US versus China: The Battle for Supremacy in South China Sea

By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY

Introduction

Even though South China Sea has not been in the “breaking news” mode recently, the aggressive military activities by both the United States and China have not abated even after President Donald Trump exited the White House on January 20, 2021. Watchers of events in the region are, however, growing increasingly concerned about the possibility of war or major conflict being triggered off by an accident between the two superpowers through a third party.

The constellation of internal political conditions within China itself and regional hostility of geopolitical character against China by neighbouring countries, hostility in various degrees of objective concretization despite their various economic ties to China are a crucial factor that is heating up the South China Sea from the seabed, figuratively speaking. This is a powerful factor to be taken into serious consideration in the analysis of the overall scenario unfolding in the region.

While these countries have economic ties with China from one degree to another, ties that are expected to help douse the growing tension with China, they are mostly politically hostile to China. This is not only an accident of geography in which most of these countries are in close proximity with one another but also with China. Significant is the fact that most of these countries are democracies whereas China is a recognized unrepentant Communist dictatorship or hybrid authoritarianism.

Most of these countries have have one axe or the other to grind with China from one degree to another. However, in most cases, it is in the domain of maritime territorial disputes that the growing hostility with China is anchored. That is the bedrock of their hostility or antagonism towards China. Taiwan is probably the only exception in which China claims Taiwan belongs to it and, therefore, has no sovereign identity of its own. Hong Kong also falls into the same category of spurious claim of sovereignty over the two islands.

But Vietnam, Brunei, The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, even South Korea and Japan have one dispute or another to settle with China over islands, reefs, waterways, fishing rights, and ownership of oil and gas resources surrounding the South China Sea. India is in a special category of its own. India, another juggernaut in the Indo-Pacific region, has been having overt and covert running battle with China over the years. The border clash in June 2020 was the latest in the series of age-long skirmishes with China.

The above forms part of the entire corpus of strategic thinking towards China in the last two or three decades back in Washington. Where is China really headed? Is China heading for showdown and/or war with its neighbouring countries and by extension the United States? Or are we to believe those propaganda about peaceful co-existence and cooperation with her neighbours? No one can really tell with any pin-point accuracy.

While previous US administrations have tried to hide behind the facade of diplomatic niceties in pushing their strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and South China Sea specifically, it was Trump administration that came out unabashedly to escalate the stakes to the stratosphere by pushing to the forefront the US national security interests as captured by the quest for freedom of open navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea for the US and other South East Asian countries within the frameworks of UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC).

Core of Conflict in South China Sea

At the core of the territorial or geopolitical disputes and aggressive military posturings in the South China Sea from both the United States and China including neighbouring countries in the region are the estimated $3.37 trillion total trade passing through the South China Sea (2016 estimate) while 40 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade transited through the South China Sea in 2017 with  3,200 acres of new land China created in the Spratly Islands since 2013

China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea – and the sea’s estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas  – have antagonized competing claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As early as the 1970s, countries began to claim islands and various zones in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which possess rich natural resources and fishing areas.¹

China maintains that, under international law, foreign militaries are not able to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to the United States, claimant countries, under UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should have freedom of navigation through EEZs in the sea and are not required to notify claimants of military activities. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its ruling on a claim brought against China by The Philippines under UNCLOS, ruling in favor of the Philippines on almost every count. While China is a signatory to the treaty, which established the tribunal, it refuses to accept the court’s authority.²

According to Christian Wirth (2019) [m]aritime security concerns related to shipping routes through the Malacca straits ‘chokepoint’ and the South China Sea have become the major drivers of post-Cold War international politics. Despite that the contestations in the two geographically distinct areas raise quite different legal and political questions, the issues of territorial disputes and the safety of maritime transport are intertwined, often conflated and therefore hardly separable in terms of their effects on international relations. Taken together, they are commonly seen as proof for the fact that rising China is limiting the free flow of goods at sea and, by consequence, challenging the ‘rules-based international order’. Yet, the concern with the security of the so-called Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) is not new. In the course of seeking to reorient their foreign and security politics after the Cold War, Japanese opinion-leaders had come to see the security of sea lanes through Southeast Asia as a ‘matter of life and death’ for their economy already in the mid-1990s. The Chinese leadership, by 2003, found itself facing this ‘Malacca Dilemma’ too. At the same time, extra-regional actors such as Australia and the US who would be among the least affected in the extreme scenario of sea lane closures, came to attach disproportionate importance to the freedom of navigation (FoN) in the ‘IndoPacific’. China’s large-scale land reclamations from 2014 onwards and an arbitration tribunal’s award for the Philippine and against the Chinese position in the South China Sea from 2016 finally brought the issue to the G-7 leaders’ and EU decision-makers’ attention, while reinforcing threat perceptions across the Asia-Pacific region.³

China sees the entire area in dispute as its sovereign territory, right or wrong, and further considers it a buffer maritime security zone to keep away foreign enemies that might have interest in laying claim of ownership or part-ownership to the zone. Hence its strong objections and counter-manouvering to the aggressive military (naval) incursion to the area especially by the United States.

While China view the South China Sea with strategic imperatives of defending China maritime zone which harbours the strategic mineral resources underneath the sea and the trade value of the sea lanes and waterways on the one hand, United States on the other hand is using the Freedom of Open Navigation Operations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a cover to gain strategic access and/or bargaining power to the area in order to have its cut in the strategic oil and gas reserves in the area.

In direct relationship with the US, there are the adjacent issues of battle for technological supremacy and digital authoritarianism between the two superpowers. There is also the fear on the part of the US that China is upending the global rules-based order upon which Western powerdom currently rested and seeking to replace it with authoritarian order malleable to the dictats of China.

Who wins in this Thucydidean chess game in the South China Sea? This article seeks to unravel the disputes and lay it bare for the domino effects to become visible both in regional and global security environment and arrangement.

Culling Insights from History

Since China announced its expansive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (SCS) in 2009, the region has become steadily militarized as Beijing seeks to legitimize and defend its claims. Other key maritime counter claimants within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including most notably Vietnam, but also Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, have sought to modernize their naval and coast guard capabilities to preserve the status quo in the SCS. Their improvements, however, have been decidedly miniscule in comparison to Beijing’s dramatic military upgrades. Indeed, only Vietnam stands apart from its ASEAN brethren in the depth and breadth of its military modernization to offset China’s growing military footprint. Even so, Hanoi remains a very distant second to China. Taiwan—considered by Beijing to be a renegade province of China—has also been quietly upgrading its military infrastructure in the SCS. And major powers outside of the region, including Australia, France, India, Japan, the UK, and the US, are heightening their military presence in the SCS, though without installing permanent military structures to rival China’s expansion. Their activities take the form of periodic joint exercises, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), or both to uphold international law and rules of behaviour.⁴

The risk of conflict escalating from relatively minor events has increased in the South China Sea over the past two years with disputes now less open to negotiation or resolution. Originally, the disputes arose after World War II when the littoral states China and three countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam which joined later scrambled to occupy the islands there. Had the issue remained strictly a territorial one, it could have been resolved through Chinese efforts to reach out to ASEAN and forge stronger ties with the region.⁵

Around the 1990s, access to the sea’s oil and gas reserves as well as fishing and ocean resources began to complicate the claims. As global energy demand has risen, claimants have devised plans to exploit the sea’s hydrocarbon reserves with disputes not surprisingly ensuing, particularly between China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, these energy disputes need not result in conflict, as they have been and could continue to be managed through joint or multilateral development regimes, for which there are various precedents although none as complicated as the South China Sea.⁶

Now, however, the issue has gone beyond territorial claims and access to energy resources, as the South China Sea has become a focal point for U.S.—China rivalry in the Western Pacific. Since around 2010, the sea has started to become linked with wider strategic issues relating to China’s naval strategy and America’s forward presence in the area. This makes the dispute dangerous and a reason for concern, particularly as the United States has reaffirmed its interest in the Asia Pacific and strengthened security relations with the ASEAN claimants in the dispute.⁷

It was not President Donald Trump that first started aggressive military posturing against China nor ordered aircraft carriers to the South China Sea. The US aggressive military posturing in the region goes back many decades.

For instance when China moved aggressively towards Taiwan in 1996, former President Bill Clinton did not hesitate to send aircraft carriers to Taiwan Strait in order to counter and deter China from launching an invasion on Taiwan as it has always threatened to do. The US intervention in that brewing conflict put paid to Chinese aggressive move towards Taiwan and China has been fuming with rage since then having come to the strategic recognition that if it comes to exchange of blows over Taiwan or the entire South China Sea, China would be no match for the superior military firepower and fury that the US would unleash on China.

This strategic recognition or insight into its own military weakness or deficiency is probably what account as one of the many reasons for the progressive military modernization by China till date which has now seen China as having the accalimed largest naval forces in the world today. Contemporary China’s naval (including other branches) strength can no longer be denied even though the US naval power is completely of “deep blue sea” character and capacity which it has been flaunting at the Chinese face. US gained the mastery of the world seas after the Second World War.

While the algorithm of strength on both sides of the divide is of strategic importance, it is also undeniable that the theatre of conflict has also significantly changed to include the interplay of other dynamic factors such as the alignment or realignment of regional forces which has gone to reshape the security architecture of the area. In short, the balance of power and/or terror is more favourably disposed towards the United States than to China because of the growing hostility of host of neighbouring countries such as Vietnam and The Philippines that have also made claims of maritime rights in the South China Sea and its superjacent environment. There have been near exchange of fisticuffs over some of these claims.

Even though there is no formal military alliance among or between the South East Asian countries, with the exception of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (consisting of the US, India, Australia and Japan) there is individual hostility by these countries towards China for its aggressive posturing sometimes or oftentimes of military nature. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has, however, not dissuaded China from aggressive moves towards its neighbouring countries. 

The latest military foray into the South China Sea by the United States can be traced back to the era of Barack Obama. In other words, the US incursion into the South China Sea has been a continuum spanning four administrations uninterruptedly. Interestingly, President Joe Biden was part and parcel of the Obama administration as the Vice President then and had a seat at the table where most of the foreign policy and military strategic decisions towards China were taken. Joe Biden is back at the White House as the President and Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, his worldview, mindset and current policy thrusts and actions can be viewed from the lens of what he has contributed to the previous decisions taken towards China by Obama administration.

David Larter (2020) dislosed that [t]he Obama administration authorized two FONOPs in 2015 and three in 2016. The program has escalated under the Trump administration, with the Navy conducting six in 2017 and five in 2018. However, during Trump’s first two years in office, Navy transits of the Taiwan Strait dropped precipitously from 12 in 2016 to five in 2017, then just three in 2018. The Taiwan Strait transits picked up again in 2019, with nine transits conducted through the year.⁸

[But] [t]he U.S. Navy conducted more freedom of navigation operations  in 2019 than in any year since the U.S. began more aggressively challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea in 2015.⁹ The Navy conducted nine FONOPs in the South China Sea last year [2019], according to records provided by U.S. Pacific Fleet. The FONOPs are designed to challenge China’s claim to maritime rights and dominion over several island chains in the region, which have put the U.S. and its allies at loggerheads with China.¹⁰ Patrols by U.S. warships come within 12 miles of features claimed by China, including features that the Asian nation has converted into military installations. The patrols are meant to signal that the U.S. considers the claims excessive. China views the patrols as irritating and unlawful intrusions into its waters.¹¹

In a statement, Pacific Fleet spokesperson Lt. J.G. Rachel McMarr said the Navy was committed to continuing to demonstrate its willingness to challenge excessive claims. “U.S. forces routinely conduct freedom of navigation assertions throughout the world,” McMarr said in a statement. “All of our operations are designed to be conducted in accordance with international law and demonstrate that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows – regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events.”¹²

The year 2020 was perhaps the climax. And it all started in the second quarter of 2020. However, the entry of the American aircraft supercarriers into the South China Sea in July 2020, which can be considered a major turning period in the growing conflict in the South China Sea, was preceeded by smaller American warships sailing into the disputed waters of the South China Sea. In other words, there have been early signals of trouble brewing in the region. 

According to a detailed report by Hannah Beech (2020) American warships have sailed into disputed waters in the South China Sea, according to military analysts, heightening a standoff in the waterway and sharpening the rivalry between the United States and China, even as much of the world is in lockdown because of the coronavirus.

The America, an amphibious assault ship, and the Bunker Hill, a guided missile cruiser, entered contested waters off Malaysia. At the same time, a Chinese government ship in the area has for days been tailing a Malaysian state oil company ship carrying out exploratory drilling. Chinese and Australian warships have also powered into nearby waters, according to the defense experts.¹³

Despite working to control a pandemic that spread from China earlier this year, Beijing has not reduced its activities in the South China Sea, a strategic waterway through which one-third of global shipping flows. Instead, the Chinese government’s years-long pattern of assertiveness has only intensified, military analysts said. “It’s a quite deliberate Chinese strategy to try to maximize what they perceive as being a moment of distraction and the reduced capability of the United States to pressure neighbors,” said Peter Jennings, a former Australian defense official who is the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.¹⁴

Since January [2020], when the coronavirus epidemic began to surge, the Chinese government and Coast Guard ships, along with maritime militias, have been plying contested waters in the South China Sea, tangling with regional maritime enforcement agencies and harassing fishermen. Earlier this month [April 2020], the Vietnamese accused a Chinese patrol ship of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat. Last month [March 2020], China opened two new research stations on artificial reefs it has built on maritime turf claimed by the Philippines and others. The reefs are also equipped with defense silos and military-grade runways.¹⁵

[T]he Chinese government announced that it had formally established two new districts in the South China Sea that include dozens of contested islets and reefs. Many are submerged bits of atoll that do not confer territorial rights, according to international law. “It seems that even as China was fighting a disease outbreak, it was also thinking in terms of its long-term strategic goals,” said Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “The Chinese want to create a new normal in the South China Sea, where they are in charge, and to do that they’ve become more and more aggressive.”¹⁶

From early July to late October 2020, US held five naval exercises within the region as authorized by former President Donald Trump. If Donald Trump has won the reelection bid in November 3, 2020 presidential election, it is arguable that the naval exercises would have most probably continued uninterrupted. And it would have also been likely that an accident could have happened leading to a larger conflict between the two superpowers – given the aggressive stance adopted by Trump administration towards China over serial disputes over the South China Sea.

What was perhaps most significant about the naval exercises during the time of Trump administration was that they took place during the rage of coronavirus pandemic that earlier broke out in late December 2019. Indeed, the naval exercises have nothing to do whatsoever with the virulent disagreements over the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. The US did not go to the South China Sea under the pretext of the coronavirus pandemic. At least there is no evidence to this effect. Both are parallel when it was largely expected that the two countries should have cooperated to stem the tidal wave of the raging pandemic. While the US failed to exercise global leadership to roll back the encroachment of the pandemic, US was seen at the same time conducting gunboat diplomacy to South China Sea in an apparent hegemonic struggle with China for strategic dominance or supremacy in the South China Sea.

While the number of aircraft supercarriers are known alongside their capacities, details of other military hardwares and softwares, for instance, the number of combat aircrafts, submarines and their types and capacities, warships and their various capacities and cyber platforms are not publicly known ostensibly for national security reasons. However, it is now known through some media reports and the South China Sea Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) that B-52H Stratofortress long range strategic bomber (a nuclear delivery aircraft), B-1B Lancer long range strategic bomber (another nuclear delivery aircraft), F-35 Lightning II Stealth combat aircrafts, F-18A Hornet combat aircrafts, several reconnaisance planes including AWACS plane participated in the naval drills in 2020. 

Tony Walker (2020) an Adjunct Professor at Schools of Communications, La Trobe University, Australia, said [t]he deployment of three US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers  to the South China Sea have further tested [and] strained relations between China and the United States.¹⁷ The US naval exercises represent an enormous aggregation of firepower. Adding to tensions, the US deployment coincides with Chinese war games in the same vicinity. These waters are becoming congested naval space.¹⁸ This is the first time since 2017 that America has deployed three carrier battle groups into contested waters of the South China Sea and its environs. You would have to go back a further ten years for another such display of raw American naval power in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁹

In 2017, the US sent a three-carrier force into the region to exert pressure on nuclear-armed North Korea to cease provocative missile tests and the further development of its nuclear capability.²⁰ On this occasion, it is China that is being reminded of American capacity to assert itself in what has become known as the Indo-Pacific. This describes a vast swathe that laps at China’s borders from India in the west to Japan in the north-east.²¹ Washington seems bent on conveying a message. However, it is not clear that China is in a mood to heed such messages in an atmosphere of escalating rhetoric.²²

Under Trump Administration, the year 2018 might be considered significant not just for the number of naval exercises conducted in the South China Sea but in the number of Western allies participating in these exercises. It was the year Trump Administration released the Indo-Pacific (Maritime) Strategy. The multilateral character of the naval exercises is clearly indisputable given the number of countries that participated in them in this year. According to Ralph Jennings (2018), a surge in naval maneuvers in the South China Sea by Western allies this year is keeping China from any further expansion into the contested waters, analysts say.²³ Vessels from Australia, France, Japan and the United States have sent ships to the 3.5 million-square-kilometer sea in 2018. They believe the sea rich in fisheries and fossil fuel reserves to be an international waterway, but China claims about 90 percent of it and has militarized several key islets.²⁴

Jennings further revealed in his report that “The foreign military exercises, naval ship passages and ports of call, along with one U.S. B-52 flyby have effectively stopped China from pushing ahead with expansion that’s also opposed by five other maritime claimants in Asia, experts believe. “You take a realist perspective of power, and it’s a way of ensuring the South China Sea is permanently contested,” said Alan Chong, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “So, the Chinese will issue angry statements and so on, warning of consequences, but the fact that all these multinational navies keep doing it in spite of Chinese warnings, it defies Beijing,” he said.²⁵

The number of hours that navy ships have spent in the South China Sea has hit a high this year, said Carl Thayer, Asia-specialized Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia. The U.S. Navy has sailed naval vessels into the South China Sea eight times over the past 18 months and flew two B-52 bombers over it last month [June 2018]. This month [July 2018] the United States and the Philippines kicked off their own joint naval exercises to train Manila’s navy. Australia passed three ships though the sea in April en route to a goodwill visit to Vietnam, and Japan anticipates sending an Izumo-class helicopter carrier through the sea again this year as it did in 2017. Last year military officers from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc boarded the Izumo. France passed a frigate and an assault ship through near Chinese-held islets in May [2018].²⁶

Reports in May [2018] of Chinese missiles deployed to the sea’s Spratly Islands galvanized much for the foreign naval attention this year, Thayer said. [T]he U.S. Navy wrapped up its biennial RIMPAC exercises, which are based out of Honolulu. The series of live-fire drills and scenario-based exercises brought together 25,000 people from 25 countries including South China Sea claimant states such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The Philippines gained from RIMPAC by “becoming comfortable” with allies and learning to “operate smoothly with them,” said Jay Batongbacal, a University of the Philippines international maritime affairs Professor. All four Southeast Asian countries contest some of the waters that China calls its own. The United States dis-invited Beijing from RIMPAC this year.²⁷

China criticizes these movements and often responds with its own. It cites historical records to back its claim to most of the sea. Chinese vessels followed their Australian and French counterparts. Its navy sent an auxiliary general intelligence ship this month to track the RIMPAC exercises near Honolulu, according to American media reports quoting a Pacific Fleet spokesman. In April, China held military drills for two days in the sea. They brought together about 10,000 personnel and 48 naval vessels.²⁸

China wants to keep the others away, said Jonathan Spangler, director of the South China Sea Think Tank in Taipei. “There’s the demonstrating that you are a world leader politically and militarily, the power projection thing, and there’s the deterrent aspect,” Spangler said. “There’s also the sort of insurance policy aspect. In the off-chance there’s a conflict, then (China) will be prepared.”²⁹

But use of the sea by Western navies effectively keeps China from building up more islets – many of which it has landfilled since 2010 – or testing the patience of the Southeast Asian maritime claimants, experts say. China “cannot assume on a role and can take the South China Sea by stealth” as they build economic ties to get on the good side of other claimants, Chong said. Too much pushback against other navies would scuttle Chinese statements that it’s a good neighbor in Asia, he added. Western-allied ship movement now follows a Cold War pattern where American and Soviet ships tested each other’s influence, Thayer said. U.S. and Soviet vessels had faced off, for example, in the Indian Ocean.³⁰

China may have called off plans to build on Scarborough Shoal, which is contested by Beijing and Manila, as former U.S. President Barack Obama sent ships, he said. A U.S. carrier strike group reached the sea in 2015. “Both sides are contributing to the tensions in the sense that anything America does China will push back,” he said. “Several years ago, the expression was you do 1 we do 1.5 times, you do two, we do 2.5.”³¹

In early July 2020, in the midst of global raging and panic over the outbreak of coronavirus pandemic, the US launched an aggressive naval exercise into the South China Sea. Trump administration sent two nuclear-powered aircraft supercarriers (USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan) to the area which was later joined by another supercarrier (USS Theodore Roosevelt) all commanding hitherto uncommon naval firepower. Interestingly, USS Theodore Roosevelt contracted the coronavirus pandemic in which one of its sailor died in late March/early April 2020 and the supercarrier has to dock at the home port for detoxification after which it returned to active duties in early June 2020. Naturally, the gunboat exercises drew the ire of the Chinese who accused the US of trying to destabilize the region.

The U.S. and Chinese navies are holding competing naval exercises in the South China Sea, as the Beijing accuses Washington of militarizing the region. [T]he U.S. Navy’s Reagan and Nimitz carrier strike groups transited from the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea and held the first dual-carrier drills there since 2014.³²

USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and its strike group have been involved in near-constant dual-carrier stike group operations since June 21, first with the Theodore Roosevelt CSG and then the Reagan CSG. USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) operated with Nimitz in the Philippine Sea. The exercises follow a lull in U.S. carrier operations in the Western Pacific while Theodore Roosevelt was sidelined in Guam dealing with a COVID-19 outbreak.³³

After Nimitz and its escorts took a quick break in Guam, Japan-based USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and its strike group joined for a lengthier round of dual-carrier, or carrier strike force, operations that have spanned first the Philippine Sea and now the South China Sea. “The Nimitz Carrier Strike Force celebrated Independence Day with unmatched sea power while deployed to the South China Sea conducting dual-carrier operations and exercises in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” reads a Saturday statement from the Navy.³⁴

Beijing conducted parallel drills off of the Paracel Islands in contested waters. “The military exercises are the latest in a long string of [People’s Republic of China] actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea,” reads a statement from the Defense Department. “The PRC’s actions stand in contrast to its pledge to not militarize the South China Sea and the United States’ vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty, free from coercion, and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules and norms.”³⁵

The Pentagon said the Chinese exercises are a departure from the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in which China and other nations with overlapping claims agreed to curtail military exercises in the region.³⁶

In a press conference, Chinese officials pushed back against the assertion that their exercises violated any agreement and reaffirmed their territorial claims in and around the islands off the coast of Vietnam. “I want to stress once again that the Xisha Islands are indisputably China’s territory. China’s military training in the waters surrounding the Xisha Islands is within China’s sovereignty and beyond reproach,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian said, using the Chinese term for the Paracel Islands. “At present, thanks to the joint efforts by China and ASEAN countries, the situation in the South China Sea is generally stable and witnessing sound development. Under such circumstances, it is completely out of ulterior motives that the U.S. flexes its muscles by purposely sending powerful military force to the relevant waters for large-scale exercises. The U.S. intends to drive a wedge between regional countries, promote militarization of the South China Sea and undermine peace and stability in the region. The international community, especially the regional countries, have seen this very clearly.”³⁷

According to press reports, Chinese ships were operating near the U.S. carrier formations. “They have seen us, and we have seen them,” Nimitz Carrier Strike Group commander Rear Admiral James Kirk told Reuters. “We have the expectation that we will always have interactions that are professional and safe. … We are operating in some pretty congested waters, lots of maritime traffic of all sorts.”³⁸

“Two US aircraft carriers conducted exercises in the disputed South China Sea on Saturday with China also carrying out manoeuvres that have been criticised by the Pentagon and neighbouring states.”³⁹ The USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan performed operations and exercises in the South China Sea “to support a free and open Indo-Pacific”, a US Navy statement said.⁴⁰ It did not say exactly where the exercises were being conducted in the South China Sea, which extends for 1,500 km (900 miles) and 90 percent of which is claimed by China despite the protests of its neighbours. “The purpose is to show an unambiguous signal to our partners and allies that we are committed to regional security and stability,” Rear Admiral George M Wikoff was quoted as saying by the Wall Street Journal, which first reported the exercises.⁴¹ China and the United States have accused each other of stoking tension in the strategic waterway at a time of strained relations over everything from coronavirus to trade to Hong Kong.⁴²

Interestingly, if there is any area where Joe Biden and Donald Trump have intersectional agreement  or concurrence of view and action thrust, despite the virulent disagreement over many issues and the bad name that Donald Trump finally earned for himself as the most cantakerous US President ever, it is China. This is precisely where Joe Biden has hardened his tone and position and does not look willing to moderate this hardened stance.

While Donald Trump was defeated in the November 3, 2020 presidential election in a landslide electoral victory that has not been witnessed in US political history, the expectation was that the new administration would completely overturn the entire policy legacy left behind by Trump administration especially in the foreign policy arena and strategic military domain in what would have been a justified policy discontinuity given the acrimonies and antagonisms that accompanied the 2020 presidential election. But interestingly, it was precisely in the foreign policy firmament and military domain that we see a concurrence of views between the previous and the new administration.

In the core of the US political class (cutting across both parties) there have been grave concerns whether there would a continuity or reversal of foreign policy objectives and priorities under Trump administration by the new Biden administration.

In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS formed an element of the Trump Administration’s confrontational overall approach toward China and its efforts for promoting its construct for the Indo-Pacific region, called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).⁴³

China’s actions in the SCS in recent years – including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam – have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region – meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea – could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.⁴⁴

Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.⁴⁵

Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China.⁴⁶

The issue for Congress is whether and how the Biden Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS will differ from the Trump Administration’s strategy, whether the Biden Administration’s strategy is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both.⁴⁷

But it is precisely on China that served as a meeting ground by both the previous Trump Administration and the new Biden Administration.

While [t]he new Biden administration has been reversing many of the Trump administration’s policies in areas such as immigration and energy, but when it comes to confronting China’s actions in the South China Sea, at the highest levels of power the song remains the same.⁴⁸

In its opening weeks, the Biden administration has signaled it will continue many of the Trump administration’s hardline policies towards China. And it has not backed off heavy naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region, after a U.S. ship conducted “freedom of navigation operation” (FONOP) earlier this month. Then Feb. 9 the Navy announced that two carriers were operating together in the hotly disputed South China Sea.⁴⁹

The destroyer John S. McCain transited the Taiwan Strait Feb. 4,  which China denounced as a provocation, and the following day the McCain performed a FONOP challenging competing claims in the disputed Paracel Islands, a patrol that was accompanied by what experts noted was an extraordinarily detailed explanation.⁵⁰ On Feb. 9, China’s Foreign Ministry slammed the Navy’s two-carrier exercise in the South China Sea, saying it was “not conducive to peace and stability in the region,” and that China would “work together with regional countries to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.”⁵¹

Just 21 days into Biden’s presidency, and with a remarkably small sample size, the emerging policy on China looks nearly indistinguishable from the Trump policy, which has led many China watchers to believe that a policy of strategic competition with Beijing — in the maritime realm and beyond — is here for the long term. Or at least for Biden’s.⁵²

Despite radically different positions on a range of national security issues, when it comes to the China relationship, Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump have charted similar courses thus far.⁵³ Both Biden and new Secretary of State Antony Blinken have signaled the need for some cooperation, particularly on tackling climate change. But the Biden administration has also held the line on the 2020 decision by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to formally reject China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea and has backed Pompeo’s late-hour determination that China’s actions against Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province constituted genocide.⁵⁴

During calls with counterparts in Vietnam and the Philippines, new Secretary of State Antony Blinken made clear the U.S. was not backing off its rejection of excessive Chinese claims of maritime rights and that the U.S. was committed to maintaining a rules-based order in the South China Sea.⁵⁵ In a State Department readout of a Jan. 27 call between Blinken and Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin, Blinken said the United States rejected China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea “to the extent they exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” according to a statement from State spokesman Ned Price.⁵⁶ “Secretary Blinken pledged to stand with Southeast Asian claimants in the face of PRC pressure,” the statement reads.⁵⁷

It also made clear the U.S. would defend against attacks on Philippines military or government assets. “Secretary Blinken stressed the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty for the security of both nations, and its clear application to armed attacks against the Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific, which includes the South China Sea,” the statement reads.⁵⁸

The direct language and restating of U.S. policy so early in the Biden White House was a deliberate signal that there has been no significant shift in policy with the new team, said Bonnie Glaser, who leads the China Power Project at Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It is essentially a restatement of Trump policy, articulated by Pompeo in mid-2018 and mid-2020,” Glaser said. “It reaffirms that the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the South China Sea and that the U.S. opposes Chinese maritime claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS. …The fact that U.S. policy was stated very clearly within the first week of the Biden administration demonstrates U.S. commitment to alliances and U.S. willingness to push back against Chinese actions in the South China Sea that undermine the interests of the U.S. and its allies and partners.”⁵⁹

What is further interesting about the new posturing from Biden administration is the review of the China’s strategy that is already being carried out at the Pentagon and the acompanying geostrategic elements of thinking that further up the game.

On Feb. 4, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin launched a force-wide posture review to address if the military has the right capabilities in the right places to address the threats the country faces. And in comments Feb. 10 at the Pentagon, Biden said Austin had ordered a China task force to ensure the DoD is pursuing the right concepts and technologies. “Today I was briefed on a new DoD-wide China task force that Secretary Austin is standing up to look at our strategy, operational concepts technology and force posture and so much more,” Biden said. He added that the task force would map out the course that would incorporate allies and partners and a whole-of-government approach to meet the China challenge.⁶⁰

There have been some clues as to what the administration is thinking coming in the door. In response to a question about the Trump administration’s late-hour force structure assessment, new Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said she was inclined to support many, but not all, of the themes in the assessment. “There’s some really interesting operational themes that I’m attracted to,” Hicks said. “There’s a focus on increasing use of autonomy. There’s a focus on dispersal of forces and there’s a focus on growing the number of small surface combatants relative to today.”⁶¹

Hicks’ discussion of “dispersal of forces” is seemingly a reference to the Navy’s plans to fight in a more spread-out manner, using sensors on unmanned autonomous platforms linked to manned platforms to push capabilities to more places for less money than it would cost to spread those sensors around on manned platforms.⁶² That likely means the Navy’s networking effort, Project Overmatch, upon which the whole concept depends will go forward. By extension, the broader Air Force-led Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control network will likely be a priority as well.⁶³

She also pointed to increasing investments in small surface combatants, which is another means of starting to reduce the cost of spreading around significant capabilities for less money.⁶⁴ The next-generation Constellation-class Frigate was awarded last April to Fincantieri and its Wisconsin shipyard Marinette Marine.⁶⁵ It is unclear if hypersonic missiles, a key Trump-era priority aimed at giving the military the ability to rapidly strike Chinese targets at extremely long ranges, will endure as a priority in the Biden administration.⁶⁶

In the highest-level to date interaction between the U.S. and China since the new administration took office, Blinken released a statement saying the U.S. was not backing down on China’s destabilizing role in the region. “Secretary Blinken stressed the United States will continue to stand up for human rights and democratic values, including in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and pressed China to join the international community in condemning the military coup in Burma,” Price’s statement read.⁶⁷

For its part, China released a statement saying it wanted the U.S. to “uphold the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation and manage differences, so as to push forward the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations.”⁶⁸

Seth Cropsey, a Reagan and George H.W. Bush-era DoD official who is now a senior fellow at the conservative Hudson Institute, said that so far Biden’s policies have been encouraging. “They are a little tougher than what I thought I was going to see,” Cropsey said. “For example, I don’t think that any of Taiwan’s representatives to Washington had been invited to attend the inauguration and Biden did that. They have said that they’re going to continue to arm sales to Taiwan … and we don’t know what that means but it’s a positive thing to say.”⁶⁹

Cropsey said holding off on high-level engagements with China until consulting with allies in the region was a smart move, and he was impressed with Blinken’s upholding of Pompeo’s determination that China was committing genocide against the Uighur population in Xinjiang and the continuation of naval activity in the South China Sea. “Look, it’s impossible to tell where this is going to lead and whether it is the keel of the Biden administration policy, but it looks encouraging so far.”⁷⁰

The growing confrontation in the South China Sea and in the Asia-Pacific in general is not only of political but also of military strategic significance. It is both a test of political will or resolve and demonstration of military kinetic and non-kinetic powers. Both superpowers have been breast-feeding each for decades. But this era of cooperation has probably drawn to a clangorous close. Both superpowers can now be said be in an era of cooperation within the fulcrum of competition i.e. cooperation-competition management nexus. They are now shaking their fists at each other’s face but without hitting at each other. The hitherto political understanding or tolerance that underpines their decades-long relationship has been exhausted and has ended in a cul-de-sac. The global political environment underpined by liberalism has emasculated the ability of the last strongholds of hybrid dictatorship (such as China) to exercise authoritarian control over the global order.

