Mali Again!

By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY

Introduction

Mali is at it again.

Barely a month after the death of President (Field Marshal) Idriss Deby Itno of Chad on April 20, 2021, and the taking over of the government by the military in that country led by his son, General Mahamat Deby Itno¹, the Malian military also struck in its own fashion leading to the arrest, detention and forced resignation of the government led by President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, including the Defence Minister, Souleymane Doucoure on May 24, 2021.

Constant regime change or political instability has unfortunately come to characterize Malian political life.

The current Malian coup, the second in ten months, was led by Colonel Assimi Goita who was the Vice President under President Bah N’Daw and who ostensibly call the shots or pull the strings behind the scene. He was also the one that led the last coup that brought President Bah N’Daw to power in August 2020.

The coup was, however, the third in ten years following that of 2012 and 2020.

Questions are now being asked in the global strategic quarters whether there is an ill-wind that is blowing back on democratic governance in Africa, given the spate at which the military are taking over governments in African countries. It is also being asked whether the centre of gravity for jihadist movements worldwide has now shifted from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc, to the African continent especially the Sahel region.

The Malian case, however, demonstrates how a tiny group of men (in Nigeria it is called a “cabal”) can hold a whole nation hostage and to ransom, impose its will (ideological worldview, vision, etc) on the State, by hijacking and/or manipulating the weak State structures and political institutions, and thus change the direction of the State and the country, etc.

Mali, clearly a multiethnic society, also showcases the typical North-South divide like Nigeria, Sudan and many other crisis-ridden African countries. The main ethnic groups in Mali are Bambara (33%), Fulani (13%), Soninke (10%), Senufo (10%), Malinke (9%), Dogon (9%), Sonrai (6%), other (10%)². The northern Mali is thinly populated but seemingly united, forceful and violent while the South that is more densely populated is disunited, rudderless and non-violent which enable the northern hegemons to wield real power.

Cause of the Coup

Scholars and media investigators have not adequately interrogated the real reasons for the recent coup. They have not even questioned the facial reasons given by Colonel Assimi Goita for carrying out the coup. Media reports so far seem to be satisfied with the reasons given by Goita without bothering to interrogate them.

Interim vice president Colonel Assimi Goita said he had seized power because the president and prime minister had failed to consult him about a government reshuffle in which two former coup leaders lost their cabinet positions. Goita orchestrated the August coup before being appointed vice president of a civilian-military transition.³

Ordinarily, the above would have been considered a lame excuse for overthrowing N’Daw and Ouane. But it is of fundamental consideration because the real goals and targets were not those two men removed from the cabinet but Assimi Goita himself. The next target would have been Goita if the removal of the two has gone unchallenged. The reasons for removing the two men by President N’Daw have not also been interrogated. Why were they removed? The coup, therefore, was a strategic move by Goita to secure himself in power, an act of self-preservation in the face of a looming danger of been removed from the power loop. N’Daw and Ouane were ostensibly not smart enough. They would or should have swept the three men out of the cabinet at the same time instead of going piecemeal that has cost them their positions.

It was a dangerous-looking chess board game. The Kings, the Queens, the Knights and the rookies were unevenly arranged. The Kings made the first move but a wrong one. The Knight moved next and ate up the Kings, knocking them out with just one well calibrated or calculated move.

The seed of destruction of the regime of President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane lies in its transitional character, i.e. the way the regime was cobbled together in August 2020 and thus came into existence. It could not have been otherwise. There is no doubt that this diarchic or hybrid arrangement was bound to fail inevitably and in a very tragic manner. It was just a question of time. By dropping two loyalists of Goita from the cabinet without consultation with him as the Vice President (and obviously the strongman in the cabinet) President Bah N’Daw has equally planned and executed his own coup actually aimed or targetted at Goita as the Vice President whether this was stated or not. President N’Daw has thus signed his own death warrant. The result was predictable. He was kicked out alongside his main hatchet man, Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, from the Presidential Palace and taken into detention in a military base.

Danielle Paquette, writing in Washington Post, gives an idea of what might have happened in the long chain of events starting from last year within the inner circles of the transitional team which might have also led to violent disagreements and finally the coup de’tat.

Goïta, one of the military officers who led last year’s overthrow, said the men had unveiled a new government without his input — without two members of the junta that toppled Mali’s previous government — and had therefore violated the country’s transition agreement.⁴ “The vice president of the transition saw himself obligated to act to preserve the transitional charter and defend the republic,” Goïta said in a statement. Not intervening, he added, would trigger “instability with immeasurable consequences.”⁵

Goïta — who received military training in the United States — capitalized on that unpopularity when he declared himself in charge of Mali last year.⁶ He and the other junta leaders had agreed to work with regional authorities to restore a civilian-led government. That process was supposed to take 18 months. (Ibid) Seeing it derailed is a setback, said Modibo Kadjoké, a politician in Bamako. “In 60 years of independence, we have already experienced four coups d’état,” he said. “We are living a crisis in our country, and that has been true for a long time.”⁷

Mali was still shaking off the fallout of last year’s mutiny when it was plunged into chaos again this week. The United States announced that it would halt military assistance to Mali in August [2020], and trade restrictions on commercial items and financial flows hurt the economy, which was already struggling.⁸ West African leaders lifted the punishing sanctions in October, citing the appointment of N’Daw, who was technically a civilian. He retired from the military about a decade ago.⁹

Yet N’Daw and the interim prime minister clashed with Goïta’s approach, according to two Western diplomats who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations, and approved a set of new ministers without telling him. “This has been brewing,” said J. Peter Pham, U.S. special envoy for the Sahel region of Africa during Mali’s last coup. “For one party to change the terms – of course you’ll get a negative reaction. These guys, having just staged a coup, having been tucked into a civilian-led transition, aren’t just going to say thank you and go away when you dismiss them.”¹⁰

President N’Daw failed calamitously in his own orchestrated game and nobody is expected to shed tears for him. It was a “game of throne” or power in which he failed because he made the wrong move on the chess board. President N’Daw ostensibly removed those two men because he has his own game plan, held to his chest or perhaps known only to his few trusted allies in the cabinet. What his intentions were are not known.

Transitional regimes often end badly. It breeds distrust and animosity within the inner sanctum of power. Comparatively, the last time Nigeria had a transitional regime called Interim National Government, it ended very badly. It was a huge mess. Nigeria was nearly ruined when late General Sani Abacha struck on November 17, 1993, threw out the ING and made himself the maximum ruler and subsequently plunged the country into deeper political and socioeconomic crisis the country has ever witnessed. Abacha and his main political opponent (late Chief MKO Abiola) were later consumed in the raging political inferno then and were made to kiss the dust in June and July 1998 when both were made to eat apple and drink tea respectively and were subsequently cleared off the way. It is better for the two gladiators to die than for the whole nation to perish and go into perdition!

Historical lesson: never put lion and goats together in the same cage. The lion would eventually end up eating up the goats.

In the Malian case, the immediate cause of the military coup d’état was the evident regime failure under President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane – a failure that the global community is not willing or reluctant to admit. President N’Daw and Prime Minister Ouane have not achieved anything concrete since coming to power in August 2020, have not been able to chart a new course for Mali, have not been able to end the “civil war” (or the jihadist-motivated crisis) in Mali, have not been able to revive the Malian economy that can be argued to have collapsed since many years.

Thus, going by the internal political and socioeconomic dynamics within Mali, the regime of President N’Daw and Prime Minister Ouane has become effete. It fell by its own failure to count any democratic dividend since it came to power.

The Nexus between the Past and Present

However, the current crisis may or cannot be understood in its composite form without reference to the immediate past developments. The unfolding political crisis in Mali, indeed, has its root in the past. Thus the crisis can only be understood contextually within historical perspective of the dysfunctionality of Malian State structures and political institutions.

Mali has been in throes of crisis for many decades.

The very way in which Mali came into existence as a sovereign state mediated by the former colonial power, France, constitute the historical origin of the crisis of Malian State till date. This needs to be critically interrogated to see where and how the Malian State became dysfunctional in its composition. This historical interrogation has been largely missing from contemporary media reportage or literatures.

According to Council on Foreign Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker, [a]fter gaining independence from France in 1960, Mali endured decades of instability. While the majority of the population resides in the south, Tuareg and Arab groups in the sparsely populated north rebelled against the government in 1963, 1990, and 2006, attempting to gain autonomy for the region they named Azawad. Numerous groups, including Islamist militant groups, have taken advantage of the government’s inability to assert control over territory in the north by continuously asserting territorial claims and attacking Malian government and international security forces, undermining the government and threatening to destabilize neighboring countries.¹¹

But the year 2012 was a critical turning-point in the evolution of the crisis.

