Time for US to Restore Full Diplomatic Relationship with Taiwan

By Alexander Ekemenah, Chief Analyst, NEXTMONEY

It is time for the United States to restore full diplomatic relationship with Taiwan that it severed in 1979 under Jimmy Carter Administration.
Heavens will not fall in doing so. China will not go to war with Taiwan if such diplomatic relationship is fully restored as it has threatened to do for some years now.
Taiwan deserves a place in the sun. It has earned it. It has withstood the test of history. It has weathered the storm over the decades, living under the threat of the Sword of Damocles of the revisionist powers in Beijing. It has been living under the shadow of China and the fear of being invaded without warning. China has bullied and blackmailed many a country to isolate and abandon Taiwan, thus having it marooned in the surging ocean of the South China Sea where sharks rules the waves.
The election and swearing in of President Joe Biden on November 3, 2020 and January 20, 2021 respectively mark a historical watershed in the US’s relationship with Taiwan within the broad context of its relationship with China. This new-found vistas of opportunity can, however, be traced back to some few years back.

When President Donald Trump was elected in November 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan made a call to him the following month, December, congratulating him on his electoral victory and other sundry issues. The call was controversial because Taiwan has not been privileged since 1979 to make such a public display of political affinity with the US over major political development such as an electoral victory of a particular President.

When finally Trump Administration decided to challenge China to a duel over many issues such as trade war, technology war, diplomatic war, outbreak of coronavirus pandemic, South China Sea and other sundry matters, it left no one under the illusion or delusion about classifying China as a strategic competitor that has to be contained in one form or the other and from one degree or the other. Trump Administration also left no one in doubt about its sympathy for Taiwan with series of arms sales deals and other bilateral cooperations. A new stage was reached in this yummy relationship between the US and Taiwan when Alex Azer II, the immediate past Secretary of Health and Human Resources visited Taiwan officially in early August 2020, a visit which marked the highest level of contact between the two countries in decades.

Another high-level visit was to be made in January 2021, just before the Inauguration, by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Kelly Craft, to further cement the relationship between the two countries. However, the visit was aborted at the last minutes due to circumstances not unrelated to the hiccups encountered during the transition period leading to the presidential inauguration.

However, just few days before leaving office, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, lifted all visible restrictions on official communications between the US and Taiwan that have been put on hold for many years, indeed since 1979 when former President Jimmy Carter broke off all diplomatic relationships with Taiwan in favour of China. There has been no indication that the new Biden Administration intend to reverse this.

Pompeo also declared the treatment of the indigenous Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang region to be a genocide. Whether this was a correct appelation or classification or not is another matter entirely. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden called President Xi Jinping a “thug” over the treatment being meted out to the Uighurs. Thus it can be seen clearly that the Pompeo’s genocidal classification and Biden’s description of the Chinese leader as a thug fall into the same broad continuum and official stance of the United States towards the treatment meted out to the Uighurs by the revisionist powers in Beijing. Beijing called Trump Administration’s parting shots as “last-ditch madness…likely to bring them annihilation”. China consequently slammed sanctions on about 30 Trump Administration officials including Pompeo and NSA Robert O’Brien. But no more.

Trump Administration through the National Security Council headed by the National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien also declassified (behind-the-scene) 2018 Indo-Pacific Strategy about two decades ahead of time scheduled for such declassifications. Why this was done at the particular time is still largely unknown. Every Strategy is always in two parts: the public version usually meant for academic and media reference and the private behind-the-scene version which is actually the working document. The declassification unveiled the thinking and premises of the Strategy of which the summary is the identification of China as the most strategic competitor and probably the worst enemy of the United States in recent times.

Analysts have argued forward and backward (without consensus) that the declassification was carried out to lay political land mines for the new Biden Administration to reset the US relationship with Taiwan in relation to China. But significantly, neither President Biden nor any of his officials has denounced the lifting of the restrictions and the declassification of the Indo-Pacific Strategy document – meaning that Biden Administration is in full support either openly or tacitly contrary to what many has come to believe.

However, contrary to all expectations or misgivings about President Joe Biden’s view on the thorny issue of Taiwan, the latter was invited officially to attend and witness the Presidential Inauguration at the Capitol Hill on January 20, 2021. This was a first since 1979 when the US cut off diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. It was another significant development indicating the direction that Biden Administration might be going with Taiwan.

Taiwan was without doubt elated at this development. This is very significant in signalling early enough the direction the new Biden Administration is most likely to follow in relation to Taiwan. The grounds for this has been cleared by the immediate past Trump Administraton that decided to stand up to China on many issues including the vexatious issue of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s representative in the United States, Hsiao Bi-khim, who attended the spartan but impressive ceremony at the US Capitol tweeted: “I’m honored to be here today on behalf of the people and government of Taiwan.” “Democracy is our common language, and freedom is our common objective,” she added. “I look forward to working with the next administration in advancing our mutual values and interests.”1 “The invitation to Taiwan’s Representative to the U.S. to attend the Inaugural Ceremonies, the most significant event celebrating U.S. democracy, highlights the close and cordial ties between Taiwan and the United States based on shared values,” Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement.2

Using diplomatic languages, Taiwan Government, through its Foreign Ministry announced in a statement that it “looks forward to working with the new U.S. administration to further strengthen bilateral relations and contribute to the promotion of peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”3

