By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY
Summary
The night attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy, Kaduna, the premier Nigerian military training institute (even drawing trainees from other African countries) on Tuesday, August 24, 2021, may not come as a strategic surprise to security observers and analysts with benefits of hindsight into past and similar attacks on the strategic military formations in the country since June 2011 when the Nigerian Police Headquarters was attacked and bombed by a suicide bomber killing one police officer but narrowly missing the then Inspector General of Police, Haffiz Ringim. Before then, on October 1, 2010, there was a bomb blast that rocked Eagle Square, Abuja, that claimed more than a dozen lives.
Since then, other military and police formations have been attacked with dare-devil impunity by insurgents, terrorists, unknown gunmen, and now the so-called bandits that have now reared their ugly monstrous head in the national security landscape in the last six years or thereabout.
These attacks have now even progressed to the point where insurgents and bandits can not only shoot combat aircrafts down, armed robbers can now have the effrontery to invade the precincts of Aso Rock Presidential Villa in Abuja when they burgled the residence of the Chief of Staff to the President, Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, and have his household looted of valuables and carted away, melting into thin air till date. No arrest has been made of anybody till date.
The only surprise was that the attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy was carried out by bandits that have been terrorizing the North western part of the country for the past six years – and not by the much-dreaded Boko Haram insurgents that have been tormenting the country since 2009. This clearly marks a shift in the landscape and architecture of insecurity in the Northern part of the country. It also marks an emerging balance of terror between the bandits and Boko Haram insurgents the latter mostly domiciled in the North eastern part of the country. It is evidence of the emergence of the audacity and firepower of the bandits hitherto thought to be incapable of embarking on such dare-devil attacks. It also shows the growing impotence and helplessness of the Nigerian Military in responding proactively to the multi-prong or multi-directional attacks on its men and bases by various non-state actors and agents of terror.
The attack exposes the Achilles Heel of the Nigerian Military that despite all the bravura often displayed by soldiers on the streets while intimidating civilians, it may turn out that they are extremely weak to the point where they can be attacked in their own very domains. The continued sovereign existence of the Nigerian State is threatened by these attacks which have now seemingly formed a pattern showing the fundamental weakness of the Nigerian Military as the Praetorian Guard of the Nigerian State. The proverbial enemy is no longer outside the gate but inside the premises daring the members of the household to come out to challenge them from carrying out their criminal activities.
Thus the critical question is how could a group of bandits penetrate, attack, ransack, kill, and abduct officers from the premises of the NDA and then melt into thin air – without visible rapid response from the soldiers in the academy?
To find the answer, it is apposite to backtrack to the past to examine similar attacks on prime military and police formations across the country in the last one decade or so – to show the state of unpreparedness for all emergencies and the strategic surprise with which the military and police formations have been attacked with utmost impunity. But first, the contemporary problems facing the Nigerian Military must be clearly defined, understood and determined.
Statement of the Problem
The attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy reflects larger but contemporary fundamental problems facing the Nigerian Military including other security agencies since the last two decades of democratic dispensation.
The first is crisis of perception. Here the Nigerian Military does not know precisely how to view the various violent non-state actors within the global and local (but modern) threat spectrum. This is because these kinds of threats do not exist when the military Junkers were in power. What brought these violent non-state actors and groups into existence within democratic dispensation is largely unknown. What is known is that democratic rule lifted off the lid that has hitherto covers these rebellions simmering underneath the social façade of peace that was seemingly enjoyed under military rule. But the military colossi could not conceive of a situation when and where violent non-state actors and groups would be strolling round the streets shaking their fists and guns at the Nigerian State.
Despite the fact that these actors or group of actors are generally classified and thus viewed as “enemies of the State”, it is also very clear that the Nigerian Military does not know precisely how these “enemies” become enemies of the State. What was hitherto held together by brute force of the military rule has now been torn asunder by civil rule. This crisis of perception arose out of its precarious position vis-a-vis its political masters who are actually the originators of this confusion and crisis of perception. The military colossi are sandwiched between the ruling political class that is seemingly reticent in ending the insurgency (as an example in this case) because it serves its narrow and selfish political interests to surreptitiously sustain the insurgency.
The political class does not wholeheartedly see the violent non-state actors as “enemies” of the State because it serves its purpose of maintaining political hegemony or incumbency. So when the military says these violent non-state actors are “enemies” of the State, it actually means to say the opposite: “friends” of the State because the political masters deemed them to be so. It is a subtle or complex situation that demands closer scrutiny of what the military is saying and not saying at the same time. Anybody that is carried away by the public declarations is only wasting his time or deluding himself or herself and is unmindful of the under-currents that run through its various public pronouncements and deeds in confronting these so-called “enemies” of the State.
The second is the weak theoretical anchorage of its physical position towards these enemies of the State. It is true that the military has thrown and committed itself to the battlefield to challenge the violent non-state actors on behalf of the Nigerian State. Yet its glaring incapacity to crush them raises questions about its competence to do so or whether it is even genuine in its commitment to defeating the violent groups at all. This lack of genuineness arises out of faulty theoretical anchorage precisely in viewing the violent groups as the enemies of the State when the opposite is actually the case.
“Enemies of the State” is not a theory nor is it a theoretical statement. It is a cliché or classification category borne out of the criminal activities of the non-state violent groups. The military lacks an understanding of the ideological worldview and mindset driving the criminal activities of the various violent groups. That is why the military cannot define these activities in terms or contexts of any known theory. The military is in a state of epistemological limbo or vacuity as regard the threats posed by these violent groups. That is why often times its soldiers are always caught wrong-footed or sometimes on the wrong side of the law when they commit egregious extrajudicial violations of the rights of the citizens even the criminal elements.
When the military talks about “rules of engagement” it only shows the theoretical or epistemological deficit which has come to define or frame its relationship with the violent groups. The military is actually saying it has no rules of engagement in the first place (contrary to popular opinion or belief) (and which is evident in its soldiers stepping beyond the bound of law to commit acts not permitted by law such as egregious extrajudicial violations of fundamental human rights of civilians caught in the cross-fire between the military and the “enemies” of the State) but is trying to contrive one because it is imperative to do so as a result of public pressure to bring the military under the control of rule of law. Or on more generous terms, it may be stated that those rules of engagement only exist on paper and no more.
Connected to both the crisis of perception and weak theoretical anchorage is the political undertone which hamstrung the military in its core duty and assumed or presumed competence. The political space and body language of the political gladiators in the country still favour the existence of the numerous violent non-state actors as convenient instrument of political warfare itself, i.e. as tools of winning elections. An empirical pointer in this direction of mindset is the classic case study of 2015 general elections in which Boko Haram insurgency was exploited and used against the incumbent government in power then. The then incumbent government lost the election. During this time, banditry and kidnapping have not assumed the frightening proportion that they are today. There is also the non-prosecution of all those non-state actors arrested, detained or interned. They are made to look like they are above the law of the land because they are mostly from a particular region or ethnic origin in the country. But that is only part of the explanations for this sordid situation. The other part of the explanations is that most of the arrested persons (but already “rehabilitated” and released and reintegrated back to the society) are unscrupulously still considered to be veritable and pliable political tools for winning upcoming elections. That is why they have not been decisively dealt with to serve as examples of deterrence to other would-be troublemakers through prosecution for the crimes committed by them against the citizens and the State itself. Justice has not been brought to them. Thus those who died from their hands died in vain. There has been no pretense on the part of the Federal Government that it does not want to go the route of prosecution and justice administration to these new generations of criminals – but not unaware of the fact that taking up arms in insurrection or insurgency against the people and the State is a serious crime (a treasonable felonious crime that often, under normal circumstance attract the most severe punishment).
Federal Government is even seen, with exasperation, to be shielding them through various mechanisms such as amnesty, sulhu programme, and so on, thus allowing the criminals to escape justice and be reintegrated back into the mainstream society that they have hitherto attacked with utmost violence and impunity – but with poor compensation to the victims of these heinous crimes.
There is also another disturbing issue. Till date nobody (in the public domain) have an idea of what the military and intelligence estimate or assessment of Boko Haram insurgents, bandits and other sundry criminal categories tormenting the Nigerian State and its people. Why it is disturbing is that the insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers only not emanated from the Northern part of the country but they essentially operate there and from there southward. The Nigerian Military through its own intelligence arms have not been able to tell the public for the purpose of at least civic enlightenment what their estimates are about these violent non-state actors: their various sizes, operational capabilities and the source of their weapons and financial resources (outside what the public already know about money- laundering and terrorism financing) that sustain these criminal gangsters.
Does the Nigerian Military have an intelligence estimate or assessment of the bandits: their physical size in terms of calculated numbers, strength in terms of arms and ammunitions, and the types, in their possession, the sources of these weapons, etc? Just few months back, these same bandits shot down a Nigerian combat aircraft. Nobody knows with what type of anti-aircraft weapon the aircraft was brought down. That is an indication that this banditry is no longer a piece of cake anymore. It shows the direction that banditry is going in the northern part of the country. Now, the same bandits have attacked one of the citadels of military establishments in the country. That cannot be taken as a joke at all. This shows clearly a change in the equation of balance of terror in the Northern part of the country between the bandits in the Northwest and Boko Haram insurgents in the Northeast, and ultimately the Nigerian State/Military.
It is very obvious that the bandits are evolving, and it is that evolutionary process that has brought them to the point where they are strong enough to shoot down a combat aircraft and dare to attack the Nigerian Defense Academy. The Military High Command has a lot to do as regard soul-searching and release part of this to the public.
The Nigerian Military has 1st Mechanized Division in Kaduna, 3rd Armoured Division in Jos, Air Force Base in Makurdi, and 7th Infantry Division in Maiduguri (apart from other supportive military formations and infrastructures) all with their major area of responsibility covering the entire Northern, including North Central, part of the country. How has it been possible that the Nigerian Military has no mastery of this statutory area of responsibility as regard the various hideouts of insurgents in Sambisa Forest in Borno State, the lowland savannah in Zamfara State, the plateau of Plateau State from where other criminal gangs and murderers operate from, constantly launching attacks and mayhems on the populace from time to time?
The image of the Nigerian soldiers running up and down in pursuit of these insurgents, bandits and herdsmen killers, then running into ambushes or having its planes shot down like birds do not speak well of a military that likes to pride itself as modern or that seeks to be respected for its alleged professionalism. Tragically no professionalism has been demonstrated by the Nigerian Military in its confrontation with these hordes of criminals so far, bitter as this may taste to the palate. There have been no bespoke strategies and tactics for defeating these hordes from nether regions, who on the other hand, have demonstrated more professionalism in their murderous activities.
In its basic combat approach to Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian Military indisputably is still stuck in the mental grooves of conventional warfare which is not appropriate for tackling this type of modern insurgency.
The core of the whole genre of problems facing the Nigerian Military is its questionable understanding of the nature and character of these hordes of criminals – be they Boko Haram insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers, and even those who pretend to be secessionists or separatists. Thus the main reason for the failure of the Nigerian Military in successfully defeating the myriad security threats is the lack of “scientific” understanding of the nature and character of this new genre of enemies of the Nigerian State. This scientific understanding is an imperative to craft appropriate strategies and tactics markedly different from conventional theories of war that have not helped in resolving this 12-year old insurgency, for instance. Boko Haram insurgents, terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, killer herdsmen are not in any way engaged in conventional warfare against the Nigerian State. Rather, they are carrying out hit-and-run campaign to wear down the morale, will and physical ability of the Nigerian Military to fight back in defense of the Nigerian State. They frustrate the military in this irregular mode of combat or warfare, compelling the government security agents to be running helter-skelter, like a man foolishly chasing ten rats at the same time, chasing them up and down the four corners of the country, wearing down morale, sapping energy, tearing down physical facilities and weapons of war.
That is why, for instance, even with the forward-based 7th Infantry Division established in August 2013 and located in Maiduguri, there has been no respite in the insurgency against the Nigerian State because of the fundamental flaws in the strategic and tactical approach to the insurgency by the Nigerian Military. The Nigerian Military has not been able to crush Boko Haram outright showing clearly that there is inevitable something else that we are missing in the analytical horizon of the prowess and resilience of Boko Haram insurgent group: the will and determination to fight on doggedly even to the last man standing against the Nigerian State despite some occasional crushing blows that the Nigerian Military has delivered against them from time to time. This will and/or determination is not just borne out of the arms and materials including financial support it receives from clandestine sources but also due to the largely underestimated tenacity of the ideology of jihadism that undergirds or underpins its war against the Nigerian State.
The totality of the situation such as outlined above has in turn created an unwholesome situation of low frequency of situational awareness, alertness and preparedness for the Nigerian Military – an unwholesome situation that has turned the Nigerian Military into a veritable target of attacks from time to time as have been demonstrated from 2011 to the present. Their physical facilities have become “soft” targets because they lack modern rampart of protective infrastructures even when they are seen to be manned by human sentries at their perimeters. The above is what has been demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt in the attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy by a horde of bandits who came from the night and melted back into the night!
Back to Memory Lane
It has not gone unnoticed that Nigerians can easily forget past incidents quickly. This is as a result of the fact that the nation is constantly being bombarded on daily basis with happenings that are of earthquake or tsunamic character even though such forgetfulness has been ascribed to a disease known to historians as historical short span deficit disorder (hssdd) – where lot of emotions are invested in the present happenings without sober reflection on the past similar incidents and drawing appropriate lessons from them.
