the president’s iron-fist rule. Protesters have however accused the RSF of violently dispersing a mass sit-in outside the army headquarters in June that year. Medics linked to the protest movement say at least 128 people died in the days-long crackdown.²⁴⁷

Analyst Horner said the RSF’s merger with the army “appears to be a distant hope”, especially as “Hemeti’s power base is wrapped up entirely in his control of the RSF”. “As long as Sudan retains multiple armies with competing interests and power bases, security sector reform remains unlikely,” he said.²⁴⁸

Aljazeera reported that Sudan’s military has announced plans to create a joint force to “crack down on insecurity” and assert the state’s authority in the capital and nationwide as an economic crisis and regional tensions plague a fragile transition towards elections. The announcement was made through an order from General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, deputy head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council that was published late on Thursday.²⁴⁹ Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, is head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which will be part of the new force with the police, military, General Intelligence Service and “representatives” of rebel groups and the public prosecutor, the order said.²⁵⁰

The force would be formed “immediately”, under the leadership of sovereign council member General Yasser al-Atta, according to the order. Local news outlet Star Tribune reported that the order directed state governors to work with military and security agencies to form the joint force. Dagalo also ordered the signatory rebel groups to get their members under control and designate gathering places.²⁵¹

Dagalo’s RSF, which emerged out of the Popular Defence Forces in Darfur’s conflict of the early 2000s, is viewed with mistrust by many in the country. The group was extensively armed by Sudan’s former President Omar al-Bashir after largely non-Arab rebels took up arms in 2003 accusing the central government of political and economic marginalisation.²⁵²

The Rapid Support Forces are Sudanese paramilitary forces operated by the Sudanese Government. The RSF grew out of, and is primarily composed of, the Janjaweed militias which fought on behalf of the Sudanese government during the War in Darfur, killing and raping civilians and burning their houses. The RSF’s actions in Darfur qualify as crimes against humanity according to Human Rights Watch.²⁵³

The RSF are administered by the National Intelligence and Security Service, although during military operations they are commanded by the Sudanese Armed Forces. As of June 2019, the commander of the RSF is General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemetti”). During the Sudanese political crisis of 2019, the military junta who took control of the country employed the RSF to violently crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators. Along with other security forces, the RSF carried out the Khartoum massacre on 3 June 2019.²⁵⁴

The RSF is the relabeling of the Janjaweed. They are the same armed militias that were legitimized by the dictator and war criminal Omer El-Bashir. The RSF was officially renamed in August 2013 under the command of the NISS, following a pathetic attempt at relabelling of the Janjaweed militias in order to combat other armed militias in the Darfur region, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, following joint attacks by Sudanese Revolutionary Front rebels in North and South Kordofan in April 2013.²⁵⁵

The RSF (Janjaweed) is headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemetti”), who has been its leader since it was created in 2013 or 2014. As of September 2019, Hemetti’s brother Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo is deputy head of the RSF.²⁵⁶

The RSF (Janjaweed) was estimated by Human Rights Watch as having about 5000–6000 soldiers in February 2014 in Darfur. In 2016–2017, the RSF had 40000 members participating in the Yemeni Civil War. In late October 2019, 10000 had returned to Sudan. In July 2019, about 1000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting the Libyan National Army commanded by Khalifa Haftar.²⁵⁷

In November 2017, Hemetti used the RSF (Janjaweed) to take over control of gold mines in the Darfur region, which led to him becoming one of the richest people in Sudan by 2019. Hemetti’s brother Abdul Rahim, deputy head of the RSF, heads the Al Junaid (or Al Gunade) corporation involved in gold mining and trading in Sudan.²⁵⁸

In December 2019, a Global Witness investigation into the RSF and Al Junaid argued that the RSF and Al Junaid are closely linked in terms of financial transactions. Global Witness stated that “the RSF and [Al Junaid had] captured a swathe of the [Sudanese] gold industry and [were] likely using it to fund their operations.” The General Manager of Al Junaid stated to Thomson Reuters that there were no close links between the two. The RSF (Janjaweed) has two front companies called GSK, a small Sudanese technology company, and Tradive General Trading LLC, a United Arab Emirates-based company, both controlled by Hemetti’s brother Algoney Hamdan Dagalo.²⁵⁹

During the War in Darfur, in 2014 and 2015, RSF “repeatedly attacked villages, burned and looted homes, beating, raping and executing villagers,” aided by air and ground support from the Sudanese Armed Forces. The RSF (Janjaweed) executions and rapes typically took place in villages after rebels had left. The attacks were systematic enough to qualify as crimes against humanity according to Human Rights Watch.²⁶⁰

During the 2019 Western Libya offensive phase of the Second Libyan Civil War, in July 2019, about 1000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Khalifa Haftar and based in Tobruk, which was fighting against the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli. The RSF (Janjaweed) has participated in the Yemeni Civil War (2015–present), supporting the pro-Hadi forces. Both the RSF and other Sudanese security forces, participating in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen, have killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure, for which they are suspected of war crimes by Human Rights Watch. In 2016–2017, the RSF had 40000 members participating in the Yemeni Civil War. In late October 2019, 10000 had returned to Sudan.²⁶¹

The RSF killed 100 protestors, injured 500, raped women and pillaged homes in the Khartoum massacre on 3 June 2019 during the 2018–19 Sudanese protests. During the first day of Eid al-Fitr in Sudan, in early June 2019, there were several reports that the RSF tied bricks of cement to the bodies of dead protestors to make them sink to the bottom of the Nile and never be found. The Central Committee of Medical Doctors stated that more than 100 people had been killed. On 6 June 2019, Kumi Naidoo, the head of Amnesty International, called for the “[immediate withdrawal of] all members of the Rapid Support Forces from policing and law enforcement anywhere in Sudan and especially in Khartoum”.²⁶²

In addition to the killings in Khartoum, other human rights violations during the 2018-19 crisis have been attributed to the RSF, including the rape of 70 male and female protesters during the Khartoum massacre and the following days;  the targeting of peaceful sit-ins;  and attacks on several hospitals.²⁶³

The Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors reported Janjaweed/RSF shooting dead nine people in the market of the village al-Dalij (or al-Delig) in Central Darfur on 10 or 11/12 June 2019. The massacre and the burning down of the market were interpreted by locals as a response to civil disobedience.²⁶⁴

Though the RSF is a part of the Sudanese security sector, it has demonstrated a different pattern of violence than the Sudanese police and military. More than half of the events in which the RSF have been involved since the protest wave began are instances of violence against civilians. This is compared to 25% of events involving the military (not including events in which the RSF and the military act in joint operations, which are included in the tally for the RSF’s activities) and fewer than 10% of events involving the police. Early June’s activity is an example of this difference in lethal tactics. Of the less than 10 recorded instances of the RSF using excessive force against protestors, many are associated with in total 120 reported fatalities. In comparison, in the nearly 50 instances in which the police and military have used excessive force against protesters, 40 fatalities, or less than 1 per event, are reported. Notably, the RSF also stands accused of a number of instances of sexual violence; during the June 3 crackdown in Khartoum: at least 70 rapes associated with the RSF are reported.²⁶⁵

Thus, the activities of the RSF present a two-fold threat to a post-Bashir Sudan. Firstly, the RSF’s violence against civilians imperils the likelihood of continued peaceful protests and suggests that the calls for a civilian-led government will go unheeded. Secondly, the RSF’s targeting of Sudanese military members could trigger a bloody process of influence-jockeying.²⁶⁶

Sudan has for decades carried out massive and systemic violations of human rights and humanitarian law. After the current government seized power in a military coup in 1989, the US pursued a policy of isolation, in part in response to Sudan’s human rights violations. In 1997, it imposed broad economic sanctions, citing massive human rights abuses committed during the 22-year civil war in the South.  A decade later it imposed additional sanctions, including targeted ones against individuals, for atrocities in Darfur.²⁶⁷

The human rights situation has not improved. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and aligned forces, notably the newly created Rapid Support Forces, have continued to attack civilians in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile with utter impunity.  National security agents engage in entrenched patterns of repression, targeting civil society leaders, human rights activists, and students for harassment, arbitrary detentions, and torture; restricting civil society organizations and independent media; and using lethal force to disperse protesters, killing hundreds in broad daylight.²⁶⁸

Given Sudan’s long, violent, and extensively documented record of abuses against civilians, any assessment of “progress” needs to include an assessment of human rights improvements too. US engagement with Sudan and further normalization of relations should be contingent on meaningful and lasting human rights improvements.²⁶⁹

RSF itself has become a pole of power having grown powerful since it was established in 2013 and is now seen to be in competition with the Army. This also shows the weakness of the Sudanese State in not able to reign in an obvious rogue paramilitary body that grew out of its bowel of weaknesses but mainly its repressive character. RSF has become a monster that threatens to devour anything on its path. The power of RSF will, however, automatically disappear once it is merged with the Army. And that is what Hamdan Dagalo does not want because the RSF is his power base. Hamdan Dagalo is already the deputy to Burhan – a stone-throw to becoming the President or Head of States himself. It is an opportunity of a life time which should not be frittered away by conceding to reforms that will emasculate his power base. Favorable political dynamics could propel him to the very top of Sudanese State while unfavorable dynamics could also send him crashing from where he is now.

His position is even more delicate especially against the fact that RSF has gained much notoriety and is in the eyes of public glare. It is much feared and hated with equal venom. That is why Dagalo is seen to be resisting all pressures to merge and dissolve his paramilitary unit into the regular Army. Once he bows or forced to bow to pressure, that would be his political and military career. Dagalo is even more dangerous than Burhan in this broad context. In desperation he may be compelled to strike to push out Burhan and take over to embark on full-blown military (or paramilitary) dictatorship the type Sudan may ever have seen. He is more Islamist-oriented even than Burhan and may be tempted to plunge Sudan into another NCP-Turabian Islamic fundamentalist whirlwind dictatorship. The scenario here is perhaps very scary to contemplate further.

With this coup the issue or task of merging the RSF into the regular army may be considered temporarily on suspension. The military junta is still battling to stabilize itself in power, to find legitimacy for its rule against the opposition of the civil society and the international community. This is to the benefit of the RSF and its allies in the military-security establishment.

The Crisis of Deep State

It is necessary to understand the concept of the “Deep State” or the “state” within the larger Sudanese State.

The Deep State actually grew out of the general epochal crisis of the Sudanese State with its historical root in the various internal conflicts that the Sudanese State has had to wage for its own survival over the arch of time and space. However, a critical turning point was reached when Sudan decided, under Omar al-Bashir misguided decision to become a State sponsor of international terrorism in the 90s and early 2000s which led to series of attacks on Western interests notably that of the United States and which also, in turn, automatically drew the ire of the United States which culminated in imposition of punitive sanctions against Sudan especially placing Sudan on the forbidden list of State Sponsors of Global Terrorism with all its connotative consequences.

It was partly out of these desperate conditions that the Sudanese State through its military started out to build its military industrial complex which must be regarded as been rooted in foundational illegality because it was meant for no purpose other than to prosecute its wrong-headed internal wars or conflicts it has embarked upon. The sanctions from the United States have been extremely crippling. More importantly, no other country is overtly willing to supply arms and ammunition to Sudan except through back channels because they do not want to come into confrontation with the might of the United States especially if those arms and ammunitions are perceived to threaten the national security interests of the United States. 

The “Deep State” is therefore the military-industrial complex that evolved out of the internal conflict situation in Sudan over time and space. The military and paramilitary high commands including the intelligence agencies are the arrowheads of the Deep State or the military industrial complex which became personal fiefdoms of individual commanders, both retired and in active service. The Sudanese State is clearly unable to stop the growth of the military industrial complex because at any rate, it is its active sponsor and supporter whether considered illegal or not. In fact the situation was made legal because to certain extent, the various bodies that constitute this military industrial complex were taken through legal registration of the individual companies within and outside Sudan thus giving a kind of statutory backing to the companies. The Sudanese State allowed this to happen because it needed the existence of the military industrial complex as a back-up for its failings as a functional state committed to the welfare of the Sudanese people. The establishment of the Deep State was made possible by trampling upon the rule of law and has therefore enable the military-industrial or military-security colossi to capture the Sudanese State and turn it around to do its biddings at all time. It is simply a process of State capture. The military industrial complex is a top-cloistered clique of men (both military and civilian) functioning “illegally” within or sometimes outside the Sudanese State over the years.

Meanwhile, the government of Sudan built several arms plants to become self-sufficient in weapons and ammunition. In August 2002 Russia confirmed the export to Sudan in 2001 of twenty-two armored combat vehicles and twelve attack helicopters. Under a defense cooperation agreement with Russia, first discussed in December 2001, Sudan negotiated to buy some twelve MiG-29 fighter planes said to be worth U.S. $120 million. The contract was to be finalized in May 2002, according to media reports citing Russian defense industry sources. In September 2002, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on three state-owned Russian companies (though not the Russian government) for arms supplies to Sudan, which was still on the U.S. list of countries it considered sponsors of terrorism. A Bulgarian company lost its arms trading license in May 2002 pending a criminal investigation into alleged illegal arms transfers (reportedly dismantled tanks) to the Sudanese government. The company maintained its innocence, saying it was making final deliveries under a mid-1990s contract to help build an arms factory. Bulgarian officials acknowledged such a contract had been approved, but said new shipments to Sudan had not been authorized.²⁷⁰

The resultant effect of the Deep State is to make the overall Sudanese State more fragile in its inability to bring the Deep State under control of a more rigorous legal framework. The Deep State or the military industrial complex has not made Sudanese State more stable than it met it. It has rather made it more unstable, diverting resources from the development of the economy to the narrow channel of enrichment of the clique at the expense of the welfare of the people. This is why in the post-Bashir era there has been loud clamor for the reform of military and the security sector in order to bring the military industrial complex under control.

Civilian leaders and former rebel factions have been pushing for reforms that include integrating paramilitaries and armed groups into the armed forces. But according to Digeir from the FFC civilian alliance, the 2019 power-sharing accord failed to specify who would be overseeing the security reforms. “Instead, it was left to be shared between both sides,” he said. Horner said the transitional deal demands that civilians “ultimately exercise oversight of the military”. “But there has been no sign of military will to step away from their dominant role in the country,” he added.²⁷¹

Horner said forming the transitional legislative council “would be key to initiating oversight over the military”. “But both security forces and older political parties, concerned about a dilution of their current powers, have blocked this crucial reform.”²⁷²

The military has [also] been heavily involved in foreign policy decisions since the power-sharing deal. Last year, Sudan announced plans to normalize ties with Israel as the US agreed to remove Khartoum from Washington’s state sponsors of terror blacklist. The Sudanese decision upended a policy in place since the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, said Omar al-Digeir, a leader in the FFC civilian alliance. [This has, however, provoked wild reactions from certain Middle East countries including Iran and Turkey that have different views opposed to the Israeli State (or foreign policy) interests]²⁷³

The transitional government signed the accord in January during a visit by Washington’s Treasury chief and simultaneously obtained US financial aid. Government officials have said the deal would come into effect only after the approval of the yet-to-be formed legislature. According to analyst Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute think tank, “the re-orientation of Sudan’s foreign policy since Bashir was outlined by the military”. It also “translated into closer ties with the US”.²⁷⁴

[In addition is the fact that] the military also dominates lucrative companies specialising in everything from agriculture to infrastructure projects. Hamdok said last year that 80 percent of the country’s public resources were “outside the finance ministry’s control”, without specifying the proportion controlled by the army. A military source who requested anonymity told AFP that the involvement of civilians in any military affairs remains a “highly sensitive” issue. “Recent civilian calls for security sector reforms may accordingly continue to face resistance,” the source added.²⁷⁵

Hamdok was no doubt fully aware of the dangers that lie ahead in the bumpy road to democratic rule in 2023. He had premonitions of likely coup d’état happening at any point in time. This eventually first happened on September 24 when a coup attempt was made to overthrow him. But he could not push through to accelerate the process of reforms of the military and security establishment – of course because of the fear of upsetting the creaky apple cart or chariot of power. Either way he was in a dilemma or what Cameron Hudson called a “binary choice”: if he pushes too hard and fast, he stands the risk of being pushed out completely. On the other hand, if he is too slow to act decisively he still stands the same risk of being brushed aside. He has already been pushed out mostly because he was too slow to act: doing what he needs to do and damn the consequences. He failed to act decisively and paid dearly for it.