Taiwanese experts saw the invitation as a positive sign for U.S.-Taiwan relations under the Biden administration. The Trump administration won favor in Taiwan for pushing the boundaries of U.S.-Taiwan exchanges, starting with a historic phone call between Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and then-President-elect Donald Trump in 2016. Given that, there was some concern that U.S.-Taiwan ties might suffer under a new administration. But several experts suggested that Hsiao’s inclusion is a signal the Biden camp will not walk back the Trump administration’s decision to widen the scope for exchanges.4
There were some question as to how the incoming Biden administration would approach that decision, but Biden’s nominee for Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, the new US Secretary of State, indicated during his confirmation hearing on January 19 that “I want to see that process (the lifting of restrictions on official communications announced by the previous Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo) through to conclusion if it hasn’t been completed, to make sure that we’re acting pursuant to the mandate in the (Taiwan Assurance) act that looks at creating more space for contacts.”5
It is time to boldly come out of the mushroom cloud of fear of what China would do if the US should restore full diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. For too long, both sides (i.e. the US and Taiwan) has lived and cringed under this Frankenstein monster of fear.
As Biden Administration settles down in office, this should be one of the strategic foreign policy priorities for the restoration of balance of power in the Asia or Indo-Pacific region so that countries like Taiwan would no longer have to live in fear of the possibility of being invaded by China without warning as it has threatened to do for some years now especially since when Xi Jinping came to power in 2012.
The threat to invade Taiwan with or without warning by China has been a veritable neuroweapon with which China has been waging a protracted epistemological warfare both against the US and Taiwan. All the past US administrations since the time of Jimmy Carter fell under the stupefying spell of this neuroweaponry which has become the beginning of wisdom for the US – until the immediate past President Donald Trump came to lift the spell and cast out the myth.
For all the sharp political differences between former Trump administration and the new Biden administration, there has become noticeable a fundamental and abiding bipartisan consensus over some key contemporary foreign policy issues especially those related to China and other adjunct strategic issues in the last four years.
One of these issues is that the “sheep” of Taiwan may safely graze, and therefore, cannot be abandoned to the “wolf” of China to devour as it has always threatened to do. This bipartisan consensus has taken on official documentary form most of which are in public domain and discussions in hushed tones within the hallowed chambers of the Capitol, war-room in the Pentagon, the corridors of the State Deparment and finally the White House.
China has significantly drew red lines on the floor daring the US to cross them. Obama Administration which fortuitously included President Joe Biden (as Vice President then) gingerly avoided crossing these lines at the risk of offending or antagonizing China. This was done for different set of strategic reasoning and premise which can only be understood within the context of the time and prevailing circumstances.
However, when Trump Administration came into being it predictably not only crossed these red lines, but equally dared China to do whatever it threatens to do.
One of the red lines was the South China Sea under which can be subsumed the Taiwan Strait issues. China has built up, fortified, and militarized some of the South China Sea islands to serve as military bases and springboards for launching military invasion of the surrounding neighbouring countries. This has caused a great concern not only in the neighbouring countries but equally in Washington and London. For some years now, China has been bullying her neighbours including Taiwan over the freedom of open navigation of the South China Sea where a significant world trade route passes. China has regularly transgressed the sovereign air space of Taiwan forcing Taiwan to scramble its fighter jets on numerous occasions to ward off the Chinese PLA aircrafts. Aerial dog-fights were barely avoided on these occasions. China has rammed and sank Vietnamese fishing boat just few years back over disputes over fishing rights without anybody coming to the aid of Vietnam in face of this naked aggression. The Philippines dragged China to an international tribunal for determination and settlement of rights on the South China Sea. Even when China was declared the guilty party and asked to refrain from further actions that could cause breach of peace, China has so far been belligerent and brushed aside the judgement of the international tribunal.
For all the ambivalence expressed by some quarters in the US, the sending of three aircraft supercarriers (USS Nimitz, USS Ronald Reagan and USS Theodore Roosevelt) to the SCS from early July 2020 to mid-October 2020 in a massive show of force (through five consecutive naval exercises) by Trump administration became a significant turning point in the raging ideological war and strategic struggles between the US and China which was part of a stategic iteration of US resolve to finally call off the bluffs of China over Taiwan. This became the comeappance and humiliating point for China. Once again, the US has forced China’s back to the Chinese Wall!
The gunboat diplomacy to the South China Sea by the US in 2020 is part of the broad historical continuum of similar exercises in the past. The US has forcefully intervened in the Strait of Taiwan in the past: 1956, 1958 and 1996.
In a virtual meeting held with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen by Center for Strategic and International Studies in April 2019, President Tsai reflected back on the 1996 incident in relation to Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Congress in 1979 which forms the backbone of the US-Taiwan relationship. “What the TRA also reflects is the United States’ commitment to our shared interests of peace, security, and stability in the Pacific. It has supported Taiwan’s development of the defense capabilities that we need in order to resist any form of coercion. And this commitment and support has been honored by successive administrations and the U.S. Congress. It featured prominently in March in 1996 when the Clinton administration sent two aircraft carriers to sail through the water near Taiwan to stop China’s attempt to disrupt Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. At that historic moment the U.S. stood with Taiwan, showing the world its commitment to our shared democratic values. And the people of Taiwan responded in kind, showing the world our resolve to exercise our right to vote, the fundamental democratic process proving that we were capable of joining a global community of free and democratic nations. So, in 1996, our democracy took a big step forward, and 20 years later Taiwan is one of the freest countries in the world, and the people of Taiwan elected their first female president.6