That is why each accident like the current attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy seemed to have taken us by surprise, causing us to wail, lament or express shock that we have not seen such a thing before. But there is really no new thing as such. Historians have the task of first looking backward to check whether similar accidents have happened in the past so that they can be properly put in correct perspectives and be guided in the analysis of the current world events, both global (transnational) and national (local) to see the hidden connections that may be oblivious to superficial observers (especially by reporters in the media where journalism has been defined as history in a hurry).
This section seeks to refresh our collective memory about similar events that have happened in the last one decade to show the hidden connections and to underscore the utter cluelessness and incapacity of the Nigerian State (and the Nigerian Military in this particular case) to unravel the mystery surrounding these types of attacks on the Nigerian State/Military itself.
On October 1, 2010, some members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) travelled all the from the creeks of the Niger Delta in South-south Nigeria to Eagle Square in Abuja and detonated car bombs that rocked the entire city, killing scores of policemen and passers-by. The President then, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, was billed to arrive the venue with his entourage to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Nigerian political independence. But he had not left the safety of the cocoon of the Presidential Villa before the bomb blasts took place at Eagle Square.
The Nigerian Security Establishment was taken by surprise by the bombing. They were caught napping with their pants down. They slept and never dreamt of such a momentous attack that could have taken the lives of the President and several other government functionaries if they have arrived the venue of the celebration. They were never seen to have looked into the crystal ball to see whether there was any danger looming on the horizon at the heights of the Niger Delta militancy. Their security and intelligence reports never show any thinking that the Niger Delta militants could conceive, plan to carry out and finally implement such a daring bombing campaign to the very heart of Nigeria’s capital city.
Very much later, Mr. Henry Okah, the leader of MEND was arrested, incarcerated, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to several years imprisonment in South Africa where he was accused and found guilty of gun-running – showing the determination of Jonathan administration to be seen to be impartial in the raging Niger Delta militancy as at that time and thus convey the impression or image of justice dispensation to all without any form of ethnic discrimination.
On June 16, 2011, the Nigerian Police Headquarters popularly known as Louis Edet House, Abuja, came under physical attack from terrorists allegedly affiliated to Boko Haram insurgent group operating in far-away North eastern part of the country. Boko Haram actually claimed responsibility for this daring attack.
The 2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing was believed to be the first suicide bombing in Nigeria’s history. The attack occurred on 16 June 2011, when a suicide bomber drove a car bomb onto the premises of the Louis Edet House in Abuja, the headquarters of the Nigeria Police Force. He may have been trying to kill Inspector-General of Police Hafiz Ringim, whose convoy he followed into the compound, but he was stopped by security before he could do so.1
It was confirmed that the bomber and a traffic policeman were killed, although authorities said there may have been up to six casualties. The Sunni Islamist group Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the explosion.2
The attack came days after Nigeria’s police chief visited the north-eastern town of Maiduguri, where Boko Haram is based and vowed to defeat the group.3 Boko Haram wants to overthrow the state and implement Islamic law.4
[Earlier] in 2009, hundreds of Boko Haram supporters, including the group’s leader Mohammed Yusuf, were killed after they attacked police stations in Maiduguri and other northern towns. The group has since reformed and in the past year[s] has killed dozens of police officers, politicians and anyone who criticises it, including Christian preachers and clerics from other Muslim groups.5
President Goodluck Jonathan visited the scene of the blast and urged Nigerians not to panic. He said all countries were affected by “terrorist attacks”. The president was accompanied by police chief Hafiz Ringim, who may have been the target of the attack.6
The BBC’s Jonah Fisher in Lagos says that, for the Nigerian authorities, the attack is an embarrassing strike at the very heart of their security establishment.7 Inspector General Hafiz Ringim went to Maiduguri earlier [in the] week, taking reinforcements and promising that the Boko Haram problem would be solved within months.8
[T]he group’s response was delivered directly to police head office in Abuja. Less than two minutes after Inspector General Ringim arrived for work on Thursday morning, a car that had been following closely behind his vehicle exploded in the car park. The blast in the car park of the police base also destroyed many vehicles and a large plume of smoke could be seen rising from the scene. The police said 33 cars had been damaged beyond repair and 40 more had been partially damaged by the explosion.9
The Boko Haram sect accuses Nigeria’s government of being corrupted by Western ideas and wants to overthrow the state and impose Islamic law on the country.10
Also, a bomb went off in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno state, killing four children. Police said the children were playing nearby when the bomb went off inside a home in the town of Damboa. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.11
In 2010 the group started to stage drive-by shootings on government targets in revenge for his (Mohammed Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram) killing and last year, it carried out suicide bombings on high-profile targets such as the headquarters of the UN and the police in Abuja.12 Boko Haram is waging an insurgency in the region to try and overthrow the national government and establish an Islamic state.13
Again, the Nigerian Security Establishment, particular the Nigerian Police High Command, was taken by utmost surprise. They did not see it coming at all. First, the convoy of the Inspector General of Police is always well armed to protect him from any form of public attack – similar to convoys of other Service Chiefs, Heads of Security Agencies, Governors, Ministers and other high government officials. But the convoy of the Inspector General of Police did not see the car driven by the lone suicide bomber trailing behind the convoy. The escort cars behind the convoy did not notice the car driven by the suicide bomber. The suicide bomber conveniently drove into the premises of the Police Headquarters and detonated the bomb in the car park right behind the convoy. How to describe the state of alertness of all the police sentries at the main gate, including others, beats one’s imagination.
The nation was barely out of the shock of the bombing of the police headquarters when Boko Haram suicide bombers struck again two months later. This time, the target was the United Nations headquarters at Abuja. The bombing took place on August 26, 2011.
[Another] car bomb explosion on Friday, 26 August 2011 [rocked the nation’s capital]. [The target was the] UN building that killed at least 21 and wounded 60. A spokesperson from the Sunni Islamist group Boko Haram later claimed responsibility.14 At about 11:00 WAT in the diplomatic zone in the centre of the city the car bomb vehicle broke through two security barriers. Then its driver detonated the bomb after crashing it into the UN reception area. The bomb caused devastation to the building’s lower floors. The building is said to be the headquarters for about 400 UN employees but it is not clear how many were inside the building at the time of the attack15.
A wing of the building collapsed and the ground floor of the building was badly damaged. Emergency services were quickly on the scene removing dead bodies from the building and rushing the wounded to hospital. Cranes have been brought to the blast site to move the mass of rubble and ensure that no-one is trapped there16.
The blast killed at least 21 people and injured 73. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Viola Onwuliri, said: “This is not an attack on Nigeria but on the global community; an attack on the world.” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described the attack as an ‘assault on those who devote themselves to helping others’. The attack is the first suicide bombing in Nigeria to attack an international organisation.17
In September 2011 the Nigerian Department of State Security alleged that Mamman Nur was the mastermind behind the attack and offered a ₦26 million (US$160,000) bounty. Also four men appeared in an Abuja magistrates’ court charged with organising the bombing, and were remanded in custody to a federal high court hearing.18
According to John Campbell, “Boko Haram has been an indigenous, grassroots insurrection against a discredited Abuja government and against the traditional northern Nigerian Islamic establishment. It has not been a part of an international terrorist movement, though doubtlessly there have been contacts with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and al-Shabab. Boko Haram appears to be decentralized in its leadership without a charismatic leader or a politburo. The Abuja government has not sought to address the deep-seated discontent of the Muslim north that underpins support for Boko Haram, but rather has imposed a heavy and often brutal security presence under the justification of anti-terrorism.19
If the Abuja attacks …prove to have been carried out by Boko Haram, it is likely that the West and international organizations have come to be identified with the Abuja government. That would be bad news for the United States, as northern Nigeria has one of Africa’s largest Muslim populations.20
The building is the UN’s main office in Nigeria, where 26 humanitarian and development agencies are based. It is said to be the headquarters for about 400 UN employees but it is not clear how many were inside the building at the time of the attack.21
Earlier [in the] month the most senior American general working on Africa, Gen Carter Ham, said many sources indicated ties between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, which operates in North Africa, as well as the al-Shabab movement in Somalia, says the BBC’s Africa analyst Martin Plaut. These ties, if correct, would have provided Boko Haram with the expertise it needed to carry out these deadly attacks, he says.22
It was eight years later that United Nations reopened its headquarters in Abuja.
The United Nations reopened its building in Abuja, eight years after the property was destroyed in an attack by a Boko Haram suicide bomber.23 The Nigerian government undertook the rebuilding of the property and handed it over to UN officials.24 The bombing which levelled the lower floor of the facility, left 76 people injured.25
Boko Haram’s Abu Kaka said in a teleconference with journalists that the attack was carried out to force the government to release the group’s detained members. “The government must release all our members detained across the country unconditionally before we accept dialogue with the government,” said Mr. Kaka who also used the same medium to “warn security agencies in Kano to stop persecuting” their members.26
The then president, Goodluck Jonathan, described the attack as “the most despicable assault on the United Nation’s Objectives of global peace and security, and the sanctity of life to which Nigeria wholly subscribes.”27 The then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, while condemning the attack said it was “an assault on those who devoted their lives to helping others.”28
The Nigerian government decided to officially hand over the building eight years after it was attacked on the day the UN celebrated the International Day of the UN. During the handover ceremony, Mark Lowcock, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said “the Nigerian Government handing over this building to the UN is a symbol of our shared commitment to continue supporting the people and Government of Nigeria.”29
Mr. Lowcock who represented the United Nations Secretary-General at the event recalled the day “23 people including UN staff and Nigerian civilians died in a suicide car bombing at the UN house in Abuja. This was the first attack against a UN facility in Nigeria; the building has since been rehabilitated by the Nigerian Government,” he said.30 He said Nigeria has been a key actor since it became a member of the United Nations in 1960. “Today’s reopening of the UN House in Abuja demonstrates our collective commitment to continue addressing the complex challenges facing Nigeria, West Africa, and the whole world,” said Mr. Lowcock who stood in for the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres.31
The UN Undersecretary said the opening of UN House is an act of defiance in the face of such terror. “We stand together to say that we will not be cowed by violence. We will continue to support the Nigerian people fulfil their dreams of a future of prosperity and security.32
The handover ceremony was attended by officials of Nigerian government comprising, Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, Sadiya Faruq; the Minister of Federal Capital Territory, Mohammed Bello; the Minister of Women Affairs, Paulin Tallen; former Chairman Nigeria Economic Summit Group, Kyari Bukar, among others.33
This attack on the United Nations complex, even though not a military or security formation, again, shows the complacency with which the intensification of the security situation in the country was being viewed by various bodies of their high-valued physical assets including their buildings during this tensed period. Again, as in the case of the Police Headquarters shown above, it can be seen clearly that sentry security at the United Nations complex was at its lowest ebb, with sentries walking lackadaisically about during which time the suicide bomber was able to drive and crash into the building without any visible attempt from any quarter to stop the vehicle-borne bomber. It shows that the official security system within the United Nations complex at the time was inadequate, for want of a better adjectival terminology to deploy or employ to describe the unserious state of alertness or situational awareness of the prevailing security atmosphere by several agencies in the capital city at this point in time.
Six months after the attack on the United Nations headquarters, Abuja, Boko Haram took its campaign of terror to Kaduna State, on February 7, 2012. The targets here were the 1st Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army, on Zaria Road, and the Nigerian Air Force Base in Kawo, both on the outskirts of Kaduna.