Mali has been mired in crisis since 2012, when state institutions nearly collapsed in the face of a northern separatist rebellion led by members of the minority ethnic Tuareg community, a military coup, an Islamist insurgent advance, and a regional drought.¹²

Military officers seized power in early 2012, and northern rebels— bolstered by arms from Libya and by fighters with ties to Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—declared an independent state of “Azawad.” By mid-2012, AQIM and two loosely aligned groups had outmaneuvered the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to assert control over most of the north. France intervened militarily against the Islamists in early 2013, at which point the MNLA and other factions (re-)asserted control in some areas. MINUSMA deployed in mid-2013, and Kéïta won elections later that year, marking the end of Mali’s post-coup political transition. The 2012 coup leader, Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, faces charges for the murder of rival soldiers, but his trial has been delayed.¹³

President Kéïta was reelected in 2018, but opposition mounted over his administration’s apparent interference in legislative elections in early 2020, corruption scandals, and worsening insecurity, militia violence, and economic hardships. In June 2020, a loose alliance of politicians, civil society actors, and supporters of an influential Bamako religious leader convened large protests and called for Kéïta to resign, provoking a violent state crackdown. Regional heads of state attempted unsuccessfully to mediate, including by calling on 31 disputed members of parliament to step down. (The National Assembly Speaker, Kéïta’s constitutional successor, was among them.)¹⁴

Today, state actors remain absent from much of the north— and, increasingly, from central Mali, which is outside the scope of the accord. Signatory armed groups have not disarmed, and maintain parallel administrative structures in some areas. Jihadist groups have acted as spoilers, and maintain ties to some formerly allied signatory groups. U.N. sanctions monitors also have reported the involvement of signatory group members in drug trafficking, ethnic violence, and cooption of humanitarian aid, along with state official involvement in protection rackets and obstruction of the peace process. New armed factions have emerged since 2015, with varying views of the peace accord and the state.¹⁵

The design and process behind the 2015 accord may have contained the seeds of Mali’s further destabilization. While the accord is structured as a deal between Bamako and the north, there is an armed struggle within the north over territory, trafficking routes, patronage, and revenge. The talks granted concessions to a relatively small number of actors who had taken up arms, alienating others who felt victimized by the state and/or by signatory groups. The mediators ruled out discussion of federalism or altering the secular underpinning of Mali’s political system, issues with wide resonance in and beyond the north.¹⁶

In 2017, AQIM’s Sahel branch merged with an offshoot and two local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg. JNIM has since claimed attacks on U.N., French, and state targets in Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2018, JNIM attacked the G5 Sahel joint force headquarters in central Mali, forcing its relocation to Bamako. A separate AQIM offshoot has affiliated with the Islamic State and claimed the 2017 deadly ambush of U.S. soldiers in Niger.¹⁷ 

These groups have proven resilient, withstanding French strikes on top leaders and exploiting local grievances and communal tensions. They have expanded their areas of operation, enlarged their recruitment base, killed dozens of soldiers in attacks on local military outposts, and forced the retreat of state and rival actors through targeted attacks on civilian officials, traditional leaders, and individuals accused of colluding with government and/or French forces. Security force and militia abuses may fuel recruitment.¹⁸

These complex threats and security dynamics have impeded development and humanitarian relief efforts in a poor and landlocked country with limited arable land. More than 287,000 Malians were internally displaced as of mid-2020, almost double the previous year, and at least 142,000 were refugees in neighboring countries as of early 2020, per U.N. figures. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has brought new health and economic difficulties.¹⁹

Foreign troops have deployed to Mali since 2013 to try to improve stability and counter terrorism. MINUSMA, a U.N. peacekeeping operation, has up to 15,209 uniformed personnel. About 5,100 French troops are deployed in the Sahel region (including Mali) under France’s Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorism mission that receives U.S. logistical support (as authorized by Congress under 10 U.S.C. §331) and intelligence sharing. The European Union runs programs to train and restructure Mali’s military and build the capacity of its civilian security forces. In 2017, the G5 Sahel—comprising Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad—initiated a “joint force” to coordinate military operations in border regions, with donor support.²⁰

The current crisis in Mali began in early 2012 when a Tuareg separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the north rebelled for a fourth time. The MNLA was backed by a collection of Islamist militant groups – Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa—and together the groups moved to take over territory in the north. In March 2012, then-President Amadou Toumani Toure was deposed in a military coup carried out by the Malian army as anger spread over the government’s response to the rebellion. Confusion and infighting created by the power vacuum in the capital of Bamako enabled the MNLA and Islamist groups to seize territory quickly. By April 2012, the groups controlled nearly all of the territory in the north and declared independence.²¹

The alliance between the MNLA and the Islamist groups was short-lived; in June 2012 the MNLA broke with Ansar Dine and AQIM over the Islamists push to impose Sharia law in the north. Islamists gained control over Timbuktu and Gao, destroying shrines and imposing a harsh interpretation of Islamic rule. As Islamist groups began pushing toward the center of the country, the French military intervened in January 2013 at the request of the Malian government, deploying ground troops and launching an air campaign to push back the militants. Through Operation Barkhane, France continues to lead the fight in Mali and three thousand troops have been deployed since July 2014 to protect civilians and aid the efforts of local militaries. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was also created to combat extremism in the region in April 2013. More than thirteen thousand UN peacekeepers remain deployed in Mali and MINUSMA has been called the UN’s most dangerous mission due to the high number of attacks on peacekeepers.²²

Despite increased international involvement, the campaign against militants has instead resulted in the spread of militancy to countries across the Sahel. In February 2017, France and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5) countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—announced the creation of the G5 Sahel Force, a five thousand-troop-strong counterterrorism force aimed at fighting militant groups with an expanded mandate to move across borders in the Sahel region; the multinational force began operations in October 2017. The U.S. military has also increased its presence in the Sahel, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region and building a drone base in Niger to serve as a platform for strikes against groups across West and North Africa.²³

The Malian crisis is both epochal and multifaceted. Mali seems to enjoy the unenviable reputation of an unfortunate country prone to political crisis especially that of political instability caused by frequent military coups and counter-coups. According to Anushka Bose and Jonathan Pinckney, [m]ore than 80 political transitions brought about in part by mass uprisings since the end of World War II, 11 had their breakthrough moment through a military coup, including the 2011 revolution in Egypt and the 1974 “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal.²⁴

The first noticeable thing in this scenario of crisis is the calamitous failure of efforts by the international community (through the framework of MINUSMA and French military presence in Mali) to hold Mali together and match towards genuine democratization and economic development. Of what value and purpose can one say the international community has been helpful in securing lives and properties, secure the country from internal crisis of subversion and promotion of economic development?

The second fact is that the Sahel Strategic Initiative or G5 Sahel Force has also been a resounding failure in its apparent inability to stem the tidal wave of Islamic militancy and/or extremism in the region with particular reference to Mali in this case.

What Gilles Yabi wrote as far back as 2012 is still valid till date. According to Yabi “[t]he absence of an internationally recognized government in Mali has been an obstacle to the resolution of the country’s northern crisis. But the return to constitutional order will not in itself restore state sovereignty over the entire territory. The peace, security and unity of the country and its population are severely threatened by the independence of the “State of Azawad”, unilaterally proclaimed by the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA).²⁵

The threat is compounded by the presence of numerous additional armed groups, sometimes aligned but motivated by a disparate set of causes and interests, notably including: a radical reading of Islam that is foreign to established religious practice in the region; terrorist influences; and criminal networks that operate across the Sahara. The rapid fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, long a crucial actor in the region, and the subsequent exodus of seasoned, well-armed fighters from Libya, has also contributed to Mali’s current instability.²⁶

Even before the coup, the rebels of the MNLA, aided by the Islamist group Ansar al-Dïn (led by former senior Tuareg rebel Iyad al-Ghali) were arguably driving government forces – already demoralised and poorly organised following nearly two months of attacks against them – out of the north. The military takeover hastened this process, as amid the chaos and leaderlessness that seized the Malian army, the rebels were able to complete their northern campaign in just a few days. Kidal in Mali’s north-east, Gao further south and east, and Timbuktu in the north-west all fell without substantial resistance.²⁷

Gao and Timbuktu have since become sites of pillaging and destruction, plunging their isolated civilian populations into a deep humanitarian crisis. Credible reports of human-rights violations have been emerging from Gao in particular. Though life in these austere desert cities has never been easy, the deterioration since January 2012 – when residents could go about their daily lives peacefully and without fear of having new practices and doctrines of Islam imposed upon them by force – is stark.²⁸

Ecowas, the African Union and the United Nations have constantly upheld the principle of Mali’s territorial integrity, and thus have unequivocally condemned the unilaterally-proclaimed independence of the Azawad. However, simply affirming that principle is not enough. In the context of a highly charged climate of division and mistrust, two major potential pitfalls must be avoided.²⁹

The first would be to show complacency (even naiveté) in dealings with the MNLA, by taking at face value its leaders’ articulate discourse and its promises to restore order in the territory it claims to control and to pacify the various armed groups operating in the region (particularly those associated with Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb [AQIM]). The second would be to believe that the the Malian government’s re-conquest of the north – whether or not this is accomplished with the support of a regional force – can either reset the situation to that of January or that it can in itself ensure a viable peace.³⁰