The last intervention was what led to the writing of the book on transfinite warfare by two China’s PLA Army officers, in 1999, a book that has become a classic reference for open warfare other than conventional warfare methodologies in which coronavirus pandemic can be contextually situated for a broader understanding of its collateral damages to the contemporary strategic scenario playing out in the Indo-Pacific region, and the gradual realignment of forces against China on global scale.
Thus President Donald Trump can be seen breaking with decades-old tradition in U.S. foreign policy firmament by moving the US much closer to Taiwan in the last four years than his predecessors in office and in the process angering Beijing which considers the democratic and self-ruled island a renegade province that must one day be forcefully reunited with the mainland. Trump Administration did away with the taboos, mythologemes and shibolletts that have held back a vibrant US-Taiwan relationship in preference for China that became conferred with the status of Most Favoured Nation mainly for economic advantages.
From all the official pronouncements and body languages that have been exhibited so far, it is evident that the new Biden Administration is most probably set to rejig the US-Taiwan relations and try to take what Trump Administration has done to a new notch if not to complete it. Biden Administration is coming to office with a mindset not to challenge the substance of what Trump Administration has done but to give it a form suitable for the public perception of what the Democratic Party’s foreign policy thrusts and ideological worldview are towards China, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific region in the coming decades.
What Experts are Saying
Analysts are naturally worried about the situational context and nuances of this impending rejig given what may be the likely reaction from other parties, i.e. China, Taiwan and other stakeholders.
According to Yen Nee (2021): “The Biden administration is certainly going to struggle with the conduct of relations with Taiwan,” Ross Feingold, director of business development at security advisory firm SafePro Group, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” “Over the past four years, the Trump administration has taken many steps to really engage with Taiwan in the same way that United States would engage with other foreign countries even if they’re still not using the terminology or having formal diplomatic relations,” he said.7
Steps taken by the Trump administration include Mike Pompeo’s announcement of the lifting of all “self-imposed restrictions” on contact between U.S. officials and their Taiwanese counterparts, a move that former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd — who’s also an astute China observer — said could put an end to the “one China policy” underpinning U.S.-China relations. Beijing, as expected, slammed all of those moves by the Trump administration.8
According to David Sacks (2021): The Trump administration had bolstered U.S. ties with Taipei, dispatching high-level envoys to the island, selling over $18 billion in arms to Taiwan (compared with $14 billion during the eight years of the Obama administration), removing all restrictions on contacts with Taiwan officials, working to shore up Taiwan’s relationships with its remaining diplomatic allies, and explicitly including Taiwan as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.9
A significant share of the Taiwan public was apprehensive that the Biden administration would be a continuation of the Obama administration, which they believed had prioritized Chinese cooperation on global issues such as climate change over building stronger ties with Taiwan. So far, however, these fears appear to be misplaced. The Biden administration has signaled that it will largely pick up where the Trump administration left off.10
Those who now serve in senior roles in the Biden administration signaled their support for Taiwan prior to joining the administration. Writing in  Foreign Affairs, Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, and Kurt Campbell, the NSC coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, called for the United States to invest in capabilities that would bolster deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and for the United States and China to maintain their “tacit commitment not to unilaterally alter the status quo.”11
Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin underscored their support for Taiwan during their confirmation hearings. Blinken stated the U.S. commitment to providing Taiwan with the capabilities it needs to defend itself “will absolutely endure in a Biden administration,” noting he “would also like to see Taiwan playing a greater role around the world,” and alluding to reexamining U.S. regulations for interacting with Taiwan with an eye toward liberalizing them. He concluded by saying that “the commitment to Taiwan is something that we hold to very strongly.” Meanwhile, Austin emphasized U.S. “support to Taiwan has been rock solid over the years” and he would “make sure that we’re living up to our commitments to support Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.”12
The strongest indication that U.S.-Taiwan ties will continue to be strengthened came in official statements that were issued after China flew fighter jets into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone just days after Biden took office. The People’s Liberation Army sees operational value in conducting these missions, and it could have also been motivated by a desire to test the Biden administration’s response. The spokeswoman for the National Security Council responded by underlining the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is “rock-solid.” The State Department issued its own statement that is worth quoting in full: “The United States notes with concern the pattern of ongoing PRC attempts to intimidate its neighbors, including Taiwan. We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected representatives.13
“We will stand with friends and allies to advance our shared prosperity, security, and values in the Indo-Pacific region—and that includes deepening our ties with democratic Taiwan. The United States will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. The United States maintains its longstanding commitments as outlined in the Three Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region.”14
The statement clearly puts the onus on Beijing for raising tensions, elevates the Six Assurances to holding the same weight as the three joint communiqués, affirms a U.S. intention to deepen ties with Taiwan, and again notes a “rock-solid” commitment to Taiwan. The Biden administration passed its first test with flying colors.15
Taken together, these signals indicate that the Biden administration is likely to continue to forge a closer relationship with Taiwan. This reflects a growing sense among U.S. policymakers that as Chinese foreign policy grows more assertive and military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait continues to erode, China could be tempted to try to coerce Taiwan. As a result, the United States has to more clearly signal to China its commitment to Taiwan and work with Taiwan to bolster deterrence. It also reflects a growing consensus in the U.S. policymaking community that Taiwan is a reliable partner for the United States on a host of issues.16
David Sacks suggested that “It is possible that the Biden administration will choose to strengthen this relationship out of the public eye, as the media attention makes a Chinese response more likely, and Taiwan often bears the brunt of that response. Thus, the next four years may see fewer high-level visits to Taipei, but one should expect that senior U.S. officials will continue to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts in private in an effort to build this partnership.” There is no point in doing this. US is still shackled by the fear of what China would do if the US should come out openly to support Taiwan in all material particulars. The US should conduct its businesses with Taiwan openly. It has nothing to be afraid. China will not invade the US nor Taiwan. Or it can try its hand in such a grisly adventure and see what would be the result. The era of fearing what China would do should be over.17
In an opinion article by Charles K. S. Wu, Yao-Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen and Austin Wang (2021), they note that “the public in Taiwan likes Trump for an entirely different reason. Throughout history, the US has been the most crucial offshore balancer to help Taiwan fend off Chinese aggression. Memories are still vivid among many in Taiwan as the US dispatched two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. In recent years, perhaps for good reasons, Taiwan has flown under the radar – Chinese threats of use of force have all turned out to be cheap talk. As the US busily immersed itself in the Middle East theater for spreading democracy, national building, and extinguishing terrorism, Taiwan and Asia generally have been left out of policymakers’ agenda.18
In the same era, China has been steadily amassing its power as a strategic competitor to the US. US negligence on the Taiwan issues allows China to bully Taiwan by means of blocking the island’s international participation unless major strides toward unification with the mainland have been achieved. For example, the number of Taiwan diplomatic allies nearly halved from 29 in 2000 to 15 now.19
Things took a dramatic turn when Trump came into office in 2016. Throughout his presidency, Trump has proven to be the most substantially supportive US president for Taiwan in recent decades, granted that there is a debate on whether Trump’s intentions to help Taiwan is transactional. Decisions that the Trump administration made – such as answering a phone call from Taiwan’s president, approving ten major arms sales to Taiwan, arranging high-level official visits and bilateral talks, proposing and passing numerous major pro-Taiwan legislation—are unprecedented. Coupled with his strong anti-China policies, Trump has become the most popular American president among the public in Taiwan in decades. That is why Trump’s failure to obtain a second term is seemed devastating to many in Taiwan. Citizens feel like the issue of Taiwan will be put on the back burner again.20
For starters, Taiwan is probably the most predictable. The Tsai administration enjoys high levels of support. The public in Taiwan has also increasingly identified themselves as Taiwanese. However, such a tendency does not translate into support for declaring independence. Combined, we are likely to witness Tsai’s second term replicating what it has done in the first term.21
As for the Biden administration, what worries observers is that the administration is simply trying to take up too much. In an essay he wrote [in] March [2020], Biden’s foreign policy aspirations include ending forever wars, reinvesting in diplomatic corps, lifting women and girls around the world, and combating corruption, to name a few. Compared to Trump’s foreign policy, which focuses more on Asia and the Middle East, Biden does not have a geographic preference, hoping to renew “commencement to NATO, maintain the commitment to Israel’s security, reinvest in our treaty alliances in Asia, and do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the broader network of democracies.”22
It does not take in-depth training in diplomacy and international politics to realize this plan is unrealistic. Achieving only a few of these objectives requires Herculean effort. Biden’s intentions to do all might be real, and if that is the case, we are likely to witness an overstretched United States that would be hamstrung to achieve much in every goal and, worse, incapable of responding to contingency that requires immediate attention. Overcommitment to international affairs will also reduce the approval of the administration among the public. COVID-weary Americans now more than ever wants a government to focus more on what is going on inside their country than abroad.23
The United States that is omnipresent in different regions, also reduces its ability to manage and balance China’s rise. The China that Biden faces now is different from the one in 2008. Overcommitment to a plethora of issues further handicaps the administration from doing so effectively. Unfortunately, the new administration still has not developed a clear strategy to respond to China. For example, in responding to recent human rights abuses in Hong Kong, the Biden administration seems haphazard, if not muted, in responding to China’s continuing challenges to US hegemony and its devastating behavior in destroying human rights and democracy in Hong Kong. Similar to China’s human rights abuses of Uyghurs, the US needs to take a leading role in defending global human rights standards.24
If indecisiveness in responding to China’s behaviors becomes the norm for the new administration, it might embolden the CCP to take risky actions knowing that an overstretched US is unlikely to respond effectively. For China, such a condition is opportune to test the waters about the US commitment to Taiwan in an armed conflict. If increasing Chinese aggression toward Taiwan is unaddressed by the new administration, it might eventually lead China to attempt a surprise attack knowing that the US will not respond as they did in 1996. This will not be the first time for China to test the waters. China’s militarization of the South China Sea has also proven its ambition to keep challenging the US and international society’s bottom line.25
If the waters are tested with the PLA launching its military forces on Taiwan, there will be no return to existing peaceful but contentious trilateral relations between the US, Taiwan, and China. The cross-Strait conflict will result in tremendous casualties on the Taiwan side. China might also suffer greatly, but if the conflict results in a quick victory, the CCP will be able to justify its costs. The US will have the most to lose here. Not only does it lose a strategic ally to balance China, but the inability to defend Taiwan in need will also tarnish the US reputation among its allies.26
Losing Taiwan would likely to be the first step in the hegemonic transition from the United States to China, but there is a way to prevent it. Drop overcommitment and continue to focus on China’s challenges. Whether the US can properly manage and contain China’s rise in the near future will determine not only the fate of Taiwan and the regional security of East Asia but also the new global order and the future of humanity. The maxim less is more can also apply to international relations.27

The above analysis is fundamentally faulty. While it is true that the US might have overstretched itself over the years, thus sapping its energy and resources, for instance, in the costly wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and other international commitments, it is not true that the US would fold its hands while China overruns Taiwan under any pretext. The US has historically demonstrated its commitment to the defense of Taiwan if, for instance, the cross-Taiwan Strait conflicts in the past (1956, 1958 and 1996) are taken into consideration as strategic imperative of what the US could do in a provocative situation of China invading Taiwan.

China knows pretty well such would be a very dangerous gamble because it can never read accurately the mind of Washington and how it would react to Chinese invasion of Taiwan. While it is true that China has increased and most probably consolidated its strategic advantages in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region in the last couple of years while the US was grappling with internal stress and costly external interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, it would be foolhardy for the revisionist powers in Beijing to launch an attack on Taiwan on the basis of perceived US’s weakened position in the global arena of its dominant power.

Interestingly, while China has been using the element of threat as a bargaining chip to keep the US at bay it also live in fear of what the US would do in response to such an invasion. It is a binary situation that cancel itself out. It is a mini-Thucydides Trap between threat and fear, a combination of an anomalous epistemological or neuro condition that conflict with objective reality. This is the dilemma that keeps the Chinese leaders awake at night: how to resolve precisely this dilemma of been a slave to a binary condition of threat and fear – where fear prevents one from carrying out a threat.