Headquarters 1 Division Nigerian Army is located in Kaduna. It was established during the civil war. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of Responsibility (AOR) covering the North Western flank of Nigeria and also ensuring that the borders located in its AOR are secured. The division is a mechanized infantry with affiliated combat support and combat service support units.34
Both attacks occurred almost within five minutes interval. While one of the suspected bombers gained entrance into the First Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army the other detonated his explosive under the Kawo overhead bridge in front of the gates of the Air Force base.35
Eye witnesses however say three people were killed by the blast at the Airforce base Kawo. “One of them is the suicide bomber,” they said. An eyewitness at the Zaria road scene said the explosion shattered several glasses on buildings around the First Mechanized Division area. “Virtually all the glass has been shattered,” the eyewitness said. “I saw soldiers with glass cuts on their bodies being taken out, but it’s difficult to say if there were any (more serious) casualties.”36
The first bomb, according to eyewitness, went off under Kawo overhead bridge around 12:45pm; the second at the second gate leading to the Administrative Headquarters, of I Mechanized Division, Kaduna and the third near the gate of the Air force Base, Kawo, Kaduna. There were also multiple blasts at Gomboru Market, Maiduguri and an attack on Sharada Police station, Kano.37. This came as five suspected members of Boko Haram were killed during a six-hour gun duel with security forces at Mariri, in the outskirt of Kano on Monday evening.38
The Nigerian Army confirmed that it was attacked by two suicide bombers, but claimed that the attack was not successful. In a statement by Assistant Director, Army Public Relations of I Division, Kaduna, Lt Col Abubakar Edun, reads: “At about 1218 pm on Tuesday, February 7th, 2012 a failed suicide bomb attempt was made on the headquarters complex of 1 Division of Nigerian Army, Kawo, Kaduna. The two suicide bombers came in two vehicles, a Sienna Toyata space bus and a Honda Accord.39
“The drivers of the two vehicles overran the security post and the lawn leading to the Headquarters complex. One of the vehicles (Toyota Sienna Space Bus) exploded by the car park directly in front of the Headquarters, when a soldier opened fire on the car after the attacker refused to stop which made him lose control of the vehicle.”40
The second vehicle, which did not explode was loaded with 10 numbers of 20 litres of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 4 numbers of 30 litres loaded with IEDs, and 2 numbers of large peak milk containers also loaded with IEDs. The suicide bombers in the Toyota Sienna Space bus died in the attempt while there was no casualty on the part of our own troops.”41
However, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks on the Dalet Military Barracks, Number 1 Div in Kaduna, the Sharada Police station in Kano as well as yesterday’s multiple bomb blasts in Gomboru Market of Maiduguri, the Borno State Capital.42 Speaking to newsmen in a telephone conference in Maiduguri, alleged Spokesman of the sect, Abul Qaqa said they always hit their military targets after which, the Joint Task Force (JTF) “will come and kill innocent people on the streets and thereafter attribute the killings to Boko Haram.”43
Qaqa said the Kaduna attacks were in view of the arrest of one of the sect’s kingpins by SSS recently. He said, the Maiduguri multiple bomb blasts in Gomboru Market were successful. He regretted that the JTF claimed that it was a fire incident that took place in the market, pointing out that, it was after their successful attacks that the JTF condoned off the area and set the market ablaze.44
The acclaimed spokesman also said that his members were still ever ready to pursue their mission of Islamizing the country.45
The attacks on the 1st Mechanized Division and the Air Force Base came as utter surprise to many. The 1st Mechanized Division is arguably fortified and manned by sentry security details that may say that it is would be Biblically difficult for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for kamikaze suicide bomber to even think of launching attack on such a citadel. The Divisional officialdom was taken aback. This could only be due primarily to almost-visible gross deficits in its security and intelligence assessment of the evolving security situation in the country as this point in time. The conclusion that can be drawn from this ugly incident was that the Division could have been easily overrun and overwhelmed if the insurgents and terrorists have come in large number – before the soldiers in the Division could get their acts together to launch a counter-attack to ward off the attackers. But by this time, irreparable damages could have been inflicted on the men and materials of the Division not to talk of everlasting shame and stigma accompanying such an ignominious response. What became apparent was that the Nigerian Military Establishment and with particular reference to the Divisional Headquarters, the situational awareness of the threatening security environment and state of readiness were extremely low if not at zero level.
A retrospective analysis cannot fail to come to this shameful conclusion that the most powerful division of the Nigerian Army was taken by strategic surprise by few daring suicide bombers who came to attack the Division even if they have to die in the process too. It was indeed a very pathetic and worrisome if not irksome situation that the nation finds itself with the state of preparedness of its military and security establishments.
Police Formations as Easy (Soft) Targets
An impartial or objective comparative analysis of the security architecture in the country cannot fail to notice that the Nigerian Police Force is arguably the weakest of all the security agencies in the country. They are not only poorly equipped, they are ill-motivated in morale and has been seen and acknowledged to be wallowing in cesspool of corrupt practices that more often than not act as maggots and termites that pull down super-structural edifices at the greatest hours of need. Nobody feels safe within the protective umbrella of the police because of its well-known and documented shenanigans and acts of impunities – hence the lack of trust and confidence in its ability to offer the much-needed protection from armed robbers and marauders of all descriptions.
From the very beginning of the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency and other hybrid warfare against the Nigerian State, it was absolutely wrong to have pitted the Police against these hordes of violent non-state actors. This could only happen as a result of the wrong assessment or estimate of the new security threat spectrum in the country which push forward these well-armed, unforgivable and formidable enemies of the State who have sworn from the very beginning to pull down the Nigerian State or have it overthrown by any mean in their capacity.
Of course, the Police are often the first line of defense in matters of challenge to internal security of a nation. And the Nigerian Police has put itself into the frontline of this internal defense apparatus. But if an objective assessment has been carried out, for instance, in the case of Boko Haram insurgency, then it was absolutely wrong to push the Police to the frontline in view of the sophistication of strategies and tactics including weaponry brought to the battlespace by the insurgents from the very beginning.
It would be recalled that the Police could not match the foot soldiers of Mohammed Yusuf (founder of Boko Haram) when the rebellion first broke out in Maiduguri in July 2009. The Army had to be called in with much more sophisticated habiliments of war including armored tanks, armored personnel carriers to dislodge the foot soldiers from the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested and handed over to the Police the latter who promptly had him eliminated before he could be interrogated to mine human intelligence from him. This extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf took place within twenty four hours showing clearly that the Police have interest in silencing him from spilling whatever beans he had in his bag of rebellion. Where the order came from to have him eliminated remain shrouded in secrecy till date. What happened to the culprits later identified, arrested and arraigned for prosecution remained inconclusive till date.
Thus, the Police present itself as a soft target for all manners of violent non-state actors including armed robbers. From Boko Haram insurgents and terrorists, from bandits to kidnappers, from herdsmen killers to sundry secessionists across the length and breadth of the country, the police became an object of first attack since at any rate it has push itself into the frontline of defense against these hordes of violent non-state actors. Thus too, from the times of Niger Delta militancy, police formations across the country have always been soft targets of first strike by insurgents and terrorists, bandits, and/or unknown gunmen. From one police station to another and from one state to another, there has been a relentless attack against the Police with utmost impunity and with no prosecution and punishment of the culprits to serve as deterrence to others.
In this section, few examples will be cited.
One divisional police officer and three other policemen were confirmed killed by gunmen following an attack on a police station in Nigeria’s southern state of Bayelsa, local police authorities said. The gunmen stormed the police station at Agudama-Ekpetiama area in the state capital, Yenagoa, shooting sporadically on early Monday, according to state police spokesperson Asinim Butswat.46
One security source told Xinhua (Chinese news agency) that no civilian was killed in the attack, as there was no detainee at the police station. Several sources also confirmed that service rifles, ammunition, and police uniforms were carted away by the gunmen.47 According to a statement from the police headquarters, the Inspector General of Police Mohammed Adamu has ordered a manhunt for the perpetrators of the act. Adamu also ordered the immediate deployment of detectives from the Intelligence Response Unit to complement the efforts of the state police in carrying out a discrete investigation into the “unfortunate incident”.48
The police have confirmed three officers injured after armed bandits attacked the Maraban Jos Divisional Headquarters in Kaduna State. The police spokesperson in the state, Muhammed Jalige, said the gunmen attacked the facility at 11 a.m. on a mission to loot the armoury. However, he said the officers on ground repelled the attack and successfully defended the armoury. “The bandits came in large number in three Sharon utility vehicles and, in their desperate attempt to override the personnel on duty, shot sporadically in order to gain access into the divisional armoury,” Mr. Jalige said in a statement.49
“However, the bandits met with professional and stiff resistance from the personnel on duty. The gun duel between the bandits and the station guards lasted for some minutes. However, the superior and tactical firepower of the police forced the bandits to retreat of which some have sustained fatal bullet wounds,” the police spokesperson added.50
Mr. Jalige added that the guards “were able to secure the amoury, the entire station and other adjoining facilities at the division. Sadly, one Inspector and two Special Constabulary personnel sustained varying degrees of injuries and are currently receiving medical treatment. Investigation into the incident has since commenced using the available evidence recovered from the scene as effort is geared towards apprehending the fleeing hoodlums.51
Some bandits attacked a Divisional Police Headquarters in Kaduna, leaving an Inspector and two other personnel injured. Kaduna State Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO), Muhammed Jalige, who confirmed the attack to journalists, said the attackers targeted the division’s armoury. The Police spokesman, however, said the officers and men in the station were able to repel the attack, secure the armoury and the station, using tactical and superior firepower.52
According to Jalige, the gun duel between the bandits and the station guards lasted for some minutes, however; the superior and tactical firepower of the Police forced the bandits to the retreat of which some sustained bullet wounds. “Investigation into the incident has since commenced, using available evidence recovered from the scene, as effort is geared towards apprehending the fleeing hoodlums.
“In view of the above incident, the Commissioner of Police Kaduna Command issued a directive to all officers in the Command to ensure proactive measures to protect Police facilities and forestall a repeat of the ugly incident,” he said.53
Gunmen attacked the Divisional Police Headquarters in the Orlu Local Government Area of Imo state, killing a police inspector.54 The attack, during which three of the assailants were fatally shot, brought the number of policemen killed in Imo to 22 since the beginning of onslaught on police formations and military checkpoints in the state and other south-eastern parts of the country in recent months.55
The police spokesperson for the state police command, Mike Abattam, said the incident occurred around 11.30pm. He said some of the surviving bandits escaped with bullet wounds. Abattam said: “On August 5, at 21:35 hours, bandits, in their numbers attacked and threw explosives and petrol bombs on top of the roof of Orsu Police Station damaging the roof and causing fire outbreak in the station which spread and affected some of the vehicles parked at the parking lot. The command’s tactical teams on ground engaged the bandits in a gun duel.56
“Due to the superior fire power of the police, the bandits were subdued. Three of them were neutralised and their guns, one pump-action gun and two locally-made double-barrelled pistols were recovered while others escaped into the bush with bullet wounds. Unfortunately, a police inspector lost his life in the attack.57
“Meanwhile the command is using this medium to call on the good people of Imo State especially, the Orsu community to assist the police with credible information that will lead to the arrest of the escaped bandits and report to the nearest police station any person seen with or treating bullet wounds. Also hospitals are advised to ensure that they report any person who comes to them for treatment of bullet wounds.”58
Nigerian police confirmed gunmen attack on a police station in the southern state of Akwa Ibom, killing six persons, including five police officers and a civilian. Odiko Macdon, the state police spokesperson, told media that a group of gunmen invaded on Saturday a divisional police headquarters in Odoro Ikpe in Ini local government area of the state, killing five police officers and the wife of a police officer. Macdon, while carrying out an on-the-spot assessment of the attacked police station, said the police station was set ablaze and operational vehicles and other valuables were destroyed in the attack.59
The Police Command in Imo repelled another attempt by hoodlums to attack the command’s headquarters in Owerri, killing five of the attackers in a gun duel.60
The command also announced that it had begun in-depth investigation into circumstances surrounding the death of Uguchi Unachukwu, who returned home from Germany and was allegedly murdered on May 31 in Imo.61 The Commissioner of Police in Imo, CP Abutu Yaro confirmed the failed attack in a statement signed by the command’s Spokesman, SP Bala Alkana.62 Yaro said gallant officers killed five of the hoodlums during crossfire, while others fled with bullet injuries. “Hoodlums masquerading as unknown gunmen attempted an attack on the police headquarters this morning but suffered a huge defeat.63
“They made efforts to access the police headquarters through the Works Layout around Avan Nursery and Primary School but were vehemently repelled.64 They came in a white Hummer Bus, five of the hoodlums were killed during an exchange of fire and others were injured. The Hummer bus was recovered with four Ak47 rifles, previously stolen from the police during a recent attack on its station, while officers have been deployed to apprehend the fleeing hoodlums.65
Sleeping and Snoring at Duty Post
The attack on the Nigerian Defense Academy on the night of August 24, 2021, no doubt came out of the deep night sky but with the element of strategic surprise precisely as other past attacks on military formations across the country. Without doubt, it can be safely argued that the attack caught the men in the Academy sleeping, like the proverbial thief in the night. Thus the denial by the authority of the Nigerian Defense Headquarters that the sentries especially those in the CCTV monitoring and control room were not sleeping are quite pointless. Indeed the haste with which the DHQ came to deny that there were no “sleeping Jonahs” in the CCTV room as reported by The Cable online news platform raises more questions about what the men could be doing when the bandits came calling. Significantly, it raises questions about their situational state of awareness, alertness and preparedness in times of emergency like this.
The attack by the bandits shows clearly that they may have been largely emboldened by what they perceived as the lackadaisical attitude of the men and women in the Academy. First, they would not have dared to launch the attack without prior casing of the environment to determine the level of likely resistance that would mounted against their attack. Second is their determination to launch the attack for whatever reasons they already have in mind. It behooves on the Military High Command should determine what are those reasons.
Gunmen have attacked Nigeria’s elite military academy, killing two officers and kidnapping another in a brazen assault on a symbol of the armed forces.66
The raid on the Nigerian Defence Academy, the country’s main officer training school, is a major blow for a military already struggling with an armed uprising and heavily armed criminal gangs. “The security architecture of the Nigerian Defence Academy was compromised early this morning by unknown gunmen,” said Major Bashir Muhammad Jajira, spokesman for the academy in the northwestern state of Kaduna. “We lost two personnel and one was abducted.”67 Various army units and security agencies were pursuing the attackers and trying to rescue the kidnap victim, Jajira said.68
The high-security base, located just outside the state capital Kaduna, trains Nigerian officers and also cadets from other African militaries.69 No group claimed responsibility, but Nigeria is facing a threat from rebels and large criminal gangs that raid villages, steal cattle and carry out mass kidnappings for ransom.70 Attacks and kidnappings have surged in recent months, especially in north-central and northwest Nigeria, partly driven by economic hardship linked to disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and by the impunity enjoyed by most perpetrators.71
Kaduna state, located north of the federal capital Abuja, has been the scene of mass abductions at schools and other acts of violence against communities, along with other states such as Niger, Zamfara and Katsina.72
The Nigerian government has said it is winning the battle against the criminals it describes as bandits. However, many Nigerians have stopped travelling through rural areas for fear of being abducted, many pupils have dropped out of school, and many parents are driven to desperate measures to raise ransoms to have their kidnapped children freed.73
Interestingly, just a month earlier, i.e. July 21, 2021, the Commander of the 17 Brigade of the Nigerian Army was admonishing cadets at the NDA to remain focused, disciplined, law-abiding and level-headed while on training at the Academy. Tragically, at the greatest hour of needs, the cadets disappointed the nation by been caught napping when they were attacked by bandits. Such was the pathetic situation of the military preparedness in state of emergency occasioned by growing insecurity in the country.