Drawing lesson from the failed coup of September 21, 2021, Cameron Hudson noted that during the two years that a civilian cabinet has nominally been administering the affairs of state, the country’s technocrats have seemingly gone to great lengths to put their military partners at ease and avoid direct conflicts with them. Civilian leaders choose to focus on the social, economic, and administrative reforms squarely under civilian control, allowing the question of security-sector reform to loom in the background.²⁷⁶  But now that those reform efforts have collected much of the low-hanging fruit, Sudan’s civilian leaders have come to a fork in the road: Either they continue their reforms with only limited efficacy, or they pursue structural changes to the military’s role in political and economic life, as well as in the security of the country.²⁷⁷

For its part, the military has created its own facts on the ground to support its narrative that civilian leaders are incapable of managing the country’s complex ethnic, security, and economic challenges and are therefore not fit to lead alone. It is in this context that the military’s fingerprints are on the violence and displacement rising across Darfur, on military skirmishes and provocations heating up along the Ethiopian border, and on protests in eastern Sudan against the cabinet’s failed economic policies (which are being both fueled and suppressed by the military).²⁷⁸

It also is true that significant elements of the constitutional charter remain unimplemented, namely the seating of a transitional legislative council. Of course, Sudanese politics remains a largely cacophonous rabble—unreformed, disorganized, and often at odds with each other—precisely as the previous regime wanted it.²⁷⁹

To be sure, there must also be some agreement on accountability for past crimes. Ill-gotten gains must be returned to the state and the military must divest itself of civilian-oriented businesses. Functions better suited to the police, customs, and intelligence services should be removed from the military’s purview. Perhaps most importantly, militia groups and other paramilitary groups must be brought under a unitary command structure.²⁸⁰

There are real security threats in and around the country that require a response from professional security services, as evidenced by the killing of five Sudanese intelligence officers this week in a raid on a supposed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cell in Khartoum. Growing instability emanating from Ethiopia, perennial turbulence from a host of neighbors including South Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic, and human smuggling and drug trafficking all remain challenges that will require a professional army to confront.²⁸¹ 

As Sudan grapples with the fundamental choices that will decide the country’s future for decades to come, the United States and its partners have a critical role to play. Just as Western democracies have incentivized the reform process by illustrating the benefits Sudan and its people will gain for choosing the path of peace and democracy, they must now help illustrate what a future Sudan, with a competent and professional security sector will look like.²⁸²

Indeed, after negotiating a new round of credits, Khartoum’s respected prime minister warns that the old guard wants to derail the transition.²⁸³

The latest deal for debt relief and the signing of a US$2.5 billion credit with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are necessary but far from sufficient to keep the country’s transition to a constitutional democracy on track. The deals are a milestone and accolades are due to Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and his team of technocrats for steering the negotiations, analysts say. (Ibid) Despite the economic devastation that Hamdok and his government inherited two years ago, he says the primary challenges are political as his officials try to reform the judicial system and multitude of security agencies set up under the previous National Congress Party regime. He warned that the fragmentation of the security system and the tensions between the Sudan Armed Forces, the General Intelligence Service and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) threatened the stability of the country.²⁸⁴

In all three factions, there are senior officers whose core aim is to derail the political transition to civil rule, instead establishing an authoritarian military-backed regime on the lines of General Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s in Egypt. For those officers and their regional supporters, Sudan’s economic weakness offers an opportunity to undermine the technocrats in this civil-military transitional government.²⁸⁵ Hamdok’s team has been winning international support but its local supporters are growing impatient with the torturous pace of reforms. Rampant inflation has given rise to the biggest street protests since the revolution of April 2019.²⁸⁶

However, crucial to the military is the issue of reforms of the security sector which has given the military and the security establishment so much fear – fear of losing total control of the commanding heights of the economy it has hitherto enjoyed.

The next set of reforms urged on Sudan by the IMF is the disbanding or privatisation of hundreds of state firms, many controlled by the military or security departments. These, too, are coming up against vested interests.²⁸⁷

Prime Minister Hamdok argues the military’s business empire has been depressing government revenues. But Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Burhan, chairman of the Sovereignty Council – which is military-dominated and above the cabinet in the hierarchy – insists the ‘entire military economic capacity does not exceed $3 billion’. For many Sudanese these billion dollar military enterprises proved Hamdok’s point and the high cost of the country’s security system.²⁸⁸

It may not be Burhan, however, from whom Hamdok has most to fear, but rather his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemeti’. In June, Hamdok warned of the danger of Sudan falling under the control of ‘gangs and criminal groups’, and said failure to reform the security services ‘might lead to civil war’.²⁸⁹ The Prime Minister did not say who represented the most serious danger, but within two weeks Hemeti ratcheted up tensions, refusing to integrate his RSF into the national army. This was an about-turn on his commitments under the power-sharing agreement that ushered in the joint civilian-military administration in August 2019, and under the Juba peace agreement signed in October last year with rebel groups.²⁹⁰

‘Talk of RSF integration into the army could break up the country,’ Hemeti said, arguing for the RSF’s special status as a unit ‘established under a law passed by an elected parliament’. The RSF has its origins in the Janjaweed militia, responsible for many of the worst atrocities in the Darfur conflict that broke out in 2003 and in which 300,000 civilians were killed and millions displaced.²⁹¹

Hemeti now has his own interests to protect – not only to maintain his political position as the Sovereignty Council’s No. 2, but also personally and commercially. (Ibid) An investigation into the June 2019 massacre of over a hundred protestors – who were calling for a civilian democracy, after President Omer el Beshir’s ousting – could pin the blame on Hemeti’s RSF. That inquiry is led by human rights lawyer Nabil Adeeb and reports to the prime minister, with the aim of filing criminal charges. Sudanese news outlet Dabanga says Adeeb has heard from more than 3,000 witnesses so far.²⁹² Although in the sights of Adeeb’s investigation, Hemeti is not on the list of those charged by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and genocide in Darfur. On 28 June, Sudan’s government approved the transfer of Beshir and other indictees – including the former internal affairs minister and the ex-minster for humanitarian affairs – to The Hague for trial. El Beshir has been imprisoned in Khartoum since his overthrow and is currently languishing in the city’s Kober Central Prison.²⁹³

The Janjaweed, in which Hemeti played a key role, have also been targeted by the ICC. On 9 July, the court ruled that a commander of thousands of Janjaweed fighters, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd Al Rahman, can be charged with crimes against humanity.²⁹⁴ While presiding over the RSF, which may have 50,000 in its ranks and which has provided troops to fight as mercenaries in Yemen and Libya, Hemeti has also expanded his gold business. His family company Al Gunade, which controls Darfur’s only gold concession, has mining interests in the South Kordofan region and a wider gold-trading network, allowing it to operate a budget independently of the government, anti-corruption group Global Witness has found.²⁹⁵

The RSF’s commercial network has dodged government attempts to control companies linked to the security forces. In April, the government published a list of state companies which, while including companies owned by the army and intelligence services, made no mention of Hemeti and the RSF’s interests. The government, unconvincingly, said it couldn’t find any RSF-linked companies despite public investigative reporting on its commercial network.²⁹⁶

Even without the Hemeti-linked companies, the commercial operations tied to the security forces are octopus-like. As reported by United States-based advocacy group The Sentry, they include companies controlled by the army’s Defence Industrial Systems. Notable examples are Giad, which has operated since 2002 producing cars, armoured personnel carriers and tanks, and Al Ategahat Al Mutadeda, Sudan’s top meat processor. Other state-owned enterprises controlling key sectors such as fuel imports and the gold industry have operated as a law unto themselves. The think-tank Global Financial Integrity has found that over $8bn has gone missing from oil and gold export revenues controlled by the national oil company Sudapet and the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company.²⁹⁷

The military-industrial complex is at the root the crisis of the Deep State. The military is not willing to give up its control of the companies it has establishment outside the legal framework. Rather than depend on funding from the State, the Sudanese military has created its own proto or enclave economy which it is not ready to surrender to public accountability at all through corporate governance. General al-Burhan is not unaware of this dilemma. Indeed, he can be speculated upon at this point in time that he is probably not interested in any reform that will remove the control of the military from the military-industrial complex. 

To Alex De Waal, a Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He was the founding editor of the African Arguments book series, and also the author of The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power – is a traitor to his own people. “The seizure of power by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on Monday was a brazen usurpation of the constitutional order, a selfish effort to protect the privileges of the army, and a betrayal of a succession of promises he himself had made.²⁹⁸

Al-Burhan’s action is a military coup, pure and simple: a power grab in defiance of a constitutional order which was as precious as it was fragile. It is an unconstitutional change in government that should automatically lead to Sudan’s suspension from the African Union until such time as the legitimate order is restored. In this case, legitimate order does not mean a new formula contrived by the general himself in order to preserve his own stolen status, under which he puts in place his lackeys who, should they accept his offers, will show not only that they are for sale in Sudan’s political marketplace but also that their price is cheap. For nobody has any confidence that al-Burhan will be anything other than a minor clone of his deposed mentor, Omar al-Bashir, who ran Sudan in this manner for three decades, leaving it in a desperate state inherited by the democratic revolution.²⁹⁹

No, a return to constitutional legitimacy in Sudan means at minimum that al-Burhan steps down from power, as he was legally obliged to do next month when his term as the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council expired. The general’s putsch has shown him to be unpatriotic–he is pursuing private or factional interests regardless of the cost to the Sudanese people as a whole. A national leader is prepared to make sacrifices–as an individual, as a representative of a constituency–for the greater good of the country. Such self-denying steps are particularly essential in times of hardship when the future of the nation is in the balance. Nobody pretended that the transition to democracy after the April 2019 revolution would be anything other than troubled and painful, requiring concessions from all involved.³⁰⁰

For the army those necessary compromises start with reducing its bloated numbers and budget. It would mean dismantling the military’s toxic penetration of the economy, so that officers no longer control the most lucrative commercial sectors. It would mean unpicking the networks of corruption that they have over decades woven throughout the economy.³⁰¹

A patriotic spirit would require that military leaders are ready to face accountability before the public for the violations perpetrated during the rule of al-Bashir and in the weeks after the democratic revolution, when peaceful protesters were brutally massacred in the streets of Khartoum. Perhaps if the generals were ready to be frank and repentant, there would be an opening for reconciliation and forgiveness, a compromise in pursuit of a common future. On the other hand, if the soldiers arrogantly regard themselves as above the law, then those options are foreclosed.³⁰²

Justice was one of the central calls for the revolutionaries who put their lives on the line in the street protests and the sit-in around the military headquarters. It was agreed as a component of the Constitutional Declaration. Over the last two years, the size and spending of the army has expanded, even while the national economy has been in crisis. There is now, belatedly, progress towards stabilizing the economy with debt relief and financial aid. That is all in jeopardy now.³⁰³

Al-Burhan has said that he staged the coup to ‘prevent war’. In reality, it not only threatens bloodshed on the streets but also puts the incomplete peace process at risk. The biggest armed groups in Darfur and South Kordofan were still negotiating with the government on the terms of a peace deal. The success of those peace talks is now in doubt. Rather than continue with the often slow and frustrating process of dialogue with civilians, al-Burhan put his personal and factional interests first, holding out the false promise of decisive leadership. It’s a betrayal of Sudan.³⁰⁴

Finally, al-Burhan has proved himself untrustworthy. He signed the Constitutional Declaration and a host of other commitments. Just last weekend he met with the US Special Envoy, Jeff Feldman. Al-Burhan said he was thinking of taking power but was either too confused, timid or dishonest to be frank and to understand the clear message that Feldman conveyed: ‘don’t do it’. Within hours of Feldman’s departure, the general made his power grab.³⁰⁵ And no decisive leadership has been on show. Al-Burhan has been hesitant and clumsy, a poor actor on a big stage who cannot properly remember his lines. The perfidy of Sudan’s non-leader is plain for all to see.³⁰⁶

A Marginal Petro-State

The post-Hassan El-Turabian and post-Omar al-Bashir eras have not seen a marked or fundamental shift in the economic sector. Prior to the splitting away of South Sudan in 2011, (old) Sudan was evidently not able to manage its economy especially its oil economy. The oil revenue of the old Sudan did not bring Sudan into a modern industrial age. Yet after South Sudan split away in 2011 after a brutal civil war lasting many years, Sudan was still not able to manage its economy or finances. Sudan was, and till date, largely dependent on foreign handouts. If this is not a classic case study of State failure, then it is difficult to understand what else it could be. With all the ideological braggadocio of political Islamism and its so-called advanced puritanism, the Sudanese State and the various governments or ruling cliques in Khartoum from Jafaar Nimeiri to Omar al-Bashir and down to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan/Abdalla Hamdok, the economic narratives remain the same: woeful and shameful performance due to unheard-off incompetence and corruption.

Economic performance is one of the keys to understanding the nature of the historical and/or contemporary political crisis in Sudan, although this is a separate analysis beyond the scope of the current analysis here. However, what follows below is a bird-eye view of two main sectors of the Sudanese economy: the oil sector and the State finances.

Not much has been written to lay bare and understand the hidden connections or deep relationships between economic crisis facing Sudan and the October Coup, even though there are mentions of the economic crisis in the media reportage as a part of the backdrops to the coup.  In the Western media reportage on the ongoing crisis not much is also heard of the oil sector in relation to the crisis. It is a muted issue – yet significant in the overall understanding of the problematique currently assailing Sudan. In the case of the oil sector, the key questions are: who controls the oil spigots in Sudan? Where does the oil revenue go to? To what specific projects are the revenue realized targeted?

The performance of the economy is affected by two major factors: the type of politics, including social and political instability and the overall conflicts in Sudan over the years. The ensuing economic crisis has been fed upon by various political forces and actors but without bringing solutions to the economic crisis.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in all his pronouncement so far on the coup did not directly refer to the raging economic crisis facing Sudan as part of the reasons for carrying out the coup against the Sovereign Council and thereby discarding whatever the Council might have done to ameliorate the economic crisis in terms of policy initiatives and practical solutions already carried out by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and his cabinet.

Interestingly, it is generally understood that there is a “military-industrial complex” under the firm control of the military apparachiki even from the time of Omar al-Bashir. It is also understood that on ground is the policy effort to dismantle this military-industrial complex for transparency and accountability purposes in order to remove the control of some of the strategic sectors of the economy from the absolutist control of the military – a control gained over the last two decades or thereabout as a result of the authoritarian rule under Omar al-Bashir. 

Oil mining in Sudan has not been without its own peculiar crisis importantly framed by violence.

The oil story in Sudan is one of controversy, a messy tale of money, conflict and power enmeshed in the country’s decades-long conflict.³⁰⁷

With oil comes an enormous revenue source but one that often goes disproportionately into the pockets of corrupt leaders while leaving the majority of the population in poverty. Oil has been shown to trigger conflict and destroy the environment; at the same time, it sustains economies and fuels our energy-dependent societies. In Sudan, the story is no different. Since exploration for oil began in Sudan in 1959, the oil industry has backed the economy of the dry north[east] African state. Oil was also key in the decades-long conflict that embroiled the Islamic north and the Christian and Animist South, where both sides fought over prime oilfields located strategically along the borderline. Though Sudan lost most of its oil fields and revenue after the south seceded in 2011, it continues to control the only pipeline for the south to transport its oil to international markets.³⁰⁸

The fight for the control of the oil spigots and revenue among the Sudanese corporate elite including the multinational oil companies has led to egregious violations of human rights precisely in those areas where oil fields are located such as South Kordofan, Blue and White Nile Areas, etc.

According to Human Rights Watch (2003), The Sudan government and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) made great strides in 2002, on paper, toward respect for human rights and settlement of the nineteen-year civil war. The war, however, heated up as the parties fought over oilfields and key garrisons; it was not brought to a halt until the parties agreed on October 15 to a standstill during peace negotiations. On October 30, Talisman Energy Inc., the Canadian oil company leading the development of the only concession producing oil for export in Sudan, announced that it would sell off its Sudan assets, thus bringing to a successful close a major campaign against the company by nongovernmental organizations in Canada, the United States (U.S.), and Europe.³⁰⁹

An idea of the general performance of the economy may be gleaned from Wikipedia.