The plight of the Tauregs is at the heart of the situation. The question of the Tuaregs, as well as the broader relationship between Mali’s vast, sprawling northern deserts and its southern regions, is rooted in the creation of an independent Republic of Mali in September 1960 – and indeed before. During the French colonial conquest of the Saharan sections of current Malian territory at the beginning of the 20th century, the colonising forces met with fierce resistance from several Tuareg clans. There were echoes of this hostility in the Tuaregs’ reaction to the integration of the region into the newly-independent state of Mali in 1960; particularly as the new nation’s capital, Bamako, was remote (both physically and culturally) from the deserts of the north.³¹

Antagonism between “lighter-skinned” northerners and “black” southerners remains a reality despite considerable intermarriage and decades of peaceful cohabitation between Tuareg, Arabs, Songhai, Fulani, Bambara, Malinke, Sarakollé, Bozo Dogon and numerous other communities across the north and south of the vast country. The proliferation in the last four decades of groups describing themselves as “fronts” or “popular movements” for the armed liberation of the Azawad testify to the failure of successive Malian governments to completely extinguish Tuareg rebellions. The latter’s demands for greater levels of autonomy relative to the central state in Bamako have persisted, as have their claims that not enough is being done to support the Tuareg or to preserve their cultural identity.³²

The Malian and African response to the armed conquest of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu must be as sophisticated and multifaceted as the various factors underlying the conflict, especially given the complicating presence of heavily armed Islamist groups whose objectives are uncertain but worrying. There is little evidence to suggest majority support for the independent state proposed by the MNLA, but establishing a clearer picture of what the Tuareg do want will be essential for future peace efforts. It is vital in any event to secure and preserve existing ways of life for the people of northern Mali, and the option of using force to achieve this goal should remain on the table.³³

The quick implementation of key measures can help ensure Mali’s reunification. These include an intense effort to rescue the civilian populations in the north from the immense suffering that currently affects them; dissuading the MNLA from pursuing independence; and assuaging the jingoistic fervour developing in Bamako. The involvement of Ecowas, the African Union and the United Nations to improve security and facilitate political dialogue and meaningful negotiations between legitimate Malian actors from the north and the south is also vital. In this complicated situation the psychological and emotional aspects of the conflict must be carefully considered, as neither side will accept an absolute defeat. If one characteristic is common to Malians – both those who originate in the desert and those from the savannah – it is intense pride.³⁴

The current political crisis, however, has its root in the immediate past. This ugly past is now fully manifested in the present which means that nothing concrete seemed to have been done to address the various grievances that constitute the kinetic fire of the present time. This also means no appropriate lessons have been learnt from the mistakes of the past.

In August 2020, military officers in Mali carried out a bloodless coup that led to the resignation and removal of Malian President Ibraham Boubacar Keita and Malian Prime Minister Boubou Cisse. The United States and France immediately condemned the coup, as did the UN Security Council, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU). ECOWAS issued sanctions against the coup leaders, suspended travel rights, and demanded the release of Keita and other arrested officials. The AU’s Security Council called for the “restoration of constitutional order and the release of the president and other government officials.” Following reports that military officers involved in the coup had previously received training from the U.S. military, the United States also halted all training and support exercises with Mali.³⁵

The coup followed months of protest against Keita’s administration, which escalated in July 2020 when a clash with security forces resulted in several fatalities. The protests, referred to as the June 5 Movement, focused on highlighting corruption and the government’s failure to curb insecurity across Mali. In the wake of the coup, the June 5 Movement remained a party to negotiations as ECOWAS, along with other regional organizations, pressed for the militia junta—calling itself the National Committee for the Salvation of the People—to form a transitional government predicated on civilian rule. On September 27, Mali’s former Defense Minister Bah N’Daw was named the new president of the transitional council, while the head of the military junta that took power, Assimi Goita, was named vice president of the council. N’Daw then appointed Mali’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Moctar Ouane—a civilian—as prime minister. The three heads of state will oversee an eighteen-month transitional period before elections are held. After the transitional government was appointed, Cisse and other officials detained during the coup were released; ECOWAS thereafter lifted economic sanctions and the AU lifted its suspension of Mali.³⁶

Despite the presence of various counterterrorism forces and internationally supported military operations, violent attacks and reprisals have increased and major terrorist networks and other militant groups appear to be gaining power in Mali. In January 2020, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda, the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), attacked a military outpost and killed dozens of Malian soldiers. Several attacks and reprisals perpetrated by loosely formed militias along ethnic lines indicate that violence at the community level may also be rising. In February 2020, an ethnic militia killed at least thirty people in Ogassagou.³⁷

Mali’s recent turmoil began with a 2012 coup, carried out by soldiers opposed to what they saw as a weak response to a growing separatist insurgency by Tuareg rebels in the country’s north. The insurgents were armed with weapons flowing from nearby Libya following that country’s 2011 civil war.³⁸

An opposition coalition known as the June 5 Movement (M5-RFP), led by prominent cleric Mahmoud Dicko, is calling for the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in the wake of the country’s April parliamentary elections. The protests were spurred by a Constitutional Court decision to overturn some of the election results, which the opposition says unfairly helped members of Keita’s party remain in office.³⁹

Keita has refused to step down, but he had been without a government since April [2020], when his prime minister and the rest of his government resigned amid an intensification of the civil war that has been raging since 2012. Keita formed a new cabinet in late July [2020] in an attempt to get a handle on the crisis.⁴⁰

But it was too late in the day for Keita to save the fast deteriorating situation. Keita eventually lost the handle on events. He was swept out of power alongide Prime Minister Boubou Cisse in August 2020 by a group of military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goita. A transitional regime was set up led by President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Boubacar Ouane with Assimi Goita as the Vice President.

However, the romance between N’Daw and Goita has also ended abruptly leading to the current coup and the attendant crisis.

Condemnation Galore

An African proverb says there are no way flies, ants and termites, even vultures, will not be attracted to a decaying body.

The scope and depth of the political crisis in Mali has allowed external interventions from all corners including Nigerian military intervention in 2013 – but without solving the political crisis. This was possible mainly because of the weakness of the Malian State i.e. absence of a strong political leadership to chart an independent cause and course for the nation, to set and sail the State-ship safely. The lack of such strong political leadership is occasioned in itself by political instability and constant regime change.

This is in sharp contrast with Chad with the authoritarian leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who ruled Libya for 42 years before he was overthrown during the Libyan civil war in 2011, President Idriss Deby Itno who ruled Chad for over 30 years. It is also in sharp contrast with Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe ruled for 37 years before he was pulled out by military intervention in 2017 because Zimbabwe was already on the verge of total collapse. Mali has no such authoritarian leadership but impotent and incompetent leadership that falls from power like rotten fruits be it a Keita or N’Daw, etc.

By all indications, Assimi Goita, the new leader, is trying to assume such an authoritarian character and role albeit repulsive to the liberal democratic tenets. Goita has been maneuvering and counter-maneuvering since he emerged as the indisputable military strongman in the August 2020 military coup. How far he would go would be largely determined by his ability to mediate and intermediate power within the VUCAed (volatility/vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) environment of delicate balance of forces operating in the constantly shifting political terrain of Mali, including the forces of the international community.

Tragically the very global forces that have failed to resolve the Malian crisis are precisely the same that have jumped on the bandwagon of condemnation of the regime change.

According to John Madeira, although writing in September 2020, on the implications of the Mali’s coup of August 2020, “[d]espite promising elections and claiming virtuous reasons for the coup, the military overthrowing a democratically elected president carries serious repercussions.”⁴¹

First, the coup in Mali brings international condemnation and a membership suspension from the African Union. Similarly, ECOWAS has suspended Mali, shut down borders, and halted financial flows to the state. However, more importantly, the coup could similarly suspend some forms of bilateral aid. For example, the U.S. government is barred from giving assistance to governments that come to power via a coup d’état due to language that has appeared in annual State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriations legislation since 1986. Similarly, the EU announced it would suspend police and military training in the state.⁴²

The cutting off of foreign aid, especially military aid, to Mali could be devastating due to the already poor security situation. One reason for the poor security situation is the political chaos brought on by the previous coup in 2012. The 2012 coup, which also overthrew a democratically elected government, began when soldiers mutinied over displeasure with how the government was handling a rebellion by the Tuareg ethnic group. The chaos of the early 2010s opened the door for established jihadist groups – like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – to step in and support the Tuareg’s, but also allowed new groups, like Ansar al-Din, to form.⁴³

Since then, the terrorist presence in Mali has grown to be one of the worst in the world:

• According to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index, Mali was the 13^th most effected country by terrorism.
• Mali saw the highest jump of any state in the top 20 – up nine spots from the 2018 Global Terrorism Index.
• Mali saw the third highest increase in deaths from terrorism from 2017-2018, only behind Afghanistan and Nigeria.
• Mali is the 4^th most effected Sub-Saharan African state by terrorism, behind only Nigeria, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁴⁴

An already strong jihadist presence in Mali will likely only get worse with the political uncertainty and instability a new coup brings. Conditions in Mali create a fertile base for jihadi groups to recruit from:

• Mali has a youth unemployment rate almost twice the rate of the overall unemployment rate.
• Mali is an extremely ethnically diverse state, which can lead to communal violence and allow for terrorist organizations to exploit existing conflicts.
• Mali is vulnerable to climate change, which can create instability that benefits extremist groups.⁴⁵

And the above is what has come to repeat itself as a result of the coup of May 25, 2021

On Sunday, May 30, 2021, Colonel Assimi Goita went to Ghana to attend a meeting of ECOWAS leaders convened with the specific purpose of finding a solution to the political gridlock in Mali.

Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali’s coup leader and newly appointed interim president, has been summoned to an emergency meeting of West African leaders in Ghana.⁴⁶ At Sunday’s extraordinary summit, the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is set to discuss how to deal with Mali’s second coup in nine months.⁴⁷

Goita left Bamako for Ghana’s capital, Accra, on Saturday after receiving an ECOWAS letter asking for “consultations”, according to the AFP news agency.⁴⁸ The office of Mali’s president, in a statement on Facebook, said Goita would take part in the extraordinary summit “alongside his counterparts” and would also hold bilateral talks with regional leaders.⁴⁹ The summit is set to begin at 2pm (14:00 GMT) on Sunday.⁵⁰

ECOWAS – which acted as a mediator last August when Goita and others toppled Mali’s democratically elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita – has warned it may re-impose sanctions after the colonel’s latest power grab.⁵¹ The bloc fears the takeover could exacerbate instability in northern and central Mali and undermine a regional fight against armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS).⁵² ECOWAS, the United States and France have all warned of new sanctions.⁵³ French President Emmanuel Macron, during a visit to Rwanda and South Africa, said on Saturday that he told West African leaders they could not back a country “where there is no longer democratic legitimacy or transition”.⁵⁴

[Most probably as a result of the unsatisfactory excuses given by Assimi Goita for overthrowing the transitional council led by President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane] Mali’s membership with the African Union has been suspended with immediate effect and the impoverished country threatened with sanctions following a second military coup in nine months.⁵⁵ The AU “decides … to immediately suspend the Republic of Mali from participation in all activities of the African Union, its organs and institutions, until normal constitutional order has been restored in the country”, the body’s Peace and Security Council said in a statement late on Tuesday.⁵⁶ The AU called for the military to “urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks, and to refrain from further interference in the political processes in Mali”.⁵⁷ It warned that if the military did not hand back power to civilian transitional leaders, “the Council will not hesitate to impose targeted sanctions and other punitive measures”.⁵⁸ Condemning the coup “in the strongest terms possible”, it added it was “deeply concerned about the evolving situation in Mali and its negative impact on the gains made thus far in the transition process in the country”.⁵⁹

The move follows a similar suspension on Sunday from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁶⁰ The coup sparked deep concerns over stability in the volatile Sahel region and warnings of economic penalties from across the international community.⁶¹ Colonel Assimi Goita was at the ECOWAS crisis summit in Ghana on Sunday to argue the military’s case but has now returned to Mali.⁶²

According to Claire Felter and Nathalie Bussemaker (2020) several global actors have been involved in the Malian crisis without been able to resolve it for years.

France. Mali’s former colonial ruler has been drawn deep into the conflict there. The Malian government requested help from Paris in 2013, and a mission the French military initially expected to only last a few weeks has now become what some analysts call France’s “forever war.” Operation Barkhane, as the counterterrorism effort is known, costs more than $1 billion annually, involves almost five thousand French troops, and has resulted in the deaths of forty-four French personnel since 2013. Protesters have also expressed frustration at the lack of progress foreign forces have made, with some calling for French personnel to withdraw.⁶³ 

United Nations. A UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, also began in 2013. While France and African countries have focused on counterterrorism, MINUSMA’s more than fifteen thousand uniformed personnel are meant to uphold the framework of the 2015 peace deal, rebuild the government’s security forces, and protect civilians.⁶⁴ 

Regional forces. Also contributing forces is the G5 Sahel, a regional partnership created in 2014 comprising five thousand troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. In addition, the African Union has pledged to deploy several thousand troops.⁶⁵

United States. Washington has gotten involved, though its role is relatively small. Under President Donald J. Trump, the Pentagon has reportedly proposed withdrawing U.S. troops in West Africa, canceling its annual $45 million contribution to Operation Barkhane, and closing its military base in neighboring Niger—all part of the Pentagon’s shift toward focusing on threats from China and Russia. In early 2020, however, the administration appointed its first-ever special envoy to the Sahel, J. Peter Pham, who has opposed any “extra-constitutional change of government” in Mali.⁶⁶

Consequent upon the military coup and the detention of the President and the Prime Minister [t]he United Nations mission in Mali called for the “immediate and unconditional” release of the country’s president and prime minister, who were detained by the military on Monday and later stripped of their powers.⁶⁷ The UN’s MINUSMA mission said on Twitter that those who hold the leaders will have to answer for their actions.⁶⁸ United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for calm and for Mali’s civilian leaders to be released. “I am deeply concerned by news of detention of civilian leaders of the Malian transition,” Guterres said on Twitter. “I call for calm & their unconditional release.”⁶⁹  The European Union and the African Union also condemned the arrests of President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane.⁷⁰

Mali’s powerful interim vice president, Colonel Goita, said that he ousted the interim president and PM because they failed to consult him about the nomination of a new government, violating the country’s transitional charter. Monday’s detentions raised fears of a second coup as Ndaw and Ouane led an interim government that was installed after a putsch in August under the threat of regional sanctions. Goita, who led the August coup that overthrew then-President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, said in a statement that elections next year to restore an elected government would go ahead as planned.⁷¹

The local transition monitoring committee, made up of ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA, with members of the international community, including France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union, express its deep concern at the situation in Mali marked by the arrest of the President of the transition, the Prime Minister and some other authorities.⁷² They strongly condemn the attempted coup that occurred following the publication of the decree appointing members of the government by the President of the transition on the proposal of the Prime Minister.⁷³

They demand the immediate and unconditional release of these authorities and stress that the military elements detaining them will be held personally responsible for their security.⁷⁴ They reaffirm their firm support for the transitional authorities and call for the transition to resume its course and be concluded on schedule. The international community rejects in advance any act imposed by coercion, including forced resignations.⁷⁵ They look forward to the visit from tomorrow of an ECOWAS delegation and call on all stakeholders to extend full cooperation to the ongoing efforts towards the immediate resumption of the normal course of the transition.⁷⁶ They stress that the reckless action carried out today carries with it the risk of weakening the mobilization of the international community in favor of Mali.⁷⁷

Interestingly or strangely, the same international community (United Nations, European Union, African Union, ECOWAS, etc) barely whimpered when General Mahamat Deby Itno-led military junta in Chad seized power for itself, threw out the Constitution, dissolved the Parliament, and postponed elections to the next 18 months immediately after the death of President Idriss Deby Itno on April 20, 2021. Even though the Speaker of the Parliament who was legitimately the next-in-line to the President, nobody asked for his ascencion to the Presidency in accordance with the provisions of the Chadian Constitution. This can only be interpreted to be double standards by the international community.

The Sum of All Fears

The situation in Mali is more complex than perhaps imagined unlike Chad. In Chad, it is evident that France was the major power broker, in control of the main levers of power, calling the shots or dictating the tunes, overtly or covertly. Even though France is also evidently involved in Mali, the stakes are higher such that its ability to call the shots is highly or heavily constrained. This was why France’s manouvering is largely subsumed within the larger tapestry of the international community’s outcries against the coup de’tat.

This is because “European and neighboring countries have invested lives and resources in these efforts because they worry about the region-wide implications of growing instability, experts say”.⁷⁸

Jihadi groups have not only spread across Mali but in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, and transnational crime, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, and smuggling of migrants, has become a lucrative income source for militants. Casualties from terrorism across the three countries have increased fivefold since 2016, reaching four thousand deaths in 2019. And in April 2020, the United Nations warned that Burkina Faso was experiencing the fastest-growing displacement crisis in the world, with almost 840,000 civilians forced from their homes in the previous year and a half.⁷⁹

But according to Emily Fornof and Emily Cole (2020): In recent years, the United States, France and the U.N. have deployed thousands of military advisers and troops to the region. But large investments in the military without matching efforts to strengthen governance meant that the ground remained fertile for the August 18 coup.⁸⁰

But it was probably not only the neighboring countries (Burkina Faso and Niger) that were affected by the growing security crisis in Mali at this point in time. Nigeria, for instance, has long been drawn into the internal turmoil in Mali.