The Commander 17 Brigade Nigerian Army, Brigadier General EE Emeka, has charged cadets of Dalet and Mogadishu Battalions of the Nigerian Defence Academy to remain disciplined, law-abiding and level-headed officer cadets while on training at the Academy, and to ensure that they stay away from any activity that could jeopardize the dignity and image of the Academy, the Armed Forces and Nation at large.74
General Emeka made this call at the Cadets Brigade Combined Regimental Dinner Night in honour of cadets of Dalet and Mogadishu Battalions, hosted at the Cadets’ Mess, Afaka.75
Addressing the cadets, Brig Gen Emmanuel Emeka, who was the Special Guest of Honour at the event, noted that the Regimental Dinner is an important military tradition which, among other benefits, offers the cadets an opportunity to interact with senior military officers both serving and retired and non-military staff so that they can gain a wealth of knowledge and experience. It also offers the cadets an opportunity to acquaint themselves of the conduct and etiquette required of gentlemen officers of the Armed Forces, he added.76
The Special Guest of Honour advised the cadets to remain focused and committed while undergoing training in the Academy and to also dedicate themselves towards working hard, thus enabling them become competent officers in the future and rise to the peak of their career in the Armed Forces.77
Brig Gen Emeka further expressed his delight at being invited as the Special Guest of Honour for the event and thanked the Cadets Brigade Commander, for according him the honour of being at the event. He also thanked the Commandant NDA, Maj Gen IM Yusuf, all Principal Staff Officers, military and civilian staff of the Academy for their hard work, dedication and commitment towards the molding and training of quality cadets at the Academy.78
Also speaking at the event, the Cadets Brigade Commander, Brigadier General IB Maina, thanked Brig Gen EE Emeka for gracing the event as the Special Guest of Honour.79
Regimental Dinner Night is a social activity organized by the officers’ corps in accordance with laid down regimental procedure. The military places much premium on the hosting of regimental dinner night, because It provides a good opportunity for instilling discipline, and training the officers to imbibe acceptable mess etiquette. The Regimental Dinner Night for cadets of Dalet and Mogadishu Battalions was aimed at familiarising the cadets with the procedures of Regimental Dinner Nights, as practiced in the Armed Forces.80
The occasion was graced by Senior Military Officers, Senior Civilian Staff, officers and Gentlemen Cadets of the Academy. High point of the event includes the Presidential Loyal Toast, presentation of souvenirs to the SGoH by the Cadets Brigade Commander and Conduct of the Academy Band by the SGoH.81
The Nigerian Defence Academy is no ordinary military academy. On the website of the NDA can be seen proudly inscribed: “Welcome to Nigerian Defence Academy. The Premier Military University of West Africa”
The Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) was established on 5 February 1964 in response to the Defence needs of independent Nigeria to train officers for the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Before then, the institution was known as the Royal Military Forces Training College (RMFTC). After independence in 1960, it became known as the Nigerian Military Training College.82
It is the breeding ground for middle-ranking officer corps of the Nigerian Military. Where the NDA in its training programmes ends, the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji, Kaduna, takes over before climaxing at the Nigerian Defence College.
The Armed Forces Command and Staff College is a Joint Service institution established to produce operational-level military officers of the highest professional standard as well as to ensure standardization of Staff Duties in the Nigerian Armed Forces. The College was established on 29 May 1976 as Army Command and Staff College, with assistance from the British Army Advisory Team (BAAT).83
The mission statement is “To produce operational-level Armed Forces officers of the highest professional competence and training as well as to ensure standardization of Staff Duties in the Nigerian Armed Forces”84 while the objective is “To develop the professional knowledge and understanding of selected officers of Armed Forces in order to prepare them for the increasing responsibilities both in staff and command appointments.”85
The National Defence College is the apex military training institution for the Nigerian Armed Forces, and a Centre of Excellence for peace support operations training at the strategic level in West Africa. It was established in 1992 as the highest military institution for the training of senior military officers in Nigeria.86
Since the Nigerian Armed Forces had long established a strong tri-service military training heritage with the establishment of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna, for cadet training, and the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji, for middle level staff training, it was appropriate and cost effective to continue the tradition by establishing the new strategic level military institution, the National Defence College, on a tri-service basis. 87
The objectives of the College are to: Prepare senior military and civilian officers for operational and strategic level responsibilities at national and international environments; Underpin leadership and command functions with a firm understanding of geographical considerations affecting Nigeria, Africa and the world at large; Develop an in-depth understanding of elements of national power which will aid in the formulation of grand national strategy; Provide knowledge of the political and strategic framework for policy making and operations in joint and multinational environments; Relate within a democratic framework, the higher management of defence to the broader national interests; Undertake advanced academic research at national strategic policy level; and Proffer policy recommendations on specific national and international issues that border on national security.88
The above is the immediate Nigeria’s military training landscape, architecture and physical facilities.
The Cable online reported that the sentries were sleeping when the bandits came calling. According to TheCable News: “Personnel monitoring closed-circuit television (CCTV) at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) were reportedly asleep when bandits attacked the premises on Tuesday.”89
Sources who spoke with TheCable had said the bandits sneaked in through a part of the facility that had no fence. Another source who spoke with TheCable said “it was in the middle of the night, and the personnel that were meant to be monitoring the CCTV had slept off.” “They could have put everyone on alert, and avert the attack.” TheCable learnt the academy authorities would court martial some soldiers for failing to secure the area.90
Bashir Muhd Jajira, spokesperson of the academy, in a statement also explained how the security architecture was compromised at the institution. “The security architecture of the Nigerian Defence Academy was compromised early this morning by unknown gunmen who gained access into the residential area within the Academy in Afaka. During the unfortunate incident, we lost two personnel and one was abducted,” he said. “The Academy in collaboration with the 1Division Nigerian Army and Air Training Command as well as other security agencies in Kaduna state has (sic) since commenced pursuit of the unknown gunmen within the general area with a view to tracking them and rescue the abducted personnel.”91
“The NDA community and Cadets are safe in the Academy. We assure the general public that this (sic) unknown gunmen would soon be apprehended and the abducted personnel rescued.”92
But in a swift reaction, the Defence Headquarters denied the allegation.
In a press release signed by the Director of Defence Information, Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr, dated August 25, 2021, the military high command denied that the soldiers were sleeping but failed to show what they were doing when the bandits came shooting their ways into the NDA premises, killing two officers and abducting another.
“The attention of the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) have been drawn to a news publication by Cable online news media claiming that personnel on duty at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) CCTV monitoring room were sleeping when bandits attacked the officers’ residential quarters leading to the death of two officers and the abduction of 1 other officer.
“The Nigerian Armed Forces wishes to state categorically that the allegation is untrue and hence challenge the Cable Online to publish forthwith a verifiable proof of personnel sleeping during the incident.
“It is therefore imperative to caution the Cable Online media to guide against being used as a propaganda tool by enemies of our dear country. The Cable Online should not consciously or unconsciously collaborate with these unscrupulous elements to spread unverified stories on the unfortunate event that occurred at NDA Kaduna while tarnishing the good image and reputation of personnel of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) in the eyes of the civil populace.
“It is perhaps important to mention that the AFN as a professional force consist of highly trained personnel who are dedicated to their duties of protecting lives and property of all Nigerians.
“Let me use this opportunity, to reiterate that the NDA authorities, acting on the directive of the Chief of Defence Staff has constituted a board of enquiry to ascertain the remote and immediate cause(s) of the breach of security with a view to sanction any personnel found culpable and also prevent future occurrence.
“Let me also assure that we shall continue to update the general public as events unfold as we are all aware the search and rescue of the abducted officer is still on. Troops of the Armed Forces of Nigeria will continue with its operations to ensure all those involved in the dastardly act are brought to justice”, the press statement said.
On his own part, the Chief of Defense Staff, General Lucky Irabor stated that “this madness must end” in reaction to the attack on the NDA. Speaking on the incident while addressing journalists in Yola, the Adamawa capital, Irabor expressed concern over attacks by bandits, but gave the assurance that security agencies are on top of the situation. “The incident in Kaduna has been undertaken by bandits, but it’s more of an armed robber coming to your house. The infiltration didn’t come by virtue of the normal banditry action. But these are things we’re already looking at, and in due course, you’ll get the details,” he said.93 “Suffice to say, any form of insecurity is a cause of worry for anyone. That’s why for us, we’re more determined that this madness must be brought to an end very swiftly.”94
Confidence is badly shaken by the spate of these attacks. Yet there are unanswered questions leering at the face of the military high command and at the Divisional Command in particular. What exactly happened? How did the bandits gain entry into the premises of the Division? What were the sentries doing at the time? What took them so long to respond to the attack and the commotion caused by the attack by which time the bandits have come and gone after killing two soldiers and abducting another officer? In what state of situational awareness and alertness were they during those crucial minutes? What exactly did the bandits come to do? If the sentries, particular those monitoring the CCTV control room, were not sleeping and snoring as alleged in the report by TheCable, what exactly were they doing during those crucial minutes? Does it mean that those CCTVs were not working? If they were not working, why not and who should be held responsible? If they are working, then where are the video recordings of the time of the attack?
In a situation where one sleeps on duty post or abandons duty post to go and drink beer, pepper soup or eat suya is clearly unacceptable. Anyone who runs afoul of those procedural rules must be punished severely to serve as deterrence to others because of the weight or gravity of the offence where security of lives and properties of thousands of people and ultimately the State are at stake.
Those guys working in the CCTV monitoring and control room must explain to the higher authorities where they were and what they were doing during the period of attack. No one knows how many of the bandits came invading the premises and with what types of arms they brought.
It is very confounding to see the apparent ease with which the bandits shot their ways into the Division, shooting and killing soldiers without counter-response which allowed the bandits to escape. There were also unsubstantiated reports that the bandits penetrated the premises through broken perimeter fence. If the bandits penetrated the Division through areas that were reported to be porous, who is the officer or officers responsible for maintaining the perimeter security of the Division?
There is no crime as such in copying smart technologies and other assorted systems especially in view of the failure to develop and nurture local content capacity to invent one’s versions. However, one must also develop and sustain professional devotion to maintaining such borrowed technologies and/or other systems. It is a sacred duty.
The explanations by the Military High Command and the Divisional Commanders are clearly unacceptable. Why? This is because they are not unaware of the volatile times Nigeria is today. They are not unaware of the VUCAed environment in which Nigeria is now living and with particular reference to Kaduna State. Nigeria has regrettably become volatile and vulnerable to all sundry attacks, coupled with substantive uncertainty and complexity, and evolving threat spectrum to boot, and ambiguity thus making it extremely difficult to predict where the next attacks would come from.
Kaduna State has become a killing field in the last couple of years due to combination of many factors and forces but not excluding the particular strain of governance methodologies by the government of the State. In short, Kaduna is classic case study of a failed state especially where security of lives and properties are concerned despite the brinksmanship of the State Governor there. These are clearly unpalatable statements to make but they are statements that are inexorably unavoidable in view of the number of lives that been lost in that state and the volume of properties that have been wantonly destroyed on the altar of ethno-religious bigotry and jingoism – and in view of the continually evolving threat spectrum in the state.
Kaduna State is the heart of the Nigerian military apparatus. Apart from the NDA, it is also host to 1st Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Army School of Military Police, Nigerian Corps of Army Engineering, DSS Training School, Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria, Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Nigerian Defense Industry, Nigerian Air Force Training School, Nigerian Police College, Nigerian Navy School of Armament, Kachia, Nigerian Army School of Legal Services, Bassawa, Zaria, and Nigerian Army School of Artillery, Kachia.
Kaduna is the unarguably the centre of Nigerian military establishment. Yet this state has become as defenseless in the last couple of years like Damascus, Yemen or Baghdad. There is hardly a day without hearing a report in the mainstream media of one attack or the other – especially since the current governor assumed office more than six years ago.
Thus more worrisome is the state of alertness and situational awareness of the Nigerian military which can only be concluded to be deplorable to say the least. Nigeria has been waging multi-directional war with sundry internal enemies for almost two decades non-stop. That in itself should put the military on the highest pedestal of alertness, situational aware and defense preparedness. But as it is today, this cannot be argued to be the case. The Nigerian military and other security agencies have not been able to forestall any attack but always responding to attacks that have taken place that show clearly they are not in control of any known security situation in the country. They are always late comers to the scene of attacks, chasing or boxing shadows after the culprits have long disappeared from the scene of events.
If the Nigerian Military and Security Agencies have carefully analyzed the past and present attacks on the Nigerian State, they would not fail to see a signature pattern that looms writ large on the crystal ball of horizon scanning which they have consistently failed to do or achieve over the years. There is also a common thread that runs through all the attacks: mounting of strategic surprise attack to throw the military responders off-balance. This is a red flag that can be seen by the blind even in the dark. One would have thought that in view of the constantly evolving or shifting global security landscape and architecture, with the emergence of irregular or asymmetric warfare confronting many countries or governments all over the world, the Nigerian Military and Security Establishments would have come to the conclusion that they are dealing with implacable coalition of enemies of the Nigerian State with various nametags such as Boko Haram insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, herdsmen killers, separatists, etc. They would have realized that with the ignoble failure of the Nigerian Police, they would be put on the spot to confront and defeat these sundry enemies of the State. They would have realized it’s not going to be a cake-cutting or walking, but a long-drawn battle for supremacy. They would have girded their loins for this titanic and epochal battle which is very much unlike the Nigerian Civil War in which it won a Pyrrhic victory. They would have realized their professional reputation is at stake and take measures to protect this reputation and image but which they have regrettably and tragically squandered and lost. To see the Nigerian Military and Security Establishments always several steps behind the enemy lines with the enemies several steps ahead is not nice picturesque to view.