On the military strategic domain, the increasing modernization of the China’s PLA and the advent of new technologies especially on the part of the United States, for instance, the advent of 5th-generation fighter planes and maritime dominance by nuclear-powered aircraft supercarriers, submarines and sophisticated warships such as the stealthy USS Zumwalt, have changed the military equations between the two superpowers. This has inevitably spilled over to the Asia-Pacific region where the countries there have gained access to some of these advanced military hardwares and therefore helping to tilt the balance of power in the region. While China can bully some of the smaller South East Asian countries, it cannot do so in the case of India, South Korea and Japan with their widely acknowledged military firepower within global ranking order. India, South Korea and Japan are within the ten topmost powerful military bracket in the world. While Taiwan is mostly under-rated, it has sat quitely like a fortress for the past seventy years right under the very nose of China – less than 200 kilometers away from the mainland.

What China is saying

It would be apposite to have a bird’s eyes view of the unfolding scenario of disputes in the South China Sea (within a period of four months) that have been pitting the two superpowers against each other in recent times.

May 8, 2020: China announces a unilateral fishing ban from May 1 to Aug. 16 in the South China Sea (SCS), drawing criticism from Vietnam.

May 12, 2020: A Chinese survey ship and two coast guard vessels in the SCS leave the disputed waters after an oil exploration vessel contracted by Malaysian state energy company Petronas left the disputed waters earlier the same day.

May 28, 2020: Indonesia submits a diplomatic note to United Nations Secretary-General reiterating the validity of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and endorsing the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea.

June 4, 2020: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly denies claims that China has set up a military presence in the Ream Naval Base.

June 10, 2020: Chinese President Xi Jinping exchanges congratulatory messages with Philippine counterpart Rodrigo Duterte to celebrate the 45th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties. Xi says China is ready to promote closer political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties to new levels.

June 10, 2020: Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana arrives on Thitu Island to launch a beaching ramp for construction of infrastructure on the disputed island reef in the SCS.

June 13, 2020: Vietnam protests the laying of undersea cables at the disputed Paracel Islands by China, citing the activity as a violation of Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty and a potential source of concern for militarizing the disputed islands in the South China Sea.

July 1, 2020: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang exchanges congratulatory messages with Thai counterpart Prayut Chan-o-cha on the 45th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties. The two leaders reaffirm the importance of Sino-Thai strategic partnership and of collaboration in containing COVID-19.

July 13, 2020: Trade and commerce officials from China and Myanmar hold an online planning meeting to discuss cross-border electronic commerce between China’s Yunnan province and Myanmar’s Mandalay region. The two sides emphasize the increasing importance of digital and mobile platforms for payments and retail trade in furthering bilateral business, economic, and trade ties.

Aug. 6, 2020: Vietnam lodges protests against China’s recent military drills near the Parcel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Aug. 8, 2020: ASEAN foreign ministers reiterate their call on all countries to refrain from the use of force and exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea.

Aug. 10, 2020: Myanmar’s government formally approves China’s strategic deep seaport project in the Rakhine State. The project is part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative and will, when complete, provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean and allow it to bypass the Malacca Strait for oil and other imports.

Aug. 20, 2020: Yang Jiechi, member of China’s Politburo and director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Office, arrives in Singapore for a three-day visit and meets Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. The two leaders discuss bilateral cooperation and the COVID-19 situation, as well as regional security and global developments. The two countries are keen to strengthen supply chain and cross-border connectivity to facilitate economic recovery amidst the global pandemic.

Aug. 24, 2020: The third Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting convenes via videoconference. Chinese Premier Li co-chairs the meeting with Laotian counterpart Thongloun Sisoulith. At the meeting, China pledges to share water management data on the Mekong River, which would enable downstream countries to make plans and adjustments in the river’s flow for fishing and farming practices.

Aug. 26, 2020: Philippines’ Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin indicates in a public interview that Manila will continue to patrol the Spratlys, ignoring warnings from China to stop “illegal provocations” in the disputed island chain.

Aug. 27, 2020: Regional trade ministers indicate that they are making significant progress to finalize the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a sprawling trade agreement that spans 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific, including China and all 10-member states in ASEAN. The ministers are hopeful that the deal will be ready for signing at the summit of RCEP leaders in November.⁷¹

China, [however], criticized joint naval exercises conducted by two U.S. Navy aircraft carrier groups in the South China Sea on July 4, accusing the U.S of undermining stability in the region.⁷² In a daily briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that the exercises were performed “totally out of ulterior motives,” adding that the U.S. “deliberately dispatched massive forces…to flex its military muscle,” the Associated Press reported.⁷³

The U.S. Navy had said that its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan along with their supporting vessels and aircraft had conducted exercises “designed to maximize air defense capabilities, and extend the reach of long-range precision maritime strikes from carrier-based aircraft in a rapidly evolving area of operations.”⁷⁴

China had begun conducting its own naval exercises in the sea on July 1, around the Paracel Islands, which it had seized from Vietnam in 1974. Tensions between the two countries have risen in the past months over trade, the coronavirus pandemic and China’s crackdown on Hong Kong.⁷⁵

Through the exercises, the U.S. aims to send a message to Beijing that “it’s not backing down, and that it’s still able to do this,” Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told CNBC, referring to the U.S. aim to demonstrate that its ability to project force in the region hasn’t been hurt by coronavirus outbreaks in the Navy.⁷⁶

China claims about 90% of the South China Sea, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes each year. In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague rejected China’s claims of sovereignty over the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. While this decision was legally binding, China has refused to abide by it as there has been no mechanism to enforce it. Other countries like Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Vietnam have also challenged China’s assertion on the region. To push back against China’s unilateral seizure of the reefs and construction of military installations on the sea, the U.S. has in, recent years, increased what it refers to as freedom of navigation operations, in which its naval vessels sail near Chinese-held islands and other disputed territory in the sea. In the midst of the pandemic, China has moved to project its military and political power in its neighborhood. In the past few weeks, China has engaged in clashes with the Indian military along their disputed border, with Malaysian and Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea, and twice sailed an aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has also unilaterally moved to seize new powers over Hong Kong. The U.S. Navy has sought to show that its operational capabilities haven’t been hurt by the coronavirus pandemic. Last month [June 2020], the navy operated three carrier strike groups in the Pacific, for the first time since 2017.⁷⁷

The United States intensified its military activity in the South China Sea last year, raising the risk of a confrontation with China in the strategically important waters, according to a Beijing-based think tank. The US conducted eight so-called freedom of navigation operations in the year – three more than in 2018 – during which its vessels sailed within 12 nautical miles of land claimed or occupied by China, according to the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative’s annual report. American forces also engaged in at least 50 joint and multiple exercises with countries from Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the region, it said.⁷⁸

South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) affiliated to Peking University is a new Chinese strategic think tank monitoring the military activities particularly of the United States in the South China Sea in particular and Asia-Pacific in general.

SCSPI is an open think tank and cooperative network of Chinese and foreign scholars aimed at comprehensively and objectively grasping the dynamics and news in the South China Sea by accurately probing the military, political, economic and environmental situation there. For the purpose of research, it has established its own system of monitoring maritime and aerial situation and is continuously tracking and releasing aircraft and vessel movements from countries within and outside of the region.⁷⁹

At 2:22 pm on Saturday, [August 1, 2020] China’s Army Day, think tank South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) released the latest movement of US warships on its Weibo account, including the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and USS America amphibious assault ship in the East China Sea.⁸⁰ From July 15 to 30, SCSPI’s Weibo account has released a total of 24 updates on the activity tracks of US warships and warplanes in regions including South China Sea and East China Sea. This has attracted wide domestic and foreign attention.⁸¹

In an exclusive interview with the Global Times reporters Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, Hu Bo, director of SCSPI, introduced why the SCSPI platform releases the information to the public, and the characteristics of US military activities in the South China Sea.⁸²

Speaking on the original intention of releasing US military activities in the South China Sea, Hu said that, “We do not want to create big news. We just want to objectively present the data and often we take no position.” “We mainly want to help experts who conduct research on the South China Sea, as well as the general public, to build a general knowledge, because, apart from militaries of China, US and some other countries, only very few people know what is really going on in the South China Sea that has been frequently appearing on media reports. This even includes most researchers,” Hu said, noting that “When people have a general knowledge, their view and research on the South China Sea could become more rational, which should contribute to peace from a long run.”⁸³

Hu said an imbalance exists in terms of information disclosure in the South China Sea, as the US releases a lot more information, so the outside world only sees a South China Sea situation shaped by the US  officials and think tanks. “Our information releases caught so much attention and this is another indication of the lack of South China Sea information,” Hu said.⁸⁴

According to data released by SCSPI, in July, the US military conducted 67 reconnaissance sorties in the South China Sea with large reconnaissance aircraft, ranging from multiple types of warplanes including P-8A and P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. “Even so, what we have been able to monitor and release was only a tip of the iceberg,” Hu said.⁸⁵ 

SCSPI uses Automatic identification system (AIS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to track vessels and aircraft. Information in these two systems is open source commercial data, and accessible via multiple routes in China and abroad. “Our job is data mining. From the vast original data, we have set relevant parameters, so we can automatically gather data related to the South China Sea strategic situation, like those on warships, warplanes, public service vessels and fishing boats, and make statistics and analyses based on that,” Hu said.⁸⁶

Since the data sources and approaches are relatively simple, the data’s accuracy, completeness and stability cannot match official data from internal systems of related countries, he said. “For instance, we can only track parts of trails by large reconnaissance aircraft, but not small ones. Neither can we track activities by aircraft carrier-based warplanes. And if warplanes do not open ADS-B transponder, we will be unable to track them.”⁸⁷

According to tracking data, the types of US aircraft that have appeared in the South China Sea have reached a rare level compared to other regions in the globe, as the E-8C battlefield command and surveillance aircraft and E-3B early warning aircraft are frequently appearing above waters near China, Hu said.⁸⁸

On the other hand, with China’s capabilities rapidly rising in the recent years, particularly its Navy and Air Force, the encounters between China and US military forces are becoming more frequent. Every day there are several encounters and thousands of them each year. Most of them are handled professionally and safely and only a small amount of them are risky, according to Hu.⁸⁹

Hu said that there are mainly three kinds of risks. While the Chinese and US militaries have a series of codes including Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea to avoid risks, these rules are set up for literally unplanned encounters.⁹⁰ 

In reality, many encounters are intentional: First, US warships frequently trespass into waters within 12 nautical miles of islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands or territorial waters and inland waters of Xisha Islands, and China has to expel and intercept them, in which no guarantee could be made that no accident will occur during confrontation.⁹¹

Second, US warplanes’ frequent aerial close-up reconnaissance operations are also very risky, and China is also expected to conduct correspondent measures including raising alert. The (Hainan Island) collision incident in 2001 is a direct result of US close-up reconnaissance.⁹²

Third, both China and the US conduct all kinds of military training and exercises every year, and both sides usually would conduct reconnaissance and monitoring on each other. This is understandable on a military perspective, but frictions are bound to occur if distance is not well kept. In December 2013, when China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier task group was training in the South China Sea, USS Cowpens cruiser sailed abnormally close and crossed into the Chinese flotilla, and a Chinese landing ship was left with no choice but to force the US ship to a stop. The closest distance was only 50 meters.⁹³ 

In recent years, the US has been paying increasingly less attention to safe distance, and a crisis would very easily take place, according to Hu. “Given the current overall relations between China and the US, if any maritime or aerial accident takes place, the friction could likely not be effectively managed and result in an escalation. Therefore, the uncertain factors in Chinese and US militaries’ interactions in the South China Sea are large, and the risks are becoming higher,” Hu said.⁹⁴

SCSPI’s tracking data show that the US military has significantly increased large reconnaissance aircraft activities in July compared to May’s 35 and June’s 49. July’s figure 67 is almost twice as many as May’s.⁹⁵

Reports show that since 2009, the US military has significantly enhanced the frequency of activities in the region by boosting the presence of surface vessels by more than 60 percent, reaching about 1,000 ship-days a year. In the air, it sends on average three to five warplanes to the South China Sea a day, most of them being reconnaissance aircraft, making a total of more than 1,500 sorties a year, almost twice as many as in 2009.⁹⁶

In addition to this, US military activities have also become more pointed to China. US reconnaissance aircraft made intensive flights when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was conducting operations. During the PLA’s drills in the Xisha Islands from July 1 to 5, the US conducted 15 reconnaissance aircraft operations in these five days. In July, US reconnaissance aircraft entered areas within 70 nautical miles of China’s territorial sea baseline nine times, six times within 60 nautical miles, and in the closest event, only about 40 nautical miles away from China’s territorial sea baseline.⁹⁷

These kinds of close-up reconnaissance are obviously provocations, as “since the US military has all-round, advanced reconnaissance technologies, such a high frequency aerial reconnaissance and close distance would not be necessary if it just wants to gather intelligence on China,” Hu said.⁹⁸

Hu said “the reason behind the significantly increased US aerial reconnaissance in 2020 could be related to the COVID-19 outbreak. Since many US warships suffered from group infection events which resulted in a lack of warships, the US might have opted to enhance aviation reconnaissance.”⁹⁹

Hu pointed out that out of the strategic thinking of great power competition, the US is applying prejudice and judging others. It worries about China’s presence in the South China Sea during the pandemic, so it increased military deployment. “US military deployments and activities in the South China Sea took 60 percent of its  forward deployed forces troops in the Indo-Pacific region,” Hu noted.¹⁰⁰

According to Zhang Zhihao (2019) reporting for China Daily: China will likely face more disputes when pushing for progress in negotiations and cooperation regarding the South China Sea, according to new situation report released on Tuesday.¹⁰¹ The report suggests China should enhance maritime strategic dialogue with the United States, closely monitor subtle moves by some ASEAN countries and persuade extra-regional powers such as Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom to help ease tensions in the region.¹⁰²

The South China Sea Situation Report was published by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, a think tank under Peking University’s Institute of Ocean Research. The initiative was launched on Tuesday to provide data services and situation analysis about the region.¹⁰³

Hu Bo, director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, said the overall situation in the South China Sea has eased in recent years, and joint development and maritime cooperation have made solid progress in fields such as fisheries, petroleum, gas and defense. “However, conflicts and barriers begin to surface as the negotiating sides move from consensus to discussing specific details, such as drawing a territorial boundary,” said Hu, one of the authors of the report.¹⁰⁴

For example, fishery resources are very mobile, so how to build a multilateral fishery cooperation mechanism to regulate production and conservation in the region will be challenging, he said. Oil and gas development can be even more sensitive because whichever country controls these resources will greatly bolster its economic presence in the region, Hu said. “Therefore, a preferable way is to steadily push for cooperation with bilateral participation.”¹⁰⁵

Complicating matters, he said, the US has increased its military presence in the South China Sea in recent years under the so-called freedom of navigation operations. But Hu said he believes the focal issue of China-US contention is more about geopolitical competition than it is about sovereignty and freedom of navigation. “The US is very anxious about China’s growing naval capability and continues to wrongfully perceive it as a threat to US military dominance and a means to control the South China Sea,” he said. “It is imperative that China and the US enhance the quality of maritime strategic dialogue on substantive issues, including arms control, power structures and rules for military operations.”¹⁰⁶

Hu said China has exercised restraint in handling the South China Sea issue. “China and the US should learn to coexist with each other in the South China Sea,” he added.¹⁰⁷

Liu Lin, a researcher on foreign military at the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science, said some ASEAN countries are trying to protect their maritime interests via military buildup and resource development in the region, as well as by attracting foreign countries to play a part in the South China Sea situation. “China will not change its fundamental relationship with ASEAN countries,” she said. “But as the negotiation for the code of conduct continues, it will inevitably touch some sensitive and complex issues, and new conflicts might occur if these issues are not handled properly.”¹⁰⁸

Tang Pei, associate researcher at the PLA Naval Research Academy, said a handful of foreign countries are increasingly interested in stirring up tensions in the South China Sea, and their methods are becoming more sophisticated. “Many of these foreign powers are US allies, and their participation in the situation will shift the power dynamics in the region,” she said. “To what extent they are willing to follow US actions to pressure China, despite having no conflicts of interest, is still unclear and will require further research.”¹⁰⁹

The South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative is “[w]ith a view to maintaining and promoting the peace, stability and prosperity of the South China Sea, Peking University Institute of Ocean Research has launched the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI). The Initiative aims to integrate intellectual resources and open source information worldwide and keep track of important actions and major policy changes of key stakeholders and other parties involved. It provides professional data services and analysis reports to parties concerned, helping them keep competition under control, and with a view to seek partnerships”¹¹⁰

In 2019, the US armed forces continued to carry out intensive military activities in the South China Sea, with their strategic platforms coming in and out of the region frequently, sea and air reconnaissance forces conducting various operations vigorously, the freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) near China’s stationed islands and reefs in the South China Sea increasing rapidly, and military diplomacy intensifying unprecedentedly. Though the US has become slightly more prudent in its words and deeds with regard to the military conflicts with China in the South China Sea, its operations in this region, in terms of both scale and intensity, have been significantly reinforced, compared to those in 2018. With the continual military exercises and various drills of the US armed forces and the rushing deployment of forces and platforms in the South China Sea, the region has become a front line of the maritime strategic competition between China and the US.¹¹¹

In 2019, the US military’s strategic deterrent forces, including aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines and strategic bombers continued to carry out intensive activities in the South China Sea, and conducted targeted deterrence patrols frequently in line with the regional situation and hotspot issues. Throughout the year, the US Navy deployed three aircraft carriers, including USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), and three amphibious assault ships, including USS Essex (LHD-2), USS Wasp (LHD-1) and USS Boxer (LHD-4) for military operations in the South China Sea.¹¹²

Two of the three aircraft carriers were sent to conduct targeted missions in the South China Sea, except for USS Abraham Lincoln which sailed through the waters on its way back to the US Naval Base San Diego, California after itsdeployment in the Middle East. The USS John C. Stennis, after a five-month deployment in Middle East, transited the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait eastbound to enter the South China Sea, and arrived in Laem Chebang,1 Thailand, for a port call on February 10. On February 14, the carrier left Thailand to conduct military operations in the South China Sea until March 5, thus making a nearly three-week stay in the region. Notably, while the USS John C. Stennis was operating in the South China Sea, the US President Donald Trump and the North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un met for a second summit in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 27 and 28. Therefore, the carrier was suspected of conducting pretended operations, with an aim to deter North Korea and build up momentum for the US in the summit. Shortly after the second Trump-Kim summit, the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) returned to the Indian Ocean and then headed to the Naval Base Norfolk in Virginia after its overseas deployment.¹¹³

Throughout the year of 2019, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) conducted two patrols, one in summer and the other in fall. During its summer patrol, it came in and out of the South China Sea twice, though staying for a relatively short period in the region; while during its fall patrol, the carrier spent most of the time on targeted drills in the region, especially in the waters between the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Moreover, during the fall patrol, the USS Ronald Reagan, (CVN-76) formed a carrier strike group with the guided missile cruisers USS Antietam (CG-54) and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62), and the guided missile destroyers USS John S McCain (DDG-56), USS McCampbell (DDG-85) and USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108), and conducted joint exercises in the waters south of the Scarborough Shoal with the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircrafts deployed in Clark Air Base, Philippines for days. There have been no public records yet on the subjects of exercises performed by the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircrafts and the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group. However, the waters in the South China Sea are wide with an average depth of over 2,000 meters, making itself a perfect zone for both submarine warfare and anti-submarine exercises.¹¹⁴

On October 6, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group staged a joint exercise with the USS Boxer (LHD-4) Amphibious Ready Group which transited the waters following its Middle East deployment. This exercise coincided with the “light carrier” concept which the US Navy has been testing out. Their joint exercise, to some extent, signaled a trend of the US armed forces’ maritime warfare patterns; in particular, in regions where a dual-carrier formation is temporarily not achievable and disputes are very likely to occur, to deploy 1.5 carrier strike groups is another option.¹¹⁵

Among the three amphibious assault ships in the South China Sea, the USS Wasp (LHD-1) stayed longer in the region, while the other two sailed through the waters heading to the Middle East for deployment. In late March, the USS Wasp (LHD-1) entered the South China Sea and participated in the US-Philippine Exercise Balikatan on Luzon Island, Philippines from April 1 to 12. During the exercise, the USS Wasp (LHD1) carried 10 F-35B fighters of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 (VMFA-121). It was the first time that F-35B fighters of the US Marine Corps (USMC) were involved in a joint exercise3 held in the Philippines after their deployment to the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, which is of great relevance for the US military to test out the operational capabilities of F-35B fighters in the South China Sea and its neighboring areas and help them adapt to the operational scenarios.¹¹⁶

In 2019, the US Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarines  maintained intensive activities in the South China Sea and its neighboring areas. Incomplete data suggest that the nuclear-powered attack submarines which performed combat readiness patrols in the Western Pacific region throughout the year included USS Cheyenne (SSN-773), USS Scranton (SSN-756), USS Santa Fe (SSN-763), USS Illinois (SSN-786), USS Annapolis (SSN-760), USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723), USS Asheville (SSN-758), USS Hawaii (SSN-776), and USS Topeka (SSN-754). Some of the submarines were forward-deployed to the US Naval Base in Apra Harbor, Guam, and others left the Pearl Harbor in Hawaii or the West Coast of the US for deployment to the Indo-Pacific region. Given the covert routes of the US Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarines, we cannot accurately identify the way they came in and out of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, as the South China Sea is a hotspot in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as a focus of the US military’s attention, it is impossible that the country’s submarine forces would be absent in the waters during their combat readiness patrols in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, as the two submarine tenders which are home-ported in Apra Harbor, Guam, namely USS Frank Cabal (AS-40) and USS Emory S Land (AS-39) have frequently operated in the Philippine Sea, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, we can infer that there are considerable operations of the US Navy’s nuclear submarines in the South China Sea.¹¹⁷

In 2019, the US Air Force sent the 23rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron  (EBS) and the 69th EBS successively to the Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, in support of the Continuous Bomber Presence mission. Specifically, the 23rd EBS operated there from January to July, and replaced by the 69th EBS on July 124. According to public records, the US Air Force B-52H Stratofortress did not frequently enter the South China Sea for military operations in the first half of 2019. One typical case occurred on March 5, when a B-52 of the 23rd EBS took off from the Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, flew over the Balintang Channel to conduct military operations in areas neighboring the Macclesfield Band, and eventually returned to Guam; in most of the other cases, the B-52 take off from Guam and flew over the South China Sea to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, or to participate in the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. In the second half of 2019, especially during the deployment of the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group near the South China Sea, the B-52 frequently headed to the South China Sea for military operations. From August 12 to 14, two B-52s of the 69th EBS took off from the Andersen Air Force Base each day to conduct military operations in the north of the Scarborough Shoal, and interacted in some way with the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group which was sailing through the waters northwest of Luzon Island, Philippines on their way back to Guam. This once again highlighted the extent to which the US Air Force B-52s were focused on cooperative combat exercises with carrier strike groups, especially such exercises held in areas around the South China Sea, which made the US targeting against China evident.¹¹⁸

Throughout the year of 2019, the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command ships, including USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19), USNS Able (T-AGOS-20), USNS Effective (T-AGOS-21), USNS Loyal (T-AGOS22), USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), USNS Bowditch (T-AGS-62), USNS Henson (T-AGS-63) and USNS Mary Sears (T-AGS-65) all conducted oceanographic and hydrographic surveys and collected data for preparing charts in the South China Sea for a long period of time. Specifically, in early June, the oceanographic reconnaissance ship USNS Henson (T-AGS-63) repeatedly conducted reconnaissance operations and surveys in the waters south of Sanya, which were less than 120 kilometers away from the Sanya Port. Additionally, in late August, the RV Sally Ride (AGOR-28), an oceanographic research vessel owned by the US Navy, sailed through the South China Sea northbound to moor at Kaohsiungn, Taiwan. It can be concluded that the US armed forces have normalized the deployment of at least two oceanographic reconnaissance ships to the South China Sea for reconnaissance operations, with their focus mostly on the waters south of Sanya, neighboring the Bashi Channel and in proximity to the Macclesfield Bank. The operations are primarily aimed at monitoring the important waterway of China’s submarine forces and closely watching their moves.¹¹⁹

In terms of air reconnaissance, the US armed forces intensivelyconducted various reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea by deploying air reconnaissance forces such as RQ-4 Global Hawks, P-8A and P-3C anti-submarine aircrafts, EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System (ARIES), RC-135 reconnaissance aircrafts and U-2S high-altitude reconnaissance aircrafts deployed at the Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, the Clark Air Base in the Philippines and the Osan Air Base in South Korea.¹²⁰

The RQ-4 Global Hawks usually departed from the Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, flew over the Philippines and then conducted reconnaissance in the South China Sea. As the US military’s major reconnaissance force in the region, they featured reconnaissance operations conducted at high altitude, long endurances and multiple approaches. They conducted reconnaissance three to four times each month, with their reach covering most swaths of the Philippines and the east of the South China Sea.¹²¹

At present, the US Navy has included two to three P-8A Poseidon antisubmarine aircrafts in its routine deployments to the Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and would boost the forces under special circumstances (like when the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group is navigating through the South China Sea). Meanwhile, it has also deployed two P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircrafts (numbered 169010 and 168996, respectively) which carry APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensors in the Western Pacific region, which primarily track and monitor surface targets. Specifically, the one numbered 168996 has never returned to the US mainland since its deployment to the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa on April 7, 2019. Public records indicated that on September 27, the aircraft was briefly deployed to the Clark Air Base in the Philippines when the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) Strike Group was carrying out military operations in the South China Sea.¹²²

The US military has leveraged its air reconnaissance forces with a combination of routine reconnaissance and special reconnaissance operations. When performing routine reconnaissance operations, reconnaissance aircrafts usually follow a given route: they would first jet into the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel, then head northwest to the southeastern airspace of Guangdong Province, then fly west along the coastline of southeastern China to the southwestern airspace of Sanya, Hainan Province, and finally return to Kadena Air Force Base performing reconnaissance operations. The selection of specific forces and airspace for special reconnaissance operations is often in line with the nature of a given mission. The special reconnaissance operations are primarily aimed at providing intelligence support for the US aircraft carriers, supporting surface warships for patrolling and monitoring the large-scale military actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. For example, on April 28 and 29, when the US Navy’s guided missile destroyers USS Stethem (DDG-63) and USS William P. Lawrence (DDG-110) sailed through the Taiwan Strait from south to north, a P-8A Poseidon anti submarine aircraft (number 169340) took off from the Clark Air Base in the Philippines to the airspace above areas neighboring Pratas Islands to conduct reconnaissance operations and provide intelligence support for the surface forces. With regard to the reconnaissance operations performed throughout the year of 2019, the US Air Force’s U-2S high-altitude reconnaissance aircrafts and RQ-4 Global Hawks were mostly deployed for routine reconnaissance missions, while RC-135 reconnaissance aircrafts, P-8A and P-3C anti-submarine aircrafts and EP-3E ARIES were mostly assigned special reconnaissance missions. In particular, when the US Navy’s surface forces were transiting the Taiwan Strait or the US Air Force’s MC-130J Commando II was flying over the Strait, the US military deployed three types of aircrafts, namely RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, EP-3E ARIES and P-8A for continuous reconnaissance over the south and north ends of the Taiwan Strait, in a bid to provide intelligence support for forces passing through the Strait. For instance, when the US Navy’s guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) was crossing the Taiwan Strait on November 12, the US Air Force launched a RC-135V/W Rivet Joint from the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa to reconnoiter in the airspace above the south end of the Trait. To extend the aircraft’s stay in the air, the US Air Force sent a KC-135R Stratotanker from the same base to the airspace above the southwestern Taiwan to provide mid-air refueling. In the meantime, a P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy set off from the Clark Air Base in the Philippines to the south end of the Taiwan Strait for a reconnaissance mission, joining forces with the RC135V/W Rivet Joint to provide intelligence support for the USS Chancellorsville (CG-62).¹²³

The US allies beyond the region were increasingly involved with a bigger role to play in the exercises. The Exercise Balikatan held in early April, an annual military exercise between the Philippines and the US, saw the participation of Australia for the first time. The Australian Defense Force dispatched a 50-member team composed of special forces, medical personnel, engineers and priests, which indicated that the Australian military might participate in task force combat and battlefield support subjects during the exercise. Japan joined the US-Philippines Exercise Kamandag, where army forces from the three countries conducted a multilateral amphibious landing. During the ship-to-shore maneuver, after the reconnaissance of the beach and perimeter alert building by the Philippines and the US, the three countries’ amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) launched from the Philippine Amphibious Transport Ship BRP Davao (LD-602) and the US Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship USSGermantown (LSD-42) came ashore, Philippine and US Marines secured the objective, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force led medical evacuation and disaster relief drills.¹²⁴

Cyberspace operations emerged as a new subject of the exercises. In 2019, the US conducted at least two joint military exercises concerning cybersecurity operations with countries in the Southeast Asia. In late July, the third Information System and Technology Exchange (ISTX) was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, by the Hawaii National Guard in cooperation with cybersecurity-related departments under the command of US Indo-Pacific Command, and Indonesian forces. This conference aimed to assist in cybersecurity doctrine development and enhance the cybersecurity capabilities to effectively defend and protect critical cyber information infrastructure from malicious virus and cyber intrusions. During the Cobra Gold 2019, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, the US Marine Corps and the Washington Air National Guard executed the first Cobra Gold Cyberspace Field Training Exercise (FTX) at the Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand. The exercise focused on identifying and defending critical information and warfighting systems against a cyberspace attack.¹²⁵

SCSPI concludes: In 2019, the US military continued improving its presence and operation intensity in the South China Sea, with its moves more targeted towards China. To implement its Indo-Pacific Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy, the US will continue to increase its presence and conduct more military operations against China, which may be reflected in the following aspects.

1. The forces deployed to the region will be more diversified. Operations in the South China Sea will be still dominated by the Navy and Air Force, but the roles of the Marine Corps, Army, Coast Guard and other armed forces will become more prominent. After the deployment of two USCG ships to the South China Sea in 2019, in particular, the USCG’s presence in this region will be further enhanced. By 2021, three USCG ships will be deployed to Guam, making the South China Sea a major area for activities of USCG ships. Meanwhile, the deployment of army forces will be further strengthened. In December of 2019, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp’s replacement by the USS America and the amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans (LPD-18)’s deployment to Commander Fleet Activities Sasebo has boosted amphibious attack ability of the 7th Fleet. As the US Army Pacific said in 2019 that it would strengthen the army forces in the Southeast Asia and demand division-level forces be deployed to the South China Sea and its neighboring areas. The large scale deployment of US Army forces in the South China Sea is bound to come. Though it remains unrealistic for a large scale of the US Army to deploy in the South China Sea, intensifying deployment, whether in the name of military visits or exercises, is inevitable. Having targeted China as the largest strategic maritime rival, different branches of the US military will undoubtedly conduct more active operations and innovate their moves in the South China Sea.¹²⁶
2. The military confrontation between China and the US in the South China Sea will become increasingly evident and fierce. The US military will continue to contend with China in the South China Sea with both overt and covert means. On the surface, the US military will still make provocations and exert pressures by moves such as FONOPs near Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, vessels’ and aircrafts’ navigation and patrol missions in the South China Sea and transits in the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the US military will secretly advance its deployment of reconnaissance forces and battlefield construction. With China’s continuous military modernization and Navy and Air Forces’ reinforcement, the US is bound to be more anxious and thus all-round reconnaissance operations against China will be strengthened correspondingly. Consequently, the chances of close confrontation between the two countries’ maritime and air forces will be wider. In line with the so-called “total competition” 15 concept, the US military will also leverage its publicity capacity to play up China’s deployment of weapons, construction projects on islands and reefs and rights protection actions in the South China Sea, exaggerate China’s militarization in the South China Sea, intimidate China’s neighbors or undermine the rules-based international order.¹²⁷
3. Military cooperation between the US and several countries in the region will be further deepened. Given the perceptibly fiercer contradictions between Beijing and Washington in the South China Sea, the US will enhance military exchanges, expand the scale of military exercises, improve the quantity and quality of weapons to be sold, and present outmoded weapons as gifts to countries in the region, in a bid to induce them to take their sides between the US and China. At present, except the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, most ASEAN countries have not had in-depth military cooperation with the US. The increasingly warmer US-Vietnam military relations will probably usher in further military cooperation between the two sides. When partnering with Southeast Asian countries, most of which have limited defense budgets, the US will still give priority to MDA, intelligence sharing and so on within the framework of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.¹²⁸

Let us move over to 2020.