The economy of Sudan has boomed on the back of increases in oil production, high oil prices, and large inflows of foreign direct investment until the second half of 2002. GDP growth registered more than 10% per year in 2006 and 2007. From 1997 to date, Sudan has been working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement macroeconomic reforms, including a managed float of the exchange rate. Sudan began exporting crude oil in the last quarter of 1999.³¹⁰

Agricultural production remains important, because it employs 80% of the work force and contributes a third of the GDP. The War in Darfur, the aftermath of two decades of war in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) in the south, the lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and reliance by much of the population on subsistence agriculture ensure much of the population will remain at or below the poverty line for years. The problem remains, despite rapid rises in average per capital income. In January 2007, the government introduced a new currency, the Sudanese pound, at an initial exchange rate of $1.00 equals 2 Sudanese Pounds.³¹¹

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the IMF, World Bank, and key donors worked closely to promote reforms to counter the effect of inefficient economic policies and practices. By 1984, a combination of factors, including drought, inflation, and confused application of Islamic law, reduced donor disbursements and capital flight led to a serious foreign-exchange crisis and increased shortages of imported inputs and commodities. More significantly, the 1989 revolution caused many donors in Europe, the U.S., and Canada to suspend official development assistance, but not humanitarian aid.³¹²

Sudan has 84 million hectares of arable land and less than 20% is cultivated. Major agricultural projects such as the Gezera Scheme in Gezira state are underway in order to make Sudan food self-sufficient. Sudan is one of the world’s potential breadbaskets and Sudan is nicknamed as the Arab world food basket as it accounts for 45% of arable land in the Arab world. In 1998 there was an estimated 16.9 million hectares (41.8 million acres) of arable land and approximately 1.9 million hectares (4.7 million acres) set aside for irrigation, primarily in the north of the country along the banks of the Nile and other rivers.³¹³

Sudan is mainly composed of vast plains and plateaus that are drained by the Nile River and its tributaries. This river system runs from south to north across the entire length of the east-central part of the country. The immense plain of which Sudan is composed is bounded on the west by the Nile-Congo watershed and the highlands of Darfur and on the east by the Ethiopian Plateau and the Red Sea Hills (ʿAtbāy). This plain can be divided into a northern area of rock desert that is part of the Sahara; the western Qawz, an area of undulating sand dunes that merges northward into the rock desert; and central-southern clay plain.³¹⁴

Most of northern Sudan is a sand- or gravel-covered desert, diversified by flat-topped mesas of Nubian sandstone and island-like steep-sided granite hills. In south-central Sudan the clay plain is marked by inselbergs (isolated hills rising abruptly from the plains), the largest group of which forms the Nuba Mountains (Jibāl Al-Nūbah). The western plain is composed primarily of Nubian sandstones, which form a dissected plateau region with flat-topped mesas and buttes. The volcanic highlands of the Marrah Mountains rise out of the Darfur Plateau farther west to elevations between approximately 3,000 and 10,000 feet (900 and 3,000 metres) above sea level. These mountains form the Nile-Congo watershed and the western boundary of the clay plain.³¹⁵

In northeastern Sudan the Red Sea Hills region is an uplifted escarpment. The scarp slope facing the Red Sea forms rugged hills that are deeply incised by streams. The escarpment overlooks a narrow coastal plain that is 10 to 25 miles (16 to 40 km) wide and festooned with dunes and coral reefs. Farther south the eastern uplands constitute the foothills of the Ethiopian highland massif.³¹⁶

Sudan’s rapid industrial development consists of agricultural processing, electronics assembly, plastics manufacturing, furniture, tanning, sugar production, meat processing and various light industries located in any of the 10 Industrial areas in Khartoum. Due to the many countries depending on Sudan for medicines and medical services, Sudan is now concentrating on becoming a hub for the medical industry in East Africa, providing facilities and concessions for medical investments and succeeding in covering about 70% of needs and exporting to many neighboring nations. In recent years, the Giad Industrial Complex in Al Jazirah state introduced the assembly of small autos and trucks, and some heavy military equipment such as armored personnel carriers and the “Bashir” and “Zubair” main battle tanks as well as handguns, light and heavy machineguns and howitzers and, recently, drone production. Sudan is reputed to have great mineral resources, and exploration has started extensively for gold, of which is produced nearly 30 tons annually providing a great boost to the foreign exchange reserves of the nation, with the participation of many investment companies from all over the world. Quantities of asbestos, chromium, mica, kaolin and copper are now exploited commercially, especially for export to China.³¹⁷

However, as Sudan became the world’s largest debtor to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund by 1993, its relationship with the international financial institutions soured in the mid-1990s and has yet to be fully rehabilitated. The government fell out of compliance with an IMF standby program and accumulated substantial arrearages on repurchase obligations. A 4-year economic reform plan was announced in 1988 but was not pursued.³¹⁸

Historically, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations traditionally have supplied most of Sudan’s economic assistance. Sudan’s role as an economic link between Arab and African countries is reflected by the presence in Khartoum of the Arab Bank for African development. The World Bank had been the largest source of development loans.³¹⁹ 

The mining industry contributed little to GDP until the discovery of commercially exploitable quantities of petroleum in the late 1970s offered hope that the sector would play an increased role in the economy in the future. Nonhydrocarbon minerals of actual or potential commercial value include gold, chrome, copper, iron ore, manganese, asbestos, gypsum, mica, limestone, marble, uranium, silver, lead, talc, tungsten, zinc, and diamonds.³²⁰

Extensive petroleum exploration first began in Sudan in the mid-1970s. Significant finds were made in the Upper Nile region and commercial quantities of oil began to be exported in October 2000, reducing Sudan’s outflow of foreign exchange for imported petroleum products. Today, oil is an important export industry in Sudan. Estimates suggest that oil accounts for between 70% and 90% of Sudan’s total exports. The primary importers of Sudanese oil are Japan, China, South Korea, Indonesia, and India.³²¹

Most of Sudan’s oil reserves are located in the Muglad and Melut rift basins in the south of the country. Oil fields in the south, such as those at Heglig and in the South Sudanese state of Unity, formerly part of Sudanese territory, are linked to the country’s refineries via pipelines. The two largest oil pipelines are the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which travels 1,600 kilometres from the Unity oil field to Port Sudan on the Red Sea via Khartoum, and the PetroDar pipeline, which extends 1,380 kilometres from the Palogue oil field in the Melut Basin to Port Sudan.³²²

Crude oil from the Muglad Basin is known as “Nile Blend” and is refined at the Khartoum crude oil refinery. In 2006, the China National Petroleum Corporation upgraded the Khartoum refinery, doubling its capacity to 100,000 barrels per day (16,000m3/d). Oil from the Melud Basin is known as “Dar Blend” and is refined at the Port Sudan Refinery, which has a capacity of 21,700 barrels per day (3,450m3/d). In 2005, the Sudanese government contracted Petronas to build a new refinery at Port Sudan.³²³

Sudan Crude Oil Production

The Undersecretary of the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining, Suleiman Hamed, said that his country’s oil reserves were estimated at 6 billion barrels. Mr. Hamed said that this was an indication that his ministry had prepared 25 square kilometres for immediate investment by both local and foreign companies. “Sudan has oil reserves that have been estimated at approximately 6 billion barrels, whereas 1 billion 700 thousand barrels have been used.³²⁴

“We have prepared 25 square kilometres for oil production, including two locations in the [Red Sea] state, in addition to other locations in the country’s west and south,” Mr. Hamed said in a statement. The ministry’s oil chief also revealed that “the country currently produces 60,000 barrels per day, and is expected to reach 80,000 barrels per day in 2021.” Mr. Hamed extended his invitation to highly experienced oil and gas production companies from all countries, stating that “Sudan is very rich in natural resources, and we have a very large reserve of gas that have not been tapped until this day.” “A French company is currently conducting studies and research to uncover the exact quantity of gas available in the country, figures that will be used by us. The main areas where gas has been discovered are located in the states of West Kordofan, East Darfur, the Red Sea, and the Dinder area,” he explained.³²⁵

Mr. Hamed stated that all companies that were currently working in Sudan on oil production are local, with the exception of the Chinese CNPC, which is investing in only 6 square kilometers. The official also expected that U.S., European and Russian companies will come to invest in oil and gas once Sudan is removed from the U.S. terrorist list at the end of this month. The official also called on all companies with expertise to come and invest in Sudan, saying that Sudan is in need of companies with specialised skills, expertise and technology. “We want the Russian side to work with us to construct an oil refinery in the coastal city of Port Sudan,” he said. Sudan has lost 73 per cent of its oil as a result of the secession by South Sudan in 2011, which triggered economic crisis in the following years, accentuating the nation’s dependence on revenues from oil exports.³²⁶

According to Worldometers, Sudan holds 5,000,000,000 barrels of proven oil reserves as of 2016, ranking 23rd in the world and accounting for about 0.3% of the world’s total oil reserves of 1,650,585,140,000 barrels.  Its current production strength is 107,853 barrels per day (48th in the world). Its consumption is 140,000 barrels per day (68th in the world and accounting for about 0.1% of the world’s total consumption of 97,103,871 barrels per day) as of the year 2016 with daily deficit of -32,147 barrels per day. Its oil export is just a paltry 22,315 barrels per day in 2016 representing 21% of its oil production – all indicating the strength of the economy relative to its oil resource as a source of foreign exchange earnings.  Sudan consumes 0.15 gallons of oil per capita every day (based on the 2016 population of 39,847,439 people), or 54 gallons per capita per year (1 barrels). [1 barrel = 42 US Gallons]. Sudan has proven reserves equivalent to 97.8 times its annual consumption. This means that, without Net Exports, there would be about 98 years of oil left (at current consumption levels and excluding unproven reserves).³²⁷

[Meanwhile] Sudan’s government has reached an agreement with tribal protesters to allow the resumption of exports of landlocked South Sudan’s crude oil via a terminal on the Red Sea, Sudanese officials said. Protesters from the Beja tribes in eastern Sudan – demonstrating against what they say is a lack of political power and poor economic conditions in the region – have been blocking roads and forcing Red Sea ports to close in recent weeks. A government delegation headed by a member of the ruling sovereign council met tribal elders on Sunday and secured a deal to allow oil exports from the Bashayer port, the council said. “The joint meeting between the government delegation headed by General Shams al-Din Kabashi, a member of the sovereign council, and a delegation from the Beja council reached an agreement on allowing the passage of South Sudanese oil exports through the Bashayer port,” Khartoum’s ruling sovereign council said in a statement late Sunday. The council did not disclose the terms of the deal – which came hours after senior government officials flew to Port Sudan, the Red Sea trade hub – or give further details.³²⁸

The governmental delegation led by Kabashi included Oil Minister Gadein Ali Obeid, Foreign Minister Mariam al-Mahdi and others. They put forward proposals to eventually open all ports and roads leading to the city, which protesters began blocking early last week. The Beja tribe elders tentatively agreed and said they would need a week to further discuss the initiatives, the statement added. Bashayer is the main terminal, near Port Sudan, from which landlocked South Sudan’s oil supplies are shipped to global markets. The Sudanese energy and oil ministry warned on Saturday the port’s oil depots would be completely full in 10 days’ time if the blockage continued. That would, in turn, force South Sudanese oilfields to halt production. The protesters also forced the closure of a pipeline that carries imported crude to the capital, Khartoum.³²⁹

Neighbouring South Sudan produces about 162,000 barrels of oil per day, which are transported by pipeline to Port Sudan and then exported. The Khartoum government receives $25 for every barrel of oil sold from South Sudan, according to official figures. But the eastern protesters, from Sudan’s Beja minority, say the deal with rebels from the Darfur region, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states ignored their interests. Speaking in Khartoum on Sunday, Sovereign Council chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan described the protesters’ demands as “a political matter that must be dealt with politically”. While impeding access to Port Sudan, the protesters also blocked the entrance to the city’s airport and a bridge linking Kassala with the rest of the country.³³⁰

It is obvious that Sudan’s oil resource and revenue have not been much of benefits to it because of the political crisis in which it has been engulfed over the decades.

Sudan in the Grip of Bretton Woods Institutions

In late June 2021, shortly after the IMF approved debt relief package for Sudan, hundreds of people took to the streets in several cities in Sudan to demand the resignation of the government. Behind this angst are the austerity measures put in place as part of reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “No to the policies of international financial institutions” and “The people want the fall of the regime” were some of the slogans heard among the protesters in Khartoum, according to AFP correspondents on site.³³¹

These demonstrations come less than 24 hours after the IMF announced the release of massive economic aid for Sudan, with a debt relief of 50 billion dollars, representing nearly 90% of the total debt of the country. The popular discontent has been palpable for several months and has increased after the removal of fuel subsidies in early June, which doubled the price of diesel and gasoline.³³²

In the capital Khartoum, dozens of demonstrators burned tires in front of the presidential palace, carrying placards that read “Bread for the poor”, before the police dispersed them with tear gas. In Ummdurman, twin city of the capital, demonstrators trying to reach Khartoum were dispersed in the same way. In Kassala (east), dozens took to the streets to demand justice for people killed during the popular protests that ousted former autocratic leader Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. “Blood for blood, we will not accept compensation,” protesters shouted.³³³

In a speech broadcast on national television, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok praised the “patience” and “endurance” of the Sudanese people on Wednesday after the IMF announcement. “We are on the right track,” he said. Ahead of the protests, authorities announced they had arrested 79 people suspected of having links to Bashir and planning violent acts.³³⁴

Sudan [had earlier] received approval from the International Monetary Fund for relief on more than $56 billion in debt and new IMF funding of $2.5 billion over three years. The IMF has accepted the East African country into the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative based on the country’s commitment to macroeconomic reforms, it said, meaning Sudan can finally access debt forgiveness and new funds. Sudan is the penultimate candidate for the IMF-World Bank programme and by far the largest debt holder.³³⁵

Now at the programme’s “decision point,” Sudan will see its external debt drop to about $30 billion relatively soon. It will then fall to $6 billion when Sudan achieves irrevocable debt relief after an estimated three years, at the “completion point,” IMF mission head Carol Baker said. Analysts said the HIPC decision came unusually quickly, a product of international goodwill toward Sudan’s civilian leaders sharing power with the military during a fragile political transition and acknowledgement of rapid, painful economic reforms. “It’s not over yet but this is a really significant milestone on the country’s path to a more prosperous future,” said Ian Clark, partner at legal firm White & Case, which is advising the government on debt restructuring through the HIPC with financial adviser Lazard.³³⁶

Deepened by decades of isolation and sanctions, Sudan’s economic crisis includes inflation approaching 400%, shortages of basic goods and services and a spike in food insecurity. Recent economic reforms include the removal of fuel subsidies and sharp exchange rate devaluation under an IMF-monitored programme required to enter HIPC. Another condition for accessing HIPC was removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, achieved last year after Sudan agreed to provide compensation to victims of attacks and normalize relations with Israel. “This is a big day for Sudan and reaffirms that all the efforts and sacrifices of the Sudanese people are recognized and rewarded,” Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok said in a statement.³³⁷

Under Omar al-Bashir, ousted as president after a popular uprising in April 2019, Sudan accumulated massive arrears, or unpaid interest and penalties that grew to account for 85% of the country’s total debt. Its power-sharing deal is due to last until the end of 2023. Sudan is still calculating its full debt, but in a March report the IMF said the country owed $19 billion to Paris Club countries and the same to non-Paris Club countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and China as of the end of 2019. Its large commercial debts of at least $6 billion are roughly matched by what it owed to multilateral organisations. Sudan’s arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank were settled earlier this year, and the IMF announced on Tuesday that its arrears were also resolved with help from a French bridge loan.³³⁸

The $2.5 billion in new funding is a combination of grants and cheap loans that the IMF calls an “extended credit facility.” This will provide Sudan much needed direct financing but requires that Sudan push ahead with reforms also required for permanent debt relief. Some $1.4 billion of the total was dispersed immediately, the IMF said, in order to repay France. The remainder will be disbursed over the next 39 months. “We are looking to make space for private sector-led growth to create jobs,” including by reducing the country’s need to print money, said Baker.³³⁹

Sudan must demonstrate it has achieved macroeconomic stability and improved governance and that it has used the new “fiscal breathing space” to reduce poverty, finance ministry senior adviser Magdi Amin told Reuters. Khartoum cannot fall back into arrears on its remaining debt for the relief to be made permanent, he added. That is crucial for Sudan’s over-burdened government, which Baker said inherited reserves at less than a week’s worth of imports from the Bashir regime. It routinely struggles to import fuel, causing frequent power cuts.³⁴⁰

The IMF estimated in April that Sudan needs more than $7 billion in external financing over the next two years. The reforms so far have caused food and transportation costs to surge, forcing Sudanese people to make sacrifices. There are frequent protests, including demonstrations planned on Wednesday. “It’s imperative that (the government) communicate properly to the population … on this so people don’t look up and just see the pain,” said Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst at the International Crisis Group.³⁴¹

On June 29, 2021, The Executive Boards of the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [announced they] have determined that Sudan has taken the necessary steps to begin receiving debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Sudan is the 38th country to reach this milestone, known as the HIPC Decision Point.³⁴²

Debt relief will support Sudan in implementing essential reforms to improve the lives of its people by allowing the freeing up of resources to tackle poverty and improve social conditions. Sudan’s external public debt will be irrevocably reduced—through HIPC debt relief and other debt relief initiatives anchored to the HIPC initiative—by more than US$50 billion in net present value terms, representing over 90 percent of Sudan’s total external debt—if it reaches the HIPC Completion Point in about three years’ time.³⁴³

In addition, as Sudan continues on its path towards peace, stability and development after more than 30 years of isolation from the international financial system, the normalization of its relations with the international community will enable access to critical additional financial resources to strengthen the economy and improve social conditions. “Today marks an important milestone that will enable Sudan to significantly reduce its debt burden. This is a potentially transformative outcome for a nation of 44 million people that has suffered conflict, instability, and economic isolation for decades,” said World Bank Group President David Malpass following the World Bank Executive Board discussion on June 28, 2021. “The World Bank has been providing pre-arrears clearance grants to Sudan and supporting the Sudan Family Support Program, and I am looking forward to further scaling up our engagement to improve the living conditions of the Sudanese people.”³⁴⁴

“I would like to congratulate the Sudanese government and people for their steadfast efforts over the past year leading to this historic milestone under challenging conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic,” said Kristalina Georgieva, IMF Managing Director. “Successful reform efforts have laid the groundwork for fostering inclusive economic growth and addressing the needs of the most vulnerable people. Sudan needs to sustain and expand the implementation of these reforms—and in doing so it can count on the IMF’s continuous support to secure a more prosperous future.”³⁴⁵

“This decision is an important milestone which will support Sudan’s reform and development agenda and our efforts to move away from the past and foster better lives for our people,” said Abdallah Hamdok, Prime Minister, Republic of Sudan. “The journey leading to this decision required hard work, dedication and strong partnership with the international community. This is a big day for Sudan and reaffirms that all the efforts and sacrifices of Sudanese people are recognized and rewarded. The Government of Sudan expresses its appreciation to the IMF, the World Bank Group, and other partners for their unwavering support and to the Sudanese people for their resilience, patience, and dedication in these trying times.”³⁴⁶

Sudan is committed to strengthening macroeconomic stability; implementing policies to reduce poverty; and putting in place a set of reforms focused on fiscal sustainability, exchange rate flexibility, expanding the social safety net, strengthening the financial sector and improving governance and transparency, in order to reach the HIPC Completion Point. The World Bank and the IMF will continue working together to provide the technical assistance and policy guidance needed by the authorities to achieve these goals, including in the context of the new, 39-month IMF financial arrangement.³⁴⁷