Killing Fields in the North East
The North eastern part of the country has been turned to a killing and burning field since 2009 when Boko Haram insurgency broke out in the region with Maiduguri as the epicenter. Thousands have needlessly lost their lives including members of the Nigerian Military and other security agencies. There is hardly a day without an attack being carried out somewhere in Borno, Yobe or Adamawa States, and without someone dying as a result of such attacks. Refugee or internally displaced-person camps have been created in some of these states – a phenomenon unknown two decades ago in the socio-cultural and political space of the region. Over two million Nigerians have been rendered homeless but residing in IDP camps. Destinies have been wantonly destroyed. Pogroms are regularly carried out against innocent people of all descriptions: women, men, children, adult men, the elderly, etc. School children have been abducted and carted away into captivity in the much dreaded Sambisa Forest where even soldiers of the Joint Multinational Task Force fear to enter. Girls have been abducted and carted away into captivity where they are forcefully married against their wills to the insurgents or enslaved where they refuse to marry. Many have lost their lives in the process. Children are forcefully recruited into the insurgent army making them child-soldiers, turned into spies or enslaved.
The atrocities of the insurgents know no bound. The current governor of Borno State, Professor Babagana Zulum recently disclosed that the where-about of the 10 percent of the Borno State population cannot be accounted for. The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports that available statistics indicated that Borno State had a population of 5.6 million people as at 2016.95 He also disclosed that over 100,000 people have been killed or murdered in the twelve-year old insurgency. He also said he personally has been physically attacked more than 50 times by the insurgents since he became governor. Such is the nature and character of the insurgency that can now be seen as a cosmic outrageous crime against humanity.
Particularly poignant for this article is the high casualty rate suffered so far by the Nigerian Military in its confrontation with the Boko Haram insurgents over the last twelve years of this protracted insurgency – due to combination of factors which include allegations of sabotage, compromise, betrayal on the part of the Nigerian Military commanders themselves, lack of adequate weaponry to prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign successfully, a largely unfamiliar terrain or topography of the region, interference from political establishment in the strategic and tactical directions of the counter-insurgency campaign by the military, and host of other factors.
What this has come to demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubts is that the Nigerian Military and Security Agencies can no longer claim to have monopoly of inflicting violence on the populace. They are no longer exclusively in custody of mechanisms or media for inflicting violence and pains on the populace. There are now hot contenders or competitors in this domain and this power to inflict violence is now seemingly being wrestled from the grip of the official military and security agencies that collectively form the pillar of State power or act as the Praetorian Guard with Alsatian Dogs of the State.
For the purpose of this article, examples would be taken from 2016 till date at random to show how Boko Haram has wrestled power of inflicting violence from the Nigerian military by having its soldiers constantly ambushed and killed by Boko Haram insurgents.
For instance, in April 2016, dozens of Nigerian troops were reported killed in an ambush by Boko Haram militants in the northeastern Kareto village, according to multiple military sources in Maiduguri, the capital city of the restive Borno State. “We lost between 80 and 100 soldiers in the ambush because it caught us by surprise and again we were outnumbered and outgunned,” an army source, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue, told Anadolu Agency.96
He said at least 30 militants were also killed before the troops retreated. “That figure must have risen after we retreated because Air Force fighter jets later arrived to deal a decisive blow to the militants,” he added.97
The ambush occurred on Monday morning (April 22, 2016). Army spokesman Sani Usman acknowledged that troops of the 113 battalion had come under militants’ ambush in Kareto, resulting in 24 soldiers, including two officers, sustaining injuries. “The troops successfully repelled the attack and killed quite a number of the terrorists. The situation has since been brought under control and reinforcements sent. So far our troops had 2 officers and 22 soldiers wounded in action,” Usman had stated in a statement.98
But at least three soldiers including an officer caught in the ambush, as well as medical officers at the 7 Division Headquarters Medical Centre in Maiduguri said several of their colleagues had died in the attack. They said the ambush also involved troops from the 158 battalion of the Nigerian army. An army battalion often comprises between 300 and 800 soldiers.99
An army officer said the two battalions had planned an attack on the Kareto village — a known hideout of the militants – as a launch-pad for a wider operation to liberate the Diffa (border) area of the northern Borno state “stretching from Malam Fatori to Damasak which largely remain in the grip of the terrorists”. “But we ran into a well-coordinated ambush by the terrorists. The engagement lasted for nearly six hours and they deployed heavy weapons like RPGs and 12.57mm antiaircraft guns for fire support,” the officer said. He said it took the heavy bombardment by the fighter jets to break the ambush.100
The Nigerian Army [claimed it] has confirmed the death of seven soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram terrorists, BHTs, on a military base in northeastern Borno State. The Army added that 16 other soldiers were wounded in the attack that took place in Metele. “Gallant troops of 157 Battalion decisively engaged BHTs who attempted to overrun their position near Kangarwa in Borno State.101
“The sustained superior firepower of the troops led to the neutralization of 76 BHTs,” the statement of Wednesday October 10 and posted on Twitter said.102 “The [former] COAS Lt Gen TY Buratai has commiserated with the families of the deceased and directed that the wounded be given adequate medical attention.”103
The government has stressed that despite a fightback, it was winning the war against the insurgents who continue to attack army positions and internally displaced camps. The Boko Haram insurgency was a key plank of the promises that brought Muhammadu Buhari into office. The army has since 2015 pushed the group from territories it “ruled.”104 The army says the group is now restricted to the Sambisa Forest from where they have planned attacks. It is believed that there are thousands of captives being held in the forest including a number of the famed Chibok Girls.105 Their activities stretch beyond Nigeria into the wider Lake Chad region. Thousands have died in Nigeria and millions displaced on the back of their attacks which has spread across Cameroon’s Far North, parts of Chad and Niger.106
The 7 Div NA is the youngest Div among the 6 divisions of the Nigerian Army. The Div established to decisively counter the threat of insurgency, terrorism and armed banditry prevalent in the North Eastern part of the country. It became operational with effect from 22 August 2013 with its area of operational responsibilities covering 3 north eastern state of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe state. The Div’s HQ is located in Maiduguri and the approved mascot is a Wolf while the approved logo is a snaring Wolf and the Arabic numeral “7” superimposed on a background of horizontal yello ochre (sandy brown), 7 green stripes as well as red and black colours. The motto of the Div is “Doggedness and Boldness.”107
Paying a Steep Price
The Nigerian Military has steep price to pay for being thrusted into the forefront of confronting the phalanx of violent non-state actors. Colonel Dahiru Bako, a Nigerian Army officer, was one of the several officers who paid with his life in standing against the Boko Haram insurgency in the North eastern part of the country.108
Colonel Dahiru Bako was fatally wounded in an ambush by Boko Haram militants in Borno state, Sept. 20, 2020, and later died as a result of the sustained injuries. Nigerians in the northeastern states of Borno and Yobe trooped out to mourn the fallen war hero.109 Colonel Dahiru Bako and his troops were [ambushed and] attacked by militants Sunday morning near Damboa, a community in southern Borno state. In fierce fighting, Bako was severely wounded and three of his soldiers were killed, said Col. Ado Isa, a spokesman for the Nigerian Army’s 7th Division.110
Speaking at Bako’s funeral, [the then] Nigeria’s army chief, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, credited his leadership of a special military unit countering the Boko Haram insurgency. He said Bako led many successful raids, and he described the late soldier as a hero.111 So did Muna Jibrin, who told VOA that Bako saved her from militants while she was in the throes of childbirth back in December 2014. The militants had overrun the Maryam Abacha maternity hospital in Damaturu. “All the patients and staff of the hospital ran away, leaving only I and my auntie stranded because I couldn’t walk,” Jibrin recalled. “It was the late Colonel Bako and his team who came to our rescue.”112
Borno state’s governor, Babagana Zulum, on Wednesday presented Bako’s widow with a check for 20 million naira, worth $51,614. The families of the three other slain Nigerian soldiers received checks for 2 million naira, a military official told VOA.113
There was an attack on 153 Task Force Battalion located in Marte Local Government Council of Borno State on February 17, 2021. At least seven Nigerian soldiers [were] confirmed killed after a deadly ambush by Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State.114 The affected soldiers were attached to the 153 Task Force Battalion in Marte Local Government Council of the state, sources familiar with the matter told PREMIUM TIMES.115
According to the sources, the troops were caught by surprise when the terrorists swooped on them at 10 a.m. on Monday. They, however, put up a strong fight to defend their base and ward off the insurgents. But despite their gallant efforts, the soldiers were overwhelmed “because they could not withstand the superior firepower of the terrorists”, our sources said.116
The unit, which was totally dislodged, has now been moved to Dikwa, another local government area, a development that has now opened up Marte to further attacks. To this end, the army authorities have issued advisories to troops in Sector 3 (especially those in Baga, Cross Kauwa, Kekeno and Monguno and the areas surrounding Marte) to be on red alert.117
[The] attack on Marte Local Government by the extremist Boko Haram group makes it the third onslaught on the area in a month, military insiders said.118 The terrorists had ambushed soldiers at the location on January 10 and 15. The casualty rates from those attacks are unknown. The group claimed responsibility for those attacks and held the base for a few days before they were dislodged by the Nigerian Army.119
The troops of operation Tura Taka Bango, in collaboration with the air force, had destroyed seven of the group’s militarised trucks and decimated several terrorists. During the last attacks, thousands of civilians fled to Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, which lies around 130 kilometres away.120
This was yet followed by another attack on the Army barrack located in Mainok, about 60 miles west of Maiduguri, Borno State. This happened on April 26, 2021.
The Nigerian Army has confirmed an ambush on one of its bases at Mainok, Borno State. In a statement by its spokesperson, Mohammed Yerima, on Monday evening, the army described the attack as a multi-directional attack which claimed one officer and six soldiers.121
There were reports about the death of an unspecified number of soldiers who died after a deadly attack on the N156 battalion in Mainok. Sources told PREMIUM TIMES the terrorists who came around noon disguised themselves in a military convoy, went straight to the formation’s armoury and attacked the personnel.122
Amongst the casualties recorded was the commander of the battalion, a lieutenant colonel. “The terror groups disguised in military convoy and gained access to 156 TF Bn position in Mainok and headed straight to the arms store and started inflicting heavy firepower on the troops and dislodged them,” one military source said.123
The source said many other soldiers fled into the bush during the attack. The terrorists also set ablaze a Nigerian army tanker and some buildings in the military base. But according to the statement by the army, the terrorists were held by the troops until reinforcement arrived. He also said scores of Boko Haram terrorists were killed during the attack.124
In a statement signed by the Director, Army Public Relations, Brigadier General Mohammed Yerima, dated 29 April, 2021, and titled “Mainok: COAS applauds Troops of Operation Lafiya Dole for their Resilience and Doggedness” confirmed that the barrack came under heavy attacks from Boko Haram insurgents. “On Sunday 25 April 2021, troops of Operation Lafiya Dole deployed in Mainok, Borno State, came under multi-directional attacks by Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists mounted on unconfirmed number of Gun Trucks as well as foot soldiers with possible intent of establishing a phantom caliphate in the town. The terrorists were held by the gallant troops of 156 Task Force Battalion until the arrival of reinforcement teams from 7 Division, Special Army Super Camp Ngamdu and Army Super Camp 4, Benesheik.125
During the fire fight which lasted several hours, the gallant troops tactically lured a number of the terrorists into a killing zone within their camp where the Air Task Force of Operation Lafiya Dole scrambled Alpha jets and helicopter gunboats [sic] which took turns in decimating the already trapped terrorists. In the aftermath of the encounter, scores of Boko Haram terrorists were neutralized with their body part littering the area and a number of their gun trucks destroyed.127
Regrettably, one gallant officer and six soldiers paid the supreme sacrifice while 5 other soldiers sustained various degrees of injuries. The wounded soldiers have already been evacuated to the military medical facility for treatment. Currently, troops are in full control of Mainok and environ as exploitation for fleeing terrorists is ongoing.128
The Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Ibrahim Attahiru (now late) applauded troops of Operation Lafiya Dole for their resilience, commitment and doggedness and further reassured Nigerians of the Army’s unalloyed commitment to defeating Boko Haram/SWAP terrorists while urging citizens to always avail the troops with accurate and timely information for prompt action.129
On May 22, 2021, calamity struck the Nigerian Army when its Chief of Staff, Lt General Ibrahim Attahiru, and ten other high-ranking military officers died in a plane crash at the International Airport, Kaduna. The incident happened as the plane was trying to land in bad weather, the military said. Ten other officers, including the plane’s crew also died.
Lt. General Attahiru, 54, only took up his post in January 2021 after President Muhammadu Buhari reluctantly sacked the former Service Chiefs after long-drawn public outcries against the Service Chiefs because of their perceived incompetence in fighting insecurity in the country especially Boko Haram insurgency in the North eastern part of the country.