Even though COVID-19 wreaked havoc worldwide in 2020, the US military continued to carry out intensive military activities in the South China Sea, with their strategic weapon platforms, typically carrier strike groups, strategic bombers and nuclear attack submarines, operating in the region frequently, posing unprecedented deterrence against China. In the meantime, the US Navy and Air Force continued to conduct frequent reconnaissance operations in the region, deploying a mix of reconnaissance aircraft, including those of civilian contractors, to the South China Sea, all of which built up strong momentum for battlefield construction and warfighting readiness across the US military.¹²⁹

Through 2020, the US military successively deployed three carrier strike groups, two amphibious ready groups, several nuclear attack submarines and 17 batches of B-52H Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer bombers to the South China Sea for “Dynamic Force Employment”. The intensity, in terms of the scale, number and duration, of the US military activities in the region in 2020 was rarely seen in recent years.¹³⁰

To begin with, military forces deployed to the South China Sea were of large scale and long duration. The US Navy successively sent the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) CSG, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) CSG, the USS America (LHA-6) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the USS Makin Island (LHD-8) ARG to the South China Sea throughout 2020. Specifically, the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG sailed through the South China Sea on the way to paying a port visit to Da Nang, Vietnam. The USS Nimitz CSG and the USS Makin Island ARG transited the South China Sea en route to a deployment to the Middle East. The USS Ronald Reagan CSG and the USS America ARG from the 7th Fleet were deployed to the South China Sea to conduct deterrence patrols.¹³¹

In view of the time of the operations, the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG entered the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel on March 1 and departed around March 17. The USS Nimitz CSG entered the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel on July 3 and then left via the Strait of Malacca on July 18 for the deployment to the Middle East. The USS Ronald Reagan CSG entered the South China Sea four times throughout the year. It first entered the South China Sea on around July 3 via the San Bernardino Strait in the central Philippines and left around July 7; it returned to the waters in mid-July from the Java Sea and left on July 20; it reentered for the third time on August 14 via the Bashi Channel; it then went back to on October 12 via the Strait of Malacca for the last time of 2020. Overall, it maintained a presence in the South China Sea much longer than before. It is worth noting that, unlike routine patrols in previous years, the deployments of US carrier strike groups to the South China Sea and its neighboring areas in 2020 highly resembled live combat. For instance, the USS Ronald Reagan CSG was deployed to the neighboring areas of the South China Sea for more than four months, during which it swiftly entered and departed the waters several times and collaborated with other carrier strike groups, in the hope of maintaining necessary deterrence and keeping distance with the Area Denial forces of China.¹³²

Secondly, the operations covered highly sensitive areas with a great variety of exercise subjects. While underway in the South China Sea, the US Navy’s carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups usually operated to the southwest of Taiwan, or near the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. The exercise subjects covered strategic combat exercises, including dual-carrier combat drills, the concept of operations (CONOPS) of light aircraft carriers and joint naval and air operations, as well as tactical drills like seaborne supply and carrier-based aerial refueling. On March 15, USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG and USS America ARG conducted Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) operations near the Macclesfield Bank in the South China Sea,2 marking the first such exercise undertaken by the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG in the region.¹³³

On April 20, the USS America ARG met up with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) guided-missile frigate HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154) to flex muscle in sensitive waters near China’s survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 and Malaysian drillship West Capella in the South China Sea, as a move to show that they had Malaysia’s back and provoke China-Malaysia “standoff.” On July 3, the USS Nimitz CSG from the 3rd Fleet and the USS Ronald Reagan CSG from the 7th Fleet assembled in the South China Sea, respectively via the Bashi Channel and the San Bernardino Strait, the Philippines, for the first dual-carrier exercise in 2020 near the Scarborough Shoal,  which was followed by a second dual-carrier exercise near the James Shoal on July 17, with the same two carrier strike groups.¹³⁴

The US military launched two consecutive dual-carrier formation exercises in sensitive waters of the South China Sea in a short span of half a month, whose timing coincided with the drills held by the PLA in the Paracel Islands and the annual Taiwanese Han Kuang Exercise. Taking the first dual carrier operation for example, on July 3 and 4, a US Air Force (USAF) B-52H Stratofortress bomber from the 96th Bomb Squadron departed Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana for the South China Sea for a joint exercise with USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz  Carrier Strike Groups. Joint strike against ground and seaborne targets between carrier strike groups and bombers has emerged as an important exercise activity performed by the US military in the Western Pacific. When these two carrier strike groups were underway in the South China Sea, several US Navy P-8As from Kadena AFB in Okinawa headed for the South China Sea. The P-8A could extend real-time intelligence support to aircraft carrier formations, and when armed with AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, could conduct joint naval and air strike training with carrier strike groups. Apart from the P-8A, the USAF sent KC-135R aerial refueling aircraft from Kadena AFB near the Scarborough Shoal to carry out aerial refueling exercises with the embarked carrier air wing to boost fighters’ capability for long-range operations in the South China Sea.¹³⁵

Throughout the year, the USAF sent B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers to the South China Sea for highly intensive military operations, focusing on exercising the CONOPS of “Dynamic Force Employment”, a term coined by former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, to make the tactical operations of US military’s bombers “unpredictable”. Statistics shows that USAF bombers operated over the South China Sea for 17 times in 2020, four of which took off directly from the mainland US, whereas the rest were from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. Most of which were in dual-bomber formations when operating in the region, with a total of 11 B52H and 21 B-1B sorties. Overall, the bomber operations took on the following characteristics:

First of all, the routes were discreetly selected with a focus on south-north collaboration. The USAF bombers would normally enter the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel, to the north of the Philippines. However, apart from this route, the US military also charted out a new route via the airspace above the Sulu Sea off the southern part of the Philippines in 2020.¹³⁶

In this way, the US military could send one bomber from the south and the other from the north respectively. Allowing the US to intervene in the region from two directions simultaneously, this operational model was very likely a diversion strategy. On the surface, it appeared that the US attempted to engage with the firepower of China with the bomber in the north. Yet, the real purpose is actually to simulate bombarding the Spratly Islands in the south. This model indicates that the US military is making continued efforts to rehearse airstrikes against the Spratly Islands, which are relatively poorly defended by the Chinese military. Besides, given the trajectories of B-1Bs on December 23 and 28, 2020 while operating over the South China Sea, the potential targets of US military exercises not only cover the Spratly Islands, but also the Paracel Islands and even some important military ports and bases on Hainan Island.¹³⁷

Second, the US armed forces emphasized the unpredictability of tactical operations. The US military began to apply “Dynamic Force Employment” of bombers to the Western Pacific Region, when five B-52H Stratofortress bombers from the 69th EBS of the USAF finished their sixmonth rotational deployment to Guam on April 16. The deployments lasted from two to four weeks and seemed to be random and contingent. The first dynamic force employment was made on April 29, when two USAF B-1B Lancers from the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota flew a 32-hour round-trip sortie to conduct military operations over the South China Sea and then flew back to the base.  The US military maintained the model of sending bombers to the Western Pacific Region for patrol from the US mainland and Guam respectively to ensure a persistent bomber presence in the South China Sea. As to the time of entering the waters, the US military often entered the airspace at night. For instance, from the night of May 18 to the early morning of May 19, two USAF B-1B Lancers covertly flew to the South China Sea from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, exploiting the cover of darkness. The US military traditionally fires the first shot at night, in an attempt to launch a surprise attack against its adversary in order to rapidly seize command of the air and the sea.¹³⁸

Third, the US military laid great emphasis on systematic joint operations. The history of the US military’s repeated attempts to send and withdraw bombers to and from the South China Sea reveals that these operations are invariably reinforced by intelligence support provided by reconnaissance aircraft and aerial refueling. For example, when two USAF B-1B Lancers took off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam for military operations over the South China Sea on May 26, the US also deployed an RC-135W Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft (numbered 62-4139), a P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft (HEX: AE6854), an EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft (numbered 159893) and a P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft (numbered 161586) from Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. On December 28, two USAF B-1B Lancers departed Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to conduct military operations over the South China Sea, during which three USAF KC-135R Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft (call sign: PEARL24, 25 and 26; tail number: 59-1459, 63-8022 and 600328 respectively) flew from Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa to the airspace above the northwestern part of Luzon Island, the Philippines, to provide aerial refueling for these bombers.¹³⁹

According to incomplete statistics, throughout the year, the US military conducted nearly 1,000 reconnaissance sorties from several bases such as Osan Air Base in South Korea, Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and Brunei. These reconnaissance aircraft covered 13 types, including the U2S, RC-135, E-3B airborne warning and control system (AWACS), E-8C joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS), P-8A and P-3C anti-submarine aircraft, EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft, CL-650 reconnaissance aircraft, CL-604 maritime surveillance aircraft, RQ-4B Global Hawk and MQ-4C Triton high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.¹⁴⁰

As the US carried out major military operations, for example, carrier strike groups and bombers operating in the South China Sea, warships transiting the Taiwan Strait or conducting so-called “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPs) near the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, the frequency and intensity of reconnaissance operations by various reconnaissance aircraft of the US military would markedly increase. For instance, when the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52), operated near China’s Paracel Islands to conduct a so-called FONOP on April 28, the US military deployed a P-8A, a P-3C and an EP-3E from Kadena Air Force Base to the northern airspace of the South China Sea to extend intelligence support to the operation. As the ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) data shows, when the Nimitz and Ronald Reagan CSGs conducted dual carrier operations in the South China Sea from July 3 to 7, the US military conducted 15 P-8A, three EP-3E, and two RC-135W sorties, plus one RC-135U and a single P-3C sortie, the intensity of which was quite exceptional since the US military deployed P8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft to the Western Pacific in 2013.¹⁴¹

The US military sought to keep track of China’s various military activities in the South China Sea and its neighboring areas through constant routine air reconnaissance against China. Whenever there were PLA military operations in and around the South China Sea, the intensity of the US reconnaissance activities would grow accordingly. For instance, when the PLAN aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted training in the South China Sea from April 12 to 22, the US military sent two to three sorties of various reconnaissance aircraft on a daily basis to perform reconnaissance. An E8C (tail number: 96-0042), which was deployed to Kadena Air Force Base on July 11, conducted intensive reconnaissance operations over those waters. Then on July 17 and 18, the US Air Force made an unusual decision to deploy an E-3B AWACS (numbered 77-0355) and an E-8C JSTARS to the southwestern airspace of Taiwan for early warning and patrol operations targeting Southern China and Southeast Fujian Province. On August 26, a USAF RC-135S Cobra Ball ballistic missile-detection reconnaissance aircraft (tail number: 62-4128) from Kadena Air Force Base operated near the Paracel Islands to reconnoiter China’s missile tests.¹⁴²

In 2020, SCSPI found through ADS-B signals that on multiple occasions US reconnaissance aircraft impersonated civilian aircraft of countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines to conduct close-in reconnaissance near China’s coast by broadcasting spoofed ICAO hex codes. For example, on the morning of September 8, a USAF RC-135W (tail number: 62-4134, HEX: AE01CE) departed Kadena Air Force Base for a reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea. After entering the Bashi Channel, the aircraft changed its Mode-S code to 750548 and disguised itself as a Malaysian airliner. On September 22, a USAF RC135S (HEX: AE01D6) stopped transmitting signals after taking off from Kadena Air Force Base, and impersonated a Philippine airliner (HEX: 75C75C) after it entered the Yellow Sea. The plane operated till around 8:00 p.m. that day to conduct intensive reconnaissance over the Yellow Sea, and then changed its hex code back to the real one after completing the mission, which was presumably sent to monitor the military exercise of the PLA in the Yellow Sea. Similar cases are too numerous to mention.¹⁴³

According to Wang Wenbin, spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of mid-September in 2020, US reconnaissance aircraft had impersonated civilian aircraft of other countries more than a hundred times off the coast of China, representing a modus operandi of the US armed forces in conducting close-in reconnaissance globally. The US armed forces might believe that such practices are not expressly regulated by international law, but they are undoubtedly unethical. Moreover, these egregious conducts have severely disrupted the aviation order and air safety in relevant airspaces and threatened the security of China and countries in the region, and are likely to bring great danger to real airliners, especially to countries that the US impersonated.¹⁴⁴

A Tenax Aerospace Bombardier CL-604 maritime surveillance aircraft (tail number: N9191) arrived at Kadena Air Force Base on March 31, 2020, and was sent on a South China Sea reconnaissance mission for the first time on July 16. As of the end of 2020, the aircraft had made 33 flights to the South China Sea. On July 29, a Lasai Aviation Bombardier CL-650 reconnaissance aircraft (tail number: N488CR) was deployed to Kadena Air Force Base. It was sent to the South China Sea for the first time on August 20 to conduct reconnaissance operations, and made four flights before transferring to Europe. On August 18, a Meta Special Aerospace “King Air” Beechcraft 350 low-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (tail number: N334CA) arrived at Manila Airport in the Philippines, primarily to facilitate anti-terrorism efforts in the Mindanao region of the Philippines.¹⁴⁵

US private defense contractors’ reconnaissance aircraft, by joining in reconnoitering in the South China Sea, could complement US military reconnaissance aircraft, so as to boost the military-civilian joint combat capability. Meanwhile, their deployment was also aimed at addressing “gray zone” challenges, a concept stressed by the US recently. Usually, the Tenax CL-604 would after departing Kadena Air Force Base, make a stopover at the Clark Air Base in the Philippines for refueling, and then fly to the South China Sea for reconnaissance missions. It mainly reconnoitered regions including the south end of the Taiwan Strait, China’s southern coastal areas, Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands. As US civilian contractors’ reconnaissance aircraft were on their South China Sea missions, US military reconnaissance aircraft, such as P-8A, P-3C and EP3E, would also be active in the region. Therefore, there would be possible fusion of information between the civilian and military planes that they could interact and coordinate with each other.¹⁴⁶

Throughout 2020, the US military operated abnormally frequently around Taiwan, as evidenced by an unprecedented 13 Taiwan Strait transits by US warships, the first dual-aircraft formation flying over the Strait, and even an exceptional overflight over Taiwan. Not to mention, Director for Intelligence of the US Indo-Pacific Command Michael Studeman’s visit to Taiwan on November 22, a move showing that the US-Taiwan intelligence cooperation has been brought out in the open. By deploying vessels and aircraft to the Taiwan Strait to instigate separatists and providing intelligence support, the US has been sending quite a dangerous signal to the “Taiwan independence” forces and posing a grave threat to peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait region.¹⁴⁷

In addition, the southwestern airspace of Taiwan has become a priority for various types of US reconnaissance aircraft to conduct intensive surveillance. Apart from providing intelligence support for vessels and aircraft transiting the Taiwan Strait, their primary object was to monitor the PLA’s latest actions in eastern Guangdong and southern Fujian.¹⁴⁸

In addition to large-scale multilateral military exercises, the US military also conducted multiple small-scale tactical exercises in the South China Sea throughout 2020. With a focus on live combat, these exercises were mainly to practice various new CONOPS developed by the US military in recent years. In the first quarter of 2020, for example, the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG and USS America ESG, while operating in the South China Sea, joined forces twice to conduct Expeditionary Strike Force operations, with the aim of enhancing the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) of carrier and expeditionary strike groups in the region.¹⁴⁹

SCSPI concludes: In 2020, the US military exerted maximum pressure in the South China Sea through a raft of intensive moves, such as deploying various strategic weapons platforms to the region, frequently operating near China’s stationed islands and reefs and transiting the Taiwan Strait, in an attempt to display its military power and deter China. However, the US is gradually losing such military dominance in the Western Pacific despite its evident military superiority globally, as China has been delivering much more targeted and effective countermeasures. Overreactions and excessive deterrence of the US military will not contribute to peace or stability of the region.¹⁵⁰

At present, the US Democrats and Republicans have basically reached a consensus on the strategic judgment of China, agreeing that “China represents the most pressing strategic threat to the US.” In December 2020, the US Congress passed a USD 2.2 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which is modeled after the European Deterrence Initiative13 and primarily aiming to advance the overall development of critical infrastructure of the US military in the Indo-Pacific region, so as to address “the threats and challenges posed by China.” Kenneth Braithwaite, Secretary of the US Navy, has called for the Navy to establish a new numbered fleet 14 dedicated to the South China Sea and the eastern Indian Ocean. Therefore, under the new US administration, neither the course of confronting China, politically or militarily, nor the trend of China-US military confrontation in China’s surrounding areas like the South China Sea, will change. The Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, a pace-setting new strategy jointly released by the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, also makes clear that “the Naval Service will develop an integrated all-domain naval force” and “emphasizes expanded cooperation with allies and partners,” so as to cope with the long-term strategic competition.¹⁵¹

In recent years, the US has continued to expand its military presence in the South China Sea, with scaled up various military drills and activities in the region. In an era of rising Sino-US competition, it could be expected that various types of warships and warplanes of the US military will continue to frequently perform different kinds of military activities in the region. Considering that allies and partners are the cornerstone of all foreign policies of the new administration, the US will place more reliance on its allies and partners to counterbalance China, especially against the backdrop of a relative decline in its own power. Measures could, for example, include getting regional allies and partners to step up involvement in the South China Sea issues, seeking to expand cooperation in sharing military bases and conducting joint military operations, and interfering in the maritime disputes through various means, including military intervention.¹⁵²

Owing to the growing development of open source data and mass media, and US military’s actively disclosing relevant information, US military operations in the South China Sea were excessively politicized and popularized during the Trump presidency. In an effort to emphasize competition with China, the US flaunted military power on their official websites and social media and even publicly intimidated China, which significantly aggravated tensions in the South China Sea region. The Biden administration is well aware that the Sino-US competition is a long-term process, and that “maximum pressure” will not crush China but may instead result in an uncontrollable situation. Military competition is only normal, but it must be kept under control. With this principle in mind, the US military may shift from “doing much and talking much” to “doing much but talking little”, and lower the posture and intensity of publicity. For instance, the USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG was given less media coverage while operating in the South China Sea in late January 2021. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this trend can be sustained. In any case, it would be positive for the two militaries and two countries if the competition could be kept as limited as possible to the professionals.¹⁵³

China’s view of the US’s new maritime strategy and its intentions would not be complete without considering the report of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies under the Chinese Foreign Ministry as a reaction to the US maritime strategy.

On December 17, 2020, Trump administration released a major maritime strategy document, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power,¹⁵⁴ whose tone differed markedly from previous maritime strategy documents. The document is a joint (triservice) effort by the US Marine Corps, US Navy and US Coastal Guards, the first of its type.

The strategy was the last of such strategy documents bequeathed by Trump Administration having just a month to leave office. It can be regarded as a parting shot at China and by extension Russia – interestingly from a President that has hitherto showered praises on both President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin. It was the climax of a tumultous 4-year era where personal hubris or chutzpah was allowed to interfere with State policy objectives.

It is noteworthy that Biden Administration did or has not denounce the strategy for any reason – and there is no indication at all that there would be such denounciation. Rather, what has been seen is the hearty acceptance and reinforcement of the strategy going by the entire gamut of policy ponouncements on China by the Biden Administration so far.

However, when all the national security strategy documents under Trump Administration from 2017 to 2020 are put together, they can be seen to have put the United States on a new track of thinking or rather security epistemology including a new foreign policy and concomitant military posturing which may rather be considered aggressive in comparison with previous strategy documents for instance either under Clinton Administration, Bush (Jr) Administration and Obama Administration. It can be sensed or inferred that the security epistemology under Trump Administration is derived from the ideology of America First or Make America Great Again – and it is interesting to note that Biden Administration did or has not fundamentally disassociated itself from this ideology of America First/Make America Great Again in its foreign policy and military posturing so far.

Indeed, Trump Administration may be considered a nuanced extension of Bush (Jr) Administration in the context of all the strategies around global war on terrorism, the war campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. But amazing is how the global security dynamics have changed in the last two decades or thereabout – from the threat of international terrorism during, for instance, the time of Bush (Jr) Administration to the visibly aggressive China’s global ambitions including the resurgent Russia which now threaten to upturn the liberal global rules-based order, and emerging threats from Iran and North Korea.  There is also the visible shift of emphasis from non-state actors such as Al Qae’da, ISIS (though still relevant) to state actors such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea (more threatening because they all possess State powers with which they can mobilize massive resources to prosecute their ambitions whether benevolent or dangerous in character and scope.

The Heritage Foundation made some critical observations about the new maritime strategy.¹⁵⁵ The execution of the 2020 tri-service maritime strategy is questionable. The Navy’s 2018 strategy called for large-scale exercises and fleet experiments to validate unmanned platforms; these have yet to occur, though the Navy says these are planned in 2021. The 2015 tri-service strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” called for 120 ships deployed forward by 2020; as of January 4, 2021, only 97 ships were deployed. Lastly, without structural changes, it is unlikely that the three Naval services will be able to shift budgeting, operational, or future force design to a more integrated approach called for in the 2020 strategy.¹⁵⁶

The 2020 strategy came out too late for the Trump Administration to implement and risks being discarded by the next Administration. Should this occur, it would create an unacceptable delay to urgently needed attention and investment to compete in the maritime domain with the Chinese and Russians. As such, the Biden Administration should review and endorse this document as quickly as possible.¹⁵⁷

The strategy, however, unequivocally stated that “The United States is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas. The Naval Service—forward deployed and capable of both rapid response and sustained operations globally—remains America’s most persistent and versatile instrument of military influence. Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, leveraging the complementary authorities and capabilities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, advances the prosperity, security, and promise of a free and open, rules-based order.”¹⁵⁸

In the preface to the strategy document signed by Kenneth J. Braithwaite, Secretary of the Navy, it is stated that “It’s been 75 years since our combined Sea Services achieved victory in World War II. It took the valor and strength of every Sailor, Marine and Coastguardsman to achieve dominance on the waves, undersea, and in the skies, projecting strength overseas while protecting our shores at home. It also took innovation and cooperation within the Naval Service, across the Joint Force, and throughout the industrial base on an unprecedented scale. We won the war then, and have served side by side ever since, protecting the peace to the great benefit of our Nation, our allies, and the world.”¹⁵⁹

As detailed in the following pages, the rules-based international order is once again under assault. We must prepare as a unified Naval Service to ensure that we are equal to the challenge. The men and women who wear our uniforms are ready, determined, and dedicated to serve with honor, courage and commitment. As leaders, it is our responsibility to ensure they are prepared, equipped, and trained to prevail in long-term strategic competition, win any potential fight, and preserve the future peace.¹⁶⁰

This strategy details the direction our Service Chiefs have designed together. It is a strong signal of support for our personnel, our allies, and our partners—and a cautionary warning for any would-be adversaries. We are and will always be one force—Semper Fortis, Semper Fidelis, Semper Paratus—always strong, always faithful, and always ready to protect and defend the United States of America, around the clock and around the world.¹⁶¹

In the foreword to the strategy signed by David H. Berger, General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps, Michael M. Gilday Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, and Karl L. Schultz Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant of the Coast Guard, the following was unequivocally stated as the assessment of the global security environment that informed the strategy.

Our actions in this decade will shape the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.¹⁶²

The security environment has dramatically changed since we last published A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in 2015. Several nations are contesting the balance of power in key regions and seeking to undermine the existing world order. Significant technological developments and aggressive military modernization by our rivals are eroding our military advantages. The proliferation of long-range precision missiles means the United States can no longer presume unfettered access to the world’s oceans in times of conflict.¹⁶³

Since the beginning of the 21st century, our three Sea Services have watched with alarm the growing naval power of the People’s Republic of China and the increasingly aggressive behavior of the Russian Federation. Our globally deployed naval forces interact with Chinese and Russian warships and aircraft daily. We witness first-hand their increasing sophistication and growing aggressiveness. Optimism that China and Russia might become responsible leaders contributing to global security has given way to recognition that they are determined rivals. The People’s Republic of China represents the most pressing, long-term strategic threat.¹⁶⁴

In the midst of fighting two wars, our three Services have worked to meet these global challenges. The Navy has prioritized controlling the seas, increased its forward deployed forces in Asia and Europe, and realigned its warfighting organizations. Today, roughly 60 percent of Navy forces are in the IndoPacific region. Sweeping transformation of the Marine Corps is generating greater expeditionary combat power with enhanced capabilities for sea control and sea denial. The Coast Guard is expanding its global engagements and capacity-building efforts in key vulnerable regions. Together, we are developing new operational concepts and redesigning our forces to provide the capability and capacity to execute them. However, we are not yet where we need to be. Getting there will require predictable budgets and on-time funding.¹⁶⁵

America’s Naval Service defends our Nation by preserving freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and winning wars. For generations, we have underwritten security and prosperity and preserved the values our Nation holds dear. However, China’s behavior and accelerated military growth place it on a trajectory that will challenge our ability to continue to do so. We are at an inflection point. Our integrated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard must maintain clear-eyed resolve to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries while we accelerate development of a modernized, integrated all-domain naval force for the future. Our actions in this decade will shape the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.¹⁶⁶

Together, we must act with urgency to integrate and modernize our forces as we prepare for the challenges ahead. The boldness of our actions must match the magnitude of our moment. The security of our Nation depends on our ability to maintain advantage at sea.¹⁶⁷

The United States is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas. Since the end of World War II, the United States has built, led, and advanced a rulesbased international system through shared commitments with our allies and partners. Forward deployed forces of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—collectively known as the Naval Service—have guaranteed the security of this system. Free and open access to the world’s oceans has fostered an extraordinary era of wealth and peace for many nations. That system is now at risk.¹⁶⁸

Advantage at Sea is a Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this era of global peace and prosperity. We prioritize competition with China due to its growing economic and military strength, increasing aggressiveness, and demonstrated intent to dominate its regional waters and remake the international order in its favor. Until China chooses to act as a responsible stakeholder rather than brandish its power to further its authoritarian interests, it represents the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system.¹⁶⁹

Other rivals, including Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, and transnational criminal organizations, also continue to subvert the international rules-based order. We will address these challengers in a coordinated, multinational manner with forces developed to address more significant military threats.¹⁷⁰

The stakes of this competition are high. China’s aggressive actions are undermining the international rules-based order, while its growing military capacity and capabilities are eroding U.S. military advantages at an alarming rate. The Naval Service must act with urgency, clarity, and vision to take the bold steps required to reverse these trends.¹⁷¹

Advantage at Sea provides guidance to the Naval Service for the next decade to prevail across a continuum of competition—composed of interactions with other nations from cooperation to conflict. This strategy emphasizes the following five themes. We must fully leverage the complementary authorities and capabilities of the Naval Service to generate Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. We must strengthen our alliances and partnerships— our key strategic advantage in this long-term strategic competition—and achieve unity of effort. We must operate more assertively to prevail in day-to-day competition as we uphold the rules-based order and deter our competitors from pursuing armed aggression. If our rivals escalate into conflict, becoming our adversaries, we must control the seas to deny their objectives, defeat their forces, protect our homeland, and defend our allies. And, we must boldly modernize the future naval force to maintain credible deterrence and preserve our advantage at sea.¹⁷²

This strategy connects the Service Chiefs’ statutory roles—developing naval forces and providing best military advice for employing naval forces. Section I outlines the security environment and the problems that we face. Section II articulates how Integrated All-Domain Naval Power addresses these problems. Section III describes how naval power can be applied across the competition continuum in day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict to achieve national objectives. Section IV guides the development and integration of a modernized, alldomain naval force that will ensure our unfettered access to the seas and reverse our eroding military advantages.¹⁷³

The challenges we face require us to make hard choices. This strategy prioritizes our most pressing threats, emphasizes expanded cooperation with allies and partners, and relies on deeper Naval Service integration to mitigate strategic risk to the Nation. Additional detail regarding our priorities, capabilities, investments, divestments, and operational approaches is contained in supporting classified guidance, both existing and forthcoming. Advantage at Sea is complemented by separate Service Chief guidance, such as the Chief of Naval Operations’ Navigation Plan, the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Planning Guidance, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard’s Strategic Plan.¹⁷⁴

The world’s oceans play a vital role in America’s national security and prosperity. The sea has always been a competitive space that has served as both a strategic buffer and a vital connection to the world. As strategic competition continues to intensify, our rivals seek to exploit the openness of the maritime domain as they carry out campaigns of coercion and intimidation.¹⁷⁵

The oceans connect global markets, provide essential resources, and link societies together. By value, 90 percent of global trade travels by sea, facilitating $5.4 trillion of U.S. annual commerce and supporting 31 million American jobs. Undersea cables transmit 95 percent of international communications and roughly $10 trillion in financial transactions each day. For decades, the free and open international order has produced shared security and prosperity throughout the world.¹⁷⁶

Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) employ all instruments of their national power to undermine and remake the international system to serve their own interests. Each conduct a variety of malign activities incrementally, attempting to achieve their objectives without triggering a military response. Both nations back their revisionist activities with regionally powerful militaries and obscure their aggressive behavior by mixing military and paramilitary forces with proxies. China’s and Russia’s attempts to exert control over natural marine resources and restrict access to the oceans have negative repercussions for all nations.¹⁷⁷

China has implemented a strategy and revisionist approach that aims at the heart of the United States’ maritime power. It seeks to corrode international maritime governance, deny access to traditional logistical hubs, inhibit freedom of the seas, control use of key chokepoints, deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United States as the preferred partner in countries around the world.¹⁷⁸

To enable its strategy, China deploys a multilayered fleet that includes the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia—naval auxiliaries disguised as civilian vessels—to subvert other nations’ sovereignty and enforce unlawful claims. It continues to militarize disputed features in the South China Sea and assert maritime claims inconsistent with international law. Its state-subsidized distantwater fishing fleet steals vital resources from nations unable to defend their own exclusive economic zones. To support its multilayered fleet, China is also developing the world’s largest missile force, with nuclear capabilities, which is designed to strike U.S. and allied forces in Guam and in the Far East with everything from ballistic missiles to maneuverable cruise and hypersonic missiles. Further, China has centralized its robust strategic, space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities.¹⁷⁹

With naval forces as the cornerstone of its efforts, China is aggressively growing and modernizing its military. Already commanding the world’s largest naval force, the PRC is building modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, amphibious assault ships, ballistic nuclear missile submarines, large coast guard cutters, and polar icebreakers at alarming speed. China’s navy battle force has more than tripled in size in only two decades.¹⁸⁰

This rapid growth is enabled by a robust shipbuilding infrastructure, including multiple shipyards that exceed those in the United States in both size and throughput. In conflict, excess PRC industrial capacity, including additional commercial shipyards, could quickly be turned toward military production and repair, further increasing China’s ability to generate new military forces.¹⁸¹

Whereas U.S. naval forces are globally dispersed, supporting U.S. interests and deterring aggression from multiple threats, China’s numerically larger forces are primarily concentrated in the Western Pacific. However, as China seeks to establish regional hegemony, it is also expanding its global reach. China’s One Belt One Road initiative is extending its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure that will enable its forces to operate farther from its shores than ever before, including the polar regions, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic Ocean. These projects often leverage predatory lending terms that China exploits to control access to key strategic maritime locations.¹⁸²

Modernization efforts are also underway in Russia. Its military prioritizes nuclear and advanced missile systems, attack and guided-missile submarines, bombers, missile frigates, fighter jets, air-to-air missiles, and state-of-the-art air defenses. In conflict, Russia may threaten cyber or kinetic strikes against Washington or European capitals, or attack undersea communications cables, causing severe impact to the global economy. It may also gamble that use of nuclear weapons might avert defeat in combat or preclude retaliation.¹⁸³

Russia’s operations are designed to fragment the international order. Its pursuit of an expanded sphere of influence has been defined by opportunism and a willingness to violate international agreements and laws, as well as use of military force. Its campaign to restore strategic depth has motivated RF aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as its intervention in Syria.¹⁸⁴

In the event of conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its allies can mount an effective response—leading to a fait accompli. Each supports this approach through investments in counter-intervention networks. Each seeks to shift the burden of escalation by reinforcing annexed territory with long-range precision-strike weapons and make a military response to an invasion seem disproportionately costly.¹⁸⁵ 

Additional competitors, violent extremists, and criminal organizations all exploit weak governance at sea, corruption ashore, and gaps in maritime domain awareness. Piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit acts leave governments vulnerable to coercion. Climate change threatens coastal nations with rising sea levels, depleted fish stocks, and more severe weather. Competition over offshore resources, including protein, energy, and minerals, is leading to tension and conflict. Receding Arctic sea ice is opening the region to growing maritime activity and increased competition. These forces and trends create vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit, corrode the rule of law, and generate instability that can erupt into crisis in any theater.¹⁸⁶