In addition, following the arrears clearance, the World Bank has unlocked substantial project financing through IDA, which will provide nearly US$2 billion in grants for poverty reduction and sustainable economic recovery—with a focus on enhancing competitiveness, transparency and accountability; increasing investment in irrigation and agriculture to support sustainable livelihoods; supporting access to energy, water, health, and education; creating jobs; and creating entrepreneurship opportunities for women and youth.³⁴⁸

The leaderships of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund express gratitude to their member countries of all regions and income levels, in particular Canada, France, Italy, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, together with the European Commission, whose interventions and additional grants helped catalyze international support and raise the necessary financial resources to help Sudan reach the Decision Point. They would also like to thank other countries which went through their budgetary processes to contribute: Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.³⁴⁹

At the start of the HIPC process, Sudan’s total public- and publicly guaranteed external debt was estimated at US$56.2 billion in NPV terms. Application of traditional debt relief mechanisms reduces this debt to US$30.9 billion. Additional debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative is estimated at US$23.3 billion in NPV terms. Of this amount, US$4.6 billion, US$17.0 billion, and US$1.7 billion are projected to be provided by official multilateral, bilateral, and commercial creditors, respectively.³⁵⁰

Paris Club creditors have provided financing assurances for interim debt relief to Sudan . The largest Paris Club creditors for Sudan are France, Austria, the United States, Belgium, and Italy. The IMF Executive Board has approved interim debt relief assistance on debt service falling due to the IMF in the period between the HIPC Decision and Completion Points. At the HIPC Completion Point, Sudan’s current debt due to the IMF will be paid with the proceeds of voluntary financial contributions that have been received from over 100 IMF members, including many low-income countries.³⁵¹

Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). MDRI debt relief from IDA and the African Development Bank would cancel all remaining claims at the Completion Point.³⁵²  Altogether, Sudan’s external debt burden is expected to fall from about US$56 billion (163 percent of GDP) in NPV terms as of end-2020 to US$6 billion (14 percent of GDP) once the Completion Point is reached and with the participation of all creditors.³⁵³

Arrears to IDA were cleared on March 26, 2021 through bridge financing provided by the United States, reimbursed with the proceeds of a Development Policy Grant primarily funded from IDA’s Arrears Clearance Set Aside in IDA19. Arrears to the African Development Bank Group were cleared on May 12, 2021 through bridge financing provided by the government of the United Kingdom and contributions from Sweden and Ireland. The bridge loan from the UK was reimbursed via the proceeds of a Policy Based Operation Grant. Arrears to the IMF were cleared on June 29, 2021 with the assistance of bridge financing from the government of France, which the authorities reimbursed using front-loaded access under the new IMF financial arrangement.³⁵⁴

In 1996, the World Bank and IMF launched the HIPC Initiative to create a framework in which all creditors, including multilateral creditors, can provide debt relief to the world’s poorest and most heavily indebted countries to ensure debt sustainability, and thereby reduce the constraints on economic growth and poverty reduction imposed by the unsustainable debt service burdens in these countries. To date, 38 HIPC-eligible countries, including Sudan, have reached Decision Point, of which 36 have reached Completion Point.³⁵⁵

Created in 2005, the aim of the MDRI is to further reduce the debt of eligible low-income countries and provide additional resources to help them reach their development objectives. Under the MDRI, three multilateral institutions—the World Bank’s IDA, the IMF and the African Development Fund—provide 100 percent debt relief on eligible debts to qualifying countries, at the time they reach the HIPC Initiative Completion Point. Sudan will receive additional debt relief under the MDRI from the World Bank Group and the AfDB Group, but it is not eligible for MDRI debt relief from the IMF because Sudan does not have any outstanding MDRI-eligible loans from the IMF. Sudan, however, is expected to be considered by the IMF for “beyond HIPC” debt relief, as was done in the case of Liberia and Somalia, which would amount to 100 percent debt relief on eligible debt from the IMF.³⁵⁶

According to Sudanese PM Abdalla Hamdok, the East African country’s total debts amount to some $60 billion. France is hosting a conference of several African leaders offering to assist Sudan’s transitional government.³⁵⁷

Meanwhile France offered crisis-stricken Sudan a bridging loan worth $1.5 billion (€1.25 billion) on Monday to help pay its arrears to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while Germany is also keen to participate in Sudan’s debt relief. The announcement was formally made by French President Emmanuel Macron, who is hosting a summit of several African leaders in Paris [May 2021], seeking support for Sudan’s fledgling transitional government. “Despite the difficulties, considerable progress has been made since the fall of the old regime,” Macron said in his opening address.  Hailing its transition as “an inspiration” and a “precedent,” he said that the international community had a “collective responsibility” to help Sudan realize its goals.³⁵⁸

Alongside Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said: “This contribution demonstrates the strength of our partnership and the trust we have in Sudan.” Macron also announced the cancellation of Sudan’s $5 billion debt to France. “We are in favor of entirely cancelling Sudan’s debt (towards France),” Macron said in a news conference. “We are expecting from other participants … to make a similar effort, which is the needed effort to free Sudan from the debt burden.”³⁵⁹ Other countries in attendance at the Paris meeting, including the United States and Britain, agreed to clear Sudan’s arrears to the International Monetary Fund.³⁶⁰

According to Hamdok, Sudan has outstanding debts of around $60 billion and its economic crisis has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. Earlier this year, Sudan settled its debts with the World Bank thanks to a bridging loan from the United States. By clearing its debts with the World Bank and the IMF, Sudan is paving the way to receiving poverty-reduction grants, as well as a wider debt relief package from the global community.³⁶¹

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas was also present in Paris for talks over Sudan debt relief, as it was confirmed Berlin pledged $110 million worth of Sudanese IMF liabilities. Germany is also offering 390 million euros worth of bilateral debt relief. Before departing for the French capital, Maas recalled the Berlin conference on Sudan last June, at which participants had pledged a total of $1.8 billion in aid. “Great hopes rest on the success of the peaceful revolution in Sudan,” Maas said in a statement. “The political and economic reform process that has begun is arduous, but it offers a historic opportunity for more peace, economic prospects and freedom for the people of Sudan. Germany has stood shoulder to shoulder from the very beginning.” Maas said Germany was prepared to “participate comprehensively” in the country’s debt relief.³⁶²

Last August, the government in Khartoum reached a peace agreement with rebel groups after a seventeen-year conflict. According to UN figures, some 300,000 people had been killed in the conflict in the western Sudanese region of Darfur since 2003, and around 2.7 million forced from their homes.³⁶³

The coup was definitely a victory for the Middle East backers of the new military junta while it was a great loss for the World Bank/IMF condominium and other multilateral financial institutions that are currently engaged with Sudan over how to pull its economy out of the woods.

The IMF on Tuesday [October 26] said it was following events in Sudan after a military coup that saw the prime minister deposed and major donors suspend aid. “It is premature to comment on the implications of recent events in Sudan, but we are monitoring the developments carefully,” a spokeswoman for the Washington-based crisis lender told AFP.³⁶⁴ The World Bank and IMF in June granted Sudan debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, cutting the nation’s debt in half to about $28 billion, and the institutions have offered additional help if economic reforms continue. However, following the coup, the US, a key backer of the transition, strongly condemned the military’s actions and suspended hundreds of millions of dollars in aid.  The EU late Tuesday threatened “serious consequences” for Sudan’s rulers, including financial support.³⁶⁵

There are, of course, key questions on Sudan and answered by the IMF itself. For instance, what does the Decision Point mean and why is it important for Sudan?

According to the IMF’s FAQs: At Decision Point, a country becomes eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. A country reaches Decision Point when it: (1) establishes a minimum six-month track record of satisfactory performance under an IMF Upper-Credit-Tranche quality program; in Sudan’s case, the UCT-quality Staff-Monitored Program (SMP); (2) clears its arrears to the World Bank, AfDB, and IMF, and agrees to a strategy to clear arrears to other multilateral creditors; (3) agrees to a set of appropriate completion point triggers with IMF and IDA staff; and (4) adopts at least an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy.³⁶⁶

Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative will significantly reduce Sudan’s external debt burden.Assuming full application and creditor participation, Sudan’s debt is expected to decline from about $56 billion under current assumptions to $28 billion at Decision Point in present value terms. At Completion Point, debt is estimated to decline further to around $6 billion.³⁶⁷

What happens next? What more does Sudan need to do to get the full amount of debt relief? To obtain full debt relief, Sudan will need to reach the HIPC Completion Point. This can be accomplished once Sudan implements the floating Completion Point triggers (including satisfactory implementation of their full Poverty Reduction Strategy for at least one year) and maintains a track record of satisfactory macroeconomic performance under the country’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF).³⁶⁸

Why does Sudan need debt relief? Sudan’s debt is large and mostly comprised of long-standing arrears (see composition below) that have accumulated over time. Standing at over 150 percent of GDP and over ten (10) times of exports, Sudan’s debt is unsustainable. The HIPC framework aims to lower an eligible country’s debt burden to 150 percent of exports in order to align it with their capacity to repay.³⁶⁹

What is the composition of Sudan’s debt and what does debt relief mean in the context of the HIPC initiative? Sudan owes debt to multilateral creditors (11 percent), Paris Club and non-Paris Club bilateral creditors (78 percent, split 42 and 36 percent, respectively) and commercial creditors (11 percent). Under the HIPC initiative, all creditors are expected to share in the burden of debt relief by providing comparability of treatment. Comparability of treatment means that Sudan should not accept less favorable terms from any one creditor than others; in other words, all creditors should apply the “common reduction factor” equally to their outstanding debt stock in providing relief.³⁷⁰

Sudan has a new financing arrangement with the IMF. What is the purpose of that? The new Extended Credit Facility (ECF) will anchor the authorities’ policies and reforms between the HIPC Decision Point and Completion Point. The reform priorities in the ECF arrangement have been closely coordinated with other donors and complement the proposed HIPC floating Completion Point (CP) triggers that will determine precisely when Sudan could reach the Completion Point.³⁷¹

Reforms will focus on: fiscal stability through increased domestic revenue mobilization and reduced energy subsidies, and measures to strengthen the social safety net; supporting exchange rate flexibility and the adoption of a reserve money targeting regime; strengthening the financial sector by implementing a dual banking system and reforming the bank resolution regime; and strengthening governance and transparency, especially in the SOE sector.³⁷²

How is Sudan’s economy currently doing and how has the global COVID-19 pandemic affected the country? Despite recording a third consecutive year of contraction in 2020 (-3.6 percent), the Sudanese economy held up better than the Middle East and North Africa region as a whole despite COVID-19 mitigation measures and record flooding. Inflation rose to 379 percent y/y in May 2021 due to large monetization of the fiscal deficit and was exacerbated by shortages of food and fuel. Growth is expected to pick up in 2021 with inflation falling as the fiscal deficit is reduced and higher grant financing lowers the need for monetization.³⁷³

The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded the challenges faced by the transitional government. The official number of confirmed COVID cases stands at 34,889 with 2,600 deaths as of May 24. Due to an accelerating infection rate, on May 18 the government suspended studies in all universities and schools for one month and banned certain mass gatherings.³⁷⁴

What role does the international community play in supporting Sudan’s plea to attain debt relief? The international community supports Sudan in achieving debt relief on multiple levels. The IMF and World Bank are supporting Sudan’s efforts to reintegrate with the international financial community through the HIPC process, including through the joint debt reconciliation exercise. The IMF supports the authorities’ policy agenda to achieve a satisfactory track record through the Staff-Monitored Program, while the World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) lent their support to the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy. Sudan cleared its arrears to the World Bank on March 26 and the African Development Bank on May 12 and to the IMF on June 29. Several bilateral partners are also providing support.³⁷⁵

Does debt relief provide fresh resources to Sudan? No, debt relief aims to bring the level and repayment schedule of the debt that Sudan currently has to a level that is sustainable, with debt service payments that are consistent with Sudan’s limited payment capacity. At Decision Point, Sudan’s stock of debt will decline but its debt service payments will likely increase as Sudan resumes debt service payments. That said, reintegration with the international financing community and becoming current on debt service obligations falling due will unlock concessional financing and grants from multilateral as well as bilateral donors. Moreover, sustained strong macroeconomic policies and improvements in the business climate will help attract foreign investment.³⁷⁶ 

Sudan is the 38th country to reach this milestone, known as the HIPC Decision Point.³⁷⁷

With the support of the international community, Sudan has been pursuing a transformational reform agenda focused on: (i) achieving internal peace based on inclusion, regional equity, and justice; (ii) removing economic distortions and stabilizing the economy, and (iii) building a foundation for future sustained inclusive growth, development, and poverty reduction. In support of its home-grown reform agenda, in June 2020, the transitional government requested a Staff Monitored Program (SMP) with the IMF. Under the program, Sudan has built a strong track record of reforms—such as the reduction of retail gasoline and diesel subsidies and the move to a market-determined exchange rate, as well as measures to strengthen governance and provide further social assistance through the Sudan Family Support Program.³⁷⁸

Given the country’s fragile economic situation and large financing needs, regaining access to resources from multilateral institutions will be a critical step in further supporting the government’s agenda of improving economic and social welfare throughout the country.³⁷⁹

In light of its large and unsustainable debt burden, Sudan was deemed eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative as indicated by the preliminary debt relief analysis (DRA).  And on June 28, 2021, the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank approved debt relief for Sudan under this initiative—immediately reducing the country’s debt from about US$56 billion to US$28 billion.³⁸⁰

This important milestone, known as the Decision Point, is the first formal step in the HIPC process and means that Sudan has established a strong track record of economic reforms, is committed to reducing widespread poverty, and has cleared its arrears to the International Development Association (IDA) (US$1.1 bn), to the African Development Bank (US$400 million) (March 2021) and to the IMF (US$1.4 billion) in June 2021.³⁸¹

Reaching the Decision Point also means that a new Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement will be in place to anchor the authorities’ policies and reforms between the Decision Point and the Completion Point, at which time Sudan’s pre-Decision Point debt to the IMF would be cancelled. These combined efforts serve as an important step toward forgiveness by all creditors of much of Sudan’s total public- and publicly-guaranteed external debt, which was estimated at US$56 billion at the end of 2020.³⁸²

If Sudan continues its steadfast commitment to economic reforms, the country has the potential to reach the Completion Point by June 2024, which could drop Sudan’s debt by US$50 billion to about US$6 billion. This can be accomplished once Sudan implements the floating Completion Point triggers (including satisfactory implementation of their full Poverty Reduction Strategy for at least one year) and maintains a track record of satisfactory macroeconomic performance under the Extended Credit Facility arrangement. As such, it will be important to make sustained progress over the coming months, and for donors and the international community to provide Sudan with sufficient support to facilitate its transition to a stronger, more inclusive economy that benefits the Sudanese people.³⁸³

On September 29, 2021, the World Bank Group issued a broad overview of the political economic travails facing Sudan

The World Bank in Sudan maintains a portfolio of approximately $2.3 billion across a range of areas, including education, health, agriculture, natural resource management, climate change, peace-building, and public financial management.³⁸⁴

Sudan is geographically located at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and stretches across the Red Sea. Sudan shares borders with seven countries including Libya and Egypt to the North, Chad to the West, the Central African Republic to the South-West, South Sudan to the South, Ethiopia to the South-East and Eritrea to the East.³⁸⁵

The White and Blue Niles meet in Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan, and merge to become the Nile River that flows all the way to the Mediterranean Sea via Egypt. Sudan has a Sahelian belt with the desert in the far north, fertile land in the Nile valleys, the Gezira and across the rest of the country from Darfur to Kassala via Blue Nile and Kordofan States for farming and livestock herding.³⁸⁶

For most of its independent history, the country has been beset by internal conflicts that weakened its ability to play a leadership role in the region. Under the terms of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, South Sudan seceded in 2011 and became the 54th independent State of Africa.³⁸⁷

The secession of South Sudan induced multiple economic shocks. The biggest one being the loss of the oil revenue that accounted for more than half of Sudan’s government revenue and 95% of its exports. This has reduced economic growth, and resulted in double-digit consumer price inflation, which, together with increased fuel prices, triggered violent protests in September 2013.³⁸⁸

The outbreak of civil war in South Sudan damaged both economies depriving Sudan of much needed pipeline revenues. The war in South Sudan also precipitated an increase in Sudan’s already large population of refugees and internally displaced persons with Sudan now serving as a source, destination and transit country for irregular migration, including refugees and asylum-seekers using the East African North-bound migratory route through Libya to Europe. The country hosts an estimated 763 thousand South Sudanese refugees and 159 thousand refugees and asylum seekers from Eritrea, Syria, Yemen, and Chad. The recent peace accord between the warring parties brokered by Sudan and Ethiopia appears to be holding, but the war damaged oil infrastructure, further eroding revenue availability to Sudan.³⁸⁹

Following the global oil price slump in 2015/2016, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to lower oil transit fees for South Sudanese oil via Sudan’s pipeline, as it became inefficient to export it. In December 2016, they extended their 2012 agreement on oil for three years on the same terms, except for provisions to adjust transit fees in line with global oil prices.³⁹⁰

Continuous food price hikes led to the December 2018 demonstrations which resulted in the removal of president El-Bashir from power in April 2019. This led to the formation of a Transition Government in September 2019. The power-sharing agreement between the military and civilian forces expected to last 39 months, allowed a civilian Prime Minister to lead the government under the authority of a Presidential Sovereign Council to be chaired by the military during the first 21 months followed by a civilian during the remaining 18 months. A transitional legislative assembly is expected to be established soon. On Wednesday July 22, 2020 the Prime Minister appointed 18 civilian Governors thereby achieving a key milestone included in the Constitutional Document of the transition.³⁹¹

Armed conflicts in Sudan’s westernmost region of Darfur have subsided but many parts of the region remain precarious because of the proliferation of arms and banditry. Efforts to settle conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile remain deadlocked. The Transitional Government has engaged in peace negotiations with relevant armed groups and signed a peace deal on October 3, 2020 with Sudan Revolution Front (SRF)   expected to put an end to the long-standing conflicts that divert huge resources from much needed social programs and investments in human capital to military buildup.³⁹²

In addition to the political and economic uncertainty, Sudan, like the rest of the world, has been experiencing the unprecedented social and economic impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. The COVID-19 shock is expected to be transitory with potential recovery possible in 2021 but the overall adverse economic impact on Sudan will be substantial. The economic impact of COVID-19 includes the increased price of basic foods, rising unemployment, and falling exports. Restrictions on movement are making the economic situation worse, with commodity prices soaring across the country. According to the International Monetary Fund has already forecasted an overall economic stagnation in 2020 in Sudan.³⁹³

On September 30, 2021, World Bank Group President David Malpass met with Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan.