On Twitter, the [P]resident said the crash was a “mortal blow… at a time our armed forces are poised to end the security challenges facing the country”.
[The] crash comes three months to the day after a Nigerian military plane crashed short of a runway in the capital Abuja, killing all seven people on board.130
Earlier on February 21, 2021, seven people had died in a Nigerian military Beechcraft plane crash shortly before landing at the Abuja International Airport.131
Vice Marshal Daramola told the BBC that the aircraft was on a mission to try to rescue 42 people, including students and staff abducted from their boarding school in the town of Kagara on Wednesday, when it turned back following engine failure.132 The Nigerian Air Force plane had reported engine failure, the military spokesman tweeted.133
The chief of air staff ordered an immediate investigation. In a series of tweets, the air force asked the public to “remain calm & await the outcome of investigation”. “This is to confirm that a Nigerian Air Force (NAF) Beechcraft King Air B350i aircraft crashed while returning to the Abuja Airport after reporting engine failure enroute Minna. First responders are at the scene. Sadly, all 7 personnel on board died in the crash”
— Air Vice Marshal Ibikunle Daramola (@KunleDaramola3) February 21, 2021
The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), @CAS_IOAmao, has ordered an immediate investigation into the incident.134
Before Lt General Ibrahim Attahiru died in the plane crash he had paid several visits to formations and units of the Nigerian Army. One of such visits was to the 6th Division of the Nigerian Army based in Port Harcourt, Rivers State.
As part of his familiarization visits to units and formations in the Nigerian Army, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Ibrahim Attahiru, today, 23 March, 2021 paid his maiden Operational visit to Headquarters 6 Division Nigerian Army, Port Harcourt, where he charged the officers and soldiers to key into his vision to have “A Nigerian Army that is Repositioned to Professionally Defeat all Adversaries in a Joint Environment.”135
The COAS arrived [the] headquarters [of] 6 Division Nigerian Army in company of the General Officer Commanding 6 Division Nigerian Army and Land Component Commander, Operation Delta Safe, Maj Gen Sanni Gambo Mohammed and inspected quarter guard organized by personnel of the Nigerian Airforce. On ground at the Division’s Headquarters were Commissioner of Police, Director State Security Service as well as Principal Staff Officer of the Division.136
The COAS while addressing officers in the Division conference hall, reiterated the key cardinals of his Command Philosophy which are Readiness, Loyalty to the Commander in Chief and to the Nation by extension, Dependable, which is to accomplish all tasks in line with the Norms and Core values of the Nigerian Army and continuous development.137
The COAS stated that development especially in leadership is one which officers cannot do without as they are Commanders at various levels they find themselves. He further enjoined Commanders and subordinates not to engage in any form of illegal duties as he will not tolerate such actions.138
The COAS ended his tour by paying a courtesy visit to the Governor of Rivers State, His Excellency Nyesom Wike at Government House Port Harcourt, where he appreciated the Governor for his efforts at ensuring peace in the state. He further thanked the Governor for his support to 6 Division, his firm stance against all forms of criminalities and separatist groups in the state.139
The Governor in his remarks congratulated the COAS on his appointment and expressed confidence on Lt Gen Attahiru’s capability to tackle to current security situation bedeviling the nation. He added that with the COAS’ exposure and rich knowledge base, he is optimistic that things will change in the nation’s security. He further used the visit to pledge his support to 6 Division and the Nigerian Army in general.140
The Chief of Army Staff was accompanied on the visit by the Chief of Military Intelligence, Brig Gen Abdurahman Kuliya, Director Army Public Relations, Brig Gen Muhammed Yerima, Provost Marshal, Brig Gen Olatunji Olayinka, the Chief of Staff to the COAS, Brig Gen MI Abdulkadir and other Principal Staff Officers of Headquarters 6 Division among whom were the Commander 6 Division Garrison, Brig Gen Tayo Adio, all Commanders of 6 Division affiliated formations/units and Sector Commanders, Operations Delta Safe.141
In any war, there will always be casualties on both sides of the divide. There is no way the Nigerian military would not have lost some of its men and women including materials. It is the price that must be paid in one form or the other. But the price goes beyond the human casualties suffered by the Nigerian Military. But how did Boko Haram grow to become such a devouring monster which victims include the high numbers of soldiers that died in action? What is the size of this monster that the Nigerian Military could not defeat it in the last twelve years? Thus, part of the prices is its humiliation and loss of pride as the hitherto acknowledged most powerful military in West African region. Its balloon of pride has been deflated by its inability or incapacity to stem the tidal wave of insecurity that is now threatening to overwhelm the Nigerian State and people. Instead of standing up to the enemies of the State and the people, it wastes its precious times bullying, intimidating and threatening the civilian populace.
Invasion of Aso Rock by Armed Robbers
Then came the most shocking of all attacks on the Nigerian State. This time around, it was the cousin of the bandits and insurgents – armed robbers – that carried out the attack on no other place than Aso Rock precincts. The target was the residence of the Chief of Staff to President Muhammadu Buhari, Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari. They looted the household, carting valuables away and disappeared into thin air.
According to various news reports of the time, burglars on the early hours of Sunday [May 9, 2021] daringly made forceful entry into the official residence of the Chief of Staff to the President, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, including his Administrative Officer, Abubakar Maikano, around the presidential villa, Abuja.
The Chief of Staff, Prof. Gambari confirmed the incident to journalists covering the Presidential Villa. But the Chief of Staff, through the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Media and Publicity, Mallam Garba Shehu said that there was nothing to worry about.142 The presidential aide was however silent on whether any arrest was made given the level of tight security network around the residence. [Garba] Shehu in a text message said: “The Chief of Staff, Professor Ibrahim Gambari has confirmed that there ‘was a foolish attempt’ to burgle his residence at 3:00am this morning but it turned out to be unsuccessful. Professor Gambari, whose house is on a street next to the Villa, has assured that there is nothing to worry about from the incident.”143
The Gazette had [earlier] exclusively reported that armed men suspected to be robbers had raided Gambari’s residence. The report claimed that the robbers also raided the residence of the CoS’ Admin Officer. It said, “Armed men suspected to be robbers invaded the residences of two senior aides to President Muhammadu Buhari inside the precinct of the Presidential Villa, administration officials and security sources have told Peoples Gazette, raising fears that the rising insecurity across the country was drawing closer to the elite than previously estimated.144
“The incident on May 9 (yesterday) prompted Ibrahim Gambari and Abubakar Maikano, the chief of staff and admin officer, respectively, to abandon their residences, sources said. “Their houses were robbed and the robbers packed money and other valuable assets from both houses,” an aide to the informed about the robbery told The Gazette. “It was not immediately clear whether or not valuable documents of state interest were carted away by the intruders, but The Gazette heard that the residences were thoroughly ransacked. “The robbers took away as much as possible from both places,” a security officer that confirmed the incident said. “What is more unfortunate is that no one has been arrested.”145
“Officials also said Mr. Gambari was given an official residence at the Defence House, but has not been living there, preferring instead to live inside Aso Rock and be close to the president.146 “Nigeria’s presidential palace just west of the city centre has long been seen as highly fortified and far beyond the reach of burglars, bandits and other criminals currently holding the vast swathes of the country to ransom.147
“No explanation was immediately rendered for the invasion and why it was not prevented by the ubiquitous contingent of security officers, especially those of the State Security Service, guarding the fortress.”148, 149
The incident on Sunday prompted Gambari and Abubakar Maikano, the chief of staff and admin officer, to abandon their residences, sources said.150
“Their houses were robbed and the robbers packed money and other valuable assets from both houses. The robbers took away as much as possible from both places. What is more unfortunate is that no one has been arrested,” the source said.151
[The] armed robbers attack on Aso Rock raises fears that the rising insecurity across the country is drawing closer to the elite than previously estimated.152
Global Landscape of Asymmetric Warfare – Lessons not Learnt by the Nigerian Military
Flowing from the above, it is evident that the Nigerian State and the Military in particular have learnt very little if anything at all from international experiential encounter with hybrid and asymmetric warfare over the last forty years. This is partly understandable for the simple reason Nigeria was largely insulated from these encounters – until Boko Haram insurgency broke out in July 2009 in the Northeastern part of the country but interestingly not from the rural areas where poverty has been pronounced but from the metropolitan centre of Maiduguri city where it could be argued that there is more crumbs falling from the table of the rich for the masses to feast upon.
But the above is not an excuse for the failure of the Nigerian State or Nigerian Military to learn from other countries’ encounters with civil conflicts that degenerated into asymmetric warfare.
From Al Qa’eda terrorist attack on America, from Afghanistan to Iraq, from Libya to Syria and Yemen, from Sudan to Chad and Mali, and the sandstorm of Arab Spring of 2010, just to mention a few examples, Nigeria failed to distill and learn any lesson from these global events.
Andrew Kubik, while admonishing American warriors, said: “Warfare is an extension of politics (Clausewitz). It must be the last resort after politics fails. As long as humankind walks this earth, there will always, always be conflict. The difference is how modern warriors must not be barbarians or cavemen. Today and tomorrow, warriors must be a diplomat one moment, yet respond proportionally at the last resort.153
Why? Because the entire world is watching, and warfare as we know it is changing real-time. No longer can you go from a campaign the size of World War II and expect to carry basic tactics and techniques through a Korean war, Vietnam even reaching sixty years into an era of Middle East conflicts.154
The idea of 21st Century Warfare is to be smaller, smarter and autonomous. Doing more with less, lighter and efficient using intuitive tools, fused intelligence that is timely, relevant and available for many, many small teams even individual warriors. Networked, operating autonomously where forces resemble white blood cells responding to a disease.155
Forces on the ground must be integrated appearing natural blending into a modern surrounding versus hiding behind the next hill. Avoid standing out, yet be capable of exploiting every domain covering and defending more territory (Afghanistan 2001/Libya 2011). Avoiding the barriers and frictions in warfare by learning faster in order to adapt, evolve and transform real-time. What you don’t want to do is hold on to tools, methods or standards even regulations only because it worked the last time. The world is more aware, meaning, with the use of the Internet alone; the worldwide public community will instantly know what one did in warfare, how they did it and where.156
With this said modern warfare has reached levels where tactics should now be disposable yet innovative, evolving in hours, and discarded on yesterday’s even today’s battlefields. Nations and their military and intelligence capabilities must be just that. Intelligent. This will all be problematic where you must walk along the boundaries between innovation vs. fixing something that isn’t broken or reinventing a “wheel.”157
The lesson learned in 21st Century warfare and national security is evolution must take place real-time, both strategically and tactically. Nations and alliances must adapt, change, and evolve even become efficient and smarter. One thought to consider is when was the last time any nation fought in warfare against high threat air defenses?158
In the 21st Century, your strength is your limitation, or your blessing is your curse. Today and tomorrow, everyone is aware. The world is not in a vacuum resulting in awareness becoming a limiting factor to providing national security. This barrier or friction is proven by the 2009 Israeli hit against Hamas leadership in Dubai. 16 operatives believed their Cold War intelligence tactics were proven in the past and would still be effective. Unbeknownst to Israel was the impact of 21st Century technology. Cameras throughout the city captured these assassins spread amongst one of the most famous cities in the world. Their down fall was their complacency, failing to adapt and evolve at the same pace of society. Specifically, they failed to keep up with an intelligent and aware 21st Century world where no one keeps up with the World Wide Web. If 16 individuals could not hide, neither will mass forces, ships, vehicles and aircraft. Space based satellites are no longer safe without the entire world paying attention. Knowing a nation’s every move.159
There are cases where awareness can be turned on its head and used to one’s advantage. When Pakistani extremist can infiltrate Mumbai and cripple one of the largest cities in the world with less than 10 individuals, this is proof how warfare and national security has been redefined. The November 2008 scenario proved evolution and transformation took place quicker than average, occurring within less than a decade from Al Qaeda’s attacks against America. These individuals infiltrated India via small boats equipped with light tools and weapons where smaller is better even smarter and independent. By carrying supplies with mere backpacks, they exploited over the counter technologies to overwhelm their targets.160
In warfare, American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines traditionally rely on a limited set of values to guide them with difficult choices found only in war. On the battlefield, country, unit, family, faith and self, drive men and women. Modern warfare found within the 21st Century requires the United States invest further in educating their recruits ensuring they are raising warriors, professional individuals capable of thinking beyond country, unit, family and faith.161
For a traditional military, serving for 2-4 years then out is acceptable during a draft, and then only for career fields that do not require extensive training such as gate guard or cook. This is unacceptable with a special operations community, or an all-volunteer force, where there are fewer recruits with far greater responsibilities and required training than generations prior. In addition, it takes years to recruit, train and develops shadow warriors. Modern American military brings changes in demographics where there is more diversity and over half the force is married with children finally college educated. Career individuals have increased risk of facing true conflict or war. America’s national security rides on the backs of these people.162
In today’s battlefields, the entire world demands these individuals be capable of a wide variety of sophisticated decisions under incredible stresses, where a poor decision – or even a good decision with a poor outcome – can have substantial national security impacts (e.g. the death of civilians, offending a local potentate). Never forget how their current foe moves freely not dressed in traditional uniforms, or follows basic laws of armed conflict. Even worse, todays and tomorrow’s adversaries now emerge within civilian populations further muddying the waters of societies. Educating warriors beyond the conduct of hostilities has much potential to reduce unnecessary violence, trauma and innocent death.163
Warfare is never simple, and changes with each generation. This paradigm shift in raising warriors operating alone and autonomously requires people trained in the arts, philosophy, critical thinking and leadership. The fact is how country, unit, family and faith are a limited support system. When confronted by an adversary where man faces death or takes the life of another human being, going against nature, demands individuals capable of compartmentalizing yet thinking at light speed considering option. Additionally, the more exposure to real-world combat, the more difficult compartmentalizing becomes.164