New and converging technologies will have profound impacts on the security environment. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, additive manufacturing, quantum computing, and new communications and energy technologies could each, individually, generate enormous disruptive change. In combination, the effects of these technologies, and others, will be multiplicative and unpredictable. Militaries that effectively integrate them will undoubtedly gain significant warfighting advantages.¹⁸⁷

The United States and its allies will be challenged to build the necessary capability and capacity required to address these many threats. Increasingly sophisticated weapon systems and a shrinking defense industrial base will raise the price and extend the timelines for developing and procuring new weapons and platforms. Continuous budget pressures, including the economic impact of COVID-19, may constrain resources available for defense.¹⁸⁸

Shi Xiaoqin and Liu Xiaobo of the China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies made an assessment of the aforementioned U.S. maritime strategy with an omnibus title “The Prelude to All-Encompassing Maritime Competition Between China and the U.S. is about to Begin—An Appraisal of America’s Newest Maritime Strategy”. The China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College made the translation.¹⁸⁹

On December 17, 2020, the U.S. Navy (USN), U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) jointly issued a new maritime strategy entitled Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. This tri-service strategy is a follow-on to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which the three services jointly issued in 2007 and 2015. Two characteristics of the document deserve attention: one, it directly regards China as an opponent and two, it simultaneously classifies China and Russia as opponents. Compared with the U.S. maritime strategy issued at the height of the Cold War in 1982, this document might be regarded as the first maritime strategy document issued after the inauguration of Sino-U.S. strategic competition.¹⁹⁰

This strategy strives to unify thinking for all of America’s maritime forces, namely, that the U.S. no longer has command of the global commons and that the strategic guidance that forward presence can shape regional security and prevent conflict is now obsolete. All of America’s maritime forces must now shift to great power competition with China and Russia, fight for command of the sea, and gain the advantage.¹⁹¹

Comprising four parts, the document covers America’s maritime security environment, strategic aims, strategic approach, approach to military construction, and tactics for responding. Part one summarizes America’s maritime security environment and the challenges America faces. Part two elaborates on how integrated all-domain naval power can handle these challenges. Part three describes how to employ sea power throughout the whole continuum of competition including day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict, in order to achieve national objectives. Part four explicitly presents the guiding principles for maritime force modernization and all-domain naval development and integration in order to ensure the U.S. can access the sea unimpeded and reverse the erosion of the U.S. military advantage.¹⁹²

With respect to assessment of strategic opponents, the maritime strategy emphasizes that China and Russia are the two biggest threats, with competition from China being of primary concern. The strategic document declares that China’s continuously growing military capabilities are eroding America’s military advantage at an astonishing rate. Thus, U.S. maritime forces will take actions to reverse this trend.¹⁹³

The document proposes five ways to implement the strategy: 1) fully exploit and integrate the particular advantages of the three services, in order to create a comprehensive, all-domain maritime force; 2) strengthen relations between the U.S. and its allies and partners, in the belief that this is America’s primary strategic advantage in long-term strategic competition; 3) adopt more resolute actions in day-to-day competition in peacetime in order to stop America’s strategic competitors from conducting military operations; 4) during conflict, the goal of U.S. maritime forces will be sea control; it will defeat the enemy’s military forces and protect the U.S. while defending its allies; and 5) conduct bold modernization and reform of the future maritime force in order to maintain credible deterrence and keep America’s maritime advantage.¹⁹⁴

Overall, the strategy has two characteristics that deserve attention. First, U.S. maritime forces once again emphasizes the traditional [notion of] fighting for command of the sea. Second, the U.S. will strengthen its struggle in the “gray zone.” This includes operations falling below the intensity of war and operations that seek to make incremental gains, such as weaponizing social media, infiltrating global supply chains, and engaging in space and cyber conflict, etc.¹⁹⁵

If we were to summarize the goal of the strategy in one sentence, it would be that in the next ten years the USN, USMC, and USCG will come together to shape a maritime balance of power favorable to the U.S. in order to offset China’s advantages.¹⁹⁶

First, the U.S. once again emphasizes great power maritime competition and not cooperation, and [the need to] fight for command of the sea. Overall, the 2007 version of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and its 2015 revision emphasized the shared global nature of the ocean and supported maritime cooperation between great powers. This was closely related to the “liberal interventionism” embraced by the U.S. at the time. “Liberal interventionism” argues that preventing war and winning war are equally important. That is, the U.S. believed that it could use means other than war—including deterrence, ocean management, law enforcement, patrols, and low-intensity operations—to safeguard the international order. The new maritime strategy document shows that the American conviction has changed to “principled realism,” which emphasizes seizing the advantage and using traditional military power to safeguard the international order. In the past, the U.S. believed that it could achieve cooperation at sea with China. Partners for maritime cooperation were not always U.S. allies, and even China could be a cooperative partner. Aside from identifying China and Russia as strategic opponents, the new document proposes that the U.S. pay attention to freedom of navigation, port security, control of maritime choke points, fighting for command of the sea, and strengthening alliances. Sino-U.S. maritime competition is global in scope.¹⁹⁷

Second, America’s assessment of its forces compared to China’s has changed. The title of America’s new maritime strategy is clearly stated: obtaining advantage at sea. The Foreword mentions that America’s advantage at sea is no longer unrivalled, that it faces challenges from China. It cannot be ruled out that with this strategy the U.S. seeks to give the impression of weakness or is exaggerating the threat from China to gain a larger national defense budget. However, based on the speeches of high-level U.S. officials and those involved in the U.S. political and military spheres it appears that the U.S. firmly believes that it is losing its advantage at sea. During a 2019 Congressional testimony, the Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, gave a speech entitled “regain the advantage.” Clearly, believing that China is gaining advantage vis-à-vis the U.S. and the U.S. is losing its advantage has become the consensus of the U.S. strategic community. Based on this judgment, the U.S. will focus on weakening China’s advantage and regaining advantage at sea.¹⁹⁸

Third, the strategy guides preparations for war. Cooperation is the theme of the 2007 and 2015 iterations of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. There was a belief that in the age of globalization maritime threats were the common threats faced by all states using the sea, and given that these threats cannot be resolved by one single county it advocated for engaging in global maritime cooperation. The corresponding guiding principles proposed reliance on forward presence in shaping the peacetime environment and controlling crises. The means discussed in the new maritime strategy focus not on shaping but winning victory.¹⁹⁹

Lastly, and of great importance, the strategy exhibits a major defect. It does not touch on the most important strategic issue in the sea power struggle, that is, how to simultaneously confront two great powers, China and Russia, all around the globe. How the U.S. allocates its forces between the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean will be the biggest problem for the strategy. Moreover, how the U.S. would simultaneously handle the strategic struggle in the west and the east if China and Russia were to form an alliance is an issue that the U.S. maritime strategy does not consider.²⁰⁰

At first glance, it seems that China has finally been thrust into the dangerous tempest of modern maritime competition as a great power. Keeping in mind China’s vulnerable position in the maritime order since the age of sail, that China is now seen by the U.S. as an evenly matched opponent, whether for good or ill, means that we cannot just turn a blind eye and sit back and wait for death.²⁰¹

First, the end of the Trump administration strategy does not mean that the strategy will quickly become a historical document. The keynote of America’s new maritime strategy is strict implementation of America’s newest “National Security Strategy” and “National Defense Strategy.” In the present context, in which Sino-U.S. strategic competition has become the high level consensus of the two political parties in the Congress, it is certainly unlikely that major adjustments will be made to the strategy after the new administration takes office. Before the document was released, adjustments to U.S. maritime forces had already begun in order to implement the strategy. For example, the USN Chief of Naval Operations proposed the recreation of the “1st Fleet” in order to fill the force gap between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. Coastal Riverine Forces changed their name to the Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces, emphasizing “blue water and high-end operations,” in order to meet the needs of great power war.²⁰²

Second, [since] the strategy aims to weaken China’s advantages and fight for command of the sea, it will intensify confrontation between Chinese and U.S. sea and air forces and might spark a conflict or even a regional war. Considering the U.S. combatant command-level “Indo-Pacific Strategic Report” and the visions of the combatant commander, [one can conclude that] the U.S. efforts to weaken China’s advantages will be implemented in conjunction with “pushing back against China.” The U.S. will continuously engage in saber-rattling [lit. “flaunt its muscles”], it will strengthen medium- and long-range power projection capabilities, and striking China’s maritime forces will drive its construction. As a result, U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific will be more frequent, more robust, and more focused on strike capabilities.²⁰³

Third, the U.S. will also introduce a new style of struggle, namely, it will bolster competition in the “gray zone.” That is, the U.S. will take greater action in the domains of social media; supply chains, especially defense industry chains; and space and cyber. A fairly obvious early indicator of this was that the USCG—which traditionally operates in the vicinity of the U.S. coast to defend the security of U.S. territory—has recently moved forward into the South China Sea region. It is preparing to conduct military operations in the South China Sea, with the aim of striking China’s maritime forces as well as bolstering joint law enforcement with regional states in the South China Sea, in order to respond to China’s South China Sea rights protection operations.²⁰⁴

In the face of this severe maritime security challenge, China should strive to control potential maritime conflicts with the U.S., doing so in these four ways. First, it should maintain strategic restraint, making every effort to urge the U.S. to reduce its hostility [towards China]. Second, it should maintain the smooth operation of strategic communications channels and crisis control mechanisms, in order to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations that might give rise to conflict or an inadvertent armed clash. Third, it should take substantive actions to unite neighboring states to jointly safeguard regional security and peace. Fourth, it should promote global and regional maritime governance to restrain America’s impulse to militarize maritime security.²⁰⁵

Shi Xiaoqin is a researcher in the World Naval Research Institute at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. A retired PLA Senior Colonel, Shi has worked at the PLA Academy of Military Science, Central Military Commission Department of Strategic Planning, and the Office of the National Security Council. She researches sea power, maritime security, and naval strategy.²⁰⁶

Liu Xiaobo is the Director of the World Naval Research Institute at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. A former naval officer, Liu worked at the PLAN Naval Research Institute from 2007-2017. From 1993-2007 he was assigned to the first destroyer detachment of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet.²⁰⁷

From the above, several things emerge for consideration. The first is that China is not unaware of the military activities of the United States in the South China Sea or the East China Sea as the case may be and in the Western Pacific in general – in recent years – for the good, the bad and the ugly. China is closely monitoring the United States and its new aggressive military posturing and/or gunboat diplomacy in the region. With the activities of such a think-tank as the South China Sea Situation Probing Initiative, and not the clandestine activities by the China’s Military Intelligence, US is being served the notice: We know you are here! We know what you are doing! We are not fooled! On the other hand, the United States knows that the Chinese know what it is doing in spite of the various camouflages. Therefore, both sides are not fooled by each other at all.

The second is a very crucial issue. What can one interprete as the Chinese mindset towards the US military activities in the South China Sea? Is China worried at the spate of these military activities? If it is worried, what could be the extent of the worry? What is the nature and type of the worry?

It is difficult knowing and understanding the mindset of the Chinese governing elite towards the US. One cannot pretend to know it. But from the spate of condemnations of these military incursions or exercise in gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea by the United States, including the various propaganda, one can draw the inference that the Chinese are truly worried because they too do not know precisely the intent and/or purpose of the US military exercises – whether they are an end in themselves simply to intimidate China or they are preparatory to invasion of China by testing the waters in advance. China is also obviously worried about the increasing multilateral cooperation between the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region in carrying out joint exercises in the South China Sea. US is also slowly dragging its allies from Europe (United Kingdom, France, Germany and others) including Canada to the South and East China Seas under one pretext or the other. This level of worry might be considered legitimate or justifiable simply because of its strategic importance in changing the balance of power against China especially if it finally comes to exchange of blows by a deliberate intent to clip the flapping wings of the Chinese Dragon or through an accident on the already turbulent waters of the South China Sea.

If the analysis of Shi Xiaoqin and Liu Xiaobo of the China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies is anything to go by, even though not an official position of the China’s Military Commission whose chairman is President Xi Jinping himselt, it is obvious that the Chinese are extremely worried going by the languages they deployed to describe and characterize the Maritime Strategy. For instance they are worried “that in the next ten years the USN, USMC, and USCG will come together to shape a maritime balance of power favorable to the U.S. in order to offset China’s advantages.”

The Chinese recognize that “The new maritime strategy document shows that the American conviction has changed to “principled realism,” which emphasizes seizing the advantage and using traditional military power to safeguard the international order. In the past, the U.S. believed that it could achieve cooperation at sea with China.” This is contrast to previous “liberal interventionism” that is anchored on the use of means other than war – including deterrence, ocean management, law enforcement, patrols, and low-intensity operations – to safeguard the international order”.

The authors believed that “America’s assessment of its forces compared to China’s has changed” but are fearful that “the strategy guides preparations for war.” However, they finally observe and “of great importance” that  “the strategy exhibits a major defect. It does not touch on the most important strategic issue in the sea power struggle, that is, how to simultaneously confront two great powers, China and Russia, all around the globe.”

The authors conclude that “it seems that China has finally been thrust into the dangerous tempest of modern maritime competition as a great power. Keeping in mind China’s vulnerable position in the maritime order since the age of sail, that China is now seen by the U.S. as an evenly matched opponent, whether for good or ill, means that we cannot just turn a blind eye and sit back and wait for death.”

There are three pegs on which this conclusion is based.

The first is that “the end of the Trump administration strategy does not mean that the strategy will quickly become a historical document. The keynote of America’s new maritime strategy is strict implementation of America’s newest “National Security Strategy” and “National Defense Strategy.” In the present context, in which Sino-U.S. strategic competition has become the high level consensus of the two political parties in the Congress, it is certainly unlikely that major adjustments will be made to the strategy after the new administration takes office.

The second is that “the strategy aims to weaken China’s advantages and fight for command of the sea, it will intensify confrontation between Chinese and U.S. sea and air forces and might spark a conflict or even a regional war.”

The third is that “the U.S. will also introduce a new style of struggle, namely, it will bolster competition in the “gray zone.” That is, the U.S. will take greater action in the domains of social media; supply chains, especially defense industry chains; and space and cyber. A fairly obvious early indicator of this was that the USCG—which traditionally operates in the vicinity of the U.S. coast to defend the security of U.S. territory—has recently moved forward into the South China Sea region. It is preparing to conduct military operations in the South China Sea, with the aim of striking China’s maritime forces as well as bolstering joint law enforcement with regional states in the South China Sea, in order to respond to China’s South China Sea rights protection operations.”

While the Chinese authors may have correctly observed the growing status of the US Coastal Guards within the framework of the US Naval Services and its growing status as a global force to be reckoned with within the framework of enforcement and interdictions, they essentially did not or failed to link it with the emergence, on the other hand, of China’s Maritime Militaia as a potent force that has been giving increasing strategic concern to China’s neighbouring countries including the US. In short, there is a kind of interconnectivity between the growing role of the USCG and China’s Maritime Militia. The role of China’s Maritime Militia within the context of growing hostility between China and her neighbouring countries is beyond the scope of this article here but will be examined in a separate article later.

However, China is encountering regional hostilities in recent times that actually have their roots in the past Chinese predatory attitudes towards the neighbouring countries. What is more worrisome to the Chinese is that these neighbouring countries now seem to be reliant on the United States for their both physical and figurative defense from one degree to another. China knows very well that it cannot launch military attack on any of the neighbouring countries without spiking a counter-reaction from the United States. Thus China is handcuffed by itself.

Thus, despite its itchy fingers on the trigger of the guns already aimed at Taiwan, China has been largely restrained from pulling the trigger. Why? Because it is not unaware that this is just one issue that the US would not take lightly with China if it dares to invade Taiwan. The US is most unlikely to fold its arms while the China’s PLA overruns Taiwan. Taiwan has become a delicate strategic calculus for both the US and China and nobody seems to be backing down from its entrenched bellicose standpoints.

But in addition to Taiwan is The Philippines. The Philippines has fought China on the international legal plane and won. But China has refused, with impunity, to respect the international tribunal judgment that asked China to back off its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters under contention.

Vietnam, Brunei and host of other countries, including South Korea and Japan, have axe to grind with China and all these countries are raising their tomahawks against China. Australia has recently joined the league of hostile countries against China by baring its fangs against China.

Thus it can be seen that China has come to face a contemporary hostility from its neighbours not just because it has become an economic behemoth but more because it has become a huge military and security threat to the identity and sovereignty of these countries as the Chinese hegemonic ambitions become open for all to see despite its propaganda nonsense about peaceful coexistence and the need for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

China recognizes that the US is the only mortal threat to its entire corpus of global and regional hegemonic ambitions. And to undercut the US or whittle down its power, China has embarked on two-pronged policy approach: economic development and modernaization of its military. 

The elevation of the US Coastal Guard into the global strategic domain and possible frontline battle from the duty of enforcement of US coastal proximity as noted by the Chinese specialists are of immense importance in understanding the reaction of the Chinese to the new Maritime Strategy.

The [US] Department of the Navy (DON) is a single military department that includes two military services—the Navy and the Marine Corps. As such, DON has a single civilian leader, the Secretary of the Navy, and two four-star military service chiefs—an admiral whose title is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and a general whose title is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Although the title “Secretary of the Navy” includes only the term “Navy,” the secretary serves as the civilian leader for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).²⁰⁸

Although the term “naval” is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq), and is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C. 8001(a)(3) states that “The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-Marine Corps team. See also the section below entitled “The Naval Service.”²⁰⁹

Unlike DON, which is part of DOD and is covered (along with the Departments of the Army and Air Force) in the U.S. Code primarily in Title 10, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is covered primarily in Title 14. Even though the Coast Guard is not part of DOD, Title 14 states that the Coast Guard “shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times.” (14 U.S.C. 101) Title 14 states that the Coast Guard “shall be a service in the Department of Homeland Security, except when operating as a service in the Navy” (14 U.S.C. 103(a)), and that

          Upon the declaration of war if Congress so directs in the declaration or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate as a         service in the Navy, and shall so continue until the President, by Executive order, transfers the Coast Guard back to the Department of Homeland Security. While operating as a service in the Navy, the    Coast Guard shall be subject to the orders of the Secretary of the         Navy, who may order changes in Coast Guard operations to render    them uniform, to the extent such Secretary deems advisable, with      Navy operations.” (14 U.S.C. 103(b)) The last time the Coast Guard           operated as a service in the Navy was during World War II.The          possibility that the Coast Guard might at some point operate as a   service in the Navy is why legislation concerning the Coast Guard      sometimes uses phrases such as “the   Secretary of the Department in       which the Coast Guard is operating.”²¹⁰

The four-star admiral who heads the Coast Guard, called the Commandant of the Coast Guard, is not a member of the JCS.²¹¹

Unlike the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, the Coast Guard is not only a military service and a branch of the armed forces, but also a law enforcement agency. For this reason, Navy ships whose operations create a distinct possibility of encountering potential law enforcement situations sometimes embark detachments of Coast Guard personnel.²¹²

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are also sometimes referred to collectively by officials of those services and other observers as the naval service. For example, a tri-service strategy document released in December 2020, entitled Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, states that the three services are “collectively known as the Naval Service,” and defines the term naval service in its glossary as meaning the three services. As another example, the April 2020 edition of a tri-service doctrine publication, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, states: “The United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard collectively form the nation’s Naval Service.”²¹³

The Coast Guard, however, is not frequently referred to as a naval service in annual Navy or Coast Guard documents submitted to Congress, and the U.S. Code does not specifically define the Coast Guard as a naval service (as opposed to a military service or a branch of the armed forces) in 10 U.S.C. 8001(a)(3), 14 U.S.C. 101, 14 U.S.C. 103(a), or other provisions.²¹⁴

The three services in recent years have from to time issued joint maritime strategy documents, including, most recently, the previously mentioned document entitled Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, which was released in December 2020.²¹⁵ 

Sinclair, McHarty and Herzinger (2021) are of the view that [t]he updated Tri-Service Maritime Strategy might be the most important enterprise-level policy document for the Coast Guard of the last 30 years. At its core, the strategy does two key things. First, it acknowledges the idea that the heads of the naval services collectively believe that to prevail in strategic competition in the maritime domain, the United States must be able to outmatch our adversaries not just in terms of lethality, but in our ability to effectively operate below the threshold of conflict. Doing so is a critical component of national defense in and of itself and has the benefit of helping to create the operating and theater conditions that increase the potential for success if it becomes necessary to engage in armed conflict. In other words, while the strategy is replete with strong language calling for increased lethality and more flexibly deployed hard power punch, it also importantly acknowledges that sea power means more than strike4 and sea control and that successfully navigating the entire competition continuum in the maritime furthers U.S. national defense as a whole.²¹⁶

This opens the door for (long necessary) increased attention to issues like maritime security capacity building with like-minded partner nations and allies, most (but not all) of whom are not particularly interested in U.S. Navy-like force projection, but are instead concerned about being able to effectively govern and protect their own maritime borders. Thus, assisting our partners develop the authorities, capabilities, and capacity to execute their own maritime constabulary functions like exclusive economic zone enforcement, contraband interdiction, migrant operations, and countering illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing must be part of a holistic maritime national defense posture because our rivals are using all measures short of war to advance their strategic goals; none more so than China. The TSMS clearly states that helping partner and allied nations so that they can better address these challenges, but especially when the challenges are posed by strategic rivals to the United States like China and Russia, is a critically important tile in the mosaic of modern sea power.²¹⁷

Of nearly equal import, the strategy also (albeit slightly) acknowledges that the Arctic is an increasingly important competition domain and that an overt, persistent presence in the high latitudes advances our national security interests, consistent with both the Department of Defense (DOD) services (Navy and Air Force) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s recently updated Arctic strategy documents.²¹⁸

These equities — the imperative to team with partner nations and the growing and long past due acknowledgment of the Arctic (and, although not mentioned in the strategy, likely even the Antarctic) in the expanding field of strategic competition — directly implicate the core competencies of an increasingly global U.S. Coast Guard. Including them in the TSMS inextricably links the Coast Guard to its DOD-based naval services partners. The importance of this linkage for the Coast Guard in what will foreseeably be a more competitive budget environment cannot be overstated.²¹⁹

Second, the strategy calls for increased integration and interoperability between the naval services. This means operational integration; education, training, and performance improvement integration; and procurement integration. Perhaps most importantly though, it means cultural integration, the full extent of which has been wickedly elusive to the U.S armed forces. Total naval services cultural integration, aspirationally marked by truly seamless jointness, would greatly benefit not just the nation, but the Coast Guard particularly, which sometimes finds itself on the outside looking in with respect to major DOD muscle movements, including budget plus ups, discussions regarding fleet sizes, personnel management/benefits, and even important “all hands” guidance from senior U.S. military leadership.²²⁰

There has already been lots of coverage regarding the Coast Guard’s tactical and operational role in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy. This brief will not rehash that, but will instead call attention to some higher-level actions that will also help execute the strategy. As a start, the Biden administration should seriously consider taking the necessary steps to add the commandant of the Coast Guard as a full voting member to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doing so would require a statutory change, but if executing Coast Guard-like functions are truly going to be part of the sea power projection equation, this change is long past due.²²¹

Further, the administration should charter a study as to whether the DHS is still the best organizational model to meet the threats of the world today. This would necessary include an assessment of whether nesting the Coast Guard in DHS still makes the most sense, given the current geopolitical environment marked by strategic competition with so-called “great power” rivals. Analyzing the pros and cons for shifting the Coast Guard out of DHS into DOD is relatively well-trod ground, but given China’s increasingly militarized Coast Guard, such a shift, either temporarily or permanently, may prove inevitable in the years to come.²²²

The key takeaway, however, is that ultimately, if we’re indeed serious about fully integrating the naval services at the operational level as called for in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, they must be likewise fully integrated at the legislative level. There are several ways to go about this, ranging from relatively easy closer institutionalized coordination amongst relevant committee staff and members to comparatively harder major shifts in authorization and appropriation committee responsibility. But it must be done.²²³

Fence-ringing the World

China is not unaware of the military strength of the United States, considered objectively without fanciful propaganda. China is not unaware that the United States has practically fence-ringed the world with its about 800 active military bases round the world including the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions. China is not unaware that it is greatly disadvantaged by its lack of foreign bases – hence the military component of the Belt and Road Initiative. While the economic-infrastructure aspect of BRI is ongoing even with the latest hostility mounted against it due mainly to the Western propaganda, the military component is yet to take on concrete form that can be considered a counter-weight to the existing fortified US military bases with special reference to the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions.

The United States operates a global network of military installations and is by far the largest operator of military bases abroad with locations in dozens of nations on every continent, with 38 “named bases” having active-duty, National Guard, reserve, or civilian personnel as of September 30, 2014. Its largest, in terms of personnel, is Ramstein AB, in Germany, with almost 9,200 personnel.²²⁴

The Pentagon stated in 2013 that there are “around” 5,000 bases total, with “around” 600 of them overseas. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject there is no comprehensive list of detailed information on the exact number or location of all bases, stations and installations as it involves highly classified information. The total number of foreign sites for installations and facilities that are either in active use and service or may be activated and operated and by American military personnel and allies is at just over 1000.²²⁵

David Vine (2015), associate professor of sociology at American University noted that: Despite recently closing hundreds of bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States still maintains nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories abroad—from giant “Little Americas” to small radar facilities. Britain, France and Russia, by contrast, have about 30 foreign bases combined.²²⁶

By my calculation, maintaining bases and troops overseas cost $85 to $100 billion in fiscal year 2014; the total with bases and troops in warzones is $160 to $200 billion. These costs have heightened debate over whether the United States needs so many bases abroad: What effect do they have around the world, and are they really making us safer?²²⁷

The first step is looking at where U.S. bases are, and where they’re most prevalent.

Italy: Hundreds of bases in Europe have closed since the 1990s, but the base and troop ( 11,500) presence in Italy has been relatively constant. Recently, the military has built new bases and expanded Africa-focused operations in Sicily.

Japan: During the Cold War, U.S. forces occupied hundreds of bases in Japan and the Pacific to surround China and the Soviet Union. Since 1995, anti-base protests have escalated in Okinawa, where there are still more than 30 bases.

Honduras: A “temporary” base has existed since 1982, allowing officials to claim there’s no U.S. base in Honduras while circumventing the Honduran constitution’s prohibition against a permanent foreign troop presence. Some suspect the base’s involvement in a 2009 military coup.

Burkina Faso: A “cooperative security location” in Ouagadougou reflects a new generation of small, clandestine “lily pad” bases appearing in countries with little previous U.S. military presence. At least 11 such bases in Africa host special operations forces, drones and surveillance flights.

Iraq: There were 505 bases at the U.S. occupation’s height, but the Iraqi parliament rejected the Pentagon’s wish to keep 58 “enduring” bases after the 2011 withdrawal. U.S. forces have occupied at least five bases since 2014 and are considering more installations.

Thailand: The Pentagon rents space at U-Tapao Naval Air Base from a contractor, allowing U.S. and Thai officials to insist there’s no U.S. “base” and no inter-governmental basing agreement. The base was a major logistics hub for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Philippines: The Philippines evicted U.S. forces from massive bases in the 1990s. Since 2002, at least 600 U.S. troops have deployed to help Filipino forces combat insurgents from some seven lily pads; 6,000 U.S. troops have operated temporarily under the cover of military exercises.²²⁸

[Meanwhile] United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is a unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for the Indo-Pacific region founded on January 1, 1947 after the Second World War with the strength of 375,000 personnel.²²⁹

Formerly known as United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) since its inception, the command was renamed to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on 30 May 2018, in recognition of the greater emphasis on South Asia, especially India.²³⁰

It is the oldest and largest of the unified combatant commands. Its commander, the senior U.S. military officer in the Pacific, is responsible for military operations in an area which encompasses more than 100 million square miles (260,000,000 km²), or roughly 52 percent of the Earth’s surface, stretching from the waters off the West Coast of the United States to the west coast of India, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic.²³¹

The commander reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is supported by service component and subordinate unified commands, including U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Korea, Special Operations Command Korea, and Special Operations Command Pacific. USINDOPACOM also has two direct reporting units (DRUs)—U.S. Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) and the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance  (CFE-DMHA), as well as a Standing Joint Task Force, Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W). The USINDOPACOM headquarters building, the Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center, is located on Camp H.M.Smith, Hawaii.²³²

United States Indo-Pacific Command protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, we will enhance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence and military readiness. We recognize the global significance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and understand that challenges are best met together. Consequently, we will remain an engaged and trusted partner committed to preserving the security, stability, and freedom upon which enduring prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region depends. We will collaborate with the Services and other Combatant Commands to defend America’s interests.²³³

USINDOPACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses the Pacific Ocean from Antarctica at 92°W, north to 8°N, west to 112°W, northwest to 50°N/142°W, west to 170°E, north to 53°N, northeast to 62°30’N/175°W, north to 64°45’N/175°W, south along the Russian territorial waters to the People’s Republic of China, Mongolia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and Japan; the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern Asian landmass to the western border of India; the Indian Ocean east and south of the line from the India/Pakistan coastal border west to 68°E, south along 68°E to Antarctica; Australia; New Zealand, Antarctica and Hawaii.²³⁴

Characteristic features:

• 36 nations
• More than half the world’s population
• 3,200 different languages
• 5 of 7 U.S. collective defense treaties²³⁵

United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is one of six geographic combatant commands defined by the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). As a geographic combatant command, USINDOPACOM is in charge of using and integrating United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests. The USINDOPACOM AOR covers more of the globe of any of the other geographic combatant commands and shares borders with all of the other five geographic combatant commands. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is supported by multiple component and sub-unified commands including: U.S. Forces Korea, US Forces Japan, U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Army Pacific.²³⁶

There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The 36 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than 50% of the world’s population, 3,000 different languages, several of the world’s largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties. Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific, along with ten of the fourteen smallest. The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one third of Asia-Pacific nations are smaller, island nations, including the smallest republic in the world and the smallest nation in Asia.²³⁷

The region is a vital driver of the global economy and includes the world’s busiest international sea lanes and nine of the ten largest ports. The Asia-Pacific is also a heavily militarized region, with seven of the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations. Given these conditions, the strategic complexity facing the region is unique.²³⁸

In concert with other U.S. government agencies, USINDOPACOM protects and defends the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win.  This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.²³⁹

The US Pacific Command [USPACOM] was established as a unified command on 01 January 1947 as an outgrowth of the command structure used during World War II. The command is the oldest and largest of the United States’ nine unified commands. In October 1957, the US Pacific Command headquarters was moved from Makalapa to Camp H.M. Smith, location of the headquarters of the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific.²⁴⁰

Added responsibilities were assigned to USCINCPAC on 01 January 1972 for military forces and elements in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia and the Arctic. His area of responsibility was further expanded on 1 May 1976 to the east coast of Africa. This enlarged the U.S. Pacific Command to more than 50 percent of the earth’s surface, an area of over 100 million square miles. Another enlargement of the USPACOM area took place in October 1983, when USCINCPAC was assigned responsibility for the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People’s Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. The most recent enlargement of the USPACOM area of responsibility occurred on 7 July 1989, when the Alaskan Command (which had been disestablished in 1975) was reestablished at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska as a subordinate unified command of USCINCPAC. The Unified Command Plans of 1989 and 1996 slightly reduced USCINCPAC’s area of responsibility. In 1989, with the focus of attention shifting to the Middle East, the 16 August plan reassigned responsibility for the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden to USCINCCENT. Likewise, the 01 January 1996 plan transferred the Seychelles and adjacent waters to USCINCCENT.²⁴¹

USPACOM Headquarters staff consists of about 530 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel, plus about 110 civil service employees. About 1,500 people belong to additional support units, such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Information Systems Support Activity, the Pacific Automated Server Site Japan, the Pacific Stars and Stripes, the Joint Interagency Task Force West, the Joint Task Force Full-Accounting. the Cruise Missile Support Activity, the Special Intelligence Communications, the Joint Intelligence Training Activity Pacific, and the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific.²⁴²

The highly respected Senator Daniel K. Inouye declared that “The United States Pacific Command is the largest U.S. military regional command that stretches from the west coast of the United States to India.”²⁴³  This was as far back as April 2002.