In a BBC analysis (2021) of the unfolding events by Robin Brant, he says “China’s official spokespeople try not to talk about war. They almost always emphasise that theirs is a peace-loving country. China is not a nation with a history of expeditionary military confrontation far beyond what it regards as its borders. However, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has repeatedly said that it would use military force to prevent any move towards formal independence by Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province.28

“Threatening a war isn’t as nuanced as talk of military intervention. It’s blunt, more frightening. It is different too. Military intervention could come in a multitude of ways; not necessarily an out-and-out war between two competing sides and their allies. But Taiwan’s status is a red line for Beijing, a part of what it regards as its unimpeachable territorial integrity. An “internal affair”, alongside Hong Kong. The language deployed by the government spokespeople may not always be this provocative but when it comes to Taiwan it’s fair to assume this is what China is, ultimately, willing to resort to.”

There is no doubt that China has grown itchy fingers in the last few years in its willingness to deploy and/or apply military force to resolve the Taiwan issue. One may not also doubt this willingness from strategic point of view if the past patterns of skirmishes with Russia, India and bullying of other neighbouring countries in the last decades are anything to go by. This is more especially so when China can be seen to have become emboldened, again in the last couple of years, by the progress of its military modernization and militarization of the political space.

The constant threat of war by the revisionist powers in Beijing, especially by President Xi Jinping, is without doubt frightening. Thus war cannot be ruled out of the strategic calculus for cross-Taiwan Strait and/or the South China Sea. The increasing talks about application of military force are worrisome enough and there is no doubt that both the White House and Pentagon have taken due notice of this trend in the last few years.

Yet there is also a noticeable caution on the part of Beijing based on the existing balance of power or terror in relation to the US and the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing has not forgotten the subtle humiliation encountered in 1956, 1958 and 1996 at the hand of the US when it arms-twisted China to refrain from all-out invasion of Taiwan. Beijing has not equally forgotten the humiliation it suffered from the hands of the British and American imperialism during the Opium Wars and from the Japanese during the Second World War. Again, last year, amidst the raging coronavirus pandemic worldwide, the US sent three aircraft supercarriers to the South China Sea to shake its fist right at the China’s nose. Equally significant is the growing hostile environment in Asia-Pacific where it can now be seen clearly a number of countries aligning themselves against the strident and bellicose tones from Beijing. We have Australia boldly looking directly at the Chinese eyes and calling for international investigation of its role in the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Thus a war with Taiwan is most probable a direct invitation to intervention from host of these hostile neighbours in defense of Taiwan not to talk of the almighty US, an opportunity to clip the flapping wings of the Chinese Dragon. This scenario cannot be ruled out in the consideration of strategic factors or variables that may precipitate war on the part of China and expected response from the external environment already hostile to China.

Without doubt, the new Biden Administration still has not developed a clear strategy of how to respond to China over Taiwan. That is because it is currently preoccupied with how to tackle the most pressing front-burner issue of halting the raging coronavirus pandemic in the US. Biden administration is yet to settle down fully most especially at the State Department where Anthony Blinken is yet to have a clear handle on the most pressing foreign policy issues at stake at the moment.

During the 2020 presidential election campaign, Joe Biden’s harsh criticisms of Trump administration’s foreign policy thrusts towards either China or Taiwan and Asia-Pacific in general were not really based on the substance of the policy thrusts. Biden said they were not smart enough not that they were not tough enough. This is definitely a new line of thinking. The next few months of Biden administration would probably reveal the nature and contour of its “smart policy thrusts” towards China, Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region in general.

The significant question here is what could propel China to invade Taiwan in a “mother-of-all-war” that China is yet to engage in modern time, i.e. in post-1949 revolutionary era? The most probable trigger would be total declaration of independence by Taiwan. This has become the main red line on the ground.

But this expected declaration of independence is a misnomer in itself especially on the plane of objective reality. How? Taiwan has been ruling and governing itself since 1949 when the Chiang Kai-chek-led Kuomintang forces fled to Island of Formosa as Taiwan was known in the colonial era before the civil war. Communist China has never ruled Taiwan. China has not been able to intervene directly nor have any meaningful impact on the internal processes of governance within Taiwan since 1949. Contrary is perhaps the case: the constant harrassment and bellicose policy attitude against Taiwan self-rule has in turn led to the hardening of the position of Taiwan. Taiwan has dug itself in the trench expecting invasion at any “fucking” time from mainland China. It has not come since 1949 even though there have clumsy attempts to do so. Thus it is contrary to all rational thinking that Taiwan would wake up one day and go ahead to its surrender its hard-earned autonomy or semi-sovereignty to China on platter of gold without recourse to dominant global reasoning and view.

Taiwan has its own flag, coat-of-arms, national anthem, national currency, a central bank, and most important of all, a relatively powerful Armed Forces not subject to the command and control of China’s People Liberation Army (PLA). It also pursues foreign policy objectives that are clearly not in tandem with that of China. It has a thriving economy that is not under the control of Chinese policy makers. Taiwan is one of the strongest democracies in the world, experiencing peaceful transition from one administration to another since 1949. For the first time too, Taiwan is being presently led by a woman, Tsai Ing-wen, a hardliner against China, who won another re-election, something unheard or strange in a patriachal-dominated China. All these have taken concrete historical formation, an objective reality completely independent of all wishful thinking.

But the ROC [Taiwan] has never been part of the PRC in its history. The majority of Taiwanese believe that Taiwan is already an independent country called the Republic of China.29 Taiwan is a well-functioning democratic society that recently elected its first female president and has achieved its third democratic turnover of power. By any measure of democratization, such as the “two turnover test” or indicators measured by the Freedom House and other institutes, Taiwan is a fully consolidated democracy — according to some, the only democracy  in the Chinese-speaking world.30

It is China that is most probably living in fool’s Paradise believing that Taiwan is part of its territorial integrity, that it has no political independence or independent existence – when everything is contrary to this warped or prejudicial perception.

Taiwan has sat strong, confident and alert, just next door to mainland China, waiting for the threatened invasion. Let there be no mistake in the realm of strategic thinking. It would not be a cake-walk! China would not walk over Taiwan without tasting blood in its own mouth. This is more so if the sophisticated arms it has received both from the US and other sources in recent times are anything to go by. King Darius-led Persian Army, numerically stronger, met its Waterloo at the Battle of Gaugamela at the hand of Alexander-led Greek Army. Persian Empire was destroyed forever, never to rise again.

A glorious moment, one of its finest hours, presented itself to Taiwan in early 2020 when coronavirus pandemic started spreading globally like a wildfire. Taiwan holds up a golden trophy for its early victory over the coronavirus pandemic. Taiwan was the first to alert the World Health Organization about the outbreak of the pandemic while the latter was still snoring in its slumber at its headquarters in Geneva, Switerland. When WHO finally woke up from its sleep of death, it became angry for being woken up. It ignored and snubbed Taiwan because of the fact that Taiwan has been locked out of the mainstream multilateral organizations since the early 70s. Taiwan recorded only seven deaths with less than two thousand people infected. Taiwan’s early victory has been largely attributed to a very proactive political leadership under President Tsai Ing-wen, the force of will of the leadership, the early rapid response, the activation of public health safety measures, advanced medical sector and application of smart technology.