A hybrid threat uniquely focuses on organizational capability and generally attempts to gain an asymmetrical advantage over purely conventional opponents within a specific environment. This advantage not only asserts itself in the realm of pure military force, but also in a more holistic manner across all the elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement/legal. The advantage generates the effect of transitioning the rules of the battlefield from those of a conventional fight to those realms of a hybrid’s choosing—primarily in the categories of tempo, depth, and intensity. As a result, a weaker military opponent can stand against a stronger one for an indefinite period and continue to generate effects that a more conventional opponent could not generate in the same situation. This hybrid capability poses significant difficulties for large conventional military organizations such as the U.S. military because these large conventional structures are oriented primarily on symmetrical type adversaries, or in the lesser case asymmetrical type adversaries, but never on an efficient combination of the two. Thoroughly understanding this capability can offer insight into methods of understanding and predicting hybrid organizations.165
Historical examples of hybrid type warfare reach back to antiquity, even though the term hybrid threat is relatively recent.8 In ancient Rome, a hybrid force of criminal bandits, regular soldiers, and unregulated fighters employed tactics ranging from that of fixed battle, roadside ambush, and the employment of stolen siege engines against Vespasian’s Roman Legions during the Jewish Rebellion of 66 AD.9 In the Peninsular War of 1806, a hybrid force of Spanish guerillas combined with regular British and Portuguese forces to generate decisive military effects on Napoleon’s Grand Armee. During World War II, the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front integrated and synchronized an ill-equipped irregular force with its conventional military forces in order to generate multiple hybrid type effects from 1941 to 1945. During the Vietnam War, the People’s Army of Vietnam—the North Vietnamese Regular Army—synchronized its operations with the Viet Cong, an irregular force, in order to sustain a lengthy conflict against the superior conventional forces of two separate First World nations: France and the U.S. The non-state actor in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, Lebanese Hezbollah, combined the aspects of conventional and unconventional war to fight against the premier conventional military power in the Middle East, the Israeli Defense Forces. In each of these historical cases, trends emerge which, arguably, suggest why and how hybrid forces exist, enabling observers and analysts to anticipate the manifestation of hybrid threats in the future.166
Regardless of the plentitude of historical examples, a persistent obstacle to understanding the hybrid threat has been a seeming inability to classify what a hybrid threat is and why a hybrid threat coalesces in the first place. The conflicting definitions for this age-old construct have stymied the ability of military theorists and planners to properly envision a common set of hybrid threat motivations and potential actions. Fundamentally, the problem is the gap that exists between the cognitive logic of “definition” and the uniqueness of each context in which “hybrid” manifests itself. No definition can be adequate to multiple contexts that differ in time, space, and logic.167
This indicates the need for a theory suggesting principles that shed light on the nature and manifestation of hybrid organizations in hybrid conflicts.168
Since the tragic attacks of 9/11, strategists and commentators have searched for the appropriate historical analogies and political metaphors to deal with the struggle against international terrorism. One of the most interesting suggestions is that the global war on terror resembles traditional counterinsurgency missions. What is missing in many of these historical comparisons, however, is a comprehensive review of what actually occurred in past counterinsurgency situations, ranging from Vietnam to Malaysia to El Salvador.169
Insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer. As the United States confronts this threat, extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Reconceptualization is needed. The strategic salience of insurgency for the United States is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. But insurgency remains challenging for the United States because two of its dominant characteristics–protractedness and ambiguity-mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest. Existing American strategy and doctrine focus on national insurgencies rather than liberation ones. As a result, the strategy stresses selective engagement; formation of a support coalition if possible; keeping the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmenting the regime’s military, intelligence, political, informational, and economic capabilities; and, encouraging and shaping reform by the regime designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it. A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different in some important ways. Specifically, it should include the rapid stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force (but larger is usually better); a shift to minimum U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible; rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces; shifting the perception of the insurgency from a liberation one to a national one; encouraging sustained reform by the partner regime; and cauterization–the strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency.170
Sustained capability enhancement is crucial, even when the United States is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education, and focused training. Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations to provide counterinsurgency support, improved homeland security, and methods for early warning of insurgency, preventative actions, and the creation of early-stage support packages. The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat. A strategy of victory which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot, hence a strategy of containment is the more logical one. Because insurgents attempt to prevent the military battlespace from becoming decisive and concentrate in the political and psychological, operational design must be different than for conventional combat. Specifically, the U.S. military and other government agencies should develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and de-resource insurgents. To make this work requires an independent strategic assessment organization composed of experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists, and regional experts to assess a counterinsurgency operation and allow senior leaders to make adjustments. When involved in backing an existing government, the U.S. force package would be designed primarily for training, advice, and support. It should be interagency from the inception. In most cases, the only combat forces would be those needed for force and facility protection, more rarely for strike missions in particularly challenging environments. Modularity should increasingly allow the Army to tailor, deploy, and sustain such packages. Sustaining the commitment is an important part of force packaging. Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a decade or more. Consideration must be given to rotation procedures for deployed forces. To some extent, contractors can relieve this pressure, particularly since many of the training, advice, and support functions in counterinsurgency do not have to be performed by uniformed military. But as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the use of contractors brings a range of other problems associated with training, control, discipline, and protection. Given the likelihood of continued involvement in counterinsurgency support, the Army will need to consider increasing the number of units that have particular utility in this environment, such as Intelligence and Engineers. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency support, need refocusing and restructuring. As a minimum, a larger proportion of these units should be in the active component. And, both need greater autonomy to be effective in a counterinsurgency environment rather than being assigned to the commander of a maneuver unit. In general, though, the Army should not develop specialized units to “fight” counterinsurgency. Leader development and training for counterinsurgency must emphasize ethical considerations and force discipline, cultural sensitivity, and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. Most importantly, leader development must focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and adapt. Organizationally, the U.S. military should develop matrix and networked organizations. Professional education and training must be increasingly interagency and multinational.171
The New Battleground of Irregular Warfare
As we have observed earlier the failure of the Nigerian Military to understand the nature and character of Boko Haram insurgency and banditry in this particular case as homegrown or hybrid and irregular or asymmetric warfare is one of the most fundamental reasons why it has not been able to defeat and crush them. This failure has created a lacuna in the military strategies and tactics adopted in confronting these enemies of the Nigerian State over the years.
Capt. Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army, who has nearly 20 years of infantry and intelligence experience throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and has advised foreign security forces from the tactical to strategic level and holds a Master of Science in Homeland Security from the California State University at San Diego, wrote recently on the US Army War College online platform: “Twenty-first century IW has become synonymous with low-intensity conflicts because recent wars have predominately associated the term with only one of its five core tasks: counterinsurgency. References to irregular forces or capabilities in U.S. National Defense Authorization Acts appear exclusively as a means of countering non-state actors or groups through PN forces. This results in narrow perspectives that view IW purely as a tool for fighting violent extremist organizations and thereby less relevant to interstate competition. It is true that all counterinsurgency is IW, but not all IW is counterinsurgency.”172
The Pentagon’s 2010 Joint Operating Concept for IW explains that, in addition to unconventional warfare (UW), stability operations (SO), counterterrorism, foreign internal defense (FID), and counterinsurgency, IW encompasses “a host of key related activities including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations.”173
According to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, IW is defined as activities conducted “by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”174
Gen. James Mattis and Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman presented IW as a twenty-first century theater shaping tool in their 2005 Proceedings thesis describing a “four block war.” Expanding upon U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak’s 1999 “three block war” foundation, Mattis and Hoffman proposed that IW can carve out a competitive edge against regimes who use hybrid tactics in strategic competition with other states. Properly imagined and applied, IW concepts integrated into larger theater strategies can alter the decision-making calculus of state competitors by imposing costs in the psychological and information domains — what Mattis and Hoffman described as the fourth block. It took 15 years and several hard-learned lessons to mold that concept into the IW Annex.175
The current Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, General Lucky Irabor was reported to have said, in reaction to the attack on the NDA by the bandits that, “this madness must stop”! What exactly does that mean? What sort of madness is General Irabor talking about and seeing being displayed by the bandits, insurgents, kidnappers and herdsmen killers? What brought about this madness in the first place? Precisely what degree of madness is being seen displayed?
The bandits have been having their ways collecting handsome ransoms from both individuals and government readily willing to pay such ransoms because they are forced to do so as to secure the lives of the kidnaped. It has become a highly lucrative business of primitive accumulation of capital through exercising violence against the individuals and the State. Ditto for Boko Haram insurgents who have been having their ways looting, harvesting crops of farmers in the North east, marrying girls of their choices who are kidnapped and carted away into captivity, extorting monies from various sources especially through terrorism financing, etc.
To these people, there is no madness at all but a business franchise forcefully acquired from the Nigerian State that has hitherto abandoned them to life of poverty, deprivations and social depravity.
Thus for General Lucky Irabor to talk of madness is absolute lack of understanding of the social vectors and dynamics that have led these people into a state of what he now calls madness. Instead of talking about madness, the General should be talking about how to end this generation of social conflicts through military strategies and tactics adapted to the reality of the current times. Labelling them as mad people does not in any way solve any problem posed by them at all. It is a superfluous statement borne out ignorance of the historiography of violence of these people. Where was General Irabor when Boko Haram bombed the 1st Mechanized Division, Kaduna, in June 2012, killing nearly a dozen soldiers then? Was that not enough madness?
It is wonderful that both the military and police high commands have not been seen to have distilled a body of lessons in the last twelve years since the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the field of necessary or requisite strategies and tactics in irregular or asymmetric warfare, and counter-insurgency theories and praxis (methopraxies) despite what they would want the public to believe. Objectively speaking, there is no case of madness anywhere at all. Rather, what one can see is the inescapable case of incompetence of the Nigerian Military to protect itself at the unexpected hour; a case of being taken by surprise, a case of state of unpreparedness; a case of low situational awareness of existing environmental dangers; and a case of lack of understanding of unfolding dynamics of the security threat spectrum.
This failure is due to the fact that the military and police high commands are still shackled or enslaved by the conventional theories of war. And this is because of what they are still being taught and fed with in the military and police academies. This is said without any form of prejudices or malice against the military-police establishments. Were it to be otherwise, then the military and police high commands would have come up with new set of skills (borne out of contemporary knowledge of new security spectrum) to combat and defeat the various security threats assailing the country today. There would have been a paradigmatic change in the basic approaches to fighting the irregular constabulary forces of insurgency, terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and so on. But this has not been the case. Rather, what the nation has been witnessing is the flatulent and irresponsible approaches behind the façade of kinetic force often deployed in confronting the non-state enemies of the nation.
Does the Nigerian Military really see Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping (etc) as security threats to the nation or a transactional business opportunity to engage in behind-the-scene financial requests from the Federal Government – to put the question in this crude manner? What would have been the case with the Nigerian Military if there have been no Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and herdsmen killing or ethno-religious clashes?
In answer to the last question, the Nigerian Military would have been most probably sitting down quietly with its soldiers continually drinking beer and pepper soup, or kunu, while eating suya, isi ewu or ukwobi – and in the process also growing fat, slothful and obese. It would gradually be silently nursing, unbeknown to the public, elephantiasis of the scrotum, arterio-sclerosis, pulmonary disorder or cardiovascular malfunctioning coupled with brain disease of slow thinking. One day the nation would have heard a heavy thud accompanied by a loud noise of atomic bomb proportion with all the attendant commotion. The Nigerian Military has suffered a stroke – and before the nation could get it to the nearest hospital at the street corner, it has given up the ghost and pronounced dead, and subsequently wheeled to the morgue to wait for the date of state funeral!
Thus the existence of Boko Haram, banditry, kidnapping, etc, is like a boon to the Military to keep itself relevant, daily exercise its limbs and brain, and ultimately prevent it from that shameful death drama on the street. Tragically, however, what the public is seeing of our military is a spectacle of shame, a theatre of the absurd where soldiers literally go to the warfront already physically challenged, limping or hobbling with crutches of antiquated weapons clearly outgunned by the superior firepower of the enemies. That is why we are seeing Nigeria crawling on four to the US to beg for Super Tucano aircrafts and Cobra helicopters because it does not have the necessary habiliments of war to fight these hordes of enemies arrayed against the Nigerian State. It is indeed a very pathetic situation.
What has ultimately and indubitably emerged from all prior analysis of the crisis facing the Nigerian Military (on behalf of the Nigerian State) in this article so far is the pursuit of a carrot-and-stick policy approach to the myriad of security threats to the existence of the nation. While Nigeria is begging for arms and professional assistance from foreign countries to enable it have the necessary stick, it is also granting amnesty, mounting rehabilitation programmes such as sulhu to serve as carrot to entice the insurgents to abandon the battlefield. How successful this double-barreled policy will eventually be is yet unknown. But what this means is that Nigeria has no means of all elements of national power to crush the insurgency, banditry, etc, unpalatable as this may taste to the palate.