Senator Inouye further disclosed that “More than 300,000 U.S. military personnel are assigned to this command. It’s an area of many challenges and many opportunities. Forty-three nations are in its area of responsibility. Seven of the world’s eight largest armies are in this area. Three of the world’s most populous nations are in this region. It is an area of rapid economic growth, but also the home of many impoverished nations. It is a region with many emerging democracies, but also one with totalitarian regimes who still threaten their neighbors. In the Pacific, one finds thorny territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands, and long simmering tensions between such places like Taiwan and China, North and South Korea. A fact unknown to most Americans is that Asia is home to the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia. Yet, with all of these challenges of potential problems, it’s been a region of relative peace and calm. At least for 30 years, there have been no major conflicts in this theater.²⁴⁴

The leaders in every nation in the Pacific know that the key factor which has given us this generation of peace is in the Pacific Command,… Unlike Europe, there’s no North Atlantic Treaty  Organization (NATO) keeping the peace and deterring aggression. In Asia, it is up to you, Admiral [Dennis C. Blair]. The Pacific Command has maintained a military force necessary to deter any threats. Equally important, the U.S. military has been engaged in peaceful cooperation every day in the region. This combination of deterrence and engagement is the reason for the generation of peace.²⁴⁵

The Seventh Fleet is a numbered fleet of the United States Navy. It is headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan. It is part of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 60 to 70 ships, 300 aircraft and 40,000 Navy, Marine Corps personnel, and Coast Guard support personnel. Its principal responsibilities are to provide joint command in natural disaster or military operations and operational command of all US naval forces in the region.²⁴⁶

The Seventh Fleet was formed on 15 March 1943 in Brisbane, Australia, during World War II, under the command of Admiral Arthur S. “Chips” Carpender. It served in the South West Pacific Area  (SWPA) under General Douglas MacArthur. The Seventh Fleet commander also served as commander of Allied naval forces in the SWPA.²⁴⁷

After the end of the war, the 7th Fleet moved its headquarters to Qingdao, China. As laid out in Operation Plan 13–45 of 26 August 1945, Kinkaid established five major task forces to manage operations in the Western Pacific: Task Force 71, the North China Force with 75 ships; Task Force 72, the Fast Carrier Force, directed to provide air cover to the Marines going ashore and discourage with dramatic aerial flyovers any Communist forces that might oppose the operation; Task Force 73, the Yangtze Patrol Force with another 75 combatants; Task Force 74, the South China Force, ordered to protect the transportation of Japanese  and Chinese Nationalist troops from that region; and Task Force 78, the Amphibious Force, charged with the movement of the III Marine Amphibious Corps to China.²⁴⁸

After the war, on 1 January 1947, the Fleet’s name was changed to Naval Forces Western Pacific. In late 1948, the Fleet moved its principal base of operations from Qingdao to the Philippines, where the Navy, following the war, had developed new facilities at Subic Bay and an airfield at Sangley Point. Peacetime operations of the Seventh Fleet were under the control of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, but standing orders provided that, when operating in Japanese waters or in the event of an emergency, control would pass to Commander, Naval Forces Far East, a component of General Douglas MacArthur’s occupation force.²⁴⁹

On 19 August 1949 the force was designated as United States Seventh Task Fleet. On 11 February 1950, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the force assumed the name United States Seventh Fleet, which it holds today.²⁵⁰

Seventh Fleet units participated in all major operations of the Korea and Vietnamese Wars. The first Navy jet aircraft used in combat was launched from a Task Force 77 (TF 77) aircraft carrier on 3 July 1950. The landings at Inchon, Korea were conducted by Seventh Fleet amphibious ships. The battleships Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri and Wisconsin all served as flagships for Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet during the Korean War. During the Korean War, the Seventh Fleet consisted of Task Force 70, a maritime patrol force provided by Fleet Air Wing One and Fleet Air Wing Six, Task Force 72, the Formosa Patrol, Task Force 77, and Task Force 79, a service support squadron.²⁵¹

Over the next decade the Seventh Fleet responded to numerous crisis situations including contingency operations conducted in Laos in 1959 and Thailand in 1962. During September 1959, in the autumn of 1960, and again in January 1961, the Seventh Fleet deployed multiship carrier task forces into the South China Sea. Although the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese supporting forces withdrew in each crisis, in the spring of 1961 their offensive appeared on the verge of overwhelming the pro-American Royal Lao Army.²⁵²

Of the 50–60 ships typically assigned to Seventh Fleet, 18 operate from U.S. facilities in Japan and Guam. These forward-deployed units represent the heart of Seventh Fleet, and the centerpieces of American forward presence in Asia. They are 17 steaming days closer to locations in Asia than their counterparts based in the continental United States. It would take three to five times the number of rotationally-based ships in the U.S. to equal the same presence and crisis response capability as these 18 forward deployed ships. On any given day, about 50% of Seventh Fleet forces are deployed at sea throughout the area of responsibility.²⁵³

Following the end of the Cold War, the two major military scenarios in which the Seventh Fleet would be used would be in case of conflict in Korea or a conflict between People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (Republic of China) in the Taiwan Strait.²⁵⁴

[In the case of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China was embarrassed by the amount of firepower commanded by the Seventh Fleet. China quickly retreated to avoid being pummelled by the US Seventh Fleet in a conflict.]

Seventh Fleet is the largest of the U.S. Navy’s forward deployed fleets. At any given time there are roughly 50-70 ships and submarines, 150 aircraft, and approximately 20,000 Sailors in Seventh Fleet. It is [c]ommanded by a 3-star Navy Flag officer, Vice Adm. Bill Merz, since September 12, 2019.²⁵⁵

Seventh Fleet’s area of operation spans more than 124 million square kilometers, stretching from the International Date Line to the India/Pakistan border;and from the Kuril Islands in the North to the Antarctic in the South. Seventh Fleet’s area of operation encompasses 36 maritime countries and 50% of the world’s population, including: The five largest foreign militaries: China, Russia, India, North Korea, and the Republic of Korea; and Five U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty Allies: the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Thailand.²⁵⁶

For more than 75 years Seventh Fleet has maintained a continuous forward presence in the Indo Pacific, providing security and stability to the region. In 2018, U.S. 7th Fleet ships, squadrons, operational units and senior leaders promoted regional stability and maritime security through more than 1,000 theater security cooperation engagements. Engagements included major operational events, such as 160 bilateral and multilateral exercises, as well as 370 port visits and more than 500 senior leader exchanges, construction projects, military to military training and education seminars and community relations events. Building partnerships and familiarity helps avoid misunderstandings and prevents unnecessary military escalation.²⁵⁷

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is currently the Navy’s forward deployed aircraft carrier in Seventh Fleet. Whereas other carriers are homeported in the U.S. and deploy periodically, USS Ronald Reagan is permanently forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan and spends about half of each year at sea. USS Ronald Reagan, when combined with guided missile destroyers and cruisers, creates a carrier strike group of up to 12 ships and 75 aircraft. These forces have a higher operational tempo than other Navy vessels, and being forward deployed cuts an average of 17 days transit time to the region compared to forces based in the continental U.S. The Navy may assign another aircraft carrier to Seventh Fleet for temporary operations, adding 70 more aircraft and numerous ships to our long range strike capability.²⁵⁸

Seventh Fleet controls 10-14 destroyers and cruisers at any given time, with 11 based in Yokosuka and 25 periodically assigned to the region from Hawaii or San Diego. These surface ships carry Theater Ballistic Missile interceptors, long range Tomahawk land attack missiles and antiaircraft missiles.²⁵⁹

Should tensions escalate into armed conflict, our advanced submarines would provide our greatest advantage against an enemy. At any given time there are 8-12 submarines in Seventh Fleet. All U.S. subs are nuclear powered.²⁶⁰

Seventh Fleet has 16-20 reconnaissance aircraft, the newest being a militarized version of the  Boeing 737 called the P8, which arrived in Dec 2013. These aircraft provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance of the entire region. They also carry sonobuoys and torpedoes for antisubmarine warfare.²⁶¹

Seventh Fleet has four amphibious ships, the largest of which is the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). Nearly the size of an aircraft carrier, Wasp is capable of carrying dozens of helicopters, MV22 Ospreys and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter aircraft along with more than 1,700 Marines and their equipment. Amphibious ships are specifically designed to operate relatively close to shore using landing craft to support of amphibious operations ashore. This design also makes them well suited to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. In addition to the amphibious ships, Seventh Fleet also controls four mine countermeasure ships designed to locate and neutralize mines. Both these and the amphibious ships are based in Sasebo, Japan.²⁶²

Forward deployed SEAL teams and special boat units are based in Guam. They often provide support to Presidential visits.²⁶³

Naval Expeditionary Forces within Seventh Fleet are comprised of Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Coastal Riverine, Embarked Security, and Construction forces. These forces execute a wide range of missions in the littorals and on land, partnering with multiple nations throughout the Seventh Fleet. One of its missions is Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief and command and control of forces in response to HA/DR missions that leverage our uniquely inherent Navy Expeditionary capabilities to render assistance throughout the 7th fleet.²⁶⁴

Seventh Fleet is self sufficient, with about 50 combat logistics ships commanded from Singapore. They are government owned or contracted ships with partial civilian crews and Navy presence. These ships supply Seventh Fleet units throughout the region for continuous, sustained operations at sea.²⁶⁵

In summary, if it comes to exchange of blows in the South China Sea or in the Pacific, China would be greatly disadvantaged even with its current status of military strength and the ongoing modernization. Falling back on its nuclear arsenal as a way of equalizing the United States also has its great disadvantages.

First, starting a nuclear war with the United States, either on a first-strike basis or in self-defense is a direct invitation to Armaegeddon that will be unleashed on it by the United States. It is a sure road to hell.

Second, a limited war with the United States (without application or deployment of nuclear weapons) is also a disadvantage to China because such a limited war would be fought exclusively on Chinese sea shores in which case all its coastal industrial cities would be severely punished by heavy bombardment and pounding from the US Navy and Air Force that would break the backbone of China’s industrial power.

This is because even with its large naval fleet, China PLA Navy is still yet to take on form of global “blue sea navy” status – in other words, the ability to project its Naval power worldwide like the Russians, the British or the Americans. Chinese Navy has grown proportionally strong in recent years and it is increasingly becoming fearsome within the Asia-Pacific region. It is already making incursions beyond the Pacific to other regions in the world. Yet it is largely constrained. For instance, China has so far only one operational aircraft carrier (Liaoning) which is not even designated as a supercarrier of the USS Nimitz or Ronald Reagan or Theodore Roosevelt status. The second carrier is not fully operational. Even though not much is currently known about Chinese submarine fleet, there has been no indication of the extent of its projection of power to the immediate proximity of the US shores. On the other hand, the entire Asia-Pacific is crawling with US submarines that can be argued to be primed mainly against the Chinese in view of its rising threat level and the concomitant reduction of the Russian threat level. The United States parades some of the most powerful and advanced nuclear-powered submarine fleet in the world. Added to this is the various end-to-end Global Strike Force of the United States Air Force with its various components of long-range strategic nuclear bombers such as B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, B-2 and the upcoming B-21 Raider. This is apart from its nuclear arsenal under the Strategic Air Command (SAC)/NORAD

China is no doubt facing a very hostile environment with particular reference to what has been considered the world’s most dangerous seas (South China Sea and East China Sea) and then the Indian Ocean. In what retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair, the highly respected former Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command, called a “high operating tempo (optempo) world” China faces a huge swarthe of enemy countries that have sought refugee from the United States from one degree to another. These countries are more afraid of China than the United States. It is interesting to note that hardly any country in the region is really willing to enter into any form of military alliance with China because of the fear of its hegemonic ambitions for regional dominance. China is also facing another behemoth, another rising power, right under its nose: India, the largest democracy in the world. India has become a huge counterweight, a sort of hegemonic deterrence, to Chinese Communist dictatorship or authoritarianism. India has been slowly projecting its own power, both economically and militarily. India is a nuclear power and cannot be run over without grave consequences.

Walking a Geostrategic Tight Rope

It is amazing how suddenly, within a time-space of just about twenty years or therebout the United States found a military match in China that is now giving the US goose pimples on the face or making it have a sleepless night. It is amazing how China managed to fill in the vacuum created by the collapse of both the Soviet Union and Communist rule there – even before Russia could re-awaken to its lost glory.

There is no more doubt that the US is now extremely worried and scared of the emergence of a military behemoth in China that now clearly dwarf the height attained by the former Soviet Union before it went down into State failure and disintegration in 1991/92. China is now consuming the US’s strategic attention on daily basis, in worrying probes and analysis of the China’s global ambitions which have become visible in their hegemonic nature and character but yet still convey an enigma. How did China arrive at this point to suddenly surpass the individual South East Asian countries both economically and militarily. How did China achieve this feat?

US is now facing a foe unlike any other in the past not even the former Soviet Union and even the resurgent Russia. US was not unaware of the severe limitations of the Soviet Union in terms of its military strength as exemplified by the humiliation it suffered in the Afghanistan War from 1979 to 1988. For instance, it became evident that apart from its awesome nuclear weapons arsenal, the Soviet Red Army was severely constrained not in terms of manpower strength but in terms of equipment. But Soviet Union successfully sustained a massive propaganda that covered up the full extent of its military limitations but put it at par with the United States in terms of superiority and firepower.

However, in the case of China, it is a different ballgame entirely. Propaganda has very little role to play in what has rather become apparent that the Chinese PLA has covered a lot of mileage within a very short period and its military strength is visible for all to see in reality and in practice which has now come to pose a semi-existential threat to the American global status and threatening to topple it from that dizzying height. Chinese PLA has gained momentum, wax by leaps and bounds, gained strength consistently in all branches even though it has not been battle-tested in any major war. It has even gone into new realm of what is now collectively known as neuroweaponry, a very worrisome development that is now attracting the strategic attention within the Pentagon, the academia and strategic think-tanks across the  country (US).

The meteoric rise of China presents an epochal dilemma the US political officialdom and military establishment (including the military-industrial complex). What is applicable to the US is also doubly applicable to the European powers within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In a putative scenario of war, NATO may no longer be a match for the current military strength of China unlike Russia. For more than 50 years, NATO was able to serve as a deterrence to former Soviet Union. However, it is very much doubtful, if in a putative scenario, NATO would be able to crush China if it were to be “relocated” to the Asia or Indo-Pacific!

For 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has provided Congress with an annual report on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These reports have assessed the contours of China’s national strategy, its approach to security and military affairs, and potential changes in the PRC’s armed forces over the next 20 years, among other matters. 2020 marks an important year for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as it works to achieve important modernization milestones ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) broader goal to transform China into a “moderately prosperous society” by the CCP’s centenary in 2021. As the United States continues to respond to the growing strategic challenges posed by the PRC, 2020 offers a unique opportunity to assess both the continuity and changes that have taken place in the PRC’s strategy and armed forces over the past two decades.²⁶⁶

DoD’s first annual report to Congress in 2000 assessed the PRC’s armed forces at that time to be a sizable but mostly archaic military that was poorly suited to the CCP’s long-term ambitions. The report recognized the CCP’s objective was for the PRC to become a “strong, modernized, unified, and wealthy nation.” Despite these great power aspirations, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organization, and readiness for modern warfare. Yet the CCP understood these deficiencies and set long-term goals to strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations to strengthen and transform China.²⁶⁷

DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modern warfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfare along China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defense industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.”²⁶⁸

Two decades later, the PLA’s objective is to become a “world-class” military by the end of 2049—a goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined what a “world-class” military means, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijing will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat. As this year’s report details, the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:²⁶⁹

• Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the U.S. Navy’s battle force is approximately 293 ships as of early 2020.
• Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 groundlaunched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.
• Integrated air defense systems: The PRC has one of the world’s largest forces of advanced longrange surface-to-air systems—including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced systems—that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense system architecture.²⁷⁰

More striking than the PLA’s staggering amounts of new military hardware are the recent sweeping efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited for joint operations, improving the PLA’s overall combat readiness, encouraging the PLA to embrace new operational concepts, and expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.²⁷¹

Despite the PLA’s progress over the past 20 years, major gaps and shortcomings remain. The PRC’s leaders are aware of these problems, and their strategy envisions the PLA undergoing almost 30 more years of modernization and reform. Of course, the CCP does not intend for the PLA to be merely a showpiece of China’s modernity or to keep it focused solely on regional threats. As this report shows, the CCP desires the PLA to become a practical instrument of its statecraft with an active role in advancing the PRC’s foreign policy, particularly with respect to the PRC’s increasingly global interests and its aims to revise aspects of the international order.²⁷²

Given the continuity in the PRC’s strategic objectives, the past 20 years offer a harbinger for the future course of the PRC’s national strategy and military aspirations. Certainly, many factors will determine how this course unfolds. What is certain is that the CCP has a strategic end state that it is working towards, which if achieved and its accompanying military modernization left unaddressed, will have serious implications for U.S. national interests and the security of the international rules-based order.²⁷³

The missions, tasks, and the ongoing modernization of China’s armed forces in the wake of global changes that have taken place since the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe, include but not limited to preservation of communist rule in China.

• The PRC’s strategy includes advancing a comprehensive military modernization program that aims to “basically” complete military modernization by 2035 and transform the PLA into a “worldclass” military by the end of 2049.
• The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to counter an intervention by an adversary in the Indo-Pacific region and project power globally.
• In 2019, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.
• China has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the United States in several military modernization areas, including:

          – Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an           overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines          including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the      U.S. Navy’s battle force is approximately 293 ships as of early    2020. China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage and is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes.

          – Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC   has developed its conventional missile forces unrestrained by any international agreements. The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-         launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise          missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM        with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.

          – Integrated air defense systems: The PRC has one of the world’s    largest forces of advanced long-range surface-to-air systems—     including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced      systems—that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated    air defense system (IADS) architecture.

• The People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is the largest standing ground force in the world. In 2019, the PLAA continued to transition into a modern, mobile, and lethal ground force by fielding upgraded combat systems and communications equipment and enhancing its ability to conduct and manage complex combined-arms and joint operations.
• The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—the largest navy in the world—is an increasingly modern and flexible force that has focused on replacing previous generations of platforms with limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2019, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, antiair, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.

          – Naval Shipbuilding and Modernization: The PLAN remains         engaged in a robust shipbuilding and modernization program that     includes submarines, surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships,       aircraft carriers, and auxiliary ships as well as developing and     fielding advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control           capabilities.²⁷⁴

• The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 total aircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces across a broad range of capabilities and competencies.
• The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is responsible for the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. The PLARF develops and fields a wide variety of conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. The number of warheads on the PRC’s land-based ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 in the next five years.

          – The PRC is expanding its inventory of the multi-role DF-26, a      mobile, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile system     capable of rapidly swapping conventional and nuclear warheads. –         The PRC’s robust ground-based conventional missile forces       compliment the growing size and capabilities of its air- and sea-          based          precision strike capabilities.

• The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. Its      current major target is the United States.

          – The PRC’s Space Enterprise. The PRC’s space enterprise    continues to mature rapidly. Beijing has devoted significant      resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating           launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.

          – The PLA has historically managed the PRC’s space program. The          SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations.

          – In 2019, the PRC described space as a “critical domain in   international strategic competition” and stated the security of space       provided strategic assurance to the country’s national and social   development.

• Military Readiness: In recent years, CCP leaders have directed the PLA to improve its combat readiness. This guidance is increasingly evident in the intensity of the PLA’s training and the complexity and scale of its exercises.
• The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 total aircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces across a broad range of capabilities and competencies.
• The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is responsible for the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. The PLARF develops and fields a wide variety of conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. The number of warheads on the PRC’s land-based ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 in the next five years.

          – The PRC is expanding its inventory of the multi-role DF-26, a      mobile, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile system     capable of rapidly swapping conventional and nuclear warheads. –         The PRC’s robust ground-based conventional missile forces       compliment the growing size and capabilities of its air- and sea-          based          precision strike capabilities.

• The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. Its      current major target is the United States. 

          – The PRC’s Space Enterprise. The PRC’s space enterprise    continues to mature rapidly. Beijing has devoted significant      resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating           launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.

          – The PLA has historically managed the PRC’s space program. The          SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations.

          – In 2019, the PRC described space as a “critical domain in   international strategic competition” and stated the security of space       provided strategic assurance to the country’s national and social   development.

• Military Readiness: In recent years, CCP leaders have directed the PLA to improve its combat readiness. This guidance is increasingly evident in the intensity of the PLA’s training and the complexity and scale of its exercises.

Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection

• The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency.
• The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are currently the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PRC aims to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.
• The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency.
• The PLA is developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive operations within the Second Island Chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally. In addition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities improvements, China is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations.

Nuclear Deterrence 

• China’s strategic ambitions, evolving view of the security landscape, and concerns over survivability are driving significant changes to the size, capabilities, and readiness of its nuclear forces. 
• China’s nuclear forces will significantly evolve over the next decade as it modernizes, diversifies, and increases the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms. 
• Over the next decade, China’s nuclear warhead stockpile—currently estimated to be in the low200s—is projected to at least double in size as China expands and modernizes its nuclear forces.
• China is pursuing a “nuclear triad” with the development of a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and improving its ground and sea-based nuclear capabilities. 
• New developments in 2019 further suggest that China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture with an expanded silobased force.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

• CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the PLA’s growing global presence, are necessary to create a “favorable” international environment for China’s national rejuvenation.
• The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals.²⁷⁵

China’s Global Military Activities

• The PRC has increasingly recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy goals.
• As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s leaders have increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests.
• In 2019, the PLA continued to expand its participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, normalize its presence overseas, and build closer ties to foreign militaries.

PLA Overseas Basing and Access

• The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.
• Beyond its current base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional overseas military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces. The PRC has likely considered locations for PLA military logistics facilities in Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. The PRC and Cambodia have publicly denied having signed an agreement to provide the PLAN with access to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base.
• A global PLA military logistics network could interfere with U.S. military operations and provide flexibility to support offensive operations against the United States.

The PRC’s Influence Operations

• The PRC conducts influence operations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic objectives by targeting cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United States, other countries, and international institutions.
• The CCP seeks to condition domestic, foreign, and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept Beijing’s narratives.
• CCP leaders probably consider open democracies, including the United States, as more susceptible to influence operations than other types of governments.²⁷⁶

Resources and Technology for Force Modernization

• The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.
• The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including the implementation of its MCF Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.
• In 2019, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.2 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the secondlargest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is higher than what it states in its official budget.

Science and Technology Goals Supporting Military Modernization

• China seeks to become a leader in key technologies with military potential, such as AI, autonomous systems, advanced computing, quantum information sciences, biotechnology, and advanced materials and manufacturing.
• China has invested significant resources to fund research and subsidize companies involved in strategic S&T fields while pressing private firms, universities, and provincial governments to cooperate with the military in developing advanced technologies. 
• China continues to undermine the integrity of the U.S. science and technology research enterprise through a variety of actions such as hidden diversions of research, resources, and intellectual property.

Foreign Technology Acquisition

• The PRC pursues many vectors to acquire foreign technologies, including both licit and illicit means. The PRC’s efforts include a range of practices and methods to acquire sensitive and dualuse technologies and military-grade equipment to advance its military modernization goals. 
• The PRC leverages foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage, and the manipulation of export controls for the illicit diversion of dual-use technologies to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition. 
• In 2019, the PRC’s efforts included efforts to acquire dynamic random access memory, aviation, and anti-submarine warfare technologies.²⁷⁷

What are the strategic intentions of the Chinese Dragon?

Bill Hayton (2020), Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House, London  when asked: What have Beijing’s military and paramilitary activities in the South China Sea this year revealed about its objectives and hard power capabilities in the region, responded that   “China’s activities, both this year and over the longer term, indicate three main objectives in the South China Sea:

• To protect Communist Party of China (CPC) rule through the creation of ‘strategic depth’ around China’s coastline, particularly through the construction of island bases in the Spratlys, and also the development of a submarine ‘bastion’ between the Chinese mainland and the Spratly Islands within which to deploy the country’s strategic nuclear deterrent.
• To ‘reclaim’ (in its own view) ‘lost’ territories: Taiwan, the various rocks and reefs of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
• To extract resources (oil, gas, hydrates, fish, etc) from areas beyond its legitimate Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) entitlements through a strategy of coercive ‘joint development’.²⁷⁸

In addition to these ‘whole state’ objectives, various Chinese state agencies, notably the military, coastal provinces and state-owned enterprises, pursue their own objectives under the ‘umbrella’ of national interests. Promoting a ‘patriotic’ agenda in the South China Sea can be a means of gaining extra funding, political promotion or simply kudos for the agency or individual concerned – regardless of whether it actually advances the national interest. Successful Chinese bureaucratic actors are adept at instrumentalising state objectives for their own purposes and any single action is likely to involve elements of all four sets of objectives.²⁷⁹ 

During 2020, China has stepped up its ‘sea denial’ strategic messaging towards the United States through the testing of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and associated public diplomacy. The first publicly-known tests of an ASBM in the SCS were conducted on 1 July 2019. The second set was conducted on 26 August 2020. These tests followed a high-profile US naval exercise, the first time two aircraft carrier groups had operated together in SCS since 2014.²⁸⁰

It appears that China is rapidly developing the capabilities to exclude other navies from the South China Sea and that this will enable it to protect a manouvering space for its ballistic missile submarines within a ‘bastion’ defense.²⁸¹

China’s efforts to build up its sea denial capabilities can also be seen as part of a long-term strategy in support of a future invasion of Taiwan. Artificial island bases in the southern part of the SCS combined with ASBM threats to US carrier groups would complicate American operations in support of Taiwan in the event of conflict. China also maintains the long-term ambition to occupy every land feature within its ‘Ushaped line’ claim in the South China Sea. In April 2020 the State Council announced two new district councils in the South China Sea, as subsidiaries of the ‘prefecture level city’ of Sansha, established in 2012 to administer the SCS. One district is Nansha – ‘South Sands’ – to manage the Spratlys. The other is Xisha – ‘West Sands’ to manage the Paracel Islands and also Zhongsha – ‘Central Sands’ – the Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal.6 Given that China does not occupy the Scarborough Shoal and that the Macclesfield Bank is entirely underwater, this move can be read as a statement of intent to both occupy Scarborough Shoal and build on the Macclesfield Bank.  China may try to extend its territorial claims to underwater features. In April 2020, the Chinese government announced names for 55 underwater features, all of them on Vietnam’s continental shelf. It also continue to regard James Shoal , off the coast of Borneo, as the southernmost point of Chinese territory even though that feature is actually 22 metres below sea level.²⁸²

During 2020 China has successfully coerced both Vietnam and the Philippines into abandoning or suspending their plans to develop offshore natural gas reserves and attempted to do the same to Malaysia. It has also engaged in ‘punitive’ oil survey work in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Vietnam and Malaysia: using seismic research vessels escorted by flotillas of coastguard and maritime militia vessels. In March, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources announced a successful experiment had taken place between 17 February and 18 March to extract methyl gas hydrates from the sea floor of northern part of the South China Sea. The process is currently far from commercial development but it provides another incentive for Chinese interests to want to control the sea’s natural resources. From 1 May until 16 August, China once again imposed its unilateral annual fishing ban in the area north of 12° North, ie north of the Spratly Islands. While the geographical scope of the ban is rejected by the other claimant states there were no reports of confrontations during the period of the ban. However, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat with eight people on board near the Paracels on 2 April, triggering a protest. In an interesting development, the Philippine government issued a statement of solidarity. A Philippine fishing boat was sunk by a Chinese vessel in June 2019. In January 2020, an organised flotilla of at least 50 Chinese fishing boats sailed to the southern extremities of China’s ‘U-shaped-line’ and operated within the EEZs of Malaysia and Indonesia under the protection of CCG vessels.²⁸³

China’s unilateral expansion into and through the international waters within the first island chain—or what Beijing now calls China’s Blue Territories— over the past six years has altered the strategic balance of power dramatically in the Indo-Pacific region. That strategic balance has shifted in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and against America’s security and interests.²⁸⁴

In addition to building a modern, blue-water navy, the PRC has taken a wide range of destabilizing actions that pose an increasing threat to global security. Among these actions are the construction of naval air stations in the South China Sea, including on Mischief Reef, which is located within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, a U.S. ally; its declaration of an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea near Japan; its claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands; and its flat-out repudiation of the authority of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the world’s oldest standing internationallaw arbitral body. The threatening actions also include China’s unprecedented and increasing naval operations in the western Pacific, South Pacific, and Indian Oceans; the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; the Arctic and Antarctic; and, finally, the Atlantic Ocean. These actions are clear empirical indicators of China’s future malign intentions and actions.²⁸⁵

These intentions and actions position China’s military forces, particularly its navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine corps, as the arbiters of a new global order—one that stands opposed to U.S. national interests and values and those of our friends and allies. China has spent billions of dollars on a military that can achieve the dreams of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) values and those of our friends and allies. China has spent billions of dollars on a military that can achieve the dreams of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).²⁸⁶

It is crucial to establish firmly and quickly why the PRC’s rapid, global, and very expensive naval expansion matters. The CCP is engaged in a total, protracted struggle for regional and global supremacy. This supremacy is at the heart of the “China Dream”. China’s arsenal in this campaign for supremacy includes economic, informational, political, and military warfare. The campaign at its heart is opportunistic; we have witnessed already China’s expansion into the vacuum of a diminishing U.S. presence in East Asia.²⁸⁷

If one has not read Xi Jinping’s words and realized the supremacist nature of the China Dream and carefully watched the nature of China’s rise, then one innocently might ask the obvious question: Why does it matter that the PRC seeks regional, or even global, hegemony? That is, why does the world not simply abide a “rising China,” a seemingly benign term so often employed by Beijing’s propaganda organs and PRC supporters worldwide? After all, fewer would be concerned if, for instance, a “rising Brazil” or a “rising India” sought regional hegemony and proclaimed a desire to lead the world into the twenty-first century.²⁸⁸

The answer goes to the core of China’s leadership and how it behaves. Under the CCP, the PRC is an expansionist, coercive, hypernationalistic, militarily and economically powerful, brutally repressive, totalitarian state. The world has seen what happens when expansionist totalitarian regimes such as this are left unchallenged and unchecked. In a world under this type of hegemon, people are subjects—simply property—of the state, and ideals such as democracy, inalienable rights, limited government, and rule of law have no place.²⁸⁹

Clear empirical indicators directly contradict the oft-quoted pledge by China’s leaders to pursue a “peaceful rise,” one in “harmony” with the rest of Asia and the world. By its expansionist actions and words, China has challenged the post– World War II norms of international behavior and, most importantly, the peace and stability that the Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed over the past seventy years.²⁹⁰

For instance, in spite of the country’s having a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita on par with that of the Dominican Republic, China’s leadership has invested staggering amounts of national treasure in a world-leading complex of ballistic missiles, satellites, and fiber-linked command centers with little utility but to pursue military dominance aggressively* Despite China’s need to keep its children indoors because of hazardous levels of pollution, a health care system in crisis, toxic rivers, a demographic time bomb caused by government-directed population expansion and then forced contraction, and only one-third the GDP per capita of the United States, Beijing chooses to spend its precious resources on military force buildup.²⁹¹

The RAND Corporation also share the views of its researchers on the complexity of the situation (i.e. the US dilemma over the ascendancy of the China PLA to the current stratospheric military strength.