The centre of Mali has become a sort of launch-pad for al-Qaeda and ISIL-linked groups to attack neighboring countries. Regional leaders fear the violence could further spread into the generally more stable West African coastal countries if the political unrest creates further instability.⁸¹  International powers, particularly France, which has had a military presence in Mali since 2013, are also worried the crisis could undermine multibillion-dollar efforts to contain the armed groups. The continued displacement caused by the violence, European leaders fear, may also fuel another wave of migration to their shores.⁸² There is also concern among regional leaders about the precedent that would be set if Keita is forced to step down.⁸³Mediators from the 15-member regional bloc Economic Community of West African States have proposed the creation of a unity government but draw the line at what they describe as an unconstitutional change in power.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, there have been continuous allegations of corruption and power consolidation among the government elite, fuelled by recently published images of the president’s son partying on a yacht abroad.⁸⁵ This comes as citizens continue to struggle under Mali’s crumbling economy, which depends largely on gold and cotton and has been badly affected by the devolving security situation and the coronavirus pandemic.⁸⁶ Striking teachers also joined protesters press demands for promised salary increases.⁸⁷ The country also faces chronic lacks in road and electricity infrastructure, as well as access to healthcare, food and water. According to World Bank figures, more than 40 percent of Mali’s 20 million people experience extreme poverty.⁸⁸ Moreover, the deteriorating security situation remains a constant backdrop to the protests, which have taken place in the country’s more stable south.⁸⁹ 

Indeed, rightly or wrongly, Nigeria (under former President Goodluck Jonathan) thought or felt that it is also threatened by the unfolding events in Mali at this point in time. This was what led to the military intervention in Mali by Nigeria in January 2013, an intervention that was not covered by the analysis quoted above, an unfortunate omission by the Western media analysts, even though the  intervention was a complete fiasco or disaster of monumental proportion. It was a misadventure borne out of ill-thought strategic advisory. It was a-strategic. It did not solve any problem. Rather it complicated the political situation both in Mali and even in Nigeria, the latter in relations to the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast part of the country.

Many Nigerians inside the government have maintained that Boko Haram has links with international jihad networks, especially al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the leading elements among Mali’s Islamic insurgency. Mali has used that claim as a basis of requests for outside help. If such links do exist on meaningful terms, it would seem likely that Boko Haram will escalate their attacks in northern Nigeria in solidarity with its Islamic brothers. If that happens, there will be yet more pressure on the already overstretched Nigerian forces.⁹⁰

With the acceleration of Mali-centric activity following the French intervention, President Jonathan announced that Nigerian troops would arrive in Mali imminently. There are reports that some are already there. It is unclear what, if any, operational significance the presence of small numbers of troops from ECOWAS states will have on the current fighting. However, the Nigerian presence keeps open the ECOWAS role. France already has around 750 troops on the ground, and is planning to more than triple that to at least 2,500. The United States, UK, Belgium, Denmark, and Canada have all pledged transport planes, and in some cases, logistical and training support.⁹¹

Nigeria plans to deploy up to 1,200 troops as part of a West African intervention force to support French and Malian troops battling Islamist militants in the Sahara desert.⁹² Allied French and West African forces are seeking to drive the rebels out of northern Mali, which they seized from government forces after a coup last year left a power vacuum. “We cannot pull out until we have solved the problem. I cannot tell you when we will solve the problem, but Nigeria is totally committed and we remain committed until the crisis is resolved,” Jonathan told Reuters in an interview in Geneva. …Until democratically elected people take over the government of Mali, we will not pull back.” As well as deploying troops, Nigeria also has warplanes in neighboring Niger ready for missions in Mali.

Jonathan said Nigeria had a direct interest in intervening in Mali, pointing out links between the Nigerian Islamist sect Boko Haram and al Qaeda’s North African wing in Mali. “We believe that if we stabilize northern Mali, not just Nigeria but other countries that are facing threats will be stabilized,” he said. “Nigeria controls 55 percent of the economy of West Africa and Mali is a West African country so we expect the Nigerian contribution to take that proportion. If we don’t show that leadership other countries may not come up strong.”⁹³

Nigeria’s military intervention turned out to be an abject barefooted diplomacy analogous to village square negotiation and alternative dispute resolution among warring clans or households. It was a poor outing for Nigeria’s foreign policy that has been swept under the carpet because of its non-concrete achievement of peace, stability and economic development for the country.

Unfortunately too, the Nigeria’s body of national interests in Mali has not been appropriately defined, contextualized or communicated by the current Nigerian Government under Buhari administration through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas Nigeria issued a press release when President Idriss Deby Itno was shot on April 19 and died the following day, no such press release has been forthcoming in the case of the raging crisis in Mali. The Nigerian Government has not told the public precisely what it is precisely trying to resolve in the evolving crisis in Mali. Nigerian Government, hitherto acknowledged to be the regional hegemon, is not known to have projected power of any known description, whether kinetic or non-kinetic in the resolution of the Malian crisis. Rather, Nigeria has been floating like water hyacinth along the murky water of the international community and with particular reference to ECOWAS.

Torpedoing the Dominos

There is a rising fear of the domino effect of the latest Malian coup spiraling out of control to spread its negative effects to neighboring countries including, the most fearful of all, Nigeria given the failure of governance in the last six years prompting what may be called “pressing the reset button”

The fear of having a bad precedent or bad omen established with the latest coup is the driving motive for the running helter-skelter by ECOWAS leaders and the international community. That is what is responsible for the latest “shuttle diplomacy” by former President Goodluck Jonathan as an “emissary of peace” and incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari. All ECOWAS leaders, indeed AU and the international community are sorely afraid of a possible ill-wind of coups and counter-coups blowing like hurricane on the horizon on the African continent once again.

Nigeria is particularly at the vortex of the maelstrom of this fear because of its failure to arrest the hydra-headed monster of increasing security challenges in the last one decade or more now. More worrisome in this emerging scenario is the total failure of the Nigerian security agencies especially the military establishment to arrest the rising insurgency, terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and herdsmen killing across the length and breadth of the country. The military in particular is saddening incapacitated from performing its main constitutional duty of protecting the territorial integrity of the country against internal subversion and protecting the citizens from attacks from enemies of the State.

Nigeria faces security challenges on several fronts. In the northeast, conflict between the military and two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—Boko Haram and an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—has killed tens of thousands over the past decade, displaced millions, and caused a protracted humanitarian crisis. The conflict also has destabilized adjacent areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. In Nigeria’s northwest, conflict between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades.⁹⁴

Boko Haram has nevertheless proven resilient, as the military has struggled to curb the group’s attacks and reestablish state control in contested areas, notably in rural zones. The emergence and growth of an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction since 2016, alongside rising insecurity in other parts of the country, have placed further strain on Nigeria’s overstretched security forces. Meanwhile, several high profile corruption cases have stalled in Nigeria’s slow-moving court system, and the country’s top anticorruption official has himself come under investigation for alleged graft. Critics accuse the Buhari administration of targeting anti-corruption inquiries to sideline political opponents, even as Buhari’s cabinet includes several ministers previously implicated in corrupt practices.⁹⁵

Robert I. Rotberg, the founding director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict and president emeritus of the World Peace Foundation, and John Campbell, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria respectively have just released an extremely indicting report on Nigeria claiming that the country is already at the point of no return as a failed nation rather than being classed as a weak or fragile state, and that it is just a question of time before the eventual collapse would occur if the ongoing trend of insecurity in the country is not arrested quickly.⁹⁶

The authors note that “[o]nly a new determination by Buhari and the political class to restore security and a sense of safety to Nigeria’s citizens can prevent the nation from spiraling further into failure and despair. The kinds of committed leadership that have been lacking in Nigeria for at least a decade will be necessary, plus renewed efforts to reduce the fraud, graft, and embezzlement that are fundamental to Nigeria’s weaknesses as a state and that are compelling contributors to its failure.”⁹⁷ Only Nigeria can save itself, but doing so takes the kind of political will that has so far been wanting.⁹⁸

In a followed-up article, the same authors declared that “Nigeria is in big trouble. If a state’s first obligation to those it governs is to provide for their security and maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, then Nigeria has failed, even if some other aspects of the state still function. Criminals, separatists, and Islamist insurgents increasingly threaten the government’s grip on power, as do rampant corruption, economic malaise, and rising poverty.”⁹⁹ 

The authors also note that “[i]ncreasingly, prominent Nigerian opinion-makers are calling for an alternative to the current administration—whether through a national convention to rebuild the state from scratch, the breakup of Nigeria into smaller countries, or a domestic military takeover of the kind Nigeria has experienced repeatedly since independence in 1960. Many other Nigerians decry the government’s inability to keep citizens safe but support its calls for external assistance in the form of economic and military aid.”¹⁰⁰

It is from this fundamentally structurally failed position that Nigeria has been mediating in the Malian crisis. How far this would succeed, given the depth and scope of the Malian crisis, is not known for now. But important is the mortal fear by the Buhari administration that its failure at governance at home driven by its gross incompetence might eventually push Nigeria over the cliff into abyss of collapse or disintegration or as an alternative to such scary scenario caused the military to intervene and throw out the administration, as already noted by Campbell and Rotberg and was already noted just two months back by the government itself when it raised the alarm that “some (unknown) disgruntled opposition politicians and religious leaders are planning to overthrow the government. Neither option is good or sustainable. Nigeria has simply boxed itself into a tight corner from which it is finding it extremely difficult to extricate itself.