There is another dimension the problematique presented by the insurgents, bandits on the one hand and the military on the other. If the insurgents and bandits are agreed to be home-grown, hybrid, irregular or asymmetric warriors, then it is certain that they cannot be faced as conventional warriors or faced with conventional strategies and tactics of war. This means that the military has to review, revise and adopt new strategies and tactics for confronting these enemies. The first line of action is to obtain accurate intelligence about their concentrations (hideouts) and their movements. No one has been assured the military has such accurate actionable tactical intelligence given the haphazard ways the military has been confronting the insurgents and the bandits. The second step is to go behind the enemy’s line with Special Forces to launch attacks on their formations and hideouts. The public is made to believe that Nigeria has such trained Special Forces, but its role and achievement in the counter-insurgency campaign by the Nigerian military against the insurgents and/or the bandits cannot be quantified as they are not known. Such is the apparent helplessness of the Nigerian Military, seen running from pillar to pole, apparently without adequate weaponry to decisively push back or defeat the insurgents for the past twelve years. That is why the military is trying to shift the campaign to aerial warfare using combat aircrafts and helicopters to bomb the insurgents and the bandits. Even this shift to the air domain is fraught with lack of sophisticated aircrafts and helicopters – which is why Nigeria has to beg to purchase twelve Super Tucano combat aircrafts from the US recently (with six already delivered) but was denied the request to purchase AH-1 Cobra attack choppers by the US Congress. These are the multiple headaches of the Nigerian Military at the present time.
The greatest curse in the political history of Nigeria is the intervention and advent of military rule in 1966, the traipsing in and out of power by the military Junkers. This is said without bitterness but as a matter of objective reality borne out of critical interrogation of the historical problems facing the Nigerian State over the years. Because some few military officers could not reconcile their differences in the interest of the nation, Nigeria was tragically plunged into a needless civil war and misery whose impacts are still being felt till date even when the civil war ended as far back of 1970. The ghost of the civil war is still haunting the nation till date. But after vacating power in May 1999 and instead of facing the task of reconstructing the Nigerian Military into a modern one, the military was gradually run down with corrupt practices that have largely gone unpunished. While the nation was inundated with talks of professionalization of the military, there was nothing really to show for it. Thus when Boko Haram insurgency broke out in July 2009, the military was equally helpless to defeat the insurgents precisely like the Police. Boko Haram metamorphosed into a Frankenstein monster that devours everything on its path.
To fast-forward, Abacha military dictatorship sowed the seeds of Niger Delta militancy when it approved the execution of the Ogoni Nine. The complete failure of governance in the North east especially its de-industrialization since the time when Colonel Muhammadu Buhari was the military Governor of the old Borno State gradually created the forces that coalesced into the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency decades later.
Whatever a man soweth that he shalt reap abundantly! If thou soweth the wind, thou shalt reap the whirlwind!
Conclusion
Since the military has been deployed to fight the bandits, unfortunately the military has not been able to define for the nation who really are these bandits. The question then arises whether the military knows the enemy it is fighting at all.
There have been allegations and counter-allegations about the origin of current crop of bandits in Nigeria. There have been numerous allegations that these bandits are not even Nigerians at all but foreigners from northern African countries who were recruited to serve as political shock troops (thugs) during the 2015 general elections. The allegations went further to claim that when there was unexpected peaceful election, graceful acceptance of defeat by the incumbent party then including peaceful transition of power, these foreign “bandits” suddenly found themselves irrelevant and redundant. However, instead of sending them back to their countries of origin, according to this line of narrative, they were allowed to stay, by acts of omission or commission. But they were no longer given the stipends which were formerly given to them. The allegations went further to state that it is this state of abandonment by their political recruiters that drove these foreigners to go into the forests and became bandits engaged in raids, killings, and taking of hostages for ransom collection as a mean of survival in the face of abandonment and total neglect by those who recruited them in the first instance.
Several names have been mentioned in the social media as the political masterminds of this recruitment exercise that has now become an albatross on the neck of the country. But there have been no official or authoritative confirmation of this sordid development while some argued that there is no need for such confirmation and that the names already known are sufficient proof that there was indeed such a recruitment that is now seen to have gone awry for the ruling party and the country. Even the name of President Muhammadu Buhari has been mentioned as the actual grandmaster of this development since it was his political ambition to become President that led to the decision to recruit these foreigners as political thugs. Again, President Buhari has neither confirmed nor denied the allegation. But there has been no documentary evidence to prove this name-dropping – thus making it extremely difficult to believe this particular allegation.
President Buhari has even recently said that he would not leave office as a failure. First, he has unwittingly admitted that he has failed based on his poor performance record of governance in the last six and half years, Second, he is not unaware of the high possibility of leaving office in May 2023 a complete failure and this spectacle has been haunting him – which is why he voiced it out as a matter of great concern to him – because the public already perceived him as a failure except his die-hard supporters. This is why he is fretting that he may leave office in 2023 a complete failure.
There is no doubt that he probably considered himself a failure considering what has happened and is still happening on the security plane. There is nobody that would chalk up Buhari administration as a success considering the number of people that has needlessly lost their lives and properties, loss that could have been prevented if the government has proactively approach all the security challenges with sacred seriousness that it deserves. Alas, politics of blame game was conveniently played with it. At first, it was the cluelessness of the immediate past administration that led to the escalation of the security crisis in the country. However, when that blame game got exhausted, the attention was now turned to sponsors of Boko Haram, banditry, etc, but without the courage to name any person and damn the consequences.
This is seemingly harsh to say, may even be considered risky to say, given the high level of intolerance of this administration to criticisms, whether constructive or not, the consequence of which is the trampling underfoot the fundamental human rights of citizens who dared to raise their voices against what they perceived as going wrong in the polity.
In this regard, the critical question is this: having wasted six and half years recording failure and with only one and half years remaining to leave office, how is he going to double up to recover the lost opportunity of six and half years to achieve superlative success to make up for the lost period?
Boko Haram does not recognize Nigeria’s constitution or the election earlier this year of President Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan shook up his national security team following the bombing, and says greater civilian participation in surveillance will help defeat the terrorists and their sponsors.176
Cracking Boko Haram, however, means getting to the bottom of a group about which little is known. Abubakar Umar Kari lectures in sociology at the University of Abuja. He said Boko Haram is hard to pin down. “It’s like a mystery. Sometimes the more you look, the less you see. And its existence is also shrouded in a lot of controversies,” said Kari. “There have been a number of conspiracy theories about who are behind it, what it does, what its objectives are and so on.”177
Kari said the government’s military approach toward the group missed the opportunity to address it as a matter chiefly of religion. “The government ought to have clearly investigated the Boko Haram from the point of view of its social existence,” said Kari. “Who are these people? What do they profess? How are they objectively similar and diametrically opposed to the mainstream Islamic faith? What are their grievances, if any? Before going to law and order, they should have understood all these things. And up to now, surprisingly, this particular angle has been neglected.”178
Human rights activist Shehu Sani writes extensively on Boko Haram. The head of Nigeria’s influential Civil Rights Congress said the group’s fundamentalism appeals to a dissatisfied generation of Nigerians. “Their method of preaching has always been anti-establishment. And when I say anti-establishment, I don’t only mean the political establishment, but even the religious establishment as represented by the sultan and the emirs of northern Nigeria,” said Sani. “We have seen the growth of a new generation of radical Muslims in the northern parts of Nigeria, who have chosen the road of armed struggle.”179
Sani said a government amnesty offered to militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta changed the dynamics of Boko Haram. “The use of money to appease people who pick up arms made it very easy for other people to say, ‘Come on. For me to be listened to, I should also pick up arms.’ And the Boko Haram are somehow, in their own, thinking that the only way for the government to take them seriously is to go beyond the targets of government and towards international institutions, like the United Nations, so that the message will be sent very clearly to the world, and the government can be embarrassed,? said Sani.180
Sani said security forces appear overmatched by Boko Haram, especially given the contentiousness between some northern governors and the commanders of military task forces in their states. “Nigerian security forces are ill-equipped intellectually and materially to handle violence of this sort, for the reasons that those who are planting bombs and those who are picking up arms against the state are better funded and better connected and more determined than security agencies,” said Sani. “Nobody will dare expose the Boko Haram. Because when you do that you expose yourself to a lot of danger from the Boko Haram, and no government will protect you.”181
There is also without doubt discontent within the military itself over the conduct of the war. And this discontent has caused bitterness that has inevitably gone to affect the fighting morale of the soldiers. There have been numerous reports of mismanagement of funds, lack of adequate welfare schemes for the fighting soldiers, and inadequate compensation to the families of the soldiers that fell at the warfronts.
It would be recalled in this context or regard that twelve soldiers of the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army were found guilty by a court martial for mutiny. The soldiers mutinied against the General Officer Commanding the Division for allegation of betrayal after been asked to attack a Boko Haram hideout but were ambushed by the insurgents.
The revolt happened on May 13 (2014) after soldiers were ordered to drive at night a road frequently attacked by Boko Haram. The soldiers initially refused, saying it was a suicide mission. They eventually followed orders, and were ambushed. The convoy was driving from Chibok, the northeastern town from which more than 270 girls and women were abducted from a school a month earlier. The bodies of the dead were brought to northeastern city of Maiduguri, leading to a demand by colleagues to speak to the 7th Division’s commanding officer, Amadu Mohammed. They threw stones and shot at him, witnesses said. The officer took refuge in an armoured vehicle and was unharmed.182
Brigadier General Chukwuemeka Okonkwo, the court martial president, said the sentences were subject to confirmation by Nigeria’s military authorities but said there was no doubt about the gravity of the offence. The panel considered “its likely effect on the counter-insurgency operations in the northeast as well as its implications on national security”, he told the court.183
Nigeria’s army has been under pressure to end the bloody rebellion that has claimed thousands of lives, made [millions] of others homeless and seen the armed groups make territorial gains in the northeast in [over a decade now].184
But front-line troops have frequently complained of a lack of adequate weapons and equipment to fight the better armed rebels, while there have also been reports that troops have not been paid or received proper food supplies.185
As at the time of publishing this article, the bandits have not released the officer abducted from the NDA. It has even demanded N200 million as ransom to release the officer. However, it is not known whether the bandits have gotten in contact with the Nigerian military authority for negotiation over the ransom and release of the abducted officer. Worrisomely, from the body language of the Nigerian Military High Command, it can be interpreted that it may not care much for the safety of the abducted officer – hence the non-contact with the bandits for negotiation. What the Military High Command said was that it is pursuing the bandits!
From what can be seen as unfolding in the Northern part of the country, evident and extrapolated from various newspapers’ headline stories, editorial, featured stories, social media commentaries in recent years, it can be safely argued that the North has virtually collapsed economically as a result of growing insecurity on daily basis, contrary to what the Northern political establishment would like the general public and the international community to believe. This is not a pessimistic statement of condemnation nor a statement meant to impugn the image of the Northern political establishment. It is a statement borne out of the objective reality: the number of people that have fell victims to the campaign of terror by the various violent non-state actors and groups, the helplessness of the security agencies, including the military, to stem the tidal wave of this insecurity, the unexplored connivance of foreign governments and non-governmental international actors and groups, the socio-cultural permissiveness in the ongoing killings, the failure of the mainstream Islamic establishments to rise up in condemnation of the pogroms, etc.
Yes. Individuals have condemned the killings. But this is clearly insufficient. Those who want to rule Nigeria forever must at least secure and protect their home fronts in order to convince others they are capable of ruling Nigeria forever. The failure of government and governance is very apparent. The failure of the ruling party is very apparent. The failure of security architecture or framework, despite its domination by Northern elite, is very apparent. The failure of social institutions is very apparent. The failure the main religious institution in the North, Islam, is very apparent.
There are two inter-related issues here for contemplation. The first is that quite a large number, indeed the preponderant number, of military facilities are undeniably located in the Northern part of the country. Naval facilities are now even been moved from the littoral South to the desert North. The second issue is also the undeniable fact that more than ninety percent of all strategic posts in military and security agencies are dominated by elements of Northern extraction. Buhari administration does not hide its preference for nepotistic-driven appointments, with utmost reckless impunity. But how is it that these facts have not helped in curbing the growing insecurity in the country especially in the North? Government’s response has been a mixture of carrot and stick policy but neither carrot nor stick approach seems to be working in any way. Hardly a day passes without report of strike by bandits, kidnappers, killing by unknown gunmen somewhere in the North showing the utter helplessness of both the carrot and stick approaches. Government is growing weaker in its ability to faithfully and forcefully implement any of the policy approach. The nuts and bolts that have hitherto held the society (social bond) together are gradually loosening and the social order is falling apart.
There is short, medium and long-term invisible or physical cost to (increasing) fear in this case, the fear of the total collapse or implosion of the North, which is yet to be quantified. Even if the North has not totally collapsed or is not going to collapse at all, there is the cost to the needless fear generated by the ongoing crisis in the region which plays tricks on people’s minds, causing unnecessary panic, causing migration from the North to the South and causing so many acrimonies in the process. Unfortunately, this fear has not been convincingly dispelled by all stakeholders in the North because particularly the regional elite is still feeding the Frankenstein monster of insecurity by playing politics with it and thus benefitting from it at the expense of innocent people who are unfortunately to be caught in the crossfires.
With what is being witnessed on daily basis in the Northern part of the country, the military is obviously at its wits’ end despite all assurances to the contrary. There is growing fear that the military may crack up given its fundamental weaknesses and the inability to curb the growing insecurity across the length and breadth of the North.
So much is expected from the military, so little is being delivered!