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy and the publicly released summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy agree on one fundamental theme: The United States is entering a period of intensifying strategic competition with several rivals, most notably Russia and China. Numerous statements from senior U.S. defense officials make clear that they expect this competition to be played out primarily below the threshold of major war—in the spectrum of competition that has become known as the gray zone.²⁹²

Although such tactics as psychological warfare, subversion of political systems, and covert paramilitary and information operations are not new phenomena in international conflict and competition, our analysis shows that some of the tactics employed by Russia and China are comparatively new in form and effect. Moreover, the methods of gray zone coercion vary significantly between Russia and China and require differentiation of scope of threat posed to the United States, as well as types of potential responses. Both problems represent a strategic threat to U.S. and allied interests, especially as techniques and technologies evolve over time. The United States and its allies, we find, have yet to come to terms with the challenge of the threat, let alone fashion a strategy to neutralize it or roll it back.²⁹³

Chinese gray zone tactics have often assumed a more materially threatening form. Russia’s more virtual and ephemeral approach has complicated policy responses. The long-term challenge for European states hoping to fashion policies that confront Russia’s gray zone activities will be prioritizing timely and proportional whole-of-government counter-responses that deter future tactics without escalating to new thresholds of conflict that may lead to war. As part of our analysis, we examined Chinese gray zone tactics and the regional response in Asia.²⁹⁴

In Northeast Asia, Japan believes that it is engaged in an increasingly high-stakes competition with China over efforts to change the status quo of territorial sovereignty and administrative control of the Senkaku Islands and nearby areas— a competition that Japanese leaders believe they are partly managing, at least for the time being, by deterring the China Coast Guard from escalating its activities and successfully expelling Chinese fishing boats that enter the Senkaku Islands’ territorial waters without incident. Yet the trends do not bode well for Japan: China Coast Guard patrols have begun to feature the presence of vessels that are more heavily armed, and the Chinese maritime militia continues to penetrate the Senkaku territorial sea with increasing regularity. Although Japan can continue to play defense against Chinese probing tactics, a change in strategy by China in favor of more, better-armed, and more-provocative penetrations by China Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels could potentially strain Japan’s capacity to respond without increasing the potential for armed conflict.²⁹⁵

In Southeast Asia, countries in the region have grown increasingly wary of China’s gray zone aggression in the South China Sea. These activities include the use of law enforcement and a maritime militia in an unprofessional and escalatory manner to deter or, in some cases, actively deny the use of living and nonliving resources. Officials and scholars in the affected countries highlighted such tactics as bumping, shouldering, and ramming, as well as using water cannons, by the China Coast Guard against other nations’ coast guard and fishing vessels. China’s unprecedented expansion of artificial islands in the South China Sea and subsequent construction of logistics, maintenance, and storage facilities, along with airstrips, harbors, ports, and armament platforms, are in the process of further tilting the regional military balance in favor of China. Finally, China has supplemented these securityoriented aspects of its gray zone strategies with growing employment of economic coercion and political subversion.²⁹⁶

Our research in these countries confirmed that they have identified the challenge from Chinese gray zone activities and seek to deter further attacks when feasible and appropriate. But there are significant limits on the ability of these countries to deal with the challenge on their own. They remain constrained by their military capacity to deter Chinese military and paramilitary activities, for example. Even more fundamentally, the nonaligned foreign policy orientations of many regional actors, and their accompanying desire to strike a tenuous balance of deterrence and engagement with China, are preventing moreforceful displays of deterrence.²⁹⁷

Much of the literature about the gray zone challenge has focused on identifying and characterizing the problem. Some analysts have proposed U.S. responses but have focused on the idea of deterring gray zone aggression, not offering a framework for responding in all  dimensions— namely, military, diplomatic, informational, and economic. Rather than recommending that the United States merely remain on the defensive, we recommend a more comprehensive approach by going on the offensive—and adopting a whole-of- government approach to the problem.²⁹⁸

In evaluating response options for gray zone activities, we first sought to develop a general strategic concept that would allow the United States to go beyond case-by-case reactions, knitting together individual actions to achieve more-meaningful results over the long term. In developing a strategic concept, we derived the following principles that should guide the U.S. response to the gray zone challenge:

1. The United States should not merely seek to mitigate losses in the gray zone but also aim to gain strategic advantage.
2. In seeking strategic advantage, the United States should be proactive rather than reactive in its approach to the gray zone challenge.
3. A core element of successful gray zone strategy is the ability to respond quickly to new provocations.
4. The United States should attempt to lead through multilateral processes and institutions even while being prepared for “go-italone” responses when U.S. leadership is essential to marshal a response.
5. U.S. responses must be aligned with local partners to the greatest extent possible.
6. Any strategy for responding to gray zone aggression must balance excessive risks of escalation—including military, diplomatic, and economic aspects—with the reality that, to be effective, countering gray zone aggression demands some degree of risk tolerance.²⁹⁹
7. Gray zone tactics are a symptom of broader regional ambitions and grievances and cannot be addressed outside that context.
8. Russia and China continue to value their status as legitimate and respected members of the international system.
9. Not all gray zone aggression has equal significance for the security of regional allies and partners or for global norms.

Any meaningful strategic concept to gain strategic advantage must be based on a theory of success—that is, an argument for why specific policies are likely to produce desired outcomes. Some causal link must bind means to ends, explaining why the actions undertaken as part of the strategy will lead to or support those ends. The theory of success that we propose in this analysis is grounded in the principles that we develop from our assessment of Russian and Chinese goals and strategies. Those principles describe a situation in which the following are true:

• Russia and China are using gray zone techniques as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with aspects of the regional power and territorial status quo.
• Both are employing such tactics precisely because they want to express those desires and demands without completely alienating themselves from the international community and undermining their claim to great-power status and privileges.
• All significant regional players see these activities as a threat and have a significant—though, in many cases, constrained— appetite for U.S. leadership.
• The gray zone encompasses a wide spectrum of activities that pose consistent short- or long-term risks, and the various levels of threat must be carefully distinguished.
• Many of those tactics take place in such realms as competing over narratives, gaining political influence, and managing economic relations in which the United States and its allies and partners have, or ought to have, natural advantages.³⁰⁰

These aspects of the gray zone context suggest the potential value of a theory of success that builds on the essential post–World War II U.S. grand strategic posture: building, leading, and speaking in the collective name of an informal community of status-quo states committed to international norms and rules. In other words, the concept of a rules-based order remains a highly appealing concept to rally support in Europe and Asia and offers the United States an opportunity to significantly strengthen its hand in the unfolding competition by using reactions to Chinese and Russian aggressiveness as the basis for strengthened regional postures.³⁰¹

Pushing the envelope on responses—that is, manipulating the risk of escalation for coercive leverage—can serve U.S. and allied purposes in some cases but not all. On the one hand, both Russia and China seek to avoid outright military clashes with the United States. The whole point of their gray zone approaches is to remain below the threshold of armed conflict. In some cases, more-escalatory U.S. responses could serve to call the bluff of Russia and China by forcing them to either change course or out-escalate the United States and its allies; our field research indicates that the latter option is unlikely in most instances. On the other hand, a strategic concept based solely around using every gray zone provocation as an invitation to out- escalate Russia and China would be neither prudent nor effective. Any escalatory steps obviously carry certain risks of unintended or accidental conflict. More than that, the United States will not be able to adopt a blanket approach of pushing the envelope in risk.³⁰²

Thus, the theory of success underlying the proposed strategic concept could be stated as follows:

                   The combination of intensified multilateral pressure, the                               identification of specific red lines, the credible commitment of                      the U.S. military, economic power, and expanded diplomatic                            efforts to address Chinese and Russian concerns can shift the                      risk and cost calculus for certain gray zone actions onto the                          aggressor, partly by playing to Chinese and Russian desires to                        preserve their international status and avoid regional                                    balancing.³⁰³                            

The theory of success that we propose here aims to marry enhanced multilateral cooperation with U.S. diplomatic and military power to change the balance of costs and risks affecting perceptions in Moscow and Beijing. That basic dynamic would be used to deter the most dangerous gray zone adventurism and to dissuade many other actions in this sphere over time. To achieve both of those objectives, the United States can take context-setting initiatives to shape the strategic environment. And finally, because those efforts will not prevent all gray zone activities, the United States should work with allies and partners to enhance resilience and build tools for competitive success against less-aggressive, more-gradual gray zone tactics, which are likely to remain persistent.³⁰⁴

Combat Readiness

Reviewing the various officials reports publicly made available including media reports, it can be safely assumed that the United States is most probably ready for combat with China over the South China Sea. There are three  major tests of this assumption of combat readiness of the US military.

The first is the increased hardened tones by the US military establishment and numerous strategic quarters against China throughout the era of Trump Administration even when at certain times President Donald Trump can be seen showering encomia on China especially on President Xi Jinping.

The second test can be seen from the number of gunboat forays into the South China Sea in the last few years, again, especially under Trump Administration by sending carrier strike groups for naval exercises in the South China Sea on an increased basis. Biden Administration has not repudiated these gunboat forays but has continued with them. Nobody goes to an enemy’s backyard to shake its fists at the enemy’s face without preparation or readiness to fight if fight should breaks out. This is an African wise saying!

The third is the number of official reports churned out especially under Trump Administration which showed clearly a marked departure from the previous administrations in terms of global outlook, scope and depth of the strategic issues involved. The hardened tones of these reports are clearly unmistakable.

These official reports are based on the assessment and recognition of the weaknesses or vulnerabilities inherent in the force structures of strategic defense both on the part of the US and China. One of such areas is in the naval domain where the US recognizes the need to increase the quantity and quality of its Naval Operations – as against what has been perceived as the increasing firepower of the Chinese PLA Navy.

Thus, on December 10, 2020, the American Pentagon, through the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Norquist, announced to the American Congress the annual long-range plan for construction of Naval vessels.

Today, the Department of the Navy released the annual 30-year shipbuilding plan.  Over the last four years, the Trump administration has steadily increased the number and readiness of battle-force ships.  This plan moves to continue that buildup and is resourced to achieve a 355-ship naval fleet.³⁰⁵

The 30-year shipbuilding plan is consistent with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) which recognizes China and Russia as near peer threats.  To ensure that we maintain superiority over these threats, the NDS requires a modern, ready force to operate in the Pacific maritime region.  The Department has realigned more than $45B over the Future Years Defense Program to Navy Shipbuilding and other priorities as described in the Office of Management and Budget’s fiscal framework.³⁰⁶

The shipbuilding plan is based on naval operational experience and extensive analytics. The Department of the Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation recently completed a comprehensive Future Naval Force Study – an extensive analytical effort to inform the design of the future of America’s naval force. The team assessed various naval force structure options to maintain our current overmatch and identified the need for a larger, more modern fleet. Another key finding was the need to expand the U.S. industrial base to support new ship construction and modernization.³⁰⁷

The plan calls for a larger fleet of both manned and unmanned vessels prepared to face greater challenges on, above, or under the sea by accelerating submarine construction, modernizing aircraft, extending the service life of cruisers, and increasing the number of destroyers. Although we reach 355 ships by the early 2030s, the plan is about more than numbers of ships. It is about equipping our future force for the enduring defense of our nation.³⁰⁸

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Gilday announced the release of his Naval Plan to the Fleet during virtual remarks at the Surface Navy Association Symposium January 11.³⁰⁹ “For 245 years, in both calm and rough waters, our Navy has stood the watch to protect the homeland, preserve freedom of the seas, and defend our way of life,” Gilday said. “The decisions and investments we make this decade will set the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century. We can accept nothing less than success. I am counting on you to take in all lines and get us where we need to go – and to do so at a flank bell.”³¹⁰

The blueprint for fiscal years 2022-2051 came on the heels of a review conducted earlier this year known as the Future Naval Force Study, which was led by Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist.³¹¹

The Navy normally submits its shipbuilding plan early in the calendar year around the time the president’s budget request for the following fiscal year is sent to Congress. But this year the delivery of the shipbuilding plan was delayed to allow for the Future Naval Force Study to be completed.³¹²

The release of the new plan also follows the unveiling of former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper’s vision of the future fleet dubbed Battle Force 2045, with the goal of maintaining U.S. naval superiority over China in coming decades. Esper was fired by President Donald Trump in November [2020]. “The results from the [Future Naval Force Study] and this shipbuilding plan reaffirm the requirement for a larger, more resilient Navy,” the new shipbuilding report said.³¹³

Key priorities outlined include: fully funding recapitalization of the ballistic missile submarine fleet with the Columbia-class; prioritizing readiness recovery to deliver “a combat-credible forward force” in the near-term; investing in increased lethality and modernized capabilities with the greatest potential to deliver “nonlinear” warfighting advantages against China and Russia in the mid- to long-term; and growing capacity at a rate supported by fiscal guidance and the Navy’s ability to sustain that capacity in the future, to enable the fleet to grow to 316 manned battle force ships by fiscal year 2026. The service currently has just under 300 battle force ships.³¹⁴

Unmanned platforms are a key component of the proposed force structure. “Unmanned systems continue to advance in capability and are anticipated to mature to become key enablers through all phases of warfare and in all warfare domains,” the document said. “Significant resources are added to accelerate fielding the full spectrum of unmanned capabilities, including man-machine teaming ahead of full autonomy.”³¹⁵

For the future years defense program in fiscal years 2022-2026, the blueprint calls for providing a total of about $4.3 billion for 12 large unmanned service vessels, one medium unmanned surface vessel, and eight extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles. The Future Naval Force Study called for 143 to 242 unmanned surface and undersea vessels, including 119 to 166 USVs and 24 to 65 UUVs.³¹⁶

The shipbuilding report said more details about long-term acquisition plans for robotic systems would come later. “As we learn from land-based testing and as prototypes are matured, specific procurement profiles outside the FYDP will be refined,” the document said.³¹⁷

Plans call for procuring 82 new manned vessels over the next five years at a cost of $147 billion. That includes two Ford-class aircraft carriers and advanced procurement for a third carrier; 10 DDG-51 destroyers; 15 Constellation-class guided missile frigates; 12 Virginia-class attack submarines; and two Columbia-class submarines. Officials are also looking at adding a number of light aircraft carriers to the fleet. “The department also recognizes the need for continued exploration of carrier evolution and expects to conduct an analysis of alternatives within the FYDP to inform potential requirements,” the document said.³¹⁸

Senior Navy officials who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity said an analysis would be conducted in fiscal year 2022 to look at the future of the carrier force. Over the next 30 years, the plan calls for procuring: six aircraft carriers; 55 large surface combatants; 76 small surface combatants; 77 attack submarines; 11 ballistic missile subs; four large payload subs; 71 amphibious warfare ships; 80 combat logistics force ships; and 24 support vessels. After accounting for retirements of legacy vessels, the total battle force inventory would reach: 316 ships by 2026; 347 by 2030; 377 by 2035; 398 by 2040; 403 by 2045; and 405 by 2051.³¹⁹

When unmanned vessels are included, the fleet would have more than 500 ships by 2036 and about 650 ships by 2045, according to the blueprint. “This 30-year shipbuilding plan reflects the National Defense Strategy priority to build a more lethal force” to complete with China and Russia, it said. The proposed buildup would come with a hefty price tag, with the annual shipbuilding account needing to increase to nearly $34 billion by the end of the FYDP. For 2020, Congress allocated about $24 billion for Navy shipbuilding.³²⁰

Additionally, sustainment funding is projected to rise to $40 billion by 2028. “This level of projected funding will address both the force structure described in this plan and the manning, training, operations, modernization and infrastructure required to sustain a larger fleet,” the report said.³²¹

A senior Navy officials said the plan was “fully funded” within the Defense Department topline for the future years defense program, with some if it coming from efficiencies and other budget tradeoffs. The plan assumes 2 percent real growth in the budget annually in the longer term. “What’s different in this plan is we … have a good assumption in terms of what is a reasonable budget in the future, and then ensured as we build and deliver these ships that it is balanced with what it’s going to take to sustain these ships, so that we have got a balanced program here,” said another senior Navy official.³²²

Shipbuilding received about 10 percent of the Navy budget in the fiscal year 2021 submission. Under the new shipbuilding plan, that would increase to about 12 percent in 2022, and an average of about 14 percent across the FYDP. In comparison, the average amount of the Navy topline going to shipbuilding during the Reagan Era buildup was about 13 percent, according to a senior service official.³²³

The capacity of the industrial base is a key concern. “The industrial base continues to be the fundamental enabler for achieving and sustaining the Navy’s future fleet,” the report said. “Our shipbuilding and supporting vendor base constitute a national security imperative that must be steadily supported and grown, to maintain a skilled workforce. Consistent commitment to the steady acquisition profiles underlying this report is required to ensure the industrial supplier base achieves the capability and capacity required.”³²⁴

The Navy intends to fund efforts to expand infrastructure and bolster the workforce. “We are making targeted and large investments to build the base,” said a senior official. “We need not just live with the base we have.” The investments will create jobs and benefit the economy, he added. “We’re a maritime nation,” he said. “We need to have the maritime industry sized and delivering at the rate we need so we can continue to have a competitive advantage in our naval force.”³²⁵

It is of considerable importance to note that the US has clearly identified China and to certain extent Russia as its strategic enemies or rivals with whom it is engaged in a strategic competition for global supremacy especially in the area of military superiority or dominance. The US has not hidden this fact as it continually mention the duo in that order of importance in its official reports and verbal public pronouncements. Added to the duo are North Korea, Iran and other rogue nations – again in that order of importance.

Underlining the competition with China and Russia is both opposing political and ideological worldviews i.e. capitalism/liberal democracy versus state-capitalism/authoritarianism, which cannot easily be reconciled on the basis of peaceful co-existence, economic cooperation or things like that. Yes. There will always be measurement of peaceful co-existence (for instance, through arms limitation talks) and economic cooperation (through bilateral and multilateral trade system). But this cannot erase the strategic rivalry or competition that has come to the fore in the quest for global supremacy or dominance.

One of such areas is the naval domain especially as relate to the South China Sea. Again, the US has been unmistakable in its public position as regard how it view the South China Sea or South East Asia in general. It considers it an area where its national security interests are argued to be under threats by China accused of trying to build a maritime empire in the area. Therefore, the US can be seen making preparation for the D-Day when a duel may break out between it and China. It is also seen preparing its Navy for the D-Day.

Thus according to CNO Navy Plan dated January 2021 just before the swearing in of the new President, the US made it very clear as to the direction it is going in the next decade(s).

The Navy’s strategic direction remains clear. We are engaged in a long-term competition that threatens our security and way of life. As part of the Joint Force, we will meet this challenge by deploying forward—alongside our allies and partners—to deter aggression and preserve freedom of the seas. This Navigation Plan charts the course for how we will execute the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy. It supersedes Design 2.0 and informs my annual guidance for the Program Objective Memorandum and an internal implementation framework. It outlines the challenges we face, our unique role in meeting those challenges, and four priorities to focus our efforts: readiness, capabilities, capacity, and our Sailors. There is no time to waste – our actions in this decade will set the maritime balance of power for the rest of the century.³²⁶ 

A larger, more lethal, more ready fleet manned by the world’s greatest Sailors is required to maintain our advantage at sea and protect America for years to come. We will deliver, operate, and maintain that Navy with a focus on our core roles of sea control and power projection.³²⁷

Today, China and Russia are undermining the free and open conditions at sea that have benefited so many for so long. Optimism that they might become responsible partners has given way to recognition that they are determined rivals. Both nations are attempting to unfairly control access to valuable sea-based resources outside their home waters. Both intimidate their neighbors and enforce unlawful claims with the threat of force. Both have constructed sophisticated networks of sensors and long-range missiles to hold important waterways at risk. And both are turning incremental gains into long-term advantages – such as militarizing contested features in the South China Sea.³²⁸ 

To achieve its strategic goals, China is aggressively building a navy to rival our own. Already possessing the world’s largest fleet, China continues to build modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and next-generation fighters. Operating under the cover of the world’s largest missile force, the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) deploys alongside the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia to harass global shipping and exert pressure on regional countries below the level of traditional armed conflict. They have strengthened all dimensions of their military power to challenge us and our allies and partners from the seabed to space and in the information domain. Now, they are extending their infrastructure across the globe to control access to critical waterways. Their concerted efforts to challenge our advantages make China our most pressing long-term strategic threat.³²⁹

Russia is also modernizing its forces. In addition to modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, Russia is developing modern missile frigates, fighter and bomber aircraft, hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and modern submarines. The Russian Navy is expanding its operations globally and deploying closer to our shores. Meanwhile, they continue to attack our computer networks. In a conflict, we expect they will threaten cyber or kinetic strikes against the homeland. Left unchecked, Russia will continue to undermine the rules-based order and threaten our homeland.³³⁰

The U.S. Navy—operating within the Joint Force—plays a vital part in addressing the challenges posed by long-term competition with China and Russia. Deployed forward, we provide U.S. leaders quick response options for nearly any challenge – from confronting rivals to helping local populations recover from natural disasters. Our combat-credible presence creates and maintains influence abroad, and ensures critical waterways remain open for commerce. Our ballistic missile submarines provide an assured strategic deterrent that protects the homeland from nuclear attack. Our special operations teams are poised for early phase operations to keep our competitors off guard. When conflicts unfold, our forces are often first on the scene, and we can quickly scale forces to control the seas and project power ashore. After hostilities cease, we persist forward to preserve long-term U.S. interests through sustained forward engagement. We are a flexible, forward-postured force that competes and wins in the day-to-day, in crisis, and—if need be—in conflict.³³¹

American security rests upon our ability to control the seas and project power ashore. For decades, our forces enjoyed the luxury of operating in permissive environments across the world. That is no longer the case. For the first time in a generation, the seas are contested. We must stand ready to control them at the time and place of our choosing. Sea control provides the Joint Force freedom to maneuver and strike, protects friendly shipping, and denies use of the sea to our adversaries. In our digital age, it also means fighting our adversaries in space, cyberspace, and along the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. Successful modern sea control demands the all-domain power of our Navy and the Joint Force.³³²

Our Navy must also be able to influence events ashore. This starts with deterring a nuclear attack against our nation with our ballistic missile submarines – the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. Projecting power and influence from the seas is vital to deterring aggression and resolving crises on acceptable terms. Projecting power and influence ranges from launching strikes against adversary forces to shaping the battle “well left of launch” and demonstrating to a competitor they have no viable means of achieving their objectives. Naval forces field capabilities in all-domains to deter aggression – employing information warfare, cyber capabilities and special operations to a host of conventional weapons launched from under, on, and above the sea. Our power projection capabilities alongside our strategic deterrent provide the surest guarantee of security for America and our allies and partners.³³³

While America’s need for sea control and power projection hasn’t changed, how we compete and what we fight with has. Emerging technologies have expanded the modern fight at sea into all domains and made contested spaces more lethal. Ubiquitous and persistent sensors, advanced battle networks, and weapons of increasing range and speed have driven us to a more dispersed type of fight. Advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) have increased the importance of achieving decision superiority in combat. Additionally, advances in autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective and affordable way for the Navy to fight and win in contested spaces. We will modernize the fleet to harness these technologies and maintain our advantage at sea.³³⁴

To protect the homeland, preserve freedom of the seas, and deter aggression, our Navy will remain ready to control the seas and project power ashore. We will master new technologies and adapt the way we fight.³³⁵

A template for maintaining maritime superiority had earlier been laid out the previous year 2019.

Our Navy’s strategic direction, focused on Great Power Competition, is sound.  This Fragmentary Order is written for senior Navy leaders to simplify, prioritize, and build on the foundation of Design 2.0 issued in December 2018.  We will focus our efforts toward Warfighting, Warfighters, and the Future Navy, expanding on the momentum we have gained as a Navy over the past two years guided by both the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS).³³⁶ 

Mission One for every Sailor – active and reserve, uniformed and civilian – is the operational readiness of today’s Navy.  Our nation expects a ready Navy – ready to fight today – and our commitment to the training, maintenance, and modernization that will also ensure a Navy ready for tomorrow.  We will deliver this Navy.³³⁷ 

Modern naval operations are in rapid transition, demanding the integrated, multi-domain capabilities of our fleets.  We will respond to this transition with urgency.  Our fleets will be ready to fight and win at sea – keeping that fight forward, far from the homeland.  Underpinned by resilient reach-back/reach-forward and logistics capabilities, we will deliver a combat credible maritime force, ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea.  We must also succeed in sustained, day-to-day competition, winning future fights before they become kinetic.³³⁸ 

Together with the United States Marine Corps, our Navy is the bedrock of Integrated American Naval Power, a force capable of fulfilling the mandate of the NDS and NMS.  We will remain steadfast in our alliances and partnerships, which remain indispensable in any future fight.  We will apply time, effort, and resources to grow naval power and think differently to find every competitive advantage.³³⁹ 

We will focus our efforts on Warfighting, Warfighters, and the Future Navy.³⁴⁰

Warfighting End State: A Navy that is ready to win across the full range of military operations in competition, crisis, and contingency by persistently operating forward with agility and flexibility in an alldomain battlespace.  Our Navy must be the best when the nation needs it the most.  On a daily basis, our objective is to have our fleet sustainably manned, trained, equipped, and integrated into the Joint Force.  Deployed forward, we will be ready to meet requirements directed by the Secretary of Defense, the tasking of Combatant Commanders, and be prepared to surge with the Joint Force in crisis.  Our fleet will be a potent, formidable force that competes around the world every day, deterring those who would challenge us while reassuring our allies and partners.  Joining with the Marine Corps, we will deliver decisive Integrated American Naval Power when called.³⁴¹

Improve Ship Depot-Level Maintenance and Modernization.  To responsibly grow and dynamically operate the fleet, we will predictably and effectively maintain the fleet – in peacetime and in support of conflict.  As we have learned over the past decade, it is cheaper to maintain readiness than to buy it back.  Our toughest near-term challenge is reversing the trend of delivering only 40% of our ships from maintenance on time.  As the fleet ages, we must continue to invest deliberately to modernize our weapons, sensors, and platforms to outpace adversary trends.  Working with the shipyards and leveraging data analytics to identify and close performance gaps, the Naval Sea Systems Command, supported by the Type Commanders, will deliver a plan in 60 days that develops and sustains the industrial base.  We will further develop and implement better productivity metrics and identify the key levers to deliver all depot availabilities on time and in full.  Our goal is to improve productivity, reduce lost days through depot availability extensions by 80% in FY20 compared with FY19, and eliminate lost days through depot extensions by the end of FY21.³⁴²

Assess Our Force Generation Model.  Recent revisions to the Combatant Commanders’ operations plans, the Joint Staff’s global campaign plans, and globally integrated base plans will inform the Secretary of Defense’s Directed Readiness Tables (DRT).  The FY21 DRT will drive the readiness posture of the Joint Force to deploy forces.  We will assess our Optimized Fleet Response Plan to ensure our force generation: (i) meets top-down requirements for rotational deployments while providing our Sailors stable, predictable deployment cycles; (ii) meets surge requirements for crises; (iii) provides adequate time to maintain and modernize the fleet; (iv) resets the force after a crisis; and (v) provides accountable logistics support.  U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) will lead this assessment in coordination with Commander Pacific Fleet (CPF) and Naval Forces Europe and Africa (NAVEUR) with results due by January 2020.³⁴³

Leverage the Power of the Integrated Fleet.  We fight and win as a team.  We are greater when we integrate more closely with the Marine Corps.  We will build capability with our most natural partner, tying more closely with the Marine Corps at all levels.  Together, we will build Navy-Marine Corps integration by aligning concepts, capabilities, programming, planning, budgeting, and operations to provide Integrated American Naval Power to the Joint Force.  Our Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) – along with our Echelon II Commanders – will drive this integration with their Marine Corps counterparts.  Opportunities include our cyberspace operations, war-game and exercise programs, development of the Naval Tactical Grid, and potential Dynamic Force Employment options.³⁴⁴ 

Design and Implement a Warfighting Development Campaign Plan.  We will leverage advances in our warfighting capability, by integrating and accelerating them with a Warfighting Development Campaign Plan to provide effective deterrence today and ensure the Navy wins the next war, should it occur.  The plan will ensure alignment of the Navy’s strategy with higher-level guidance, and provide strategic guidance for the fleet: design, architecture, command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and targeting (C5ISR&T) requirements, and resource decisions.  It will accelerate Navy institutional learning related to key operational problems; prioritize and align the Navy’s analytic efforts; and be fully informed at all levels of classification by intelligence, our own capabilities, and operational plans.  OPNAV N7 will provide this plan by January 2020 and subsequently lead implementation.³⁴⁵

Master Fleet-Level Warfare.  Our fleet design and operating concepts demand that fleets be the operational center of warfare.  We will learn from fleet battle problems and the Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 2020, then restore annual LSEs as the means by which we operate, train, and experiment with large force elements.  Fleet exercises will be led by fleet commanders leveraging operational concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE).  Combined with wargaming, the exercises will serve as the key opportunity for experimentation and the development and testing of alternative concepts.  These exercises and experiments will inform doctrine and tactics; future fleet headquarters requirements, capacity, and size; and investments in future platforms and capabilities.  As we develop our plans for future LSEs, we will leverage experience from Combatant Command, Joint, and other service exercises to better prepare the Navy to integrate, support, and lead the Joint Force in a future fight.  DCNOs will collect lessons from these exercises to inform submissions for Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 23 and beyond.³⁴⁶

Accelerate Performance Improvement.  Intensifying competition requires more from us and yet we cannot expect our budgetary allowances to grow – we have to perform better under these conditions.  We will hold ourselves accountable for performing to plan (P2P) across our business practices including force development, force generation, and force employment.  We will broadly embrace a P2P mindset, shifting our focus from rearward-looking assessments and activity to forward-looking projections of key outcomes.  Our leaders will find the real levers of performance through data-driven insights.  When confronted with a barrier to moving a key performance lever, we must remove it or elevate it to a specific leader to address.  OPNAV N8 will continue to serve as the lead agent for our P2P efforts.³⁴⁷ 

Expand our Digital Competitive Advantage.  Effective DMO with integrated platforms, weapons, and sensors requires a new, resilient operational architecture: Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2).  We will operate and defend this architecture as a warfighting platform, enabling the secure flow of data to gain decision superiority across the Joint Force.  We will leverage the power of networks, cloud computing, machine learning, and artificial intelligence – including tactical clouds on our platforms and shore infrastructure – to connect all weapons and sensors.  Digitization increases lethality, integrates new technologies, and improves information warfare capabilities.  We will also transform our legacy business systems to improve our agility and readiness.  We will partner with other services, industry, academia, and our science and technology community to deliver these capabilities.  The Navy’s Digital Transformation Office will deliver our initial operational framework in coordination with OPNAV N2N6 and supported by the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command, in January 2020.  Additionally, OPNAV N2N6 will lead coordination with the Department of the Navy’s Chief Information Officer and implement our integrated information management strategy.³⁴⁸

Further Integrate Space, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, and Special Operations Into Fleet Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs).  While MOCs have resident intelligence, cryptologic warfare, communications, and meteorology/oceanography capabilities, fleet staffs must strengthen and synchronize space, full-spectrum cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and information operations (IO) to fight effectively across all domains.  We will leverage LSE 2020 to pilot a dedicated Information Warfare cell integrated within a MOC to more effectively execute space, cyber, EW, IO, and special operations forces into all-domain operations and enhance our ability to operate in denied areas.  USFF and CPF, supported by Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and the Information Warfare Type Commander (IW TYCOM), will deliver a plan to achieve this integration in January 2020.  This requires more than a “bolt-on” solution, and should not necessarily cause manpower requirements to grow.³⁴⁹

The results of LSE 2020 will refine the requirements and timeline for dedicated IW cells in all Fleet MOCs as part of POM 22. Additionally, the IW TYCOM, supported by Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, will develop a plan to field small tactical cyber teams as forces for fleet commanders by February 2020.³⁵⁰

 Build Alliances and Partnerships.  While we prepare for the next war and provide effective deterrence in the meantime, we must recognize the fight we are in right now.  Though we are not exchanging fire with our competitors, we are battling for influence and positional advantage today.  Operating and exercising together with allies and partners, our fleet commanders will focus on full interoperability at the high end of naval warfare.  We will build on existing maritime intelligence and logistics partnerships with allied nations, and expand relationships with partner nations to broaden and strengthen global maritime awareness and access.³⁵¹

 Assess the Navy’s Ashore Infrastructure Investment Strategy.  Historically, we have assumed significant risk in shore infrastructure investment by diverting funds to increase afloat readiness, future force structure, and other priorities.  This risk manifests itself over time with reductions to combat readiness, productivity, and quality of life for our Sailors.  The Navy must account for infrastructure investments to support our force.  Additionally, today’s networks need to be resilient, agile, extensible, and maneuverable – ashore and afloat – to accomplish the mission.  Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) will deliver, by March 2020, an assessment of readiness-based risk in the shore through FY26.  Leveraging CNIC’s readiness assessment, OPNAV N4 will generate by April 2020, a long-term strategy to mitigate these risks.  This strategy will also inform an enhanced readiness assessment and reporting structure whereby shore readiness forms part of a unified fleet readiness picture assessed by and reported through Fleet Commanders.³⁵²

It is also important to note that there has been element of policy continuity among US political administrations over the decades noticeably from the era of Ronald Reagan till date – from one degree to another. In other words, there are areas of overlapping bipartisan agreements on key issues and/or concurrence especially in the area of foreign policy and military strategic issues. What is contemporaneously interesting here is the fact of lack of fundamental differences between Trump and Biden Administrations in these two key areas. Only nuances can be seen to differentiate the two Administrations especially the fact that the new Biden Administration has not been seen to overturn key policy decisions of Trump Administration in these two areas.

Of course, there have been processes of polishing up some of these policy decisions to make them look “smart” – an adjectival terminology that President Joe Biden is extremely concerned about which he deployed copiously during the presidential campaign in 2020. In other words, President Biden/Democratic Party rejects all images or suggestions of crudity that any policy may publicly convey – which is why he is reviewing all the key policies to remove all elements of crudity that may be associated with them. 

In order to gain this global military superiority and dominance, the US has also embarked on its own modernization process and campaign for its military. This is the reason for the spate of key policy and strategy documents churned out by Trump Administration which seek to address all visible shortcomings in the US military force structure in the last two or three decades – even when it has exercised its untrammelled hegemony and/or supremacy in key flash points around the world.

Having identified both China and Russia as its contemporary strategic competitors in their respective increasing military firepowers, the US is looking and working towards the revitalization of its military in all its branches from the weakest to the strongest, figuratively speaking – to make them nimble, agile and packed with superior firepower that would make its competitors cringe with fear and awe – and ultimately to cripple their abilities to even consider challenging the US to the battlefield. Here it is a double-edged sword: both physical and non-physical (or kinetic and non-kinetic) intimidation processes and tactics, a process of actual and neuro strategy aimed at overwhelming an enemy.