Taiwan became a global “talk of the town” in its amazing and sweet victory. The allurement of the victory was so irrestisible to the extent that the United States was compelled to send its highest delegation of government officials in many decades to Taiwan, opening the floodgate to high-level contact and strategic communications between the two countries. The US delegation was led by Alex Azer II, the then Secretary of Health and Human Resources. The delegation went to Taiwan to learn the secret of Taiwan’s success in halting the spread of the coronavirus pandemic in the island nation just less than two hundred kilometers from mainland China, its chief enemy. Taiwan is in top league of those handful of countries that have been referred to as the Mekong-Pacific Knights who defeated the coronavirus pandemic early in time where others are dwarves which unfortunately include the military superpowers (i.e. countries with nuclear weapons arsenal): US, China, Russia, Britain, France, Iran, India and even Pakistan. Brazil, Canada are also dwarves!

The strategic scenario and calculus are dicey. They cannot be accurately pinpointed in time and space. There are many variables playing from the background on the scenario and changing the calculus thus serving as dynamics of the environment and shaping and reshaping the processes.

There is no Thucydides Trap between China and Taiwan. But there is between China and the US over Taiwan. Taiwan is a tinder box that need to be well managed by superior diplomatic finess on all sides (China, Taiwan and the US) lest it explodes on everybody’s face with grave consequences for all concerned. This will be discussed below.

The Strategic Imperatives of Taiwan to the US

Viewed historically, there can be no doubt that Taiwan has been a angler’s hook in the throat of China since 1949 when the countries fell apart and despite the ambivalent position of the United States towards Taiwan. United States became lukewarm to certain extent towards Taiwan because it considered doing business with China more lucrative or profitable. Thanks to Dr Henry Kissinger and his doctrine of realpolitik in the early 70s with the active support of Nixon Administration before it collapsed after the resignation of President Richard Nixon over Watergate affairs. However, the strategic importance of Taiwan has not allowed the United States to completely abandon Taiwan to the Dragon of China to devour it. Taiwan is an island fortress used to monitor and checkmate the unbriddled ambitions of China in the Indo-Pacific region. This was why Taiwan has received comparable economic and military support from the US viz-a-vis the other countries in the region such as South Korea, Japan, The Philippines and Australia.

Teshu Singh (2020) captured the structures and substance of the US-Taiwan relationship. Singh was of the view that “in all likelihood, the support for Taiwan will continue under Biden although the scale may differ”.31

Singh notes that during his election campaign, Joe Biden [did] not explicitly talked about Taiwan. “His views can be gleaned indirectly by his broad stance on China where he has stated that the US should get “tough with China”, described Xi Jinping as a “thug” and called China as a “special challenge”. He traced Biden’s changing views towards Taiwan through series of articles he wrote between 2001 and 2020. He particularly noted that he penned yet another article for New York-based Chinese-language newspaper World Journal, describing his vision towards the Taiwan issue. In the article, a clear change of stance is visible in his approach. He acknowledges the importance of Taiwan for the US. He wrote: “We are a Pacific power and will work with our allies to enhance the prosperity, security and value we share in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes deepening the relationship with Taiwan, a leading democracy, major economy and a major technology town.” He has also praised Taiwan on its handling of the COVID-19 and said Taiwan is also a shining example of an open society that can effectively control the new coronavirus.32
Most important of all, Singh notes that the US-Taiwan relations are guided by four primary documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three US communiqué with China: the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), the Communiqué on Normalization of Relations with the PRC (1979) and the August 17 Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan (1982). Last year marked the 40 years of the TRA. Besides, there are a set of six policy assurances the US had given to Taiwan. In 1982, at the third US-China joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, six assurances were agreed as a guiding principle for US-Taiwan relations. The six assurances are: the US would not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.33
The Taiwan Travel Act was signed on 16 March 2018. The act encouraged visits between officials of the US and Taiwan at all levels.” On 4 March 2020, the US House of Representative unanimously passed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act of 2019 (TAIPEI). The TAIPEI Act encourages the countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan and it identifies those that are on the verge of severing their ties with Taiwan. It also obliges the US to increase its diplomatic presence in countries that support Taiwan and vice versa. It further gives the US Secretary of State the power to expand, reduce or terminate US aid to countries depending on whether they improve, worsen, or sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.34
The US Senate on 11 May 2020, passed legislation in support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organisation (WHO). The bill entrusts the US Secretary of State to ensure Taiwan’s re-entry into the WHO. The US has also tried to integrate Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan has incorporated the concept of Indo-Pacific in its foreign policy and imbibed the mission to defend freedom and openness attached to the Free and Open Indo Pacific strategy and protecting it. In May 2018, the government started the Indo-Pacific Affairs Section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taiwan is also working with the US under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), a grouping of 41 participants from 25 Indo-Pacific countries. The framework will provide Taiwan to help build its partnership with countries that have unique strengths. Recently, the US and Taiwan have signed a pact to establish annual economic talks for five years. A memorandum of understanding was signed after the first round of the economic talks.35
The most critical aspect of US-Taiwan relations is the arms sales from the US to Taiwan. The US is the major arms supplier to Taiwan and the sale has received an impetus under Donald Trump’s administration. The first sale of arms package worth USD 1.4 billion was done on 30 June 2017. The second sale package of USD 330 million was signed in October 2018. In July 2019, the US supplied M1A2T Abrams tanks, Stinger missiles and related equipment to Taiwan. This deal is worth around USD 2.2 billion. The US State Department has also approved the sale of three weapons systems to Taiwan, including sensors, missiles and artillery, worth USD 1.8 billion. It has also approved the sale of 100 Boeing-made Harpoon Coastal Defence Systems. In 2020, the Trump administration has announced arms sales worth USD 5.1 billion to Taiwan.36
On a comparative note, the Trump administration has approved 18 arms sale deals to Taiwan, compared to 17 during Barack Obama’s eight years in office. Under the Obama administration, the US Air Force had also upgraded the long-range early warning radar surveillance system of Taiwan. Analysts believe that Trump’s weapon deals with Taiwan had highlighted Washington’s long-foreseeable hidden strategy that it had spent four decades preparing.37
A day before the US elections, Chinese aircrafts crossed the Taiwanese airspace as many as eight times. Earlier, China had carried out similar violations of airspace when senior official Alex Azar and Keith Krach had visited Taiwan. Just before the meeting of Tsai Ing-wen and Alex Azar, China sent two fighter jets to Taiwan. As Keith Krach was about to reach Taiwan to pay homage to Lee Teng-hui, who passed away on 30 July 2020, China sent two Chinese Y-8 Anti-Submarine Aircraft into the Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). In the violation of the Taiwanese airspace, China has refuted the median line between China and Taiwan.38
There is a deep-rooted bipartisan support in the US for Taiwan. Biden’s emphasis on democracy will give the US yet another opportunity for the strengthening of Taiwan-US relations. He has already proposed a “summit of democracy” in his first year in office. Earlier this year, on the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen, Joe Biden was the first Democrat presidential candidate to send her congratulatory message via Twitter.39
Jack Detsch and Christina Lu (2021) painted what the Chinese invasion picture would look like. “Taiwanese officials and lawmakers have been playing out the same worst-case scenario in their head for years now: China attacks the island across the Taiwan Strait, and officials in Taipei call for backup from the United States and other allies. With Joe Biden now sitting in the Oval Office, Taiwan wants to know: How would the United States respond?40
“Wang Ting-yu, who co-chairs the foreign affairs and defense committee in Taiwan’s parliament, told Foreign Policy that the island’s military would not be caught off guard if China prepped for an attack. Taiwanese satellite and radar systems would be able to spot a buildup of People’s Liberation Army forces in Guangdong or Fujian province, across the strait, and it could take as many as 60 days for China to mass enough troops for an amphibious assault, he said. 
“Those 60 days will be a precious time for international society to stop a war or to send a clear signal. ‘This is a red line you cannot cross,’” he said. “The question is, Taiwan will be prepared to protect our home. What will the world, especially the United States, what will you do?” The message that Biden should send to Chinese President Xi Jinping is simple, Wang said: “‘Don’t even try it.”41
Biden is under pressure from allies, including Japan, to draw a red line to prevent any Chinese crossing of the Taiwan Strait and has staffed his national security team with China hawks, most notably Kurt Campbell, who served as the State Department’s top Asia official during the Obama administration. But that doesn’t mean an antagonistic line: Campbell, whose experience on Taiwan dates back to his time in the Clinton-era Pentagon, called for the Biden administration to foster cross-strait dialogue between Taipei and Beijing at a think tank event last month.42
Biden’s objectives are likely to include “viewing Taiwan as a card to be valued, not a card to be played in competition with China,” said Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who served as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia on the National Security Council during President Barack Obama’s second term. “I think that there will be a focus on helping Taiwan gain confidence and its own security, control of its own economic destiny, and dignity and respect on the world stage.”43
Wang, who said China has buzzed Taiwan’s air defense identification zone almost every day over the past year, also hoped for the United States to sell Taiwan sea mines to deter against a possible Chinese invasion and wanted to see Taipei improve its domestic submarine production. Wang also said he would like to see Biden invite Taiwan to the big Rim of the Pacific military exercise that is held every two years, which it has never been invited to. China received an invitation to the exercise in 2018 before it was rescinded over the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea.44
“My guess is the Biden administration just decides to go back to the practice of being less public. And that is because there is no perceived need to use Taiwan as a weapon against China—that’s harmful to Taiwan’s interests,” said Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “I think that using Taiwan as a card or weapon to poke Beijing in the eye … that practice will disappear.”45
Nobody can really predict precisely the form and manner of what the Chinese invasion of Taiwan may look like. But from the past patterns of Chinese bullying of Taiwan, the invasion would most likely involve aerial and naval attacks on this island nation of currently about 24 million people. Of course, the invasion would involve the three major arms of the PLA: Air Force, Navy and the Army, the last being ferried by naval warships across the Taiwan Strait. However, there is no doubt that China would meet a stiff resistance from Taiwan across the broad spectrum of warfare and from all flanks. Nobody can tell precisely what defense infrastructures including offensive weaponry that Taiwan has erected on its coastal lines over the decades. With the demonstrated mastery of the use of smart technologies in the recent coronavirus pandemic, there may be no doubt that China would be faced with a formidable electronic/technological firewall from Taiwan.
More significant is the fact that the balance of forces probably does not even support such an invasion now except it is to take place on a very reckless and senseless basis – a recklessness that is not known and associated with Chinese strategic thinking. There are two major reasons why China will not rush recklessly to invade Taiwan for now and in the foreseeable future even if it is provoked by formal declaration of independence by Taiwan.
The first is that China does not yet know the status of strategic thinking of the new team in the White House. The specific strategic thinking of the new Biden Administration is not yet known. However, indications are that Biden Administration might turn out to be more tougher than the previous Trump Adminisration but in a much more nuanced or smart ways. So if China decides to be reckless, it might end up blaming itself at the end of the day for whatever response that might come from Biden Administration. Definitely, Biden Administration have no secret superweapon with which to fight or surprise China. But it might just turn out that it will deploy whatever it has in a very smart way that will really hurt the Chinese and take them by surprise.
The second factor is closely related to the first. If China did not invade Taiwan while Trump Administration was shaking its fists at the Chinese nose through the various naval exercises it conducted in the South China Sea from July to October 2020, it is most unlikely China would do so under Biden Administration at a time it cannot read accurately the strategic thinking of Biden and his team in the strategic decision-making loop. It is really suicidal to do so. To do so can and will definitely be met with strategic surprise. And China is probably willing to be taken by strategic surprise. Of course, neither the US nor Taiwan will launch a surprise attack on China for any reason. US and Taiwan prefer to keep the status quo ante with China but prevent or deter it from surprise attack on Taiwan which will unavoidably attract surprise counter-attack.
That is why Taiwan will also not rush into formal declaration of independence and sovereignty in the foreseeable future knowing fully well ahead it will draw the ire of China and act as a stimulus for invasion of Taiwan. It will be reckless on the part of Taiwan at this moment when there the balance of forces is not too favourable to it to go ahead and declare independence. Taiwan must get the absolute commitment of the US to rise to its defense militarily if it declares independence and China decides to invade. That commitment is slow in coming forth both as a result of likely domestic opposition (such as Congressional wranglings or disagreements) to doing so and what China is thinking and willing to do in such a scenario. The strategic options are many but dicey than superficial thinking will make it look.
The Fears, Hopes and Myths
Upon the lifting of the restrictions on official communications there was a widespread happiness in the Foreign Service by diplomats who joyfully welcome Taiwan representatives for official meetings and parties. For instance, the U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands sent a jubilant tweet, claiming to have “made some history today” after welcoming Taiwan’s de facto ambassador into the U.S. Embassy for a meeting. For the past four decades, it’s been generally off-limits for U.S. ambassadors to invite Taiwanese officials into embassies. To keep it that way, a complex and ever-changing set of rules has guided how executive branch officials should deal with the Taiwanese. But on Jan. 9, with less than two weeks left in President Trump’s term, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he was throwing out the rule book. He did this knowing fully well that Trump was on his way out of the White House. “The United States government took these actions unilaterally, in an attempt to appease the Communist regime in Beijing. No more”, said Mike Pompeo46