Nigeria’s international partners, especially the United States, must acknowledge that Nigeria is now a failed state. In recognition of that fact, they should deepen their engagement with the country and seek to hold the current administration accountable for its failures while also working with it to provide security and right the economy. In addition, they should engage and support Nigerian civil society as it forges what must ultimately be a Nigerian-led reconstruction effort.¹⁰¹ Success is by no means guaranteed. But the alternatives, including a descent into widespread warlordism, intensified ethnic and religious strife, and the establishment of jihadi safe havens, are contrary to Africa’s interests and those of the United States. As Nigeria’s security goes, so goes Africa’s.¹⁰² 

Fornof and Cole¹⁰³ particularly blamed ECOWAS for its monumental failure to strike a balance or stability in Mali. Efforts within the region to mediate the current crisis have failed. ECOWAS, the West African regional economic community, tried twice to intervene between protesters and the government, but this crisis has exposed the challenge of fostering democratic norms beyond elections. ECOWAS’ leadership is struggling to match the scope and scale of the security challenges in the Sahel. In response to the coup, ECOWAS leaders suspended Mali and announced they want to restore IBK to office. In its peace and security function, ECOWAS has been largely absent in Mali, leaving France, the EU, and the U.S. to fill the vacuum. The G5 Sahel—an ad-hoc regional coalition, comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, to combat violent extremism—has had difficulty raising money and establishing the necessary structures and capacity to fulfill its mission to address violent extremism in the region.¹⁰⁴

France, the EU, and the U.S. have provided security assistance to Mali over the past eight years but have not yet developed a diplomatic engagement strategy to navigate this political crisis. While European and American security assistance has focused on helping Malian security forces manage the extremist threat—France currently has 4,500 troops in the Sahel—they have not met the critical and necessary security governance needs, contributing to the current crisis and undermining their legitimacy as mediators.¹⁰⁵

Since 2012, both the government and international partners, especially France and the EU, have invested in the security services to improve their effectiveness against the extremist insurgency. But these investments have been insufficient in strengthening Malian democratic institutions and the rule of law. Weak democratic institutions and corruption have further eroded Malians’ faith in their government as it struggles to provide basic services.¹⁰⁶

Mali’s current crisis shows the importance of investing in rule of law and governance in times of peace, and during conflict. Resilient democracies require good governance that cannot be manufactured overnight but must be enshrined in both policy and political norms. It is too difficult to try to construct a social contract when a government is in crisis.¹⁰⁷

But despite the presence of thousands of foreign troops, the conflict in the gold- and cotton-producing country has only deepened.¹⁰⁸ Multiple armed groups have swept south into central Mali, as well as into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, inflaming ethnic tensions along the way.¹⁰⁹ Thousands of soldiers and civilians have so far been killed while hundreds of thousands have been forced from their homes.¹¹⁰ Eight years on from the initial rebellion, attacks and ethnic killings are routine, with large swaths of the country still outside of government control.¹¹¹

Mali is technically a failed state. With a GDP of about $17.5 billion and GDP per capita of $891 including life expectancy at 58.9 years, according to the CIA World Factbook and World Bank and with Islam as the primary religion at 94 per cent of the 20 million population, but with a transnational terrorist attacks numbering 43,752; 287,496 estimated Malian refugees and 15,196 estimated internally displaced persons, Mali is also one of the poorest countries in the world, and as Rotberg and Campbell noted, “most of all, failed states are violent. All failed states harbor some form of violent internal strife, such as civil war or insurgency”, of which Mali is a classic case study. 

“At a bare minimum, citizens expect their states to keep them secure from external attack and to keep them safe within their borders. The bargain that subjects long ago made with their sovereigns was being kept from harm in exchange for allegiance and taxation. When that quid pro quo breaks down, a state loses its coherence, its social fabric disintegrates, and warring factions subvert the social contract that should provide the fundamental foundation of the state.”¹¹²

But there is a superjacent issue that has been left unaddressed: the influx of arms into Mali from all sources which include Libya. Libya in particular stands out as the chief illegal source of arms inflow into Mali before and more after the destruction of Libya through civil war orchestrated by Western powers in 2011. Inevitably, Western powers bear the ultimate responsibility for the security crisis in Mali.

Through Mali, however, arms have also flowed illegally to neighboring countries, to Niger, Chad and Nigeria. Nigeria actually acknowledged this in a roundabout manner when President Muhammadu Buhari claimed some years back that Boko Haram receives its arms from Libya through Mali without elaborating on the details and without having been able to stop the illegal arms flow into Nigeria from the Sahel axis.

But then it is a wonder how a hitherto acknowledged West African hegemon, Nigeria, now declared a fully failed state, can lead the same region to bail out Mali of its faliure.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis

According to Human Rights Watch (2020), France and the United States led on military matters, the European Union on training and security sector reform, and the United Nations on rule of law and political stability. In the wake of the August coup, ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali from their decision-making bodies; the US suspended military aid; and the EU suspended its military and police training programs.¹¹³

In June, France launched the International Coalition for the Sahel, to coordinate between the G5 Sahel countries (Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) and their international partners.¹¹⁴

Operation Barkhane, the 5,000-member French regional counterterrorism force, conducted numerous operations in Mali. Until the coup, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) continued to train and advise Mali’s security forces.¹¹⁵ 

In June, the EU’s high representative expressed outrage at the killing of over 40 civilians with the likely involvement of Mali’s armed forces. He urged accountability for the crimes committed and stressed that the EU’s engagement is conditional to the respect of international human rights and humanitarian law. In September, the European Parliament echoed those concerns, urged the EU to support Mali’s democratic transition, and called for a comprehensive reform of the EUTM in order to ensure better selection, training and scrutiny of the armed forces and of their operations.¹¹⁶

The UN Security Council renewed for one year the mandates of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, and the Mali Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts which, in August issued a report implicating high-level Malian officials in obstructing the 2015 peace process and failing to prevent the 2020 Ogossagou massacre. In June, the UN Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of the UN independent expert on Mali for another year.¹¹⁷

MINUSMA supported government atrocity investigations, justice sector reform, and increased patrols in areas vulnerable to attack. However, its ability to fulfill its civilian protection mandate was challenged due to lack of equipment, notably air assets. The human rights section significantly increased public reporting on abuses by all sides.¹¹⁸

In July, the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened a trial against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, a former leader of the Islamist armed group Ansar Dine, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including rape and sexual slavery committed in 2012-2013. It is the ICC’s second trial in the Mali situation, and the court’s first trial of gender-based persecution.¹¹⁹

In another report, it was reported that “Terrorist attacks continue in central Mali. On 15 March, at least 33 Malian soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in an attack on their convoy near the town of Tessit, located in the Gao region; the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara claimed responsibility. It was the deadliest attack against Malian forces since the August 2020 coup.¹²⁰

Six MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed in attacks since January. Four peacekeepers from Côte d’Ivoire were killed and five injured in a 13 January attack in the Timbuktu region. Two days later, one Egyptian peacekeeper was killed and another seriously injured near Tessalit in Kidal region. On 10 February, assailants reportedly drove an explosives-laden vehicle into a MINUSMA base near Douentza, then opened fire with mortars and automatic weapons before peacekeepers repelled the attack. One peacekeeper from Togo was killed and 27 were injured.¹²¹

Mali’s neighbors continue to face violence from terrorist groups that have also provoked inter-communal conflict. Niger experienced several lethal attacks near its border with Mali during March: assailants killed at least 58 civilians on 15 March in Banibangou in the Tillabéri region and attacked a series of villages on 21 March in the Tahou region, leaving at least 137 people dead.¹²²

On 30 March, MINUSMA’s Human Rights Division released a report concluding that a 3 January airstrike by Operation Barkhane killed at least 19 civilians at a wedding party in the town of Bounti in central Mali. The French military had previously asserted that the strike had killed around 30 jihadists. According to the report, five armed individuals belonging to terrorist group Katiba Serma attended the wedding, three of whom were killed. In a statement, France’s ministry of defense said that it “reaffirms strongly” that the airstrike targeted an “armed terrorist group” and indicated that it had “numerous reservations about the methodology used” in the report.¹²³

Mali also faces a humanitarian crisis as noted by International Organization for Migration.

For the past decade, Mali has faced an extremely complex humanitarian crisis generated by the presence of non-state armed groups in the Northern and Central regions and subsequent violence, conflict with armed forces and human rights violations, fueled by inter-community tensions and rooted in a longstanding challenges related to development. The crisis has considerably worsened the living conditions of a large part of the population in the affected areas and led to massive population displacement. According to IOM’s October 2020 Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) report, 311,193 people continue to be displaced mainly due to intercommunal violence in the regions of Mopti, Gao and Menaka. The insecure environment also led to spontaneous movements of vulnerable groups who have notably lost their livelihoods. The vast majority of IDPs live in crowded host families and communities or informal temporary sites, lacking access to the most basic services.¹²⁴

Compounding this already precarious situation, the COVID-19 pandemic is also contributing to paralyzing the country’s economic system, risking impoverishing populations already rendered extremely vulnerable by the conflict, whilst also further burdening the struggling healthcare system. Moreover, on the socio-political level, the country has been experiencing a deep crisis culminating with the military coup of 18 August 2020. This has had a significant impact on humanitarian operations including the temporary suspension of activities involving government institutions. Since the coup and the establishment of a transition government for 18 months, IOM Mali and the international community have been working with the transition authorities to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.¹²⁵

A group of civil society organizations from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and beyond, called People’s Coalition for the Sahel, issued a press statement stating that they stood together with the Malian people during the current political crisis. This was in September 2020 but still relevant in the ongoing crisis.