The U.S. Navy’s next-generation frigate, the Constellation class, is a do-or-die effort for the service and a critical test of its return to building ships around existing technologies rather than designing them around technologies in development.³⁵³

In a roundtable with reporters, Chief of Naval Operations Adm Michael Gilday  said the Constellation class will be the model for how the Navy designs and builds the next class of destroyer, the so-called DDG Next. And for that reason, the Navy has to get it right. “I can’t afford for FFG(X) to be anything but coming off a world-class production line that produces a ship that we can count on,” Gilday told reporters in comments ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium, using an acronym for the service’s future frigate. “That will also inform how we’re going to design and build DDG Next. Those have to be world-class efforts that deliver on time, on budget, with the right capacity, with the right capabilities that we need.”³⁵⁴

The idea behind FFG(X) was to build a best-in-breed ship with all the latest technologies on a smaller platform for less money than it would cost to build a comparable number of Flight III DDGs. The ship will use a scaled-down version of the Flight III’s SPY-6 air and missile defense radar, a generational leap over the SPY-1 radar that makes up most of the surface combatant fleet today. The idea behind DDG Next will be to build a ship around a power source sufficient for electronic warfare and laser weapons of the future, which will place enormous and complicated demands on the ship’s power systems.³⁵⁵

The Navy awarded the next-generation frigate to Fincantieri in April 2020, and it will be built at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin, where the Lockheed Martin-designed Freedom-class littoral combat ship is being built.³⁵⁶

Vital statistics:

• Cost: lead ship $1.28 billion; follow-on ships between $850 million and $950 million in constant-year 2018 dollars.
• Length: 496 feet
• Beam: 65 feet
• Fully loaded displacement: 7,291 tons
• Propulsion: combined diesel-electric and gas
• Major engineering equipment: one gas turbine; two electric propulsion motors; four ship service diesel generators; one auxiliary propulsion unit
• Crew accommodation: 200
• Expected service life: 25 years

Armament:

• MK 110 57mm gun
• 32-cell MK 41 Vertical Launching System
• 16 Naval Strike Missiles
• MK 49 Guided Missile Launching System
• Four MK 53 MOD 9 Decoy Launching System
• Two AN-SLQ-32(V)6 Shipboard Electronic Warfare System
• One MH-60R Seahawk helicopter plus a UAV
• Aegis Baseline 10 Combat System
• AN/SPY-6(V3) Phased Array Radar

Timeline:

• Start of construction: first quarter of 2022
• Keel laid: first quarter of 2023
• Launch: first quarter of 2025
• Delivery: third quarter of 2026.³⁵⁷

One of the key US policies on South China Sea is its demonstrated comparative support for its allies in the region in the face of Chinese harassments.

Two U.S. Navy ships sailed into the South China Sea in a show of support for a Malaysian drill ship that’s been getting hassled by Chinese vessels as Beijing continues its attempts to claim the resource-rich sea as its own. The littoral combat ship Montgomery and the dry cargo ship Cesar Chavez each steamed near the Malaysia-contracted West Capella, which has been harassed by Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships in recent months, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. The West Capella has been conducting exploratory drilling in two oil and gas fields, Malaysian moves that have irked a Chinese government that has increasingly tried to lay claim to the region.³⁵⁸ Similar disputes have arisen in the past year with neighboring Vietnam as well.³⁵⁹

Both U.S. ships were already underway in the region at the time of the maneuver. “We are committed to a rules-based order in the South China Sea and we will continue to champion freedom of the seas and the rule of law,” Pacific Fleet commander Adm. John Aquilino said in a statement. “The Chinese Communist Party must end its pattern of bullying Southeast Asians out of offshore oil, gas and fisheries. Millions of people in the region depend on those resources for their livelihood.” The Navy regularly sends ships into the contested waters. The so-called freedom of navigation operations, or FONOPs, are intended as a gray-hulled signal to Beijing that the United States seeks to keep those waters open and international.³⁶⁰

Why is FONOP so important to the strategic national security interests of the United States?

Navy Adm. Philip S. Davidson, commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, spoke at the Halifax International Security Forum, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, on November 23, 2019.

According to David Vergun (2019) “Freedom of navigation by air and by sea is important globally, including in the South China Sea, where trillions of dollars in commerce transit each year, he [Admiral Davidson] said.³⁶¹  However, over the years, China has been militarizing islands in the South China Sea and has increased its capability there, he said.³⁶²

Now, China wants to come up with a code of conduct between it and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for operating in those waters, he said. ASEAN is a group of nations in Southeast Asia that promotes economic, political, and security cooperation among its 10 members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.³⁶³

Davidson urged ASEAN nations to ensure such an agreement, if reached, does not restrict their freedom of navigation and limit their ability to operate there for commerce and exercises. The admiral said ASEAN nations have been assured that the U.S. and its allies and partners will support their right of freedom of navigation.³⁶⁴

Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Japan and India have all sailed through those waters and participated in military exercises there, he noted. Also, the U.S. has increased its operations in the South China Sea, Davidson said. Several exercises were conducted there in September and October and two freedom of navigation exercises were conducted there in the last week or two. As well, navigation in those waters will pick up as the U.S. continues to rotate its forces through Singapore and projects air and sea power from bases in Japan, he added.³⁶⁵

Davidson then discussed a wider threat from China. China is expanding its military presence beyond the South China Sea, Davidson said. They are now operating globally, to include areas around South America, Europe and Africa. There have been more of these global Chinese naval deployments in the last 30 months than in the last 30 years, he said. They are also developing and fielding advanced ballistic missiles and hypersonics.³⁶⁶

In response, the U.S. is ramping up its missile defense systems and is developing long-range precision fires as a deterrence measure, he said. Davidson concluded that ”freedom and support of the international order is worth defending.”³⁶⁷

According to Pete Cobus “the geographic commons of Southeast Asia’s navigable rimland [and] [i]ts 3.5 million square kilometers of underlying bedrock contain oil and natural gas deposits that, by official U.S. estimates, are at least equal to Mexico’s and, by some contested Chinese estimates, might be second only to Saudi Arabia’s. Also home to lucrative fisheries and supply routes that carry 80 percent of China’s crude imports, the territorially disputed region may be the most strategically important waterway of the 21st century.³⁶⁸

Tracing shorelines of sprawling, hard-to-govern archipelago nation-states to the south, the sea is bound to the north by China, whose contentious claims to more than 95 percent of the region—first espoused by the nationalist government in 1947—cite ancient maritime records.³⁶⁹ For centuries, these waters also have been vital to the economic survival of neighboring Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.³⁷⁰

The waters are also prized by regional non-claimants. For U.S.-allied Japan and South Korea, situated far to the north, South China Sea shipping lanes provide access to trade-intensive waters of the Indian Ocean, via which more than half of their respective energy needs are met. For non-claimant Indonesia, Natuna Sea fishing grounds along the southern fringe of the contested region hold vital natural gas reserves.³⁷¹

Many nations have urged Beijing to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets maritime zones of control based on coastlines. The United States, which has signed onto UNCLOS without ratifying it, often relies on the international agreement to settle territorial disputes. China has refrained, invoking intertemporal laws based on the deep historical record, such as archaeological findings on disputed reefs and islands. At best, China views U.N.-backed codes of maritime governance as incompatible with domestic laws; at worst, it sees them as instruments of Western hegemony designed to undercut its expanding influence as a world power.³⁷²

If Asia’s astonishing economic growth of the past two decades continues, however, regional stability will remain a matter of global consequence. Beyond China’s increasingly assertive land grabs and island-building campaigns—some 1,300 hectares of tiny islets have been landfilled to sustain mostly military infrastructure, including runways long enough to accommodate bombers—low-level skirmishes between Chinese naval patrols and civilian fishing fleets from neighboring countries could spark international conflict.³⁷³

In July [2016], a five-judge panel in The Hague unanimously rejected the legal basis of nearly all of China’s maritime claims. Within weeks, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a regulation stating a “clear legal basis for China to safeguard maritime order,” in which Beijing vowed to prosecute any foreigners found fishing or prospecting in disputed waters.³⁷⁴

Other means of settling complex territorial disputes also appear ineffective. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ long-delayed code of conduct for the South China Sea, which Beijing officials said they would finalize in 2017, would do little to resolve conflicting claims of sovereignty. Much like the Hague-based tribunal’s ruling, any legally binding ASEAN declaration would lack meaningful mechanisms of enforcement.³⁷⁵

While the United States has long said it does not take an official position on South China Sea disputes, it steadily criticizes China’s behavior there and plans to expand defense alliances with countries that have overlapping claims. By 2021, U.S. Navy officials plan to expand the Pacific Fleet’s overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent.³⁷⁶

As President Donald Trump assumed office, some observers speculated that, like his immediate predecessors, he might be called upon quickly to handle another South China Sea crisis. Just months into his first term, former President George W. Bush faced an international dispute triggered by a midair collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island.³⁷⁷

Less than seven weeks after former President Barack Obama took office, Chinese ships and planes confronted the USNS Impeccable, a surveillance ship in waters south of Hainan, and ordered it to leave. The U.S. said that it had the right to be there and that the ship was harassed, while Beijing defended its actions. Obama responded by sending a guided-missile destroyer to protect the Impeccable.³⁷⁸

Such incidents, engineered or otherwise, are likely to continue defining the dispute as it unfolds in real time. Until broader questions of maritime sovereignty are resolved, the waterway promises to remain a fulcrum upon which the geopolitics of international trade, and thus the global economy, pivots. We’ll keep close tabs on developments here as they occur.³⁷⁹

Just three days after Joe Biden was sworn in as the President and Commander-in-Chief, the United States once again entered the South China Sea with one of its Carrier Strike Group. This time around, it was Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group.

The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (TRCSG) entered the South China Sea January 23 [2021] to conduct routine operations.³⁸⁰

The TRCSG is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet to ensure freedom of the seas, build partnerships that foster maritime security, and conduct a wide range of operations. “After sailing through these waters throughout my 30-year career, it’s great to be in the South China Sea again, conducting routine operations, promoting freedom of the seas, and reassuring allies and partners,” said Rear Adm. Doug Verissimo, commander, Carrier Strike Group Nine.³⁸¹

“With two-thirds of the world’s trade travelling through this very important region, it is vital that we maintain our presence and continue to promote the rules-based order which has allowed us all to prosper. While we miss visiting our allies and partners in the region in person, we’re grateful for all the opportunities we have to operate with them at sea.”³⁸²

While in the South China Sea, the strike group is conducting maritime security operations, which include flight operations with fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, maritime strike exercises, and coordinated tactical training between surface and air units. “We all benefit from free and open access to the seas and our operations represent our commitment to maintaining regional security and stability,” said Capt. Eric Anduze, USS Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer. “I’m incredibly proud of the work and professionalism this crew shows every day operating on the high seas.”³⁸³

The TRCSG consists of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11, the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), Destroyer Squadron 23, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Russell (DDG 59) and USS John Finn (DDG 113).³⁸⁴

TRCSG’s operability in the region directly supports the Chief of Naval Operation’s navigation plan to master all-domain fleet operations, and exercise with like-minded navies to enhance our collective strength.³⁸⁵

7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed fleet and employs 50 to 70 ships and submarines across the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. 7th Fleet routinely operates and interacts with 35 maritime nations while conducting missions to preserve and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific region.³⁸⁶

Theodore Roosevelt’s embarked air wing consists of the “Tomcatters” of Strike Fighter Squadrons (VFA) 31, “Golden Warriors” of VFA-87, “Blue Diamonds” of VFA-146, “Black Knights” of VFA-154, “Liberty Bells” of Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 115, “The Gray Wolves” of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 142, “Wolf Pack” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 75, “Eightballers” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 8 and “Providers” of Fleet Logistic Support Squadron (VRC) 30 Detachment 3.³⁸⁷

Theodore Roosevelt departed San Diego for a scheduled deployment to the Indo-Pacific December 23.³⁸⁸

It was exactly a year earlier that the US sent its warships to conduct the first Freedom of Open Navigation Operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea. Since then it has continued unabated.

When the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ship Montgomery on Saturday skirted a disputed island in the South China Sea, Beijing scrambled two armed fighter-bomber jets and “expelled it” from the area, the state-run media reported.³⁸⁹ Montgomery’s “freedom of navigation operation” was the first Navy  FONOP this year in the South China Sea. The sea service conducts FONOPs to reemphasize that it’s an international byway, open to all shipping.³⁹⁰

Beijing’s response also served as a reminder that China exerts large territorial claims across the Western Pacific and backs them up with a string of fortified atolls. “On Jan. 25, a U.S. warship asserted navigational rights and freedoms in the Spratly Islands, consistent with international law,” Lt. Joe Keiley, a U.S. 7th Fleet spokesman, said in a statement.³⁹¹ The Montgomery’s FONOP “challenged the restrictions on innocent passage” in those waters imposed not only by China, but also Vietnam and Taiwan, Keiley said.³⁹²

According to Toshi Yoshihara and Jack Bianchi (2021) in their major report, China’s military is going global with its PLA.

In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies and partners, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters.³⁹³

Washington and allied capitals should anticipate a future when a globalized PLA renders the operational environment far less permissive than they have enjoyed in the past. A decade hence, a globally present PLA will require the United States and its allies to revise assumptions about deterrence, reassurance, and warfighting across different regional theaters. The allied militaries will need to revisit their force structures, postures, day-to-day peacetime operations, and wartime planning as the forward presence of capable Chinese forces around the world becomes a fact of life. Given the velocity of the PLA’s global ascent, it behooves allied policymakers to think productively about counterstrategies based on a sound assessment of Chinese power, including its strengths and weaknesses.³⁹⁴

This study argues that an understanding of China’s weaknesses as they relate to its global ambitions is required to formulate an effective allied response. These weaknesses offer insights into the costs that Chinese leaders will have to pay to go global. Importantly, some weaknesses are severe and susceptible to external pressure. In other words, the United States and its close allies may enjoy agency over certain Chinese weaknesses, furnishing them leverage that, if exercised, could yield strategic dividends. This report shows that, as the PLA goes global, it confronts three interrelated weaknesses that could constrain or complicate its expansion. These weaknesses could, in turn, inform U.S. and allied strategies in a long-term competition.³⁹⁵ 

First, as a classic land-sea power, China faces an inescapable two-front dilemma in the continental and maritime directions, imposing built-in limits on its global ambitions. Beijing must always devote adequate resources to meet its commitments on land and at sea. Costly and protracted entanglement on one front could leave Beijing overexposed on the other.³⁹⁶

Above all, China must avoid intense simultaneous rivalries on its continental and maritime flanks. Mao Zedong’s “dual adversary” strategy in the 1960s that pitted Beijing against the United States and the Soviet Union has taught his successors the grave risks of such a two-front confrontation.³⁹⁷

Chinese strategists possess a clear-eyed sense of the limits on Beijing’s geostrategic choices. They recognize that China’s decisive seaward turn, a precondition for going global, has been predicated on peace on its continental front. Over the past three decades, amity with Russia freed China to go to sea. They understand that Beijing’s peace dividend on land is by no means permanent. The potential for continental challenges to undo China’s global ambitions casts a long shadow over its strategic calculus. China’s recent skirmishes with India along the Himalayan border could serve as a test case for determining how well Beijing can manage landward tensions even as it extends its reach at sea.³⁹⁸

Second, the PLA’s need to sustain a diversified force structure for contingencies near and far precludes a concentration of effort devoted entirely to global missions. The Chinese military must meet disparate and, at times, contradictory demands arising from Beijing’s local and global commitments. The PLA must be prepared for threats along China’s continental periphery, in offshore areas of the Western Pacific, and across the world’s oceans. Unresolved local disputes along China’s continental and maritime peripheries require the PLA to stay fixated on events close to home, often at the expense of its global plans. Nearby security challenges, then, are akin to a tax on the capacity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to act on the world stage.³⁹⁹

Potential flashpoints in offshore areas involving Taiwan, the Senkakus, or the Spratlys tie up contingency-specific capabilities that are not transferable to global missions. For instance, short-range ballistic missiles, shore-based tactical fighters, and coastal combatants would have limited utility for expeditionary operations. Every yuan Beijing spends on the PLA for offshore dangers is one fewer yuan that can be profitably invested in power projection forces. Meanwhile, the development of power projection itself will consume a significant amount of capital, magnifying the unpalatable trade-off choices that Chinese leaders must make to meet their objectives in the near seas, the far seas, and the interior.⁴⁰⁰

Third, the PLA needs to close significant gaps in its overseas logistical infrastructure to obtain a credible global military posture. While the Chinese military will pursue its own brand of global access, it will need to develop a network of basing and logistical arrangements to sustain expeditionary operations. China’s defense planners recognize that a large-scale effort is required to construct military-grade bases and dual-use facilities along key sea lanes. Each new base or facility and its host nation would generate their own unique political, diplomatic, economic, and legal demands as well as operational requirements. A basing network would multiply new commitments and liabilities.⁴⁰¹

Chinese strategists acknowledge that Beijing’s lack of deep relationships with its partners could severely constrain its global quest. The U.S. experience shows that close ties do not materialize overnight: they are forged by such intangibles as trust, shared values, institutionalized interactions, and a history of close cooperation. Most of China’s ties with potential host nations lack these essential qualities. China’s reflexive attempts to develop stronger bonds abroad through economic inducements may only yield limited results. Beijing may be able to arrange a wide range of access agreements with its counterparts. But the quality, durability, and reliability of those overseas facilities are likely to be uneven, if not shaky, particularly in times of crisis or war when Beijing would presumably need access most.⁴⁰²

China’s geostrategic, power projection, and overseas logistical weaknesses provide a basis for devising and evaluating allied responses. To apply their counterstrategies, policymakers should consider approaching weaknesses in the PRC’s globalizing military in the following ways:

• Defense planners must determine which Chinese weaknesses can be productively subjected to allied strategy to increase China’s difficulty in realizing its aims. Conversely, it is critical to ascertain which Chinese weaknesses may be immune to external pressure and are best left to play out on their own.
• Not all weaknesses should necessarily be subjected to allied strategy, even if they were vulnerable to external pressure. Some Chinese weaknesses should be left alone due to the strategic risks involved in targeting them. Policymakers need to judge whether allied options against PRC weaknesses might prove counterproductive or self-defeating.
• Allied decisionmakers should discern whether direct or indirect approaches should be applied against certain Chinese weaknesses. There may be circumstances when the allies should develop approaches that chip away at weaknesses. In other cases, speedy, bold, and visible action intended for maximal effect may prove more efficacious.
• The allies should recognize that Chinese weaknesses can change over time, for better or for worse. Beijing possesses agency over some weaknesses while it may have little choice over others. Some weaknesses may be ephemeral while others may worsen over time. Choosing when to apply pressure will thus be a key ingredient to allied success.
• The close allies need to be selective and prudent as they consider their strategies. Carefully discerning, differentiating, and rank ordering Chinese weaknesses will help allied decisionmakers prioritize and sequence their options and take calculated risks.

This study finds that weaknesses in China’s globalizing military can be examined in terms of costs, which measure the resistance that the PLA will encounter as it goes global. The following provides typologies of costs to help determine how allied strategy could be applied against the PRC’s weaknesses:⁴⁰³

• There are high economic costs to going global. A power projection force and an overseas logistical infrastructure will come with a hefty price tag. Even a modest network of bases and an extra-regional fleet confined to the Indian Ocean could be quite expensive. Anexpeditionary force would likely be far more costly than those dedicated to homeland defense and missions closer to home.⁴⁰⁴
• Beijing’s leaders must consider opportunity costs. Trade-offs are built into China’s geostrategic calculus. The PRC must maintain a reasonable balance between its continental, near seas, and global commitments. The shift to a global military posture could intensify competition for scarce resources as the trade-offs between near seas missions and far seas missions sharpen.
• As China goes global and encounters unfamiliar circumstances, Beijing will need to cover its startup costs. Beijing’s geostrategic reorientation will require qualitatively different kinds of skillsets and significant increases in resources to defeat the tyranny of distance. China will be climbing a steep learning curve as it seeks to obtain mastery of global power projection and its associated demands.
• The PRC will need to manage the psychological costs of going global. Chinese strategists exhibit deep paranoia about encirclement and being cut off at sea. They are predisposed to believe that hostile outside powers are determined to oppose the PLA’s growing global presence. China’s leaders are also likely to grow ever more sensitive to risk as they invest scarce capital in power projection forces.
• Beijing must pay for the cumulative costs of empire. China’s ambitions for an overseas basing infrastructure are likely to beget new commitments. Such a basing network, even if modest in scale, would require political, diplomatic, and financial capital. Chinese leaders could find themselves entangled in host nation disputes. The PLA would also need to invest in the defense of its overseas bases against capable adversaries.

The cost considerations above furnish the United States and its close allies with various opportunities to complicate China’s global plans. The report offers the following policy recommendations:

• The United States and its allies should recognize that the territorial status quo in the Western Pacific imposes a constraint on the PRC’s global ambitions. Potential contingencies in the near seas consume significant resources at the expense of China’s global plans. Conversely, if China were to upend the current order in its favor, including conquest of Taiwan, Beijing could open new strategic vistas to go global.⁴⁰⁵
• The close allies should acknowledge that the preservation of the status quo in maritime Asia is closely linked to the globalizing rivalry with China. A credible defense of allied interests in the Western Pacific imposes a cost on the PLA’s outward orientation. Similarly, a vigorous response to Chinese expansion on the world stage could potentially dilute Beijing’s attention and resources for defending vital interests close to home.⁴⁰⁶
• The allies possess options to force on China costlier choices between its urgent needs in the near seas and its longer-term plans for the far seas. The United States and its partners should pursue strategies that compel Beijing to spread scarce resources across the near seas, far seas, and, to the extent possible, the continental periphery.⁴⁰⁷ 
• In the near seas, measures to harden the frontline states, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, could go far to tie up more of the PLA’s resources for contingencies in its immediate neighborhood. If these states were to pursue small, dispersed, and asymmetric force structures aimed at air and sea denial, they could induce China to invest more in near seas capabilities than it would otherwise prefer.⁴⁰⁸
• The United States should develop new operational concepts, postures, capabilities, and technologies to ensure that its armed forces can survive and remain lethal in heavily contested areas along China’s maritime periphery. Washington should coordinate with allied and partner militaries to maximize coalitional contributions in the near seas.⁴⁰⁹
• The allies should sharpen further the local-global trade-offs by making the far seas an inhospitable environment for China’s expeditionary forces and overseas bases. The United States and its allies should credibly demonstrate their capacity to hold at risk China’s far seas fleet, forward-deployed forces, and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that both supply overseas PLA forces and sustain the Chinese economy.⁴¹⁰
• The United States and its allies should recognize that this is not an exclusively military competition. They must not concede an open field to China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Rather, the close allies should actively contest China’s political and economic inroads in potential host nations by waging a coordinated diplomatic and information counteroffensive.⁴¹¹
• The allies should draw attention to Chinese attempts at breeding dependencies among targeted states as leverage for obtaining access to overseas bases and facilities. The messaging should focus on China’s transactional relationships with host nations that asymmetrically benefit Beijing and play up instances of China’s untrustworthiness as a partner in areas unrelated to overseas basing.⁴¹²
• The close allies should tap into Beijing’s psychological fears while showcasing allied strengths. Multinational naval exercises in the near seas and the far seas, as well as selective revelations of leap-ahead technologies and operational concepts that target China’s vulnerabilities, could go far to undercut PLA’s confidence. The allies should send a clear signal that Chinese aggression would be met with a coalitional response.⁴¹³
• The allies should acknowledge that there are limits to U.S. and allied agency over Chinese weaknesses. For the moment, they are limited in their collective capacity to steer China’s relationships with its great continental neighbors, Russia and India, in directions that favor them. The close allies may have to settle for strategic opportunism to exploit China’s dilemmas as a composite land-sea power.⁴¹⁴
• Washington and allied capitals should also recognize that the PRC’s overseas military bases and dual-use facilities will not be uniformly vulnerable to external pressure. Some are likely to pose nettlesome diplomatic problems for allied planners. The close allies do not have a free hand everywhere and they will need to tailor their strategies according to the peculiar conditions of each PLA overseas base or facility.⁴¹⁵ 
• The allies should conceive of the globalizing PLA as an integral part of a long-term comprehensive competition. Over the next decade, Beijing will struggle with the startup costs of going global. In the longer run, China will encounter stiff economic headwinds as it copes with structural problems, such as demographic decline and debt.⁴¹⁶
• The close allies should incorporate time as a planning variable because China will be vulnerable to external pressures at different times for different reasons. Charting the non-linear trajectory of the globalizing PLA over time will be key to determining when and where to exploit its weaknesses.⁴¹⁷

Finally, let us deal with one vital issue. Would China be reckless enough to launch an attack on the US through a third party in the South China Sea or South East Asia? This question repeatedly occurs in conversations around the ongoing stiff-necked competition between the US and China.

Even though Xi Jinping belongs to the hawkish faction within the Chinese Politburo (ruling clique) he is not unaware of the danger involved in pushing his luck too far especially to his own personal position as the President and Supreme Commander of the PLA, the most cherished positions in the Chinese political establishment, of allowing the dominant hawkish faction to push him (China) into (premature) confrontation with the US. The danger is two-fold.

First, such a confrontation would inevitably backfire especially considering the fact that the US would not hesitate to throw hard punches at China given its current military strength even in comparison with that of China in order to teach China some unforgettable lessons in modern warfare and/or to clip the “over”-flapping wings of the Chinese Dragon. Therefore, such a confrontation would not be to the strategic advantages of China from its current military and political standpoints both at the regional and global levels.

Second, and flowing directly from the first, a failure of such confrontation, whatever the calculated magnitude, would be calamitous to the position of Xi Jinping as it would automatically threaten him as the President and Supreme Commander of the PLA. In short, he would be pushed out by the same hawkish faction that has earlier egged him on to confront the US in the battlefield of uneven or unfavourable reality of the  turbulent South China Sea or rugged terrain of the South East Asia geopolitics.

The two reasons can be conjectured to account for the cautious relations that China has maintained with the US over the decades especially since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013 despite rattling the sabre of war with Taiwan several times. It is indisputable that the balance of power and/or terror does not favour China at the moment despite its aggressive posturing. Indeed, its aggressive posturing is not more than to intimidate or cow the US, if this is possible at all in the first place. The US has shown clearly for many years since the time of Bill Clinton when he sent US aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait to scare off China from attempting to invade Taiwan, and not just during the time of Donald Trump Administration, that it would not be intimidated or cowed by China in South East Asia or South China Sea at all.

Yes, the US has wittingly or unwittingly allowed China to grow its Dragon wing and gain some upper hands in some areas (which it now probably secretly regrets) thus creating room for China to even contemplate and attempt to arm-twist, intimidate or cow the US into a tight corner.

Are the Titans about to clash?

The question asked about whether the US is in the South China Sea to intimidate China and make it back off the US allies in the region or it is preparing for an inevitable clash with China is very germane to the understanding why the tempo of US gunboat diplomacy into the South China Sea has increased in the last few years. There is no concrete answer to this question even when the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated categorically that the US would not allow China to build a maritime empire in the region. The corollary question to Pompeo assertion is what will happen, what would the US do, if China decides, contrary to all expectations, to continue to militarize the zone in a Manichean quest to erect a maritime empire?

Even though Biden Administration is not spitting rhetorical fires at China as Trump Administration had done, it has, however, not slow down the gunboat diplomatic forays into the South China Sea. Indeed, it is rather slowly drawing more US allies into the region, in the process rattling the sabre at China. How far this would go without an accident occuring, even with the greatest caution from both sides of the divide, is what nobody can predict even with Nostradamus telescopic ability. If Biden Administration continues on its current trajectory, it will eventually become indistinguishable from Trump Administration at least where China’s policies are concerned. Even though Biden Administration is barely three months old in the White House, its policy direction towards China can be clearly seen even for the blind. Smart but no less aggressive than Trump Administration!  

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III (2020) a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation and a member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies noted that [i]f recent developments are any indication, the South China Sea will remain an intense flashpoint for the rest of this year. Two things are especially worth following. First is the degree of importance China will assign to the South China Sea given its myriad domestic and foreign policy priorities. Second is how far neighboring littoral states will push back against Chinese actions and overtures in the contested sea and what tools they will be able to employ.⁴¹⁸

In the South China Sea, asymmetry between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia exists not only in terms of capabilities but also in the degree of significance attached to the disputes. The South China Sea has never occupied the top rung on Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, except perhaps during the Philippines’ initiation of arbitration against China’s claims of historic rights in 2013 and the Hague tribunal’s decision in 2016. Given economic reforms, protests in Hong Kong, President Tsai Ing-wen’s renewed mandate in Taiwan, censure of its security policies in Xinjiang, trade talks and great power rivalry with the United States, and the ongoing public health crisis of the novel coronavirus, Beijing will have its hands full. It may have little left in its tank for the South China Sea. In contrast, the six-way territorial and maritime row represents the most pressing security and foreign policy priority for other claimants. This sharp asymmetry may stimulate a willingness on the part of the biggest claimant to concede and negotiate with other disputants. That would jive well with China’s stated intention to project good neighborliness and settle the issue among the claimants without intervention by other powers. However, this readiness for dialogue may not necessarily extend to other maritime powers, especially as the South China Sea gradually emerges as a theater for great power competition.⁴¹⁹

China is apparently taking a more active role in conveying its narrative and engaging international think-tanks and publics. In April 2019, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative was launched by the Peking University Institute of Ocean Research. Earlier this year, the initiative has already held exchanges with regional counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This is on top of the Hainan-based National Institute for South China Sea Studies setup in 2004 which has also been holding exchanges with foreign counterparts. Whether these attempts at public diplomacy allay concerns among Southeast Asian claimants remains to be seen.⁴²⁰

Meanwhile, the high priority given to the dispute by other claimants means that they will exhaust the broad gamut of defense, diplomatic, and legal redress to safeguard their interests. Vietnam, for instance, concluded the 11th iteration of its Diplomatic Academy’s annual South China Sea conference in November 2019, drawing local and international experts. But pushback against Chinese incursions tends to wax and wane, and approaches vary among claimants. The nature of the threat posed by Chinese actions and the degree of economic ties with China are important variables to consider here.⁴²¹

Having lost the Paracels in 1974 and Johnson Reef in 1988, not to mention fighting China in a bitter land border war in 1979, Vietnam traditionally pushes back the hardest. Possible resort to legal means and international forums, especially as the country chairs ASEAN this year and assumes a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council (2020-2021), will diversify Hanoi’s toolkit and raise the stakes for future Chinese interference in Vietnam’s marine economic activities. The Philippines took a tougher stance after losing Mischief Reef in 1995 and control over Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The first incident pushed the country to modernize its armed forces (1995) and eventually sign a Visiting Forces Agreement (1999) with its longtime treaty ally, the United States. The second incident compelled the country to launch a legal challenge to China’s excessive maritime claims (2013) and allow U.S. troops a rotational presence in mutually agreed locations throughout the country via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (2014). Last year, Manila also sought and obtained greater clarity on the scope of its Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. However, Manila’s recent move to abrogate the Visiting Forces Agreement may undercut the value of the alliance at a time of growing Chinese presence in the disputed sea.⁴²²

In sum, notwithstanding bilateral and regional efforts at dispute management and confidence building, the level of importance that claimants will assign to the South China Sea disputes and the extent to which they will push back against coercion will foretell how tempestuous the South China Sea will get in 2020.⁴²³

But according to Robert Sutter of George Washington University and Chin-Hao Huang of Yale-NUS College (2020) were of the view that “Beijing responded methodically to a major escalation in US challenges to Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. Officials from Xi Jinping on down reached out to Southeast Asian countries with emphasis on growing economic relations and cooperation in countering COVID-19. Top-level officials generally eschewed public criticism of the United States on South China Sea issues, while government ministries and official and unofficial media used sometimes tough language in criticizing Washington. Overall, Beijing registered satisfaction that ASEAN adopted a neutral stance and most other states showed little sign of leaning toward the US against China.⁴²⁴

The Chinese government in this reporting period faced unprecedented US criticism and US military, diplomatic, and economic moves targeting Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. US South China Sea initiatives were part of a remarkable government campaign in 2020 to solidify opposition to Chinese practices in a worldwide struggle reminiscent of the Cold War. The intensity and scope of the US campaign appeared to catch Chinese leaders by surprise. They were firm in defending interests but seemed anxious to avoid exacerbating tensions.⁴²⁵

Regarding Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, it remained to be seen whether and how escalated US opposition would change the recent pattern of Chinese incremental expansion using generally unpublicized coercive means to expand control in the South China Sea while developing close economic and diplomatic ties advancing Chinese leverage with regional governments. Top Chinese leaders generally didn’t discuss recent South China Sea disputes with the US, leaving that task to lower-level officials and official and unofficial commentary. Xi Jinping followed this practice in the past, notably when he publicly ignored the rising complaints of President Barack Obama and his administration about Chinese practices in the South China Sea and several other policy areas and moved ahead with initiatives opposed by the US government. The commentary of top leaders and other officials continued past practice emphasizing the public face of Chinese cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors in broadening economic relations and countering the COVID-19 pandemic. Prominent Chinese military exercises and coercive activities of Chinese coast guard and maritime militia continued. And Chinese specialists and commentary in less authoritative Chinese media outlets warned of the danger of military conflict.⁴²⁶

The high point of the US challenges came in back-to-back statements on July 13 and 14 by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell that offered the strongest US rebuke of China’s South China Sea claims and the strongest support for the positions of the other claimants. These initiatives coincided with the anniversary of the July 12, 2016 ruling of a UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) tribunal, highlighted in the US statements, that the vast majority of Chinese South China Sea claims were illegal. They came as US naval and air forces were carrying out over a four-week period the largest US military show of force in the maritime periphery of Southeast Asia since the Cold War. They were followed by announcements on Aug. 26 by the State Department and the Commerce Department of visa restrictions imposed on Chinese officials and bans on the purchase of US products imposed on Chinese companies involved in constructing Chinese outposts in the South China Sea.⁴²⁷

On May 26, Indonesia followed China, the Philippines, and Vietnam in submitting its diplomatic notes. China affirmed its claims and the two other claimants affirmed theirs in opposition to China. Indonesia also aligned against China. Jakarta asserted that Indonesia was not a party to the territorial disputes, the UNCLOS tribunal ruling confirmed Indonesia’s territorial claims regarding the South China Sea, and China’s nine-dash line implying historical rights that infringe on Indonesian sovereignty lacked international legal basis.