Arguments have ensued as to whether this action by Pompeo was meant to be a land mine for the incoming Biden Administration.
Analysts see the policy reversal as the latest in a series of steps taken this year by the Trump administration, with Pompeo in the lead, to lock in a more hawkish, confrontational stance against China. Pompeo and others have declared that China constitutes America’s biggest threat. “So the big question you have to ask is: Why is Pompeo doing this now? They could have done it a year ago and then managed the fallout if they felt that this was so important,” says Evan Medeiros, a professor at Georgetown University who was senior Asia director at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. “I think the answer is that this is meant to be a trap,” he says. In other words, if President-elect Joe Biden maintains the policy shift, his relationship with China may be rougher. If he reinstates the guidelines for dealing with Taiwan, he “creates a political vulnerability that he’s being soft on China,” Medeiros says.47
However, no Biden Administration official has cast doubt on the action by Pompeo. No one has question whatever might have been the suspected sinister intention behind it. Rather, what has become evident is that the new Biden Administration seems to be in full support of the action because it took off that burden from it and made it easy for strategic communications between the two countries and start of putting heads together to formulate new strategic policy relationships.
On both sides of the political aisle in the U.S., the appetite for firmer policies against China seems to have increased over the past few years. Most China-related legislation that has come up for a vote in Congress recently has passed with strong bipartisan support, if not unanimity. The Republican Party has amped up its tough-on-China policy rhetoric. Analysts think Biden will come under attack from the right if he rolls back any of Trump’s China moves, from steep trade tariffs and the closure of China’s consulate in Houston this summer to scrapping the rules on interactions with Taiwan.48
Another significant action taken by Trump Administration before leaving office was the declassification of Indo-Pacific Strategy document, a key document that has served as the guiding execution instrument for the region since 2018, as had earlier been mentioned.