“We call on the Malian authorities, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and governments and institutions with influence in the region to ensure that any intervention puts the needs and rights of Mali’s most vulnerable people at its heart, and reinforces, rather than jeopardises, vital humanitarian, development, democratic governance, peace-building and human rights efforts in the country. Poorly-targeted sweeping sanctions are inconsistent with these aims, and instead risk penalising the entire population, hitting the most vulnerable, whose situation has already worsened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.”¹²⁶

The crisis in Mali is born of years of corruption, indifference, poor governance and alarming human rights violations by armed groups, self-defence militias and members of security forces with rampant impunity. This has caused widespread public discontent, distrust in the state’s authority and worsened the security situation. The prioritisation of a military response to a complex crisis, including massive attention and funding to the security aspects of the crisis, and countless new initiatives by the international community, has failed to protect civilians from atrocities, prevent further instability and alleviate inter-communal grievances.¹²⁷

The latest political crisis must be a wake-up call to Mali, the Sahel region and the international community that a new response is needed, radically refocused on populations’ needs, to address the growing destabilisation not only of Mali, but also of Burkina Faso, Niger and the wider Sahel region. Last month we came together as a new People’s Coalition for the Sahel to launch the ‘People’s Pillars’, setting out four key priorities that we believe must guide any response to the crisis in our region: protection of civilians, a comprehensive political strategy to address the root causes of instability, a massive increase in humanitarian aid, and accountability for violations by all actors. The recent events in Mali add a renewed urgency to our calls, demonstrating the futility of any approach that fails to put the people and the root causes of conflict at the centre of engagement.¹²⁸

In order to stabilise the country and restore the rule of law, we, as members of the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, urge the Malian authorities, ECOWAS, the African Union and other relevant governments and institutions with influence in the region to:

• Work closely with diverse communities and civil society, including women and youth groups, to develop a comprehensive time-bound political roadmap that puts the protection of civilians and human security at its heart, and addresses the root causes of the conflict, including the governance crisis. This should include a timeline for transition to a civilian-led government in Mali.¹²⁹
• Ensure that any intervention does not exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, nor impede humanitarian access and aid or the freedom of movement for the Malian population, including by ensuring inclusion of comprehensive humanitarian exemptions in any sanctions regime.¹³⁰
• Push for immediate action to ensure equal access to justice, combat impunity at all levels and advance transparent accountability mechanisms for all violations against civilians, including by armed groups and international military actors.¹³¹

When the Next Coup happens, don’t be surprised!

What happened in Mali with this coup is a lesson to all other African leaders. It only shows that it can happen anywhere especially in those countries where there has been poor governance accentuated by security crisis, stinking corruption, deficit of rule of law and lack of justice. Several African countries currently fit into this noxious mode. This is why subtle warnings have been coming from global strategic quarters and scholars whose researches cannot be disputed on factual grounds except on emotional grounds. They are enough warnings to the wise.

Mali, a Francophone country home to nearly 20 million people, has plenty of experience when it comes to coups; the last one, which took place in 2012, led to the election of the just-deposed Keïta the following year. Tensions have long been bubbling in the country—Keïta, who hails from the country’s south, is widely regarded as an ineffective leader who has failed to provide the economic stability and physical security that the country desperately needs. To be fair, it is not entirely his fault—when the last coup was launched in 2012, the resulting political instability allowed a range of Islamic fundamentalist groups to capture territory in the north of the country, aligning themselves with various ethnic militias warring between themselves. Many of these jihadi groups were beaten back by French forces who—with Keita’s blessing—arrived to help restore order. But the jihadi threat was never completely eradicated, and the country has spent the better part of the last decade struggling to keep the security situation in check. The violence has only increased of late; in addition to the mounting casualties and people forcibly displaced, opposition leader and former presidential candidate, Soumaila Cisse, was kidnapped (presumably by jihadists) early this year.¹³²

While there is plenty of sympathy for the Malian people, international actors have good reason to be worried by the recent developments—for all his faults (and there are plenty), Keïta was supportive of Western efforts to combat jihadism in the region, and the ensuing political chaos will give these groups the opening to expand their hold on the country. ECOWAS has dispatched a team headed by former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan to negotiate with the coup plotters and figure out next steps; failure to reach an agreement could dent the bloc’s credibility, but it is unlikely to offer the junta much room for compromise on the contours of a democratic transition. This will align with the preferences of leaders like Alassane Ouattara and Alpha Conde, presidents of Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea respectively, who are seeking controversial third terms in office later this year and would prefer a tough regional response to deter similar uprisings in their countries.¹³³

When we talk about the lack of global leadership and the G-Zero, we tend to talk about great power rivalries (like U.S. vs. China) or big macro issues (like trade and tech wars). But Mali demonstrates how the G-Zero affects countries at the individual level. While the international community earnestly wants to help the country both for its own sake and beat back the threat posed by Islamic militants, no one wants to commit the resources or take primary ownership of the situation; 5,000 French troops won’t turn the tide against jihadists or provide the long-term stability Mali needs to right itself. Which means Mali is left to fend for itself.¹³⁴

 Undue emphasis on security and securitization has not helped matter at all. Since a 2012 coup, Mali has received significant security assistance from the United States, France, the European Union and other foreign donors to address violent extremism and insurgency and help stabilize the country. In the wake of the August military coup, it is clear that strategy has backfired—and that, in fact, the failure of international security sector assistance to prioritize governance likely contributed to the conditions that led to the coup. With the military now in control and the country facing an uncertain democratic transition, the mistake donors made prior to the coup is clear: They worked to develop Mali’s security capacity, but neglected governance of the security sector and beyond. If international donors, particularly the United States and France, want to help bring peace and stability to Mali—and the region—and achieve their own security objectives they will need to heed these lessons and change their approach to security sector assistance.¹³⁵

As the dust settles on the coup, it is safe to say that security sector assistance contributed to the conditions that led to it. The media was quick to note that coup leaders had recently received tactical training from the United States, France, and Russia. But the problem here is more complicated than training a few individuals.¹³⁶

Mali depends on foreign assistance to provide basic services, particularly in the security sector. As one observer noted, “The cost of replacing all foreign security support, from France, the United Nations and European Union, would amount to 75 percent of current government revenue.” But that security assistance is earmarked to advance donors’ interests. For major donors, including France and the United States, this means achieving the military defeat of extremists by increasing the capacity and lethality of the Malian military.¹³⁷

By contrast, those same donors have made only nominal investments in security sector governance to improve accountability to civilian authority, increase transparency and legitimacy, and ensure responsiveness to public needs. In 2020, Mali received nearly $79 million in U.S. foreign development assistance. Of this, only 1 percent was for democracy, rights, and governance, and only 5 percent for peace and security programming that is not direct aid to the security services, such as peace-building or conflict diversion or mitigation, despite the ongoing civil war. As the military got stronger over the past eight years, parliamentary oversight remained weak and Malian civil society lacked the access and expertise to be an effective watchdog.¹³⁸

Meanwhile, resources funneled so heavily to the Malian security sector—due to donor pressure on the Malian government to increase its own investment in military and police solutions to the nation’s challenges—eroded state legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Since a 2012 coup, Mali has more than doubled its military spending as a percentage of its GDP, even as insecurity hampered economic growth. Those increases in security spending left the government less able to provide badly needed public services like food, water, education, and economic development.¹³⁹

Foreign security assistance allowed, and in some cases encouraged, the government to pursue a security strategy that aligned with donors’ priorities, investing in driving out extremists or stopping illicit trade over protecting the Malian people. This order of priorities is nowhere more apparent than in the military’s increasing use of violence against civilians in the fight against extremists and in the lack of political will to hold security forces accountable. Large amounts of foreign security sector assistance weaken accountability between the government and its people and create opportunities for corruption. In the months of protests leading up to the coup, the lack of basic services, the government’s poor handling of the conflict, and corruption were among the most prominent grievance cited by leaders of the protest movement.¹⁴⁰

All of this led to an erosion of the strength and legitimacy of the civilian government in the eyes of the public, as well as impunity for alleged crimes committed by security forces such as torture, forced disappearances, and killings. Without popular support for the government, and in the absence of strong checks and balances or effective oversight and accountability of security forces, coup leaders were able to seize power without fear of resistance from the public or from other government institutions. Government dysfunction and low popularity of leaders also provided the CNSP the cover to the claim that they were acting on behalf of Malians.¹⁴¹

The coup in Mali shows the risks of poorly considered security sector assistance from big donors. Research shows that strengthening military effectiveness without reinforcing governing institutions makes coups more likely to occur and more likely to be successful—and it can increase the possibility of civil war.¹⁴²