President Malpass and Chairman al-Burhan discussed the current socioeconomic conditions in Sudan, the peace process, and the importance of continued consensus-building and broad-based political support for further reforms in the energy sector.³⁹⁴

President Malpass commended Sudan for its progress since the 2019 Revolution and affirmed the World Bank Group’s strong support for investments in energy, agriculture, rural development, and finance. President Malpass and Chairman al-Burhan discussed the importance of patience, peace, and stability in order to achieve good development outcomes, including poverty reduction, economic growth, and improved livelihoods for all Sudanese people. President Malpass and Chairman al-Burhan also discussed regional cooperation in the context of the Horn of Africa initiative to bring tangible benefits for all Sudanese people and their neighbors.³⁹⁵

Twenty-five days later after the meeting the same General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led his military lieutenants to strike at the heart of Sudan in a military coup.

Two days after the coup, the World Bank Group President David Malpass issued the following statement on Sudan: “I am greatly concerned by recent events in Sudan, and I fear the dramatic impact this can have on the country’s social and economic recovery and development. In recent weeks, I visited Khartoum to meet with Sudanese authorities, including Prime Minister Hamdok and Chairman al-Burhan, and discussed the country’s economic and social transformation. I heard a clear commitment of all parties to work together toward a more prosperous future for the Sudanese people following 30 years of authoritarian rule and disengagement from the international community.³⁹⁶

 The World Bank Group has been a close partner of Sudan, working alongside other development partners to establish the Sudan Family Support Program and support the country’s COVID-19 vaccination rollout. Sudan was embarking on an ambitious package of economic reforms, which paved the way for the country’s arrears clearance as it became eligible for debt relief under the HIPC initiative.³⁹⁷

The World Bank Group paused disbursements in all of its operations in Sudan on Monday and it has stopped processing any new operations as we closely monitor and assess the situation. We hope that peace and the integrity of the transition process will be restored, so that Sudan can restart its path of economic development and can take its rightful place in the international financial community.”³⁹⁸

Without going into granular details, it is evident that Sudan is a failure both from economic and political standpoints. What the above indicate is that Sudan has over time gone from bad to worse, due to poor governance and/or political incompetence especially under the authoritarian rule of Omar al-Bashir. Omar al-Bashir took Sudan down to valley of economic purgatory, suffering from financial bankruptcy. It has to be bailed out by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and individual countries. Sudan’s total debt has ballooned to around $56 billion by the time Omar al-Bashir was dragged out of the Presidential Palace and driven to Korba Prison.

The debt relief package did not however completely bail out Sudan but merely qualify it for new IMF funding of $2.5 billion (what the IMF called an “extended credit facility”) for urgent projects over three year period “when Sudan has achieved irrevocable debt relief”. But this mean that Sudan do not have the internal financial wherewithal to embark on any project of high financial magnitude on its own – again showing the depth or dungeon to which Sudan has sunk itself over the years especially under Omar al-Bashir. It is a vicious circle.  This debt relief which can be justifiably regarded as international intervention for financial bailout and predicated on Sudan pushing ahead with the “necessary” reforms has, however, been stoutly opposed or rejected by the Sudan masses who took to the streets to protest against these debt relief conditionalities and reforms.

It is a situation analogous to being caught between the Devil in hot pursuit and the hard Rock or Deep Blue Sea.

The question necessarily arises: what could have gone wrong in the calculations of the Bretton Woods Institutions in relation to their bailout plans for Sudan?

First, by the time Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019 the Sudanese economy has been badly battered – almost beyond salvation. The economy was wrecked, tattered and in ruin by the sheer incompetence and corruption under the authoritarian jackboot of President al-Bashir. The economic crisis then was compounded by the almost unending conflicts in Sudan such as the conflict with South Sudan which finally broke away in May 2011 including other ethnic-based conflicts.

The Sovereign Council that took over government from al-Bashir was definitely a child of circumstances and not configured from the very beginning to tackle economic problems the types faced by Sudan but essentially to hold together and prevent the State from complete collapse. The Sovereign Council was a compromise contraption thrown up by the emergencies of the time and between all the contending social and political forces. Thus the Council with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, a largely oriented Western technocrat or a lackey of the Bretton Woods Institutions, came on board on a rescue mission to salvage the Sudanese economy from total bankruptcy and collapse. But more than two years have gone by without any visible improvement on the economy except the noise about the promissory note of financial package or macroeconomic stability from the BWIs and other multilateral financial institutions such as Paris Club of creditors.

Secondly, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, from all evidences available, was not fully in charge of the State machine itself which, on the other hand, is under the control of the military Junkers within the Sovereign Council. That is why there were so many disagreements within the Council and the orders of Prime Minister Hamdok can be seen to be easily flouted with impunity by the military Junkers. The Sovereign Council was sharply divided within itself, was working at cross-purpose and in different directions. From this point of view, it is not surprising that the authority was finally hijacked by the military Junkers from within the Sovereign Council. Literally speaking, order broke down within the Sovereign Council irredeemably.  The intervention of the United States through its Envoy to the Horn of Africa has come to naught. Thus the October 25 coup can be seen to be a spanner thrown into the mechanism of the economic rescue mission led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The mission has been aborted midway before ever having the chance of achieving its set goals.

Thirdly, it should not be assumed that the BWIs are loved with the same strength in all countries. Sudanese did not hesitate to mount protests against the economic policies of the BWIs already imposed on Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok-led cabinet. They were literally up in arms in protest against the BWIs-orchestrated economic reform policies nicely tagged “macroeconomic stability” programs. That is one of the lessons largely ignored in Western media reportage on the ongoing crisis in Sudan. The protests against the BWIs form part of the social and political dynamics that fed into the October Coup. It is true that Sudanese are already used to the culture of demonstrations and protests at the drop of a feather by the government. However, this is understandable within the general context of the enormous sufferings they have been forced to go through and experienced at the hand of incompetent, corrupt and authoritarian regimes in the past and present. The BWIs have neatly packaged Abdalla Hamdok as their poster boy who would carry out their dirty jobs of imposing austerity measures under the guise of macroeconomic stability on Sudan. It turned out that this is a chimera. The nature of political complexity in Sudan was clearly underestimated by the BWIs. Indeed it turned out that the political complexity (within the overall framework of a VUCAed environment – i.e. vulnerability/volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) is much stronger than the BWIs’ historical understanding of Sudan politics and/or society. This is the epistemological failure of the BWIs as regard their efforts at helping Sudan to overcome its epochal economic crisis.

But it is not just the failure of the BWIs alone. The failure also includes that of the US Government itself, in its convoluted foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa and Sudan in this particular case. This foreign policy failure can be traced to the era of Donald Trump administration with all its well-known antics and subtle prejudices against the African continent as a whole.

Unfortunately, Biden Administration has not frees itself completely from the shackles of Trump administration in its foreign policy approach. Biden Administration is still operating with the same parameters that defined Trump Administration’s foreign policy thrusts and goals. While Trump Administration has been hailed for removing Sudan from the list of Global Sponsors of Terrorism in December 2020, (just about a month before he left office in January 2021), Biden Administration has not followed up with either a re-calibrated approach or new perspectives.

In September 2019, The Sentry and Enough Project published the following.

U.S. policy should aim to strengthen the hand of reformers in the civilian government while limiting the influence of the spoilers of reform and peace, principally those associated with the military and security services.  To achieve these goals, economic and diplomatic pressures and incentives from the United States and the broader international community should be aimed at dismantling the violent kleptocratic elements that are still in place within Sudan’s kleptocratic system and that continue to threaten the success of Sudan’s transition.³⁹⁹

To that end, the U.S. government should undertake a more comprehensive and nuanced strategy than the approach it has pursued over the past 30 years, utilizing a combination of policy-based incentives and modernized financial pressures to support carefully benchmarked reforms.⁴⁰⁰

• The United States should apply targeted sanctions against the networks of former and current corrupt officials — along with their associated companies and international and domestic partners — who are acting as spoilers for reform and peace efforts, particularly those linked to the military and Rapid Support Forces.
• The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) should issue a public anti-money laundering advisory warning financial institutions of the risks associated with Politically Exposed Persons involved in significant acts of corruption in Sudan and the typologies of their illicit financial activity, including through the gold trade and banking sector. 
• The U.S. Department of the Treasury should require U.S. companies investing in Sudan to report publicly on due diligence conducted with respect to key issues, such as anti-corruption, human rights, and direct business with the military. 
• As soon as there is evidence that the military and Rapid Support Forces are giving the new civilian government the space to govern — especially with fiscal transparency — and negotiate peace with armed movements, the United States should remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. The prospect of removing Sudan should be a major point of leverage to press for early and visible efforts at reform and peace.  We believe such a timed response is important because of the continued presence of the military and associated paramilitary forces in the new government.  These remnants of the previous regime seek to protect their looted assets and financial interests and arrangements. It is our strongly held concern that entire sectors of the economy are dominated by companies controlled by senior military and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces officials, and the reform efforts of the new civilian administration will be jeopardized by this reality, just as they were in Egypt and elsewhere. 
• The removal of Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List will permit a wide range of new possibilities for development aid, foreign investment, and debt relief for Sudan. These interventions will support the new civilian government as it seeks to rebuild Sudan’s economy and make good on its proclaimed commitments to transparent governance, religious freedom, press freedom, and a resolution of the country’s conflicts.
• With evidence that the new civilian government has oversight over the budget and is prioritizing transparency, the United States should work with other governments, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Development Bank, the European Union, the African Union, and the United Nations to begin a program of conditional debt relief.  Specifically, such relief should be triggered by progress on resolving the country’s various conflicts as well as satisfactory progress on anti-corruption reforms.
• This progress should include:
• Ensuring full transparency of the national budgeting process, including by: Making the budget available to the media, civil society groups, and the public; Permanently closing all off-budget accounts held by government agencies and corporations owned partially or fully by the government ; Subjecting the financial records of such entities to independent audits that are publicly available; Prosecuting cases of abuse or diversion of these entities’ resources for personal use; Conducting a thorough reform of all laws governing public procurement and tenders and financial oversight institutions, such as a reformed anti-corruption commission (see next bullet) and the auditor general’s chamber; and Ensuring the independence of the special corruption prosecution office and the anticorruption special court. 
• Establishing a robust and fully independent anti-corruption commission by an act of parliament; Tasking an independent commission to investigate and prosecute corrupt actors, focusing on the role of Politically Exposed Persons and their companies in skimming high profit margins from government loans and contracts; and Establishing an asset recovery commission to return to the treasury the proceeds of corruption.
• To accelerate these changes, the United States Agency for International Development should extend technical resources to implement anti-corruption reforms and support the new government’s plans for economic and public sector reforms, including through the introduction of anti-corruption and transparency standards as well as the independent institutions named above.⁴⁰¹  

It was a crash of a vision, the collapse of a mission. The US policy towards the Horn of Africa and Sudan in particular, has run into a ditch!

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as Sudanese Trojan Horse

Central to the political drama unfolding in Sudan now is General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the now former chairman of the Sovereign Council and the de facto President of Sudan.

For many years past, al-Burhan has carefully burrowed himself into the matrix and center of power in Sudan, step-by-step climbing the ladder of leadership until he got to that strategic position where he can now call all the shots across the full political spectrum in Sudan without immediate challenge to his authority. He succeeded in climbing to the apex of power with help from many forces and individual actors without and from outside Sudan over the years. He has carefully nursed and nurtured this secret ambition without attracting too much attention or enmity as to his ultimate goal.

General Al-Burhan is simply a product of the time, a product of the aggregate balance of forces in Sudan as the moment. How long he would remain relevant and at the perch of the power loop in Khartoum remains to be seen. The movement of political forces is still very fluid and the political wind can blow unexpectedly in any direction.

Burhan is definitely whom one may call a smooth player, a strategic player, with his own mind and keeping his games to his chest. He may have been largely underestimated in his ambitions because he deliberately keeps a low profile to hide those ambitions. He has carefully nursed and/or nurtured his relationship with both regional and global players without revealing his intentions. In this light, he can be seen as a thoroughbred Machiavellian moving only when it is absolutely necessary. He naturally has his support base in the military keeping eagle eyes on other Generals and containing them in their own ambitions.

But Burhan is only a pawn in the very game he has instigated. He may be regarded as a Machiavellian fool.

There may be no doubt that Western intelligence agencies are not unaware of the huge personality profile of Burhan even though pretending to be “nobody”. While the crisis was unfolding in the last few months, Burhan kept moving on the chess board, moving the knights and queens and eating up the pawns while maneuvering and counter-maneuvering to safeguard his own position while weakening those of other contenders especially the Prime Minister. He clearly outwitted all the players and pretenders. They were no match for him.

His continuous hanging on to power is to the overall detriment of Sudan. He is sowing more discord, fanning the embers of virulent political disagreements. For instance, he has caused the much-hated and indicted Islamists (who are already in jail) to be released.

Al-Burhan was previously chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, the country’s collective head of state, which was established following the Sudanese Revolution in 2019 to guide a Sudanese transition to democracy.  After the military seized power in the October 2021 coup, Al-Burhan dissolved the Sovereignty Council, which previously shared power between the country’s military and civilians. The 2020 Juba Agreement allowed al-Burhan to continue to lead the Sovereignty Council for another 20 months, rather than stepping down as planned in February 2021. Until August 2019, he was also the Chairman of the Transitional Military Council after former Chairman Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf resigned and transferred control in April 2019. He was formerly the General Inspector of the Sudanese Armed Forces.⁴⁰²

In May 2019, Burhan’s first international trip was to Egypt to meet Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. His second visit was to the United Arab Emirates.⁴⁰³

After graduating from the Military Academy, al-Burhan worked in Khartoum, as part of the Sudanese army, and participated in the fighting fronts in the Darfur war and in the Second Sudanese Civil War in South Sudan and other regions. He later traveled to Egypt and then to Jordan to receive training courses in his military field until in 2018 he was appointed commander of the ground forces of the army.⁴⁰⁴

Al-Burhan held several positions throughout his career as he began as a soldier with the Border Guard Forces and later became Commander of this Force before becoming Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Operations and then Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Army in February 2018 before he served as Inspector General of the Army for a period of time. By 26 February 2019, during the massive protests that swept the country and demanded the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, al-Burhan was elevated to the Lieutenant General rank.⁴⁰⁵

Shortly after his appointment, Burhan ordered the release of all jailed prisoners who had been arrested by his predecessor, Omar Al-Bashir, in a televised address. (Ibid) [But the same man and his cohorts in the military) would, in early June 2019, following al-Burhan’s and Dagalo’s visits to the Egyptian, UAE and Saudi leaders, the Sudanese Security Forces and Rapid Support Forces, including Janjaweed militias, led by al-Burhan and his deputy [order a crackdown] on peaceful protests in Sudan, starting with the 3 June Khartoum massacre. Dozens of peaceful protesters were killed and about forty of the bodies were thrown in the river Nile, hundreds were tortured, violated and raped in the streets of Khartoum.⁴⁰⁶

Al-Burhan’s talks with the opposition on forming a combined government were then cancelled. During the days that followed, the TMC arrested several of the opposition leaders.⁴⁰⁷

Iyad el-Baghdadi interpreted the decision-making by the TMC under al-Burhan’s leadership as being strongly influenced by the general context of the Saudi, UAE and Egyptian leaders being afraid of democratic movements. Mahmoud Elmutasim, a political activist and doctor who graduated from the University of Khartoum, similarly stated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are opposed to the existence of democracies in the Middle East, since if “the idea of democracy itself [should] ever take root, or become widespread in the Middle East,” then it would constitute a threat to the governmental systems of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.⁴⁰⁸

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was born in 1960 in the village of Gandatu in northern Sudan, to a religious family. al-Burhan studied elementary and intermediate level in his village school, and later moved to Shendi to complete his education before joining the Sudanese Military College among the 31st batch.⁴⁰⁹

Before he became the head of the Sovereign Council in 2019, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is reported to be a largely unknown quantity, preferring to remain in the shadow.  According to France24, in a lengthy military career under Bashir, he rose to prominent roles while remaining relatively unknown. He commanded the country’s ground forces before Bashir made him inspector general of the army in February, 2019 two months before the military removed Bashir from power.