On June 1, the United States became the fifth country to weigh in against Chinese claims. Its diplomatic note reiterated previous US objections to China’s maritime claim and endorsed the UNCLOS tribunal’s finding rejecting Chinese historical rights.⁴²⁸

On July 23, Australia became the sixth country to submit a diplomatic note against China’s claims, providing the most detailed rejection of China’s claims to date. Low-key Chinese reaction saw the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson on June 3 push back against US objections, reasserting China’s position that it acquired territorial sovereignty over the South China Sea through a long historical process and that Chinese maritime rights and interests were consistent with the UN Charter and UNCLOS. The spokesperson added that the United States was not a party to the disputes, and that its diplomatic and military interference undermined peace and stability in the South China Sea. A China Daily editorial on July 28 warned that Australia “jumping on the US bandwagon and meddling in the South China Sea disputes” would damage its relations with China and the broader region.⁴²⁹

In a related development, the Chairman’s statement of the 36^th ASEAN Summit of June 26, 2020 as usual had two paragraphs devoted to the South China Sea and as usual they did not mention China or its actions there. But this year’s statement was seen to undercut Chinese territorial claims based on historical process by asserting that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime rights and governing “all activities” in the oceans and seas.⁴³⁰

Though official comment remained moderate, Chinese specialists raised alarm in unofficial outlets about perceived growing South China Sea tensions caused by the United States. A June 23 commentary in Global Times by a member of a team at the National Institute for South China Seas Studies—which published a major report on US military presence in the Asia-Pacific that month—noted that “many scholars” are discussing whether large-scale military conflicts between China and the US will break out in the Asia-Pacific region, and argued that the main determinant of conflict will be the attitudes of “US hawks” toward China. Peking University’s newly formed South China Sea Probing Initiative was busy tracking more active US reconnaissance, FONOPS, and military exercises, asserting that the US military was responsible for growing tensions in the South China Sea. The defense ministry spokesperson’s comments at the monthly press conference on June 24 gave unusual attention to the South China Sea, charging the US with self-serving efforts to use stepped-up military activity, diplomatic interventions, and slanderous statements against China to raise tensions over the South China Sea.⁴³¹

The main US military exercises featured in Chinese and regional commentary involved three aircraft carriers—the USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS Nimitz, and USS Ronald Reagan—and supporting warships in their respective strike groups. The Roosevelt and the Nimitz held joint exercises in the Philippines Sea on June 21. The Nimitz and the Reagan then combined to form a strike force for operations in the South China Sea on July 4-7; and they returned for another round of operations in the South China Sea on July 17. The exercises also were notable for involving long-range US B-52 and B-1 bombers. On July 20 the Nimitz was exercising with Indian forces in the Bay of Bengal at the mouth of the strategic Malacca Strait, and on July 21-23 the Reagan exercised in the Philippines Sea with Japanese forces and a large contingent of warships from Australia. Such unprecedented US military muscle-flexing was seen in Chinese commentary as providing the background for the Pompeo and Stilwell statements strongly supporting regional South China Sea claimants against China’s illegal claims.⁴³²

According to Mathieu Duchatel: Building militarized artificial features in the Spratly and seizing Scarborough Shoal are two major achievements of Xi Jinping during his first term in power, as emphasized in his work report to the 19th Party Congress. Under his leadership, China has established a relative superiority vis-à-vis other claimants in the South China Sea in terms of military and law-enforcement presence. This has greatly advanced the Chinese goal of progressively extending effective administrative control over the South China Sea. During Xi Jinping’s second term,even though there have been localized incidents and an overall increase of Chinese presence in the area, China has refrained from risky unilateral moves. This is the result of several factors: a focus on consolidating recent gains, a priority placed on other areas of the confrontation with the United States, a more robust foreign naval presence in the South China Sea, Hong Kong and Taiwan taking precedence on the top of China’s international agenda.⁴³³

Besides this characterization of the US strategic intention, there is a deeper underlying anxiety among Chinese experts regarding the consequences of the US decision. Zhu Feng, Executive Director of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies at the University of Nanjing, argues that the new State Department’s official position amounts to a change of the US role in the region.⁶ For him, since the establishment of US-PRC relations in 1979, the US acted mostly as a “bystander” (旁观者) in the South China Sea. From his perspective, the United States maintained an overall neutrality during the deadly 1988 Johnson South Reef battle between China and Vietnam, or when the PLA seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995. Zhu Feng notes the US reacted to these Chinese territorial advances by stressing the necessary peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. Closer to now,the 2012 confrontation between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal provided a unique example, according to Zhu Feng, of the US trying to act as a “peace mediator” (和事佬), using a Chinese term with a slightly derogatory connotation (佬). In his piece, Zhu Feng does not address the damage caused by this failed mediation. The seizure of Scarborough Shoal by China undermined the credibility of the Obama administration, raising questions about its ability to defend the territorial status quo in East Asia from Chinese expansionist ambitions.⁴³⁴

Looking ahead, for Zhu Feng,the new US position is a prelude to an increased military presence by the United States in the South China Sea, and there is a risk for China that the American position encourages Southeast Asian claimants to take provocative and confrontational actions.⁴³⁵

In July 2020, the US Navy deployed the two aircraft-carrier battle groups USS Nimitz and USS Reagan in the first dual carrier exercises in the South China Sea since 2014. This is only the third time that such wargames have been conducted since 2001. One exercise involved the simultaneous deployment of a B-52 nuclear-capable bomber to practice long-range strike missions. Such a spectacular show of military power aims at deterring China from taking the risk of new unilateral moves in the South China Sea and reassures Southeast Asian claimant states, at a time in the Covid-19 pandemic context when the People’s Liberation Army has adopted an assertive posture on territorial issues in the East China Sea and over Taiwan, culminating in the border clash in Ladakh with the Indian army. Combined with the new position issued by the State Department, the US Navy exercises signal a strong resolve to maintain a robust naval presence in the South China Sea, through Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs).⁴³⁶

Zhang Junshe, researcher at the People’s Liberation Army Naval Military Academic Research Institute, describes these US exercises on China Military Network as “futile provocations” (挑衅行动注定徒劳无功) that will not affect the “generally stable” (总体稳定) situation on the South China Sea. Echoing the narrative pushed in the Chinese media by experts regarding the change of position by the US on the 2016 arbitration award, Zhang Junshe argues that rather than American naval maneuvers, the main story in the South China Sea is the ongoing negotiation of the Code of Conduct.⁴³⁷

Rather than American naval maneuvers, the main story in the South China Sea is the ongoing negotiation of the Code of Conduct.⁴³⁸

At the same time, China has in recent years changed its communication regarding US air and naval operations in the South China Sea, stepping up efforts to denounce the constant military presence of the United States in the South China Sea. The South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a think-tank at Peking University led by maritime strategist Hu Bo, and the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Hainan, a think-tank under the Foreign Ministry with a constant presence in the opinion and international pages of the Global Times, provide timely and detailed reports of US maritime surveillance, FONOPs and military exercises, most being translated in English, and the SCSPI also has a considerable presence on Twitter.The goal appears to be framing a narrative that instability in the South China Sea is caused by US military presence.⁴³⁹

In late June 2020, the Hainan Institute issued a report on US military presence in the Asia-Pacific.The report acknowledges an “absolute US military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region, and for a long time“.¹⁰ It lists the newest deployments by the United States as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which relies on the 375,000 troops under the Indo-Pacific Command, and overall concentrates 60% of the US Navy’s naval ships and 2/3 of the Marine Corps strength. Chinese analysts pay particular attention to the deployment of the B1B bomber from Anderson Airbase in training missions in the East and South China Seas since it has replaced the ageing B-52H.⁴⁴⁰

Three elements will determine the outcome of US-China competition: the struggle for the dominance of maritime affairs in the Western Pacific, the capacity to control maritime trade routes and the capacity to deliver on the needs of allies and friends.⁴⁴¹

In an interview to the Global Times later translated in English, Wu Shicun, President of the National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, argues that “China should not panic. We need to know that the US won’t have much more practical new moves. Thus we need to integrate our maritime power and study the changes in the mode of future maritime war, and form our own deterrence force.” He asserts that the US would not deploy naval power to prevent China from stopping Vietnam’s drilling in the Spratly. However, like Zhu Feng, he worries that the current US posture will be interpreted as an opportunity by Vietnam and the Philippines.⁴⁴²

The US annual Freedom of Navigation Report lists seven FONOPs conducted in the East and South China Seas in 2019, a level similar to 2017 and 2018 – the reports during the Obama administration did not contain the number of FONOPs. In addition to freedom of navigation operations and surveillance flights, the US has also changed its approach to transfers through the Taiwan Strait, with at least seven transits between January and May 2020. Commenting the publication of the Hainan Institute’s report on US military operations, Wu Shicun argues that three elements will determine the outcome of US-China competition: the struggle for the dominance of maritime affairs in the Western Pacific (对于西太平洋海上主导权的争夺), the capacity to control maritime trade routes and the capacity to deliver on the needs of allies and friends. In other words,the balance of power, but also the quality of economic offers and the delivery of public goods.⁴⁴³

The July developments point to the larger question for China on how to adjust to the US pushback in the South China Sea under the Trump administration. In an in-depth academic analysis, Dai Zheng and Zheng Xianwu, scholars at Nanking University’s South China Sea Centerstress the Chinese achievements in the areas of blue economy and marine science and technology since the 18th Party Congress of 2012, which made building a strong maritime power (海洋强国) an official national goal.They address China’s strategy in the South China Sea from the wider perspective of the strategic importance of the ocean and describe the process of building a maritime power as a contribution to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.⁴⁴⁴

A similar focus on the long term strategic importance can be found in the account that Hu Xin, Research Associate at Hainan’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, gives of the South China Sea Forum, held in Nanjing in late November 2019, an event that brings together leading Chinese experts and academics.The conclusion of the discussion is that facing US pressure, China needs to stay on its course in the South China Sea, remain “calm and rational”, and pay particular attention to maintaining risks and challenges under control. China needs to find the right balance between “defending Chinese rights” and maintaining regional stability over the long term (长期维权和维稳相结合), until the moment when China reaches a new balance in its relationship with the United States.⁴⁴⁵

From a historical perspective, China’s policy towards the South China Sea in the 1970s and the 1980s was centered on territorial disputes and on the use of military power to defend Chinese claims. Today’s approach is more complexand diversified – Dai Zheng and Zheng Xianwu describe it as a “two-pronged strategy” (双管齐下) based on differentiated treatments (区别对待). The current Chinese strategy mixes elements of cooperation and struggle in a differentiated way towards regional states and non-regional stakeholders, mainly the United States. The authors argue that China has been able to diversify its strategy simply because greater power means more policy options. China is now able to conduct normalized law-enforcement patrols, offer public goods, make greater use of economic cooperation with regional states in support of its strategic goals in the South China Sea. In short, China has departed Deng’s guideline of “hiding talent and biding time” (韬光养晦) to comply with Xi Jinping’s 2013 guideline of “striving for achievements” (奋发有为).⁴⁴⁶

Oriana Skylar Mastro (2020), Assistant Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service; and Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, was of the view that [t]he risk of a military confrontation in the South China Sea involving the United States and China could rise significantly in the next eighteen months, particularly if their relationship continues to deteriorate as a result of ongoing trade frictions and recriminations over the novel coronavirus pandemic. Since 2009, China has advanced its territorial claims in this region through a variety of tactics—such as reclaiming land, militarizing islands it controls, and using legal arguments and diplomatic influence—without triggering a serious confrontation with the United States or causing a regional backlash. Most recently, China announced the creation of two new municipal districts that govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands, an attempt to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea by projecting an image of administrative control. It would be wrong to assume that China is satisfied with the gains it has made or that it would refrain from using more aggressive tactics in the future. Plausible changes to China’s domestic situation or to the international environment could create incentives for China’s leadership to adopt a more provocative strategy in the South China Sea that would increase the risk of a military confrontation.⁴⁴⁷

The United States has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea. Maintaining free and open access to this waterway is not only important for economic reasons, but also to uphold the global norm of freedom of navigation. The United States is also at risk of being drawn into a military conflict with China in this region as a result of U.S. defense treaty obligations to at least one of the claimants to the contested territory, the Philippines. China’s ability to control this waterway would be a significant step toward displacing the United States from the Indo-Pacific region, expanding its economic influence, and generally reordering the region in its favor. Preventing China from doing so is the central objective of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the reason the Indo-Pacific is the U.S. military’s main theater of operations. For these reasons, the United States should seek ways to prevent Chinese expansion, ideally while avoiding a dangerous confrontation and being prepared to deftly manage any crises should they arise.⁴⁴⁸

China considers the majority of the South China Sea to be an inalienable part of its territory. Exercising full sovereignty over this area is a core component of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” China does not accept or respect the sovereignty claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, or Vietnam in this region. Although China has been cautious in pressing its claims thus far, three developments could convince Xi that China should be more assertive.⁴⁴⁹

Xi could feel compelled to accelerate his timeline in the South China Sea to maintain his consolidated position within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly if the political situation in Hong Kong worsens, peaceful reunification with Taiwan becomes less likely, or domestic criticism of his management of the novel coronavirus outbreak increases. With China’s economic growth for 2020 projected to hit only 1.2 percent—the lowest since the mid-1970s—Xi could find it necessary to demonstrate strength while Beijing deals with internal fallout from the pandemic. China has already declared two new administrative districts in the South China Sea in April 2020 and has escalated its criticism of U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the area. Moreover, with expectations that the first stage of China’s military modernization efforts will be completed in 2020, Xi could become more confident that China would succeed in pressing its claims militarily, especially if the United States is distracted internally with managing the coronavirus pandemic or its aftermath.⁴⁵⁰

The opportunity to press claims without resorting to force could also diminish in the future should Southeast Asian nations become less accommodating of China’s position. Vietnam, one of the claimants to contested islands, has assumed the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for 2020. During its tenure, Vietnam could block the progress of negotiations over establishing a maritime code of conduct in the South China Sea, which China has been advocating for, or it could bring legal action against China. Furthermore, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s friendly posture toward China could become politically unsustainable in the event of an incident at sea that results in the injury or death of Filipino citizens. Indonesia has also maintained a neutral position in the disputes, but this could change if Beijing continues to infringe on Jakarta’s fishing rights in the Natuna Sea. China could see military action as its only recourse if it loses the diplomatic option to assert its sovereignty claims.⁴⁵¹

The continued downward spiral in U.S.-China relations could also encourage Xi to adopt a now-or-never approach to the South China Sea. Under the Donald J. Trump administration, the United States has increased the frequency of FONOPs, challenging China’s excessive claims in the area. In 2018 and 2019 alone, U.S. Navy vessels sailed within twelve nautical miles of islands and reefs claimed or occupied by China at least a dozen times, a substantial increase from the frequency observed under the Barack Obama administration. The U.S. military continues to operate in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as allowed under international law, despite China’s attempts to exercise control over all military activities within its EEZs. U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges have declined from thirty in 2016 to twelve in 2019 as well, and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has publicly stated that the United States would come to the Philippines’ aid should any form of a Chinese armed attack occur against Manila. If the ongoing trade and technology war, exacerbated by fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, and increased strategic competition and military tensions in East Asia continue—and if the United States appears to be mounting initiatives to stop further Chinese gains—China could push back in the South China Sea in ways that lead to a military clash.⁴⁵²

If China decides the time is right to more aggressively assert its claims, it could do so in three ways, potentially simultaneously. These are listed below from the most likely and least escalatory to the least likely and most escalatory. In all these scenarios, China would seek to expand its control over the South China Sea in accordance with its broader goals of reordering the region in its favor and displacing the United States. In response, the United States would act to prevent China from changing the status quo through aggressive and coercive means and to maintain the United States’ position as guarantor of peace, security, and stability in the region.⁴⁵³

One of China’s main strategies in promoting its claims in the past has been to increase the risks for others exercising their rights by, for example, harassing other countries’ oil and gas exploration platforms, fishing vessels, and military vessels. In May 2019, China deployed its coast guard to intimidate Vietnamese offshore support vessels servicing a drilling platform near Vietnam’s southern coast, an area the Vietnamese consider territorial waters and that supplies a significant percentage of oil for a Vietnamese pipeline. This move resulted in the most significant standoff between China and Vietnam in the last five years, with Chinese and Vietnamese coast guard vessels conducting patrols near each other and the Vietnamese government issuing a statement calling for a halt to China’s activities.⁴⁵⁴

Similarly, China could adopt more aggressive rules of engagement against other countries’ air or sea operations in the area. This could include clipping a U.S. naval vessel, locking radar onto a U.S. aircraft, or conducting more frequent and provocative military exercises. Currently, China relies largely on shadowing U.S. forces and issuing strongly worded statements when the United States and others conduct FONOPs. However, it could respond more aggressively, increasing the risk for U.S. forces operating in the area. In late June 2019, for example, China tested a medium-range ballistic missile twice in the South China Sea. These tests obstructed the ability of other countries to resupply their outposts near the Paracel Islands and the United States interpreted them as a threat from China that it could hold U.S. bases and vessels, as well as those of allies, at-risk in the event of military escalation in the South China Sea.⁴⁵⁵

China could take measures calculated to change the military balance of power in the South China Sea. Though Beijing would try to couch these measures in defensive terms, such unilateral changes would necessitate a stronger response from claimants. China could begin by bringing in new actors to increase pressure on claimants. For example, as China and Russia’s militaries grow closer, China could encourage Russia to support China’s claims by challenging U.S. ships, as Russia did near Philippine waters in June 2019.⁴⁵⁶

 China could also declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) around the Spratly Islands. China is already building capabilities to enforce an ADIZ and is installing radars on various islands in the South China Sea. If China draws straight baselines—low water lines along a country’s coastline that delimit territorial waters—around the Spratly Islands, which the 2016 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea tribunal ruled would be illegal, it would be declaring 10 percent of the South China Sea to be internal waters where no foreign vessels of any kind could enter without Beijing’s permission (China has already done this around the Paracel Islands). This would significantly affect trade lanes, fisheries and fishing rights, and freedom of navigation through these areas.⁴⁵⁷

China could then claim a 200-nautical-mile EEZ outward from these straight baselines. This zone would encompass almost all of the South China Sea. China insists that foreign reconnaissance activities in its EEZ without prior notification and permission violate its rights, and it could start to enforce this interpretation. However, the United States military needs to continue conducting operations in the South China Sea, including reconnaissance, to ensure its readiness in a number of contingencies, including the defense of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China’s EEZ claims could force the United States to choose between continuing operations, thereby risking direct confrontation with China, or reducing them, undermining its alliance commitments.⁴⁵⁸

Although China’s position on EEZ rights is questionable from a legal standpoint, it could be difficult for the United States, let alone smaller states, to push back. China’s coast guard is the world’s largest, with more vessels than those of all its regional neighbors combined. While the U.S. Coast Guard has begun operating in the South China Sea, it does so at limited scale and frequency. In this scenario, China could use its new restrictions as a rationale for creating greater, more frequent obstructions to other countries’ ability to resupply their outposts. This type of brinksmanship would put the burden of escalation on the other claimants, perhaps convincing them to disengage from the islands they occupy. If countries accommodate China’s claims, Beijing could control East Asian nations’ access to these waters, which would give China an unprecedented amount of leverage against its neighbors, many of whom are U.S. treaty allies.⁴⁵⁹

The U.S. Pacific Fleet could get involved in protecting the freedom of all nations to navigate, regardless of their alliance status, which would escalate the issue and require many resources. U.S. allies and partners, such as Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, would likely challenge China’s attempts to restrict their freedom to navigate in the South China Sea, potentially leading to clashes, crises, and escalation that could bring in the United States.⁴⁶⁰

While less likely, China could take military action against other claimants, or even U.S. vessels. China could occupy or militarize the Scarborough Shoal—contested territory between China and the Philippines—that the United States has clearly communicated as a redline that could lead to escalation. China would likely do this if the Philippines reverses its support for China and if China begins to view U.S. activities as provocative. China could also block food, water, and fresh troops to islands occupied by other claimants, or use military force to take over the islands.⁴⁶¹

There are a number of possible indicators of an aggressive turn in China’s strategy. The CCP could increase its use of nationalistic rhetoric, which is often a precursor to China’s use of force. Xi could address South China Sea sovereignty issues more frequently and commit to resolving them during his tenure. There could be an uptick in calls from state-owned newspapers for China to exercise its sovereignty by taking military action.⁴⁶²

If China wishes to ensure strategic surprise, it could hide preparations for military action under the guise of conducting military exercises, which would be hard to detect. China could move aircraft to Subi, Fiery Cross, and Mischief Reefs, justifying the movement as a temporary rotation. China could also move a number of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, landing ships, support ships, and coast guard vessels in preparation for a naval maneuver. China would likely forward deploy more anti-air and anti-ship capabilities in the form of air-launched cruise missiles or ground-based systems, but it would try to hide such changes.⁴⁶³

Along these lines, China’s maritime behavior is likely to change in tandem with an increase in nationalist rhetoric and an improvement in its military capabilities. Specifically, there could be an increase in the frequency and intensity of patrols by China’s coast guard or navy, especially in areas where it is considering using force. Moreover, to try to win before fighting, China could heighten coercive measures—such as swarming, obstructing, ramming, and buzzing claimants—while simultaneously pressuring claimants diplomatically to concede to China’s interpretation of its sovereignty.⁴⁶⁴

It is most unlikely that China would launch a full-scale attack on any of the neighbouring countries in the short or medium term because of the unintended consequences. The long term may not be ruled out. There are, however, lot of uncertainties, complexities and ambiguities on the horizon that make the position of China vulnerable and therefore, extremely difficult to take decisions to launch an invasion of any of the neighbouring countries. First of all, as can be extrapolated from previous analysis, such an invasion would most likely attract retaliation from the US in one form or the other. And any clash with the US can escalate beyond what was originally planned. And if it comes to such a clash, it is more likely the US would want to throw heavy punches at China in order to quickly overwhelm it and in the final analysis humiliate it, which in turn would attract like actions from the Chinese. The concept of a limited war would come under trial or severe strain during this period; and nobody can predict exactly what would be the nature or character of such a war – whether, for instance, it would involve deployment and/or application of tactical nuclear weapons or not.

It would be suicidal madness for China to launch direct attack on any US military formations within the region be it military bases or naval task force of any description, under any pretext. Despite the scope of the hegemonic ambitions of the China Communist Party under Xi Jinping, a counterfactual analysis of its policy thrusts or actionable policies would reveal that the Chinese ruling elite is still a rationalist/realist-minded one underpinned by cautious rule of the thumb especially when it cannot read the mind of the White House in Washington with particular reference to its fear of the hawkish faction within the political establishment.

The shortest route to war with the US is invasion of Taiwan. No US administration would sit idly by while Beijing overruns Taipei. Washington has gone beyond platitudes in defense of Taiwan. It has reached the point of no return in the promised defense of Taiwan with the might of the US military machine. Taiwan is the Thucydidean temptation waiting for both hegemons to fall into.

US, on its part, is no doubt justifiably worried about the meterioric rise of China as a superpower and hegemonic behemoth within a short time of three or four decades while the US could practically do nothing to wind the hand of the clock back or stop the match of history – whereas US and former Soviet Union arose as superowers after the end of the Second World War. Since 1947 when the Chinese State came into being as the People’s Republic of China after the Civil or nationalist war, two powerful political figures emerged to chart different economic development trajectories: Chairman Mao Zedong of People’s Republic of China and Chiang Kai-chek of Republic of China (Taiwan).

Taiwan has weathered the stormy rage across the Taiwan Strait from the mainland for the past 70 years when the two countries fell apart with the outbreak of the civil war. China has been in consuming rage and energetic effort to bring Taiwan to its kneel in total submission from its stubborn heights but to no avail so far. Taiwan is on 24/7 alert mode, sleeping with one eye opened, expecting artillery fires from across the Strait any time. So far, the big guns have not started booming. The stealth modern jet fighters have not started screaming across the sky raining down bunker-busting bombs. But Taiwan has become a tinder box waiting to explode anytime.

Conclusion

Various factors and forces have been described as the reasons for the meterioric rise of China on the world stage as a superpower. But what has probably received less attention is the role of the United States in the entire scenario. By all evidences available, US is the most singularly important external factor that contributed immensely to the rise of China into its modern status as a superpower. It is the story of a sorcerer that called out the genie out of the bottle but could not put it back.

From 1979 till the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House in 2017, even prior to that, the US has been cossetting and/or breast-feeding China. Now the die is cast! China has become a fearsome regional and global juggernaut or hegemon. What to do? The neighbouring countries are no match for China if it comes to war. Only the US can look China in the face, eyeball-to-eyeball, and dare it to do its worst. And it is precisely the fear of the US that has largely restrained China from lashing out at its neighbours.

China has, however, been testing the waters: sinking Vietnamese fishing boat, breaching Taiwan’s airspace several times with its fighter jets, crossing the Taiwan Strait with its warships and submarines, sending two hundred fishing flotilla allegedly manned by China’s Maritime Militia to violate The Philippines territorial waters and many other infractions on many fronts.

In response, US has practically been bullying China, with its several naval drills in the South China Sea in the last few years like no other time in history. Is the world about to witness a modern version of the Opium Wars in which China was stripped of its pride, humiliated and wrecked for almost two centuries? Would China suffer the same fate as it did during the Opium Wars when Western powers (United Kingdom, France and the United States) conspired and went after its throat and slit it?

When Dr Henry Kissinger, the grandmaster of realpolitik, orchestrated the rapproachment between the US and China in the early 70s sealed with the first official state visist to China by former President Richard Nixon in 1972, Kissinger, Nixon, and host of other top government functionaries, military leaders and strategists never thought, for once, that China would grow to become what it is today basically the most fearsome, strategic mortal threat to the US supremacy in the world.

Comparatively, the fall of former Soviet Union in 1991/92 could easily be foretold or foreseen by anyone who cared to look closer at the events slowly unfolding in the country then. The moment Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982, every started going down rapidly for the Soviet Union. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 from the ruinous military adventure there did little to stem the downward slope. But the collapse of the Berlin in 1989/90 accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the Eastern European countries formerly under the aegis of the Soviet Union going their separate ways paved the way for the destruction of Soviet Union by toppling it over. Soviet Union dissolved and is constituent republics went their different ways. It was the end of an era which lasted about 70 years, from Bolshevik Revolution in October (November) 1917 to 1992. From the death of Leonid Brezhnev to the final disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, it was exactly 10 years. 

In the case of China, nobody in his craziest imagination has been able to assemble likely factors similar to those of the former Soviet Union and conceptualize the probable internal combustion of China that could lead to its collapse. There are fundamental differences between the two countries notably the fact that China is a civilizational state where former Soviet Union was a constitution of republics of different people. 

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic (SARS-CoV-2) has done a great deal of reputational damage to the international image of China which it may not recover from very quickly – even though China has been able to weather the storm without too much damage such as international sanctions would cause. On the other hand despite the criticisms against the US for its global leadership failure in combating the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the US did not hesitate to send its warships to the South China Sea in a pugilist show of force to bully and intimidate China. 

On the other hand too, US is also legitimately worried about the growing China’s military strength with particular reference to the PLA Navy. The particular reference to the Navy here is based on the fact that it is the easiest mean by which a great nation seeks to project its military power to the global stage and reckoning, apart from nuclear arsenal. In the case of the US including Russia, it has been able to combine all the branches of the military into one fearsome mighty force on to the world stage: nuclear weapons, Navy and Air Force, and through them its land Army. On the other hand, China is in various stages of development of its military branches and the PLA Navy is now seen to be in forefront of projection of power on to the world stage.

The Chinese navy [for instance] has grown rapidly in recent years and is breaking the balance of military power in the Western Pacific region.⁴⁶⁵ According to an annual review of the Chinese military power by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), China has achieved parity with — or even exceeded — the United States in several military modernization areas.⁴⁶⁶

“China has the world’s largest navy now, larger than the United States. And it’s filled with new technologically advanced submarines and destroyers and amphibious ships,” Craig Singleton, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told VOA. He focuses on great-power competition with China. By comparison, “the U.S. Navy is getting smaller, the ships are getting older. It costs a lot of money to build new ships,” he said.⁴⁶⁷

According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage in 2020. The Chinese navy now has an overall battle force of about 350 ships and submarines. In comparison, the U.S. Navy’s battle force is about 293 ships as of early 2020, according to the annual review.⁴⁶⁸ 

Bryan Clark, an expert of naval operations and military competitions at the Hudson Institute, told VOA Mandarin that a larger Chinese navy force presents a bigger challenge to the U.S. “It means that the U.S. Navy will have a harder time defending partners and allies, because the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is going to have a lot of ships to gain sea control in areas around Taiwan and around the Senkaku Islands,” he said.⁴⁶⁹  

At the time, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire.” Yet Chinese naval ambition is not limited to the Pacific Ocean. Observers say the Chinese fleet is also active in the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.⁴⁷⁰ 

This include the invasion of Taiwan which the US has stated clearly that China should not even think about it at all.⁴⁷¹

What we can see clearly from the above is Thucydides Trap. But both sides have been careful enough not be ensnared in it – at least so far, while the battle for supremacy rages on. This battle does not look like it will abate very soon.

The United States, which maintains important interests in ensuring freedom of navigation and securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs), has expressed support for an agreement on a binding code of conduct and other confidence-building measures. China’s claims threaten SLOCs, which are important maritime passages that facilitate trade and the movement of naval forces.⁴⁷²

The United States has a role in preventing military escalation resulting from the territorial dispute. Washington’s defense treaty with Manila could draw the United States into a potential China-Philippines conflict over the substantial natural gas deposits or lucrative fishing grounds in disputed territory. The failure of Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders to resolve the disputes by diplomatic means could also undermine international laws governing maritime disputes and encourage destabilizing arms buildups.⁴⁷³

The only alternative by the US to China is to create a South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) akin to North Atlantic Treaty Organization that was able to hold off the former Soviet Union over many decades and the current Russia since the early 90s. No individual South East Asian country can unilaterally face China, not even India, South Korea and Japan, with their acknowledged military frepowers, without the high risk of annihilation or pulverization. No Asian country may do so without the full backing of the United States.

A SEATO would serve as a major deterrence to the Chinese global ambitions right from the home regional base. China would think twice before attempting to invade any country in the region. Taiwan should naturally be part of such a SEATO.

The American 2018 Indo-Pacific (Maritime) Strategy should be made to strengthen the existing Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, India, Australia and Japan. Indeed, it should be made its focal point. The Dialogue should be expanded to include New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and finally Taiwan and other countries willing to voluntarily join.

However, there is a foreseeable future possibility. If the two Koreas finally come together in reunification akin to the reunification of the two Germanies in 1989/90, a united Korea can emerge as another pole of power in the East Asia can serve as a leverage or a check on the Chinese global and regional hegemonic ambitions in East Asia.