This is especially true in fragile, violent contexts like Mali, demonstrating why a security sector reform strategy needs to focus heavily on enhancing governance as well. Mali’s coup is a clear demonstration of what happens when security sector reform is driven by donor’s security interests rather than those of local communities.¹⁴³

The Global Fragility Act (GFA), passed late last year, committed the U.S. government to rethinking its approach to security sector assistance and cooperation. The GFA recognized that in failing to address the drivers of fragility, including improved security sector governance, the U.S. is in fact working against its own interests in fostering stable, democratic states. This new policy approach emphasizing the importance of governance is welcome; USIP’s “Justice and Security Dialogues” project in the Sahel and Maghreb reflects this investment in governance and accountability. (USIP has adopted a security sector reform strategy, which will share with policymakers lessons learned to ensure states are providing accountable, effective, responsive, and inclusive security.) Despite these commitments and some small investments in security sector governance, U.S. and French security assistance in the Sahel remains dominated by training and equipment transfers.¹⁴⁴

In neighboring Niger, the EU’s focus on preventing migration and France and United States’ focus on counterterrorism has distorted the nation’s security strategy in a similar manner to Mali. And in Burkina Faso, which also shares a border with Mali, a focus on counterterrorism has prevented a holistic security response to the violent extremism fueled security crisis and loss of government control of large portions of the country. With limited attention to peace-building and underlying grievances such as security sector abuse, land tenure disputes, and widespread cattle theft and banditry, trust in the Burkinabe government continues to erode.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the Sahel at large has been experiencing democratic backsliding. Governments in Niger and Burkina Faso have made decisions that threaten to disenfranchise large portions of the population in the upcoming November elections and the presidents of Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire are currently seeking illegal third terms.¹⁴⁶

The region is extremely fragile with overwhelming governance and security challenges. The United States, France and the EU need to reconsider how to support stability in the region, and to move beyond improving the tactical capability of security forces. Despite a growing body of evidence underlining the need for change and clear guiding principles, international partners continue to make policy choices reacting to the hard security imperative at the expense of long-term peace. Ironically, by doing so, international donors contribute to continued instability, undermining their own security objectives and committing them to providing further security assistance to fragile states.

Instead, they should invest in strengthening governance, especially security governance and security force accountability. The coup in Mali provides an opportunity for the United States to shift to a long-term peace and security strategy focused on governance and supporting the Malian people to make security decisions and hold their government accountable for its actions. This approach would require a rebalancing of priorities from military training to diplomacy, and from tactical security assistance to supporting Malian-led efforts to strengthen security governance.¹⁴⁷

Susan Stigant, director of Africa programs at the United States Institute of Peace, said in a podcast in late August 2020: Mali really sits at the heart of the Sahel, which has been one of the regions that’s been most seriously impacted by extremist violence. And so, what we’ve seen in Mali is that it’s a place where the violence that takes place in the country has now tipped out of the borders into other neighboring countries and actually risks tipping into coastal West Africa. Countries like Ghana and Senegal, who are a long-standing, I think key anchor partners to the United States. They are countries that have upheld democratic norms and elections. They are key trading partners as well. And so the overflow of the extremist threat has actually led to a coalition of the regional countries coming together in a military operation that that stands side-by-side with the French led operation. So getting it right in Mali is incredibly important to provide a foundation to stabilize and lay the groundwork for more democratic, accountable governance across the continent.¹⁴⁸

I think one of the great opportunities at the moment is this emerging consensus in the U.S. government across the various agencies on what we talk about as part of the fragility agenda that there’s a critical need to take a long-term view to focus centrally on the state-society relationship, to focus not just on training and equipping and capacitating militaries to fight extremists, but to work on what we talk about as security governance, so the ability of security sectors to work under civilian control and work in a way that responds to citizens needs and priorities.¹⁴⁹

So I think if the U.S. government is able to harness and apply some of those fundamental understandings about what works in context, like Mali—granted, it’s incredibly complex—there’s a great opportunity and it’s a place where as you said, and France as a partner, globally is, is leading, but the U.S. role is really important, for reasons that you had talked about earlier, France has limited credibility, and some people will view its engagement in the Sahel and Mali as an extension of colonial times as a kind of a neo-imperialist agenda. So, there’s a real need to balance and step back allow leadership from the African continent, but also to make clear that democratic norms accountable governance, protection of citizens and accountable decision-making is really a priority and an expectation of our partners.¹⁵⁰ 

Conclusion

Assimi Goita has pushed himself to the political forefront to manage a technically failed state. He has ostensibly dug and entrenched himself into power and the international community is also apparently unable to pull him out despite the crippling sanctions that are already being inflicted on his regime. How far he can go cannot be accurately predicted.

He is also facing a personal dilemma. Finding no acceptance from his co-West African leaders, he is left to his own devices. This creates the problem of illegitimacy which could go either way: vacating or abdicating power or becoming dangerously murderous in his desire to cling to power.

However, the Malian crisis has also presented dilemma for immediate resolution. Goita and his junta need to come out and state clearly how he is going to resolve this epochal dilemma or crisis of the Malian State. There is need for a concrete programme of action within specific timelines to return Mali to civilian rule and democratic normalcy. But such a programme of action need to be supervised by a regime committed to such programme of action including the buy-in by the international community. This is why Goita must form a government of national unity within a specific period to execute the programme of action specifically aimed at returning Mali to civilian rule and democratic normalcy – taking into consideration the political fragmentation that has occurred in Mali over the decades. .

Added to the descriptive technical failure of the Malian State is also the unarguable substantive of the international community (UN, France, US, AU, ECOWAS, EU, etc) to prevent the Malian State from sliding down the slope of technical, if not substantive, failure over the years. With the heavy presence of UN peacekeeping forces, including the French occupational forces, one would have thought and expected that they would serve as strategic leverage and counterforce to the increasing strength of the jihadist and other extremist forces and help prevent the wanton destruction of lives and properties that have been going on in Mali over the years.

But this has not been the case. Indeed, prevention of jihadist forces from taking over Mali has been the primary concern and occupation of the international community rather than addressing the fundamental root-causes of the crisis of Malian State. Issues relating to rule of law, corruption, effective governance or dysfunctionality of the political and state structures, including the Malian economy, have been largely ignored in the engagement of the international community.

The international community is more interested in dousing the tension and apprehension generated by the huge inferno which has come to consume the entire Malian society without addressing itself to the smoldering kinetic embers from below the society. The result of such an artificial approach is predictable: no specific problem has ever been solved except the escalation of the general problems that are now overwhelming the society.

From the above analysis, there is no doubting of the heavy involvement of France, again similar to Chad, the former colonial power. Francophone African countries have been unravelling and gradually falling apart, one after the other, in the last two decades or so. This needs to be holistically interrogated. Even the blind and the deaf can see and hear how Emmanuel Macron has been posturing, conducting and addressing himself to African leaders lately in so repugnant cocky arrogance or haughtiness. But it takes two to tango as it is often said. African leaders are equally repulsive in their docility while swallowing insults from Macron with his aggressive posturing and stinging languages. It is indeed a very worrisome phenomenon that is yet to be fully understood in a comprehensive manner.

More unfortunate in the Malian case is the fact that Assimi Goita has not been able to present a defensible position for taking over the reign of government; has not laid down a concrete programme of action for rescuing Mali from the throes of death. There can be no more doubt that Mali is dying. It is in a state of paroxysms of death, dying instalmentally with constant regime instability and onslaught of sundry jihadist movements hell-bent on dismembering the Malian State and installing a Caliphate Islamic State.

There is also no more doubt too that there is a wave of backlash against democratic governance brewing and howling on the horizon in Africa essentially because of the monumental failure of some African leaders to deliver on democratic dividends. This has led to whispering or murmuring for military intervention to reset the button forgetting that it is precisely the long spell of military rule in Africa that has brought the continent into the current cul-de-sac of political gridlock. This is very unfortunate, if not tragic, that such subtle suggestions for return to despotic military rule are now been made and can be heard loud and clear on the streets at this critical turning point in the evolution of African political life.

It is very clear that there is a perception crisis. The problem with Africa is not that the democratic system of governance is not working at all. Rather, it is the fact that the current crop or generation of African leaders do not care about the normative values of democratic governance. They have no respect for democratic norms which ultimately demand transparency and accountability in governance. They view governance as a business or transactional franchise which has been the underlining factor for corrupt practices and dictatorial tendencies. Corruption and lack of accountability have grown proportionately to security crisis in African countries which include Nigeria, Chad, Mali, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc, in recent times.

The route of military rule is fraught with its own problems that will be generated through conflict and clash with democratic demands such as installing democratic rule. Unfortunately too, democratic governance has not been able to weld the various antagonistic ethnic Malian groups together into a united nation driven by common purpose. There is no viable national identity to which all disparate groups in the country can cling to. Rather, ethnic identities and nationalism has come to overwhelm the country. This is the broadsheet or landscape of crisis facing Mali.

How to manage this epochal crisis can only be determined by time and evolution of the crisis itself.