But an aspect of him largely under-reported was his relationship with Saudi Arabia, the relationship he built up while coordinating Sudanese troops as part of Saudi forces fighting the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Sudanese media and analysts say Burhan coordinated sending Sudanese troops to Yemen as part of a Saudi-led coalition which intervened from 2015 against Iran-backed Huthi rebels.⁴¹⁰ It was a vital but behind-the-scenes role in Sudan’s military involvement alongside the kingdom in Yemen.⁴¹¹ Willow Berridge, author of “Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan” and a lecturer in history at Newcastle University, said the Yemen portfolio saw Burhan work closely with Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. It was with the RSF’s support that Burhan took Sudan’s top job in 2019, Berridge said earlier. “The role in this latest move of the Rapid Support Forces — branded by many as a revamped version of the Janjaweed militias who committed mass atrocities in Darfur — will make many cautious,” he said at the time.⁴¹²

Bashir deployed Sudanese troops to Yemen in 2015 as part of a major foreign policy shift that saw Khartoum break its longstanding ties with Tehran and join the Saudi-led coalition. The Sudanese military suffered significant casualties in Yemen. In the spring of 2019 after the breakdown of talks between protesters and Burhan’s transitional council, he visited Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The Gulf monarchies are crucial donors to Sudan, depositing an initial $500 million at the central bank following Bashir’s ouster as part of a promised $3 billion assistance package to maintain their influence in the country.⁴¹³

Following Bashir’s overthrow, Burhan was sworn in as Sudan’s interim leader on April 11, 2019 and in August that year was tasked with chairing the ruling Sovereign Council of military and civilian figures steering the transition to a fully-fledged democracy.⁴¹⁴ As Sovereign Council chairman, Burhan, who is in his early 60s, cemented Sudan’s ties with global powers and regional players including the United States and Israel. In February 2020, he met with then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda.⁴¹⁵ “Burhan is a high ranking officer within the armed forces, but basically he’s a veteran soldier,” an army officer, who did not want to be named, said earlier. “He’s never been in the limelight”, the officer said. Even after Bashir’s ouster Burhan continued to maintain a relatively low profile, often letting other members of the council talk in front of the cameras.⁴¹⁶ Burhan had a stint as Sudan’s defence attache to Beijing.⁴¹⁷

The Overarching African Palaver

From N’djamena to Bamako and from Bamako to Conakry and now to Khartoum, military rule has effectively established itself! The question has been asked: Is military intervention on the rise again in Africa as it was in the past? Is there is any basis for worry about what is slowly unfolding in Africa?

Military coups have been a regular occurrence in Africa in the decades since independence and there is now concern they are becoming more frequent. Sudan has this year experienced two such events, one in September which failed and the latest in which Gen Abdel Fattah Burhan dissolved the civilian arm of a transitional government and took over. In Guinea, President Condé was ousted by the army in September and in neighbouring Mali there have been two interventions by the army in less than a year, the most recent one in May. In Niger, a coup was thwarted in March just days before a presidential inauguration. So are military interventions occurring more often on the continent?⁴¹⁸

A study by two US researchers, Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, has identified over 200 such attempts in Africa since the late 1950s. About half of these have been successful – defined as lasting more than seven days. Burkina Faso, in West Africa, has had the most successful coups, with seven takeovers and only one failed coup. In 2017 in Zimbabwe, a military takeover brought Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule to an end. In April this year, after the death of the Chadian leader Idriss Déby, the army installed his son as interim president leading a transitional military council. His opponents called it a “dynastic coup”.⁴¹⁹

The overall number of coup attempts in Africa remained remarkably consistent at an average of around four a year in the four decades between 1960 and 2000. Jonathan Powell says this is not surprising given the instability African countries experienced in the years after independence. “African countries have had conditions common for coups, like poverty and poor economic performance. When a country has one coup, that’s often a harbinger of more coups.”⁴²⁰

Before the current coup in Sudan, there had been successful coups in Chad, Mali and, Guinea and failed military takeovers in Niger and Sudan. In September, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres voiced concern that “military coups are back,” and blamed a lack of unity amongst the international community in response to military interventions. “Geopolitical divisions are undermining international co-operation and…a sense of impunity is taking hold,” he said. Ndubuisi Christian Ani from the University of KwaZulu-Natal says popular uprisings against long-serving dictators have provided an opportunity for the return of coups in Africa. “While popular uprisings are legitimate and people-led, its success is often determined by the decision taken by the military,” he says.⁴²¹

Sudan has had the most coups and attempted takeovers amounting to 17 – five of them successful. That doesn’t include the current one, which has only just happened. In 2019, long-serving leader Omar al-Bashir was removed from power following months of popular protest. Bashir had himself taken over in a military coup in 1989.⁴²²

Nigeria had a reputation for military coups in the years following independence with eight between January 1966 and the takeover by Gen Sani Abacha in 1993. However, since 1999 transfers of power in Africa’s most populous nation have been by democratic election.⁴²³

Burundi’s history has been marked by eleven separate coups, mostly driven by the tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi communities. Sierra Leone experienced three coups between 1967 and 1968, and another one in 1971. Between 1992 and 1997, it experienced five further coup attempts. Ghana has also had its share of military coups, with eight in two decades. The first was in 1966, when Kwame Nkrumah was removed from power, and in the following year there was an unsuccessful attempt by junior army officers. Overall, Africa has experienced more coups than any other continent. Of the 11 coups recorded globally since 2017, all but one – Myanmar in February this year – have been in Africa.⁴²⁴

The occurrence of yet another coup in Africa shows that the AU’s efforts to prevent overthrows aren’t working. The continental body was praised for overseeing a steep reduction in coups over the last decade, but the rising trend in 2021 puts that into question.⁴²⁵ Sudan’s coup is another opportunity for the AU to redeem itself and revisit leaders’ growing tendency to use unconstitutional changes of government as a means to secure power. The AU Peace and Security Council should immediately revise practices and policies on the issue, including the use of sanctions.⁴²⁶

The AU’s October 27 decision to suspend Sudan from AU activities and the body’s insistence that the transition and timelines be restored are a good call. It needs to promote dialogue among Sudan’s political stakeholders and lead efforts to uphold human rights.⁴²⁷ The AU must, however, brace itself to resist pressure from pro-army member states. Most important, it needs to back the will of the Sudanese people rather than the country’s leaders, as required by the declaration marking the 50th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity/AU.⁴²⁸

What Next?

There is a contextual sense in which the October Coup can be said to have clearly run into an ideological ditch because it unexpectedly misfired even though it may also be said that the polemical battle was won by the pro-democratic and anti-coup groups. The anti-democratic and pro-coup groups, on the other hand, can only be said to have won a Pyrrhic victory. The coup ran into ideological ditch because first and foremost it was publicly perceived both at the national and international levels that it was ill-conceived and/or ill-motivated. But the coup has also been gridlocked because the military junta is ostensibly not willing to surrender power. It in fact has consolidated power by announcing a new ruling council.

 “Talks to resolve Sudan’s political crisis after last month’s coup have hit “semi-deadlock” because the military has refused to return to a path of democratic transition, two sources from the ousted government said on Saturday”.⁴²⁹ As a result of this impasse, the junta has entered into an intense negotiation with its civilian counterparts and the negotiation is still dragging on as at the time of concluding this piece on November 9. But many dynamics are still playing out.

According to Yezid Sayigh, a senior fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where he leads the program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States (CMRAS), “Not only did they badly handle discussions with U.S. Special Envoy Jeffrey Feltman on the eve of their coup, deceiving him about their intentions, but nothing they have done or said since then shows that they anticipated such a hostile international backlash or were prepared to preempt or mitigate it.⁴³⁰ It is equally obvious that the coup leaders also failed to realize that they would need to build an effective civilian coalition in advance, so as to legitimize and consolidate the coup in its immediate aftermath. There were obvious potential allies in the political parties that were already opposed to the Hamdok government, or ones that had recently broken away from the main government alliance, the Forces of Freedom and Change. However, the coup leaders seem to have relied exclusively on their own patronage networks so far, falling back on former supporters of ousted dictator Omar al-Bashir and assorted Islamists.⁴³¹

Another  miscalculation of the military junta was the underestimation of resistance to the coup by the demonstrators on the streets of Khartoum, Omdurman and several other cities mainly due to accumulated political consciousness and heightened by the events surrounding the coup. “The scale and duration of the civilian resistance appears to have caught the armed forces by surprise, placing strain on relations within the military infrastructure. Experts are now anticipating that coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may have to settle for a power sharing agreement with the civilian portion of the transitional government. The demonstrations in the streets have been met with deadly force, and at least 12 people have been killed, according to various media reports. As well as mass demonstrations in major cities, roadblocks have been set up by civilians across Sudan, intended to keep security forces out of neighborhoods and signify defiance in the face of the military’s seizure of power in Khartoum on Oct. 25.⁴³²

In a statement published on the official Facebook page of the country’s information ministry on Monday, Hamdok “insisted on the legitimacy of his government and transnational institutions,” and argued that his reinstatement could help bring a solution to the country’s instability. Robert Besseling, CEO of political risk consultancy Pangea-Risk, said in a research note Monday that France may also retract its offer of a bridge loan to settle Sudan’s huge arrears. “The instability may disturb oil exports from neighboring South Sudan and will have repercussions for the ongoing civil war in Ethiopia, as well as other regional conflicts and broader geopolitics,” Besseling said.⁴³³

 “Because of this resistance, and the West’s backing for Mr. Hamdok and his civilian comrades, we think Mr. Burhan will have to agree to share power,” said Zaynab Mohamed, political analyst at Oxford Economics Africa. “Tensions in the political environment will remain high in coming months as stakeholders try to negotiate a new agreement, and we expect deadly violence against anti-coup protesters to continue.” Ed Hobey-Hamsher, senior Africa analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, said factions within the military had been caught off-guard by the scale of the revolt, leading to internal rivalries and Burhan looking “increasingly isolated.” “We expect that the civilian protests will continue to grow in numbers and organisation, exacerbating instability in Khartoum and Port Sudan and straining the internal cohesion of the military,” Hobey-Hamsher added.⁴⁴⁴

Various news outlets have reported that negotiations between the army and politicians over a power-sharing deal are underway in the capital, signifying a potential reversal of the coup. In a video from Khartoum on Sunday, U.N. envoy Volker Perthes told reporters that a proposal had been presented to all sides, and voiced hope that a deal will be struck in the coming days. Reports have suggested that Hamdok may be given full executive powers and for him to appoint a cabinet of experts, along with a three-member honorary transitional council to replace the 14-member military-civilian Sovereign Council, of which Burhan was the chair. The military could lead a security and defense council and a Parliament would be established to represent political parties, the military and various rebel groups, unconfirmed reports have said.⁴⁴⁵

However, Hobey-Hamsher suggested that the legacy of distrust would render the success of future power-sharing institutions “extremely unlikely,” with any arrangement this week likely to be “volatile, short-lived and not conducive to the organisation of credible elections.” Oxford Economics Africa’s Mohamed also noted that Burhan’s power grab was an attempt to preserve the military’s power and economic privileges. “Senior military officials benefit from Sudan’s military-industrial complex, which is dominated by a network of companies controlled by the army in key industries such as gold, rubber, meat exports, flour, and sesame,” she said. “Had Mr. Burhan handed over his chairmanship of the Sovereign Council to a civilian in November, as required by the peace deal, this entire economic system would have been under threat.”⁴⁴⁶

Another miscalculation was the mounted international pressure against the coup. The military junta must have thought that the international community especially the Western countries on which Sudan depend so much for economic and financial bailouts would grudgingly acquiesce and swallow the bitter pills of the coup. The junta did not anticipate so much opposition from the international community. This is a warning for the immediate future. The same international community would later call for the prosecution of the military officers at the International Criminal Court for various allegations of acts against humanity and other crimes willfully committed by some of the Sudanese military officers while in power.

International calls for the restoration of democratic government in Sudan continued, as the Human Rights Council met in special session in Geneva to discuss the recent military coup.  Leading condemnation for the 25 October takeover, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, said that at least 13 civilians have been reportedly killed by military and security forces since then, and more than 300 injured.⁴⁴⁷

Looking on as Ms. Bachelet spoke during the specially convened session, the Sudanese permanent representative and his deputy – who reportedly associate with different sides in the crisis – sat either side of an empty chair usually occupied by Sudan’s head of delegation. Neither individual commented during the debate that followed. “🇸🇩 #Sudan has been a beacon of progress for the region and it is urgent to restore civilian rule,” UN Human Rights Chief @mbachelet calls for the release of all those arbitrarily detained and for a return to rule of law and democratic transition — UN Human Rights (@UNHumanRights) November 5, 2021  “This disproportionate and deadly use of force by the Sudan Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and other security forces – including military police and intelligence elements – must end immediately,” said Ms. Bachelet. “Those responsible for these and other human rights violations must be held fully accountable for their actions.”⁴⁴⁸

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also cited disturbing reports of violence committed against women, including an early morning raid on a dormitory of female students near the military headquarters in the capital Khartoum, on the day of the coup.  “The students were terrorized and beaten, resulting in injuries,” Ms. Bachelet told the Council. The coup had betrayed “the courageous and inspiring revolution of 2019”, she insisted, in reference to the grassroots protest movement that led to the overthrow of President Omar Al-Bashir, who had ruled for three decades.⁴⁴⁹ 

The development came as UN aid teams reported that the blockade of Sudan’s main sea port was lifted on Wednesday, and that aid relief cargo and fuel has been transported to other parts of Sudan, where there are some 13 million people in need.  “Container clearing processing is set to resume on (Sunday) 7 November,” the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said. “Since the announcement (about the port reopening), humanitarian organisations have not reported issues with movement of commodities out of Port Sudan or within the field, interstate movements have not been hindered and field operations continue despite the limited fuel availability.”⁴⁵⁰ 

OCHA also noted that the situation remained “calm but unpredictable” in the country.   Markets and shops were open across Sudan, along with banks, but support for humanitarian action was needed for “life-sustaining activities”, including people’s livelihoods, the UN humanitarian office insisted.  To support this vital work, UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) has resumed regular flights, after operating throughout last week. Some commercial airlines have also resumed their flights, OCHA said.⁴⁵¹

Echoing the UN rights chief’s condemnation of the coup, independent rights expert Victor Madrigal-Borloz told the Council that Sudan’s military leaders had shown “utter contempt for democracy” and efforts to restore democratic governance and human rights in the country.⁴⁵²

In a separate statement on Friday, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) reported that members of Sudan’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which reportedly backed anti-Government protesters, had been detained after meeting with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Volker Perthes.  “It has been reported that Taha Osman Isahaq, Sharif Mohamed Osman and Hamza Farouk were arrested near UNITAMS HQ yesterday afternoon,” the mission said in a statement.  “We call upon the military leadership to cease arresting politicians and activists and to stop committing further human rights violations.”⁴⁵³

Ahead of the adoption of a resolution urging Member States to condemn the coup and support a call for the immediate return to the civilian-led Transitional Government under Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, as well as release those who continue to be detained, Russia, China and Venezuela disassociated themselves from the initiative.⁴⁵⁴

Nearly 100 teachers have been arrested in Sudan as two days of civil disobedience and strikes in protest at last month’s military coup began. A teachers’ union said security forces had used teargas against its members outside the education ministry building for Khartoum state, where 87 were arrested and many were beaten.⁴⁵⁵

One of the teachers at the protest, Khalfalla Mohamed, said lawyers had told him his colleagues had been taken to the military headquarters after prosecutors refused to release them on bail. “We just protested and suddenly the whole place filled with all sorts of security forces, firing teargas and all,” he said. At least one, a head teacher, had her leg broken. Unknown men in plain clothes arrested another five teachers in Neyala, the capital of South Darfur, according to an officer at the education ministry in the city who spoke anonymously. “They arrested Gamal Margan, who is in charge of the education of the shepherds. They kidnapped him when he finished his prayers. The rest of them were arrested from their houses,” he said. “We are currently at our offices but nobody here is working because of the civil disobedience and also in protest of our colleagues who have been arrested and we don’t know why.”⁴⁵⁶

Activists demanding the military exit politics have announced a schedule of protests leading up to mass rallies on 13 November under the slogan: “No negotiation, no partnership, no compromise.” Safia Amen, a teacher in Omdurman on a two-day strike, said: “We are not working because they kicked out many teachers from their positions … Burhan, for example, kicked out the head of the education in the state for no reason.” Amen, who would not give her real name for safety reasons, added: “We are unhappy on what has happened in this country – after all these steps we took, the military wants us to go back. We are also on strike against the weak wages of the teachers with this harsh economic situation.” Local “resistance committees” and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), which led demonstrations in the uprising that toppled Bashir, are organising a campaign of protests to try to reverse the military takeover.⁴⁵⁷

Some main roads have been closed by makeshift barricades in Omdurman, residents said. Others were closed in Khartoum el-Shajara and Jabra neighbourhoods, in the south of the capital. Security forces were also seen moving around in northern Khartoum, some of them carrying sticks. (Ibid) Bankers have joined the civil disobedience movement. One said as many as 80% hadtaken part in the strike despite many losing their jobs after protests last week. Five managers at five different banks were sacked and replaced by a decree from Burhan on Saturday.⁴⁵⁸

According to Andrews Atta-Asamoah of Africa Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa, the military has shown poor judgement of the political and security climate in Sudan and the international community.⁴⁵⁹

After months of mounting tension, the most feared scenario for Sudan is playing out – a rejection by the military of democratic civilian rule. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, army chief and leader of the Sovereign Council, had assured Sudanese that he would protect the people’s revolution. This week he broke that promise when he overthrew the government.⁴⁶⁰

Thousands of Sudanese have protested in response to calls by the civilian leadership, the Forces for Freedom and Change and Sudanese Professionals Association to defend the revolution.⁴⁶¹ The more ungovernable the situation becomes, the greater the likelihood that Sudan will enter a political and economic tailspin, which could splinter the army and lead to a counter-coup. If the military and civilians adopt entrenched positions, human rights abuses will probably escalate.⁴⁶²

The military blamed the conflict on the country’s economic hardships. But pronouncements after the foiled September coup point to several other fault lines. First, the committee’s work to retrieve public funds from Mr. al-Bashir’s loyalists and recent moves to send Mr. al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court are seen as a witch-hunt and the targeting of pro-Bashir army stalwarts for prosecution.⁴⁶³ Second, there is no indication that the army ever planned to hand over power to civilian leaders. This is evident from how the military negotiated itself into the transition process at the outset, rising tensions as the deadline for the military to hand control of the Sovereign Council to civilians approached, and the recent coup.⁴⁶⁴

The civilian leadership is not however without blame. Due to deep-seated systemic problems and the slow onset of adequate international support, it has been slow to improve the economic situation. Several leaders have been sucked into self-defeating power struggles characteristic of the high-stakes nature of politics in Sudan.⁴⁶⁵

None of these challenges are new and there are few choices left for either side beyond the existing framework of negotiations. The military’s decision to overthrow the constitutional charter could sink Sudan into further trouble. The army has gravely misread the political and security atmosphere in the country and the international community. Despite some pro-army protests and splits in the Forces for Freedom and Change, most Sudanese are opposed to any military involvement in their politics.⁴⁶⁶

Sudan is also vulnerable economically and politically. The economy cannot survive without the technical expertise and support of development partners. This is a situation the army will struggle to change unless it can build the necessary external relationships. Given the current hardships facing the country, this would worsen the economic outlook with possible security consequences.⁴⁶⁷

Given the inability of Sudan’s leaders to agree before the October 25 coup, all sides in a revived transitional arrangement would need to commit to a robust reconciliation process. This will help avoid internal fighting, which could lead to more military interference.⁴⁶⁸

Sudan’s military leader has [tentatively] agreed with the United States on the need to speed up the formation of a new government after he ordered the release of four ministers of the government he deposed in a coup late last month, Sudan’s state-run news agency reported.⁴⁶⁹

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s office released a statement on Thursday after he spoke on the phone with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.  “The two parties agreed on the need to maintain the path of the democratic transition, the need to complete the structures of the transitional government and to speed up the formation of the government,” al-Burhan’s office said. The US State Department spokesman Ned Price said Blinken in the call urged al-Burhan to immediately release all political figures detained since the coup and “return to a dialogue that returns Prime Minister Hamdok to office and restores civilian-led governance in Sudan”. “We are considering all internal and external initiatives to serve the national interest,” al-Burhan’s media adviser Taher Abouhaga said on Thursday. “The government formation is imminent.”⁴⁷⁰

Meanwhile, mass pro-democracy protests are expected on Friday in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, and other main cities. Speaking to Al Jazeera’s UpFront programme, Nureldin Satti, Sudan’s ambassador to the United States, said the “coup is over”. “[It] cannot continue with the mobilisation that we have seen and that we are going to see in the next days and weeks.” Sudan’s top generals and former civilian leaders have been locked in tense negotiations for a way out of the crisis sparked by the military takeover on October 25, when al-Burhan dissolved the transitional government and detained other government officials and political leaders in a coup.⁴⁷¹

[Also] the international community is continuing to press for a de-escalation that can put Sudan back on the path to democracy. The United Nations Human Rights Council is set to hold an emergency session on the situation on Friday. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres encouraged General al-Burhan in a phone call on Thursday to take action towards resolving “the political crisis in Sudan and urgently restoring the constitutional order and Sudan’s transitional process,” UN associate spokeswoman Eri Kaneko said.⁴⁷²

Alex De Waal, the executive director of the World Peace Foundation, told Al Jazeera that the US could use economic leverage to speed up the formation of a civilian government. “The US has quite a considerable leverage because of the very deep economic-financial hole that Sudan is,” he said. “Other countries might have been able to get by on the bailout of the Gulf states, but in the case of Sudan, it can only actually stabilise its economy with major assistance, debt rescheduling, debt relief, assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, which requires the United States.” Moreover, French Foreign ministry spokeswoman Anne-Claire Legendre on Friday said the military coup put into doubt France cancelling some $5 billion debt it was owed by Sudan.⁴⁷³

The Final Blow

The final blow to the hope of ever returning to pre-coup status quo ante as demanded by the Hamdok-led civilian faction and its Western backers was delivered by the military junta when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the formation of a new Transitional Council with himself as the supreme leader and Major Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, as his deputy on November 11, 2021, but excluding Abdalla Hamdok and any of his loyalists thus snubbing domestic and international pressure to reverse the coup.

The new 14-member Sovereign Council, for which one member is yet to be confirmed, includes civilians representing Sudan’s regions but none from the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) political coalition that had been sharing power with the military in a democratic transition since 2019.⁴⁷⁴ The new council also includes representatives of rebel groups that reached a peace deal with the government last year but had rejected the takeover in a statement this week.⁴⁷⁵

Political sources told Reuters on Thursday that there had been no progress in indirect contacts between Hamdok and the army. Aboulgasim Mohamed Burtum, a newly appointed council member and former member of parliament, told Sky News he hoped the new government would be well-received. “We are civilians, the civilians are not only Hamdok,” he said.⁴⁷⁶

Prior to Thursday’s announcement, Burhan told Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni that he was committed to dialogue with all political forces and the quick formation of a technocratic government, Burhan’s office said.⁴⁷⁷ The United Nations called Thursday’s developments “very concerning.” In a closed-door briefing to the U.N. Security Council, U.N. Sudan envoy Volker Perthes had been “very frank in his assessment that the window now is closing for dialogue and for peaceful resolution,” Britain’s U.N. Ambassador Barbara Woodward told reporters.⁴⁷⁸

Alongside Burhan and Dagalo, three other military members of the previous ruling council were retained in the new council, as well as one civilian representative jointly selected by the military and the FFC. Four new members representing Sudan’s regions were appointed, though the representative for eastern Sudan was yet to be confirmed, state media reported.⁴⁷⁹

[Burhan’s] announcement comes just two days ahead of planned mass protests against the coup.⁴⁸⁰ Sudan’s information ministry, which has remained loyal to the deposed government, quoted ousted minister Hamza Baloul as saying the council’s formation was “an extension of the coup measures”.⁴⁸¹

Under the decree, Burhan, who chaired Sudan’s ruling council formed in August 2019 following president Omar al-Bashir’s ouster, keeps the post. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the feared paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, remains his deputy in the 14-member council. The mixed military-civilian body also retains Shamsaldine al-Kabashi, Yasser al-Atta, and Ibrahim Gaber, all senior army figures.⁴⁸² Among the civilian members is former parliamentarian Abou al-Qassem Bortoum, a businessman supporter of Sudan’s normalisation with Israel. Salma Abdelgaber from Al-Gazira state in central Sudan, Youssef Gad Karim from North Kordofan state, Abdelbaqi al-Zubair representing Khartoum state and Rajaa Nicola, a Copt, are also on the list. Ex-rebel leaders Malik Agar, Alhady Idris and Altaher Hagar, who signed a 2020 peace deal with the government, also kept their seats.⁴⁸³

On Tuesday, Burhan met with diplomats from the US, UK and Norway who called for Hamdok’s “restoration” to office and the release of all detainees. “We discussed our strong desire to see Sudan’s democratic transition put back on track. We warned against unilateral action,” the diplomatic troika said. Hamdok was briefly detained immediately after the coup but later placed under effective house arrest. Last week, the military released four civilian members of the ex-government but key officials are still detained. On Thursday, several EU ambassadors called for “a return to constitutional order”.⁴⁸⁴

[However], Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan has promised he will not hold a government position in the upcoming July 2023 elections. He makes this statement weeks after he had collapsed a transitional government in a globally condemned coup.⁴⁸⁵

The military leader, Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, has on several occasions promised to hand over power to an elected civilian government in future. His announcement will however not prevent other top generals from ripping off their military titles to become candidates.⁴⁸⁶ The military leader expressed his commitment to a peaceful transition and election. “We will honour our pledge, the pledge we made to the people and the international community, that we are committed to completing the transition, holding the elections as scheduled, and to respect all political activities, as long as they remain peaceful and in line with the constitution and the active parts of the Constitutional Declaration.”⁴⁸⁷

At least 14 demonstrators have been killed, about 300 wounded and others displaced through the anti-coup protests since the 25th October power grab by the army. “The Armed Forces do not kill its people. Investigation committees were formed and they will establish the truth about what had happened. We insist that the misleading reports were circulated on the grounds of malice against the Armed Forces. They were deliberate to undermine us as a lynchpin to the security and territorial integrity of Sudan.”⁴⁸⁸

Sudanese security forces on Sunday fired tear gas at multiple anti-coup rallies, with protesters in several cities joining a call for two-days of civil disobedience against last month’s military takeover. Hundreds of anti-coup protesters rallied in the capital Khartoum, as well as in its twin city of Omdurman, Wad Madni to the south, and the northern city of Atbara. “The authority belongs to the people,” they chanted and “no, no to military rule” as they demanded a “civilian government”.⁴⁸⁹

The composition of the new transitional council reveals the constellation of power in Sudan at the moment and is also reflective of both the ability of the military junta to cobble together and configure the various power bases or blocs for its rule. While Khartoum holds the central command position, the peripheries and semi-peripheries have been effectively annexed as adjuncts to the central command role of Khartoum as the final arbiter of all warring camps. This new configuration of power has been accurately captured and described (in advance) by ACLED in its three-part analysis of the recent events in Sudan. According to ACLED, “[a]fter a tumultuous 18 months, Sudan is on the edge of another reorganization of power. Rebel groups from the marginalised regions of Darfur and the “Two Areas” of Blue Nile and South Kordofan are preparing to enter the transitional power-sharing government. They will join the ranks of military and paramilitary elites, operating alongside a fractious civilian coalition, who are governing an increasingly unstable country. The interaction between the military establishment, paramilitary elites from Sudan’s semi-periphery, and rebel elites from the periphery will have a decisive influence on the outcome of Sudan’s revolution, though perhaps not in the way that protesters who led the uprising would have hoped for.⁴⁹⁰

Although often presented as a “transition” from military authoritarianism to civilian democracy, this historical moment is better understood as a reckoning for Sudan, in which elites from the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery reorient themselves around the wreckage of a state that has long relied on pitting the population against one another in order to maintain its rule. The outcome of this reckoning is uncertain, and complicated by a multiplicity of vested interests, rebel groups, and paramilitary factions, with consequences for the Horn of Africa and potentially beyond.⁴⁹¹  Despite the origins of the uprising arguably beginning in the geographical and political margins of Sudan, and continued sacrifices being made by demonstrators from this periphery, the composition of Sudan’s power-sharing bodies in Khartoum is not representative of Sudan’s marginalised groups. Further, the presence of both Sovereign Council Chairman General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan and Deputy Chairman ‘Hemedti’ at the apex of power is particularly unsettling when viewed from the margins, given their direct links to groups involved in producing the humanitarian cataclysm in Darfur in 2003. The civil war in Darfur formed a platform for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Hemedti to accrue considerable wealth and power in Darfur, South Kordofan, which would come to be projected into Khartoum. Hemedti himself comes from the semi-periphery of Arab-identifying pastoralists groups, who’s declining fortunes in the political economy of Sudan have resulted in such groups launching violent attacks against weaker non-Arab groups in Sudan’s frontiers. Such attacks have often been masterminded by elites in Khartoum, with irregular militia groups being armed and organised into an assortment of paramilitary groups.⁴⁹²

The announcement may not come as a surprise if what General al-Burhan said in an interview with Russia’s state-owned Sputnik news agency published on Friday October 28, 2021, is considered. He was quoted in the interview to have said that he took power to install himself as the head of the military junta that will rule Sudan until elections are held in July 2023. Thus with the assumption of supreme power, al-Burhan does not need to share power with anybody any more (even with the appointment of civilians into the new transitional council) but to issue his orders which must be obeyed and carried out without equivocation. With this announcement too, al-Burhan has drawn the curtain of possibility of Abdalla Hamdok ever returning to power that he was ejected from. The era of the former Sovereign Council has finally drawn to a clangorous close.

Suliman Baldo and JR Mailey writing in early November 2021 said that “[w]hile destabilizing for Sudan’s politics and economy, the coup does not represent a fundamental shift in the power dynamics in Khartoum. Instead, it brings the security services’ warped incentive structures into public view. Confronting these dynamics head-on is essential for addressing Sudan’s political crisis and revitalizing the transition to civilian rule.⁴⁹³

The coup is the result of warped incentive structures that trace back to the Bashir era. The security services power grab followed escalating tensions. Throughout the transition, the security services resisted the imposition of civilian oversight or constraints, balked at discussions of accountability for past atrocities, and maintained a range of commercial interests and relationships with foreign patrons.  By seizing power, Sudan’s security services are hijacking the state and preserving the violent kleptocratic system of the Bashir era.  Ultimately, control over the state affords the security services continued opportunities to accrue wealth while shielding themselves from accountability for past and future abuses.⁴⁹⁴

The scenario has clearly changed dramatically with the announcement of appointment of the 14-member transitional council and with the assumption of supreme power by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and thereby consolidating military rule and discarding all pretenses of ever accommodating the Hamdok-led civilian faction in the new arrangement. The dynamics have changed. A fundamental shift is now evident. Military rule has triumphed. A new politico-military order is being forged in Khartoum, according to ACLED.

However, Baldo and Mailey suggested that “[f]inancial pressure is essential for building the leverage needed to get the transition back on track. The international community’s response to the coup must confront the warped incentive structures of the security services head-on, targeting the military’s wealth and impunity. Crucially, public diplomacy surrounding financial pressure requires specificity and acknowledgement of sanctions’ challenging legacy in Sudan and should involve focused efforts to counter disinformation. Governments and international agencies should impose targeted network sanctions on the Sudanese officials involved in the coup, as well as those responsible for subsequent abuses perpetrated by the security forces. Sanctions should target the networks of companies controlled by Sudanese military and security agencies. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) should issue an advisory on the money laundering risks associated with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and companies under their control. Finally, financial institutions and the private sector more broadly should not wait for governments to act. Foreign companies, including banks, should assess their commercial ties to Sudan to ensure they are not inadvertently funding Sudan’s security services.⁴⁹⁵

The objectives of negotiators must reflect the stated goals of Sudan’s population. The foundation of any agreement must be the formation of a civilian-led transitional government endowed with full executive powers. The security services—and especially their finances—must be brought under civilian oversight and control. Although some concessions to the security services may be necessary and inevitable, continued free rein over the country’s lucrative economic sectors and amnesty for the perpetrators of atrocities and war crimes should be off the table.⁴⁹⁶

The trouble with the above suggestion is that it might be ineffective for the simple reason that the junta’s Middle East backers might consider bailing out the junta by financially supporting it to keep it afloat since they are largely in favor of the military takeover in the first instance. Such financial support, of course, will not be expected to be for the transition to democratic rule in 2023. Western governments will, therefore, have the Herculean diplomatic task of convincing the Middle East countries not to support the military junta in Khartoum and to help starve it of funds. But this is also neither here nor there because even if Western governments succeed in pressing hard and convincing the Middle East backers to back off al-Burhan, Russia, China, Iran and Turkey are on the other side waiting to step in to fill the financial vacuum, and the US will even find it harder dealing with all these countries than with the Middle East countries. US might therefore wish to reconsider imposing fresh sanctions on the junta and thereby help to punish the junta for derailing the transition to democratic rule process.

But it would be naïve to think and believe on the part of Western governments that the new military junta in Khartoum will willingly hand-over power to a democratically elected government in 2023 – unless pressured to do so by an overwhelming and unrelenting Western powers. Burhan is secretly opposed to democracy both as an idea and practice despite the pretension to the contrary. It would be naïve to believe what he says publicly about democracy or expression of his wish to hand over power in 2023 or that he would not contest for any post in the 2023 elections. It would be up to Western powers to hold him accountable to his words and promises.

But more dangerous a situation and volatile indeed for that matter is the retention of Major General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (arguably the most powerful and dangerous paramilitary body in Sudan) as the deputy to Burhan in the new dispensation. Dagalo was also the deputy to Burhan under the previous Sovereign Council. With his current position as the deputy commander-in-chief to al-Burhan, the possibility of ever merging the RSF into the regular Army is now most probably foreclosed. Dagalo has been most resistant to the idea and push for the security sector reform because of his fear (and understandably so) of losing his power base. Dagalo has consolidated his position representing all the paramilitary bodies in Sudan especially in the peripheries. Dagalo can be viewed and seen as well as regarded as a “runaway” from justice because he does not want the RSF probed for transparency and accountability – in turn because he had used and probably still using the RSF as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to enrich himself and his acolytes illegally through the companies floated and operated under the aegis of RSF.

Dagalo has been correctly identified as a man to watch for his vaulting ambitions – ambitions that have, however, not been properly disambiguated. He is a man waiting in the wing ready to sprint forward and strike at the appropriate time by forcefully pushing out al-Burhan at the least expected time in order to prolong military rule in Sudan in accordance with the expressed wishes of certain Middle East countries not to see and have democratic rule sprouting and consolidating itself in Sudan by whatever means.

Why is Dagalo so important in the new equation? This question was first answered by Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda. “Fragmentation of the security apparatus works only if a country’s various security organs are able to counter one another. In Sudan, the Janjaweed’s strength and autonomy began to threaten this balance. Some factions started to rebel against Bashir. In 2013, Bashir responded by turning certain Janjaweed factions into an official paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti). The RSF also served as a praetorian guard, with Bashir informally dubbing Hemedti “Himayti” (my protector). While the RSF has begun to open recruitment to a wider swath of the population, its top leaders are drawn from the Rizeigat, and primarily from Hemedti’s extended family.⁴⁹⁷

The second answer came from Murithi Mutiga of International Crisis Group in his 2019 analysis of post-Bashir era, noting that Sudan’s post-Bashir transition holds the promise of civilian rule but also perils, among them renewed insurgency, economic stagnation and backsliding into autocracy. “General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, the boyish head of the RSF, is the most powerful man in the security forces. Hemedti draws his strength from three primary sources. First, he directly oversees much of the RSF, the pre-eminent paramilitary force among the many that Sudanese authorities spawned during Bashir’s three decades in power.  The RSF now appears to control Khartoum, as well as other towns and regions of the country, notably Darfur. Secondly, he has acquired significant wealth, including proceeds derived from stakes in major gold mining operations, which he wields to extend his power and influence in Sudan’s transactional politics.  Thirdly, he has curried favour with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which see him as an accommodating strongman who – unlike Bashir – can be relied upon to serve as a bulwark against Islamist sympathisers in the military and bureaucracy.⁴⁹⁸

Hemedti’s rise exemplifies the proliferation of non-conventional security “entrepreneurs” who have eclipsed Sudan’s conventional military. Born to Chadian migrants, Hemedti dropped out of primary school but thrived as a trader. The Darfur conflict gave him his entrance into Sudan’s power politics.  He joined the Janjaweed militia, then led by Musa Hilal, his maternal cousin and a prominent leader of the Mahamid tribe, a sub-group of the Rizeigat. In 2009, Hemedti received his first government post as a security adviser to the governor of South Darfur. There he served until 2011, when Bashir helped him set up the RSF, a rebranding of the Janjaweed.⁴⁹⁹ Hemedti benefited when Bashir tapped him to take down Musa Hilal, whom the president judged disloyal. The Hemedti-Hilal conflict escalated to armed clashes in 2017, with Hemedti coming out on top.  Hilal was arrested and imprisoned by state authorities.  As Hilal’s fortunes declined, Hemedti took control of the lucrative gold mine they once jointly controlled.⁵⁰⁰

Hemedti has thrived as a businessman, establishing several companies under the umbrella of his al-Junaid conglomerate. His company, al-Junaid for Roads and Bridges, was awarded government contracts to help build at least three highways in Darfur (the Nyala-Fashir, Kutum-Fashir and Genina-Zalingei routes). His mining company operates in Jebel Amir and has started working in southern Darfur.⁵⁰¹

Bashir’s 2015 decision to send troops to fight under the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen provided Hemedti with a major boost.⁵⁰² Bashir’s 2015 decision to send troops to fight under the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen provided Hemedti with a major boost. He sent troops in much larger numbers than Sudan’s regular military did. RSF troops also took more front-line positions than the military’s rank and file, who are generally more risk-averse and therefore often deployed defensively, such as to guard the Saudi Arabian border. The RSF’s ranks were swelled by recruits from many impoverished families who were highly motivated by the financial rewards, which could reach up to $10,000 each per offensive deployment. Some even paid bribes to go.  Apart from his role in the Yemen campaign, Hemedti has authorised a representative to forge an alliance with the UAE’s ally General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. Some diplomats, inside and outside the region, express concern that Abu Dhabi is cultivating Hemedti as a long-term security partner.⁵⁰³

In early 2017, Sudan’s parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Act, which put the paramilitaries directly under the office of the president, cementing their evolution from peripheral militia to quasi-presidential guard. Bashir began referring to Hemedti as Hemayti, which translates from Arabic as “my protection”. In the end, however, when Bashir’s fortunes had begun to shift dramatically, Hemedti turned on his patron, sealing the former president’s fate.⁵⁰⁴

Hemedti’s ambitions for power and influence have led him to cultivate relationships well outside Sudan’s borders. Conspicuously, the RSF’s ranks feature men who are not Sudanese nationals. Meanwhile, Hemedti, whose Arab tribe straddles the border between Chad and Sudan, has used his ancestry to forge links to eastern Chad, as well as circles of power in N’djamena. He also maintains ties with armed groups in the Central African Republic. South Sudan’s rebel leader Riek Machar, hosted by authorities in Khartoum, has also attempted to build ties with Hemedti and travelled with him for talks with President Salva Kiir in September.⁵⁰⁵

While Hemedti lacks Bashir’s charisma and is considered a thuggish provincial warlord by Khartoum’s elites, he has played his distance from those elites to his advantage.  He has fashioned a role for himself as a champion of Sudanese outside the country’s relatively prosperous centre, seeking to portray the opposition alliance and the military as overly focused on concentrating power in Khartoum and the Nile valley. He has also presented himself as the key figure seeking to end the communal conflicts that have ravaged Sudan’s eastern and western peripheries. While in some ways a remarkable role for Hemedti to assume, given that earlier in his career he led militias accused of perpetrating some of the worst killings in Darfur, it allows him to trade on the close ties he reportedly enjoys with several armed groups.⁵⁰⁶

The economic, military and diplomatic clout Hemedti has amassed is formidable. “He almost doesn’t need to carry out a coup because he has created a role for himself as an alternative to the state and to Khartoum’s elites”, one diplomat who recently spent time in Khartoum told Crisis Group.⁵⁰⁷

From the above can be seen what may be regarded as the “rich” but notorious background of his rise from a very humble beginning to the apex of power in Sudan. The unholy alliance between Burhan and Dagalo was further unveiled by Jean Baptiste Gallopin, a former visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Berlin. “The SAF and the RSF make for awkward bedfellows. The alliance was born in April 2019, when the defection of low-ranking SAF officers forced military and security leaders to oust Bashir to avoid violence between rebels and loyalists. Since then, the SAF-RSF alliance has centred on personal ties between Burhan and Hemedti, forged during their time in Yemen, when they commanded Sudanese troops deployed in support of a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But, Burhan aside, SAF officers’ resentment of Hemedti runs deep. Because he comes from Darfur and heads a paramilitary group, his newfound prominence challenges the supremacy of top officers, who are overwhelmingly from Sudan’s central regions. Officers in the lower ranks resent the RSF’s role in the 3 June massacre.⁵⁰⁸

Burhan and Hemedti are competing behind the scenes for access to resources, such as the formidable NISS intelligence network. The RSF has poached SAF officers by offering them better pay. The rivalry remains in check – for now – partly due to the presence of Hamdok and the FFC, which complicates the strategic calculations of the SAF and the RSF while preventing the emergence of a single political fault line centred on the military and security apparatus.⁵⁰⁹ In addition, in the past few months, Hemedti and many in the FFC have come to fear that a coalition of former leaders of the NCP, NISS officers, and Islamist officers within the SAF will try to seize power, either by destabilising the country as a prelude to a coup, by assassinating Burhan or Hemedti, or both.⁵¹⁰

Fears of Islamist destabilisation have been rife since the revolution, but it is difficult to assess the threat that former NCP leaders pose. The party established a clandestine security structure made up of loyalists, the Popular Security, which pervaded all state institutions. Most NISS officers under Bashir were loyal to NCP leaders; within the SAF, those who pledged a vow of allegiance to the party reportedly amounted to about 30 percent of the officer corps, but they were well organised. Now that many top NCP officials are in jail and that the realities of power have changed, it is unclear how relevant these past affiliations still are. Some General Intelligence Service officers, for instance, are now loyal to Hemedti. Widespread public hostility to political Islam since the revolution would also make an Islamist takeover difficult.⁵¹¹

Companies owned by the NISS, Bashir’s relatives, and NCP figures are coveted prizes for Burhan and Hemedti, who compete for control of the firms’ resources. Burhan has put the Military Industry Corporation – an SAF holding company that owns hundreds of firms – in charge of many of the companies once owned by NCP leaders and Bashir’s family, while the RSF has gained control of many of the businesses previously run by the NISS. In addition, the military now retains the profits of SAF companies that, under the previous regime, were largely channelled to the NCP.⁵¹²

Today, the military and security apparatus has shares in, or owns, companies involved in the production and export of gold, oil, gum arabic, sesame, and weapons; the import of fuel, wheat, and cars; telecommunications; banking; water distribution; contracting; construction; real estate development; aviation; trucking; limousine services; and the management of tourist parks and events venues. Defence companies manufacture air conditioners, water pipes, pharmaceuticals, cleaning products, and textiles. They operate marble quarries, leather tanneries, and slaughterhouses. Even the firm that produces Sudan’s banknotes is under the control of the security sector.⁵¹³

Because they are central actors in the markets for fuel and wheat imports, companies owned by the SAF and the RSF benefit directly from subsidies on these commodities (and are well positioned to gain further profits by diverting them onto the black market). For instance, SIN, a firm which was formerly owned by the NISS and which Burhan recently brought under the exclusive authority of the SAF, reportedly controls 60 percent of the wheat market.⁵¹⁴

Since the revolution, Burhan has appointed loyalists to manage many military-controlled companies. General Al-Mirghani Idris, a friend of Burhan’s from his time at the Military College, is now the head of the Military Industry Corporation. General Abbas Abdelaziz – a former head of the RSF who is also a close friend of Burhan – is now in charge of Al-Sati, another holding firm. Another former classmate, General Mohalab Hassan Ahmed, became the head of the Martyrs’ Organisation, a holding firm that previously funded the NCP, and that has investments in gold mining and entertainment venues. The need to ensure that these companies make a profit appears to have encouraged Burhan – who initially purged many prominent Islamist officers from the ranks of the SAF and the NISS – to bring some his loyal friends out of retirement.⁵¹⁵

Until recently, the RSF focused its commercial activities on the gold market, which it largely controls, as well as on construction, contracting, and human trafficking. But the RSF has expanded its economic activities in the past year. The organisation is using the hard currency it earns from gold sales in Dubai to buy agricultural projects and real estate. In one recent purchase, the RSF reportedly acquired 200,000 acres of agricultural land in Northern state; the project involves digging an irrigation canal to the Nile.⁵¹⁶

These companies are shrouded in secrecy; high-level corruption and conflicts of interest make the boundaries between private and public funds porous. Hemedti, for instance, no longer has any official involvement in Al-Juneid, the holding company run by his brother, Abdelrahim Daglo. It is unclear whether Al-Juneid’s profits finance the RSF’s operations, though some sources believe the business falls under the organisation’s special operations branch. Military companies, on the other hand, belong to the Sudanese state but their management positions provide lucrative opportunities for embezzlement, which means that appointments form part of a system of rewards for loyalty.⁵¹⁷

Although it is hard to estimate these companies’ profits, occasional glimpses into their activities show that that they have access to considerable amounts of cash. Al-Juneid, a company founded by Hemedti, sold around 1 tonne of gold in Dubai, worth roughly $30m, during a four-week period in 2018 – a figure that suggests an annual turnover of $390m. In May, the Multiple Directions Company, a subsidiary of the Military Industry Corporation, inaugurated with great fanfare the Kadaru industrial slaughterhouse – an investment worth $40m, whose first shipment went to Saudi Arabia. Hemedti is currently building a slaughterhouse on the same scale north of Khartoum.⁵¹⁸

From the above can be seen a calm surface, from the standpoint of a superficial analysis of events. But a deeper analysis would reveal a very volatile situation, a slowly building up of volcanic eruption that may happen at any time without warning. The unholy alliance between al-Burhan and Dagalo looks strong on the surface but definitely conceal a fragile relationship anchored on rivalry between two domineering personalities, a rivalry that can explode at any time. What is not known for now is the nature of checks and balances between the two men within the decision-making loop of the ruling council. Indeed, the alliance between the two men is the core of power in Khartoum for now. In the hands of the two men lies the destiny of Sudan for now.

Conclusion

From the “pictorial analysis” of the events of the last two weeks since the fateful October 25 Coup, it can be safely concluded that the military junta and its Middle East backers (among others) have first of all lost the battle of moral justification for the coup but gaining temporal ascendancy in the power struggle between the military faction and the FFC-led (or Hamdok-led) civilian faction. They have consequently gained the ideological battle for the continuation of untrammeled military rule – never mind the inclusion of civilian elements in the new ruling council. This is the new scenario or reality in Sudan now.

However, the earlier demand by the Abdalla Hamdok-led civilian faction for the military junta to revert back to the status quo ante (i.e. pre-October 25 situation) can only be seen to be unreasonable to the extent of its impossibility, for the simple facts that, although not a law of physics, no military junta ever willingly surrender and abdicate or vacate power it has just taken when the aroma of that power is just beginning to permeate its environment; and there has been no contemporary example of such voluntary exit from pinnacle of power it has just reached – from which one can draw such inference. What further weaken the position of Hamdok is that he has nothing to bargain with except the mass movement and demonstrations on the streets which have, however, demonstrated their ineffectiveness because of lack of effective leadership steering the movement.

Of course, in the above context, no one is overlooking the highly commendable huge sacrifices that have already been made on the streets by the mass of the people demonstrating and clamoring against the military junta to vacate power since October 25. This is a very powerful factor that has to be taken into consideration as a point of negotiation with the military junta to wrest concessions from it – or where this is not feasible or possible then push the junta out of power which is easier said than done.

Abdalla Hamdok, despite the international praises heaped on him mainly by Western countries and their media, can be seen to be fundamentally weak and has bungled the opportunity for him to make lasting impression by being strong in principles while still in office. Indeed, what exactly is the substance of what Hamdok claimed to have achieved while in power? His IMF-World Bank-backed economic policies have largely been ineffectual and have been severely criticized for being anti-people. This was one of the factors that brought him down. What else did he achieve? His State institutional reforms have not yielded any tangible result.

He has dilly-dallied on one of the main crucial reform agenda: reform of the security sector – which led eventually to his being kicked out by the same military Junkers he has been kowtowing to. Hamdok saw all the handwriting of dangers on the wall but refused to do anything until the prophecies came to pass by now crying wolf. Who listens to such a weakling? Hamdok has proven beyond all reasonable doubts that he is largely ineffective.

The pace of the security sector reform has been painfully slow in the last two years since 2019, of course, with the resistance from the sectors and units affected. But the imperative of the reform should have been placed side-by-side with that of economic reforms. Hamdok did not press for the security sector reform as he should have done while accepting the post of Prime Minister in the first place. The slow pace contributed to the coup of both of September 21 and October 25 which allowed the military to act with impunity and which was partly aimed to stop or abort the reform altogether because of the dangers it represent and present to the vested interests and ambitions of the military Junkers – in which most of the “political” military officers are most likely to lose their influential positions and controlling hold on State power.

All the vectors of State power (especially the power of hire and fire) still lie in the hand of the military establishment. In this matrix of power is the Rapid Support Forces led by Major General Hamdan Dagalo (a.ka. Hemedti) who has been properly identified as a powerful figure within the military-security establishment. Dagalo. Dagalo is a dark horse waiting in the wing or corridor of power, monitoring the swinging pendulum of power and waiting to strike when the balance of forces is favorable to him. The factor of the RSF must be taken into serious consideration because it constitutes a cog in the wheel of progress. Indeed it must be taken out of the equation or matrix as quickly as possible because it is the most dangerous factor of all other strategic factors on ground in Sudan now. Western countries must be unequivocally affirmative in its pressure to have the RSF absorbed into the regular Army or disbanded completely to clear the way for legislative control and supervisory authority over the military and all other security agencies in the country. Leaving RSF intact is akin to keeping the floodgate opened for further crisis in Sudan with its unintended consequences.

Sudan is still in a state of flux, with the tug of war being waged by the visible and invisible gladiators for power or the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. The tidal wave of ebb and flow is being determined by the various power blocs that have locked horn in the battle over the soul of Sudan. Who will win this epochal battle is yet unknown.

The military coup d’état in Sudan on 25 October 2021 sent shockwaves across the region and through diplomatic circuits.⁵¹⁹ Dark clouds are on the horizon for Sudan. The coup d’état elevates the role of self-interested elites from the country’s fractious military bloc, and may well set the stage for a showdown between these forces.⁵²⁰

Sudan is obviously at a crossroad: either to go back to the embrace of military despotism or forge ahead courageously amidst all sacrifices to democratic rule.

There is perhaps a more worrisome scenario. The likelihood of another coup also looms writ large on the horizon either from the ambitious Hamdan Dagalo-led Rapid Support Force (the main dominant paramilitary group in Sudan), from the lower rank of the Army or any other unexpected quarters capable of carrying out a coup. The current status of Sudan as largely an unstable entity makes the scenario very dicey as well as scary because of the inability of the key political actors (including external actors) to reach compromise or consensus to overcome the current political gridlock.  

The Sudanese State has been hollowed or bottomed out, made almost bankrupt by the political jackals in military uniforms and mufti. It has been cruelly battered, almost cannibalized and being stripped to the bones. The Sudanese State is lying prostrate on ground, nay on a stretcher being wheeled to the surgeon’s table, critically ill, with survival chance at 50-50 ratio because of the insatiable greed of its guardians/custodians who are using the State to feather their own nests and not to bring genuine development to the people and society – like many other African countries.