The 10-page, lightly redacted report, in use across the government since 2018, seeks to explain the challenges the U.S. faces from a rising and more assertive China, spells out vital U.S. interests in the region, and lays out a plan for both mobilizing and helping key allies in achieving U.S. aims. The document states that the U.S. should maintain “diplomatic, military and economic preeminence” in the region while “preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence.” It also envisions a Korean Peninsula “free of nuclear, chemical, cyber and biological weapons” and expresses commitment to “accelerate India’s rise” so that the two countries can “cooperate” to “preserve maritime security and counter Chinese influence.” The paper elucidates the motivations behind some of the Trump administration’s actions toward China in particular, but analysts say it is self-contradictory and ideological in its aims and assertions. Critics say that by publicly releasing the document, the Trump administration was trying to bind the incoming Biden administration to its policies, while confirming China’s worst fears about U.S. intentions.49

The declassified document is “a blueprint for a Cold War 2.0,” says Lyle Goldstein, research professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He calls the document’s frank reaffirmation of the U.S. desire to maintain strategic primacy “an extreme position” because it simply doesn’t square with reality. “That’s not just true on the military side. I think the trend is probably even more manifest on the economic side,” says Goldstein.50 China is the largest trade partner to most Asian countries (and to many others around the world, including the U.S.). It is expected to surpass the U.S. in sheer economic size by 2028, according to a recent study in the U.K.51

The U.S. desire to maintain primacy as the world’s undisputed military and economic power is not just unrealistic, but it is also likely to lead to “zero-sum” thinking in which countering China’s rise becomes the U.S.’ biggest priority, says Micheal D. Swaine, director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington, D.C., think tank. “I would say [the document is] probably solely about containing China,” he says. He warns such an approach is likely to alienate allies and partners in Asia and beyond. While many may welcome a U.S. presence in the region as a counterbalance to China — and help in pushing back against China, say, in the South China Sea — they do not wish for a polarized, Cold War-like environment where every Chinese action and policy is treated by the U.S. as malign or threatening.52

The Trump administration rolled out dozens of measures aimed at punishing China in the past year — for its policies in Hong Kong, its actions in the South China Sea and treatment of its Uighur minority — and Washington also imposed sanctions and prohibited and prevented U.S. companies and investors from doing business with or investing in many of China’s high technology companies. “They are coercively trying to impede China’s own development,” says Susan Shirk, chair of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego. “Now, I know this is the Chinese view of it, but it’s hard to characterize these actions in any other way.”53

China predictably slammed the document. A foreign ministry spokesperson said that “its content only serves to expose the malign intention of the United States to use its Indo-Pacific strategy to suppress and contain China and undermine regional peace and stability.” Swaine worries the policy’s declassification will empower hawkish elements in China’s foreign policy establishment and provide them ammunition when advocating a tougher response to dealing with the United States. The timing of the declassification points to an effort to box in the Biden team and prevent it from taking U.S. policy too far off the confrontational path that the Trump administration set it on, analysts say.54
Ryan Hass (2020), the much respected Brookings Institution’s scholar wrote that Taiwan was naturally apprehensive of what would be the new Biden Administration’s foreign policy thrusts towards Taiwan. He wrote that “Taiwan’s leaders have had to navigate complicated political terrain in the US-Taiwan relationship in recent weeks” amidst the proposed visit by the US Ambassador to the United Nations which was however cancelled at the last minute, and how to respond to Secretary Pompeo’s announcement of the termination of restrictions on US government contacts with Taiwan officials, including how to deal with the public release of the United States’ previously classified Indo-Pacific strategy.55 He said “Taiwan’s decisions were complicated by American officials’ framing of their support for Taiwan as the flip side of their opposition to Chinese behavior.”
“Former Trump administration officials viewed such steps as mostly cost-free, judging that Beijing’s bark was worse than its bite. They calculated that Beijing would understand the connection between their actions and American responses with Taiwan, and over time, would grudgingly tolerate American policy shifts, so long as Washington stopped short of formal diplomatic relations or recognition of Taiwan as a de jure independent state.
Such judgments reflected a callous disregard of the fact that Taiwan — not the United States — typically bears the brunt of Chinese retaliation on cross-Strait developments. Beijing simply has more tools to impose costs on Taipei than on Washington and is more comfortable using them. In so doing, Beijing seems not to recognize that it is undermining its own objective of pulling Taiwan closer. With each act of bullying, Beijing further poison its appeal among the people of Taiwan.56 These are not just academic observations about the interplay between the United States, Taiwan, and China. Indeed, Taiwan officials will confront difficult judgments in the coming months and years on how best to respond to American expressions of support for Taiwan.57
In the US Congress, there will be a continuing imperative for politicians to demonstrate toughness toward China. China increasingly will be used as a tool by ambitious politicians to burnish one’s image as a strong defender of America and American values.58 As this rhetorical arms race on China heats up, so too will Congressional statements and symbolic legislation in support of Taiwan. Taiwan policymakers will need to decide whether to embrace and encourage such gestures, given the risk that doing so could invite a perception of cheering partisan statements that are in tension with the policies of the Biden administration, and the fact that most such gestures will have negligible influence on US policy.59
Beyond the posturing and point-scoring on Capitol Hill, there will be a seasoned group of presidential advisors in the Biden administration that are committed to strengthening relations with Taiwan. President Biden and President Tsai (蔡英文) are not strangers to each other. Key policymakers such as Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell have dealt directly with Taiwan’s leaders before and have made important contributions to strengthening relations. They have largely done so quietly and outside the public eye. They do not view Taiwan as a convenient tool to burnish their anti-China credentials. They recognize that not all expressions of American support for Taiwan are helpful for Taiwan or healthy for US-Taiwan relations. They will want to look forward, not backward, to identify pragmatic ways to strengthen the relationship.60
Hass expects President Biden and his advisors to explore how to integrate Taiwan more fully into America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. They will be interested in identifying ways for Taiwan to contribute to strengthening democratic resilience in Asia and beyond. There will be interest in deepening technology policy coordination and enhancing supply chain security. They will want to pursue steps together to strengthen Taiwan’s economic and national security. They will recognize the importance of supporting Taiwan’s efforts to garner dignity and respect on the world stage.61

President Tsai has shown steadiness and balance in her response to recent developments in US-Taiwan relations. Members of the Biden team will, with confidence, look to her to display those same attributes in the coming years as well. Such steady moderation will best protect bipartisan support for Taiwan in the United States and keep the focus on strengthening the substance of the US-Taiwan relationship.62

Critics say the moves, timed shortly before the handover, were designed to nettle Beijing one last time and force the Biden administration to make difficult, and potentially politically costly, decisions. They also came as Pompeo in recent days designated  Cuba and the Iran-backed Houthi group in Yemen as sponsors of terrorism. “If the new administration explicitly embraces the change, they get volatility and a confrontational relationship with China, which is what the Trump team and Pompeo wanted,” said Evan Medeiros, a professor at Georgetown University and former senior director for Asia on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council. “If they reject it, they get a political problem and a problem with Taiwan. The whole issue of contacts will become a new metric in the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship.”63

For four years, the Trump administration has made confronting China a key pillar of its foreign policy. As part of that effort, particularly in the past year, Pompeo and senior officials have spoken vigorously in defense of Taiwan, the most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations.64

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has demanded that Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen acknowledge the basic tenet that Taiwan and China are part of one China. The Chinese government objects strenuously to diplomatic exchanges and official visits that cast Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy, as a sovereign state.65

The Taipei government was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, after which many countries including the United States switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, and Taipei today cannot participate in some U.N. functions, such as the World Health Organization’s discussions on the coronavirus pandemic, because of Chinese objections. Pompeo’s decision has revived debate in Washington and Taipei about whether and how the United States should aid Taiwan. Successive U.S. administrations routinely weigh questions both concrete and symbolic about Taiwan, including how to stage visits with Taiwanese officials and which advanced American weapons or fighter jets the island should be allowed to procure.66

Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, applauded Pompeo’s move as a “positive legacy piece” at the end of an administration and said it could lead the Biden administration into a more sweeping rethink of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Others criticized Pompeo for political grandstanding. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister who now heads the Asia Society Policy Institute, said the Trump officials could have spent more energy focusing on concrete steps to aid Taiwan, like pushing for its readmission into the WHO. “A formal declaration of this type does nothing materially to increase Taiwan’s international political space or enhance the security interests of the Taiwanese people, it arguably creates a greater sense of crisis in the Taiwan Strait,” Rudd said. “If Pompeo was serious about this, why not do this one or two years ago? This is an exercise in Republican primary politics.”67

Taiwanese officials, particularly from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which traditionally leaned toward declaring formal independence from China, have sought relaxation of the State Department rules governing contacts for more than a decade. Those appeals were significantly stepped up the last year or so, said two people with knowledge of the Tsai government’s thinking. Taiwanese officials reveled in Pompeo’s new decree. “Decades of discrimination, removed,” said the Taiwanese envoy in Washington, Bikhim Hsiao, on Twitter. “A huge day in our bilateral relationship. I will cherish every opportunity.” The Taiwanese president, who is typically more cautious, did not comment on the shift.68
Derek Grossman (2020) a senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California was of the view that [o]verall, the signs are good for U.S.-Taiwan relations continuing to strengthen under the incoming Biden administration. This is not to say that U.S.-Taiwan relations will be as bullish as they were during the Trump administration, but Taiwan will nevertheless retain a staunch friend.69
He based his assessment on the fact that President Joe Biden as a senator on the Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, [the very year that Jimmy Carter Administration cut off diplomatic relationship with Taiwan] “voted in favor of passing the Taiwan Relations Act, which, to this day, stands at the heart of U.S. security cooperation with the island”.70 Grossman was convinced that Biden will not abandon Taiwan to its own fate. He referenced Biden’s article where he stated that “the United States does need to get tough with China” by “build[ing] a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors”. Therefore, “[t]he Biden administration is very likely to keep the substance of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy” “which seeks to compete with and counter China by strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships. As a close partner of the United States, this should be encouraging news for Taiwan.71
Taiwanese concerns, however, stem in large part from Biden’s likely push for some kind of reset with Beijing. He clearly believes that the ongoing tit-for-tat and hot rhetoric exchanged between the United States and China during the Trump administration is, at a minimum, counterproductive and perhaps dangerous to the stability of relations and world peace.72
Biden raised a lot of eyebrows when, in late May, he downplayed the threat from China by saying: “China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man…they’re not bad folks, folks. But guess what: they’re not competition for us.” Biden has also said that, on day one of his presidency, he would have the United States rejoin the Paris climate agreement, suggesting a renewed area of cooperation with China. Other areas of U.S.-China cooperation could ensue, potentially undermining bilateral relations with Taiwan.73
Moreover, Biden does not support any move towards Taiwan independence or any significant change to U.S. cross-strait policy. In August 2001, and in response to then Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian pushing independence, Biden said that “we are not willing to go to war over your unilateral declaration of independence”. A few months earlier, he wrote a piece in which he criticized then president George W. Bush’s expression of military commitment to Taiwan. Biden argued that while a Chinese move to settle the Taiwan question through “other than peaceful means” would be “of grave concern to the United States,” it would not oblige Washington to come to the island’s rescue.74
These concerns about Biden are valid and should be closely observed in the first year of his presidency. On balance, however, Biden has been quite forward-leaning on the need to defend Taiwan from growing Chinese aggression.75
Beijing and Taipei violent disagreement has to do with Taiwan’s status: whether it is a semi-autonomous region or not, whether it should declare its independence and sovereignty or not. This violent dsagreement can be traced back to an understanding reached between the two parties in 1992 referred to as the 1992 Consensus which states that there is only “one China” but allows for differing interpretations, by which both Beijing and Taipei agree that Taiwan belongs to China, while the two still disagree on which entity is China’s legitimate governing body. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence.
However the internal political dynamics in Taiwan has ruptured this agreement. While the former ruling party, the Kuomintang, accepts the consensus as a starting point for future negotiations with China, the current ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by President Tsai Ing-wen, rejects the consensus declaring in January 2019 speech that the “one country, two systems” framework advanced by Beijing is unacceptable, meaning that Taiwan could declare independence and sovereignty in the future without let or hindrance. This is the fulcrum of the rift between Beijing and Taipei.
But according to Michael Chase (2019), a senior political scientist at RAND Corporation: China responded to Tsai’s refusal to endorse its approach to the 1992 Consensus by implementing a multifaceted pressure campaign to punish and coerce Taiwan into being more compliant. Beijing’s tactics have included suspending official and semiofficial mechanisms for cross-strait communications, reducing the number of mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, pressuring countries that recognize Taiwan to sever diplomatic relations with the island, and conducting military exercises and information operations designed to intimidate Taiwan.76
In his analysis, Chase was of the view that China could choose a variety of responses, either separately or in combination to pile up more pressure on Taiwan. One of them is military intimidation: China has numerous options to display military power in an attempt to intimidate Taiwan. The PLA could hold major military exercises opposite Taiwan. Such exercises could include a demonstration of amphibious landing capabilities. China could also dramatically increase the level of air force and naval activity around Taiwan, for instance by dispatching its aircraft carrier and conducting flight operations close to Taiwan. China could send fighter aircraft or reconnaissance aircraft across the Taiwan Strait centerline to send a message to Taiwan. In addition, China could increase the number of H-6K bomber flights around Taiwan, which the former sometimes refers to as “encirclement” patrols. At a higher level of intensity, China could conduct missile flight tests close to Taiwan as it did in the 1995–96 crisis, or even launch a missile over the island.77
This came to pass in 2021. According to Jesse Johnson (2021) writing in Japanese Times, “the Chinese military sent a fleet of 13 warplanes, including nuclear-capable bombers, into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. A day later, it dispatched 15 planes, including 12 fighter jets, to the area. Just southeast of the ADIZ flights, in the area that separates Taiwan from the Philippines, the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier strike group on Saturday entered the disputed South China Sea. And on Tuesday, China announced that it would be conducting fresh military exercises in the strategic waterway even as the Roosevelt continues to operate there.78
Though some observers questioned the timing of the large-scale ADIZ flights and the dispatch of the U.S. carrier group, it was unclear if the moves were intended to send messages to the respective capitals. “Security issues are likely to be at the front and center in the U.S.-China relationship, and the most dangerous flashpoints are those issues that pertain to Chinese sovereignty and intersect with important U.S. interests,” Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, said during an online forum this week. “The leaders in both the United States and China want to avoid showing weakness and want to demonstrate resolve,” she added.79
Asked about the weekend flights by Chinese warplanes, Michele Flournoy, who had previously been mentioned as a possible Biden pick for defense chief, signaled how difficult it will be for the administration to craft a new China policy. “I am very concerned about the risk of a miscalculation between the U.S. and China, given the heightened tensions and given that we tend to not fully understand each other in terms of resolve, interests, capability,” Flournoy, a former Pentagon policy chief, said during an online event Monday. “Taiwan really has become the flashpoint because it is the No. 1 priority for China but also because the departing Trump administration made a number of very aggressive moves with regard to U.S.-Taiwan policy that were really a departure from the bipartisan norm of several administrations.” Trump’s moves, she said, had effectively “poked China in the eye.”80
For its part, the new U.S. administration appears willing to maintain a certain level of ambiguity on Taiwan, something that Biden has long supported. That was seen in an unusually quick response by the State Department on Saturday to the Chinese warplanes. In a statement, the new administration demanded Beijing halt “its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan” and engage in dialogue with Taipei, noting curtly that Washington’s commitment to Taiwan remains “rock solid” and that it will continue to assist it “in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.”81
Andrew Yeo, a politics professor at the Catholic University of America, said that by pointing to Washington’s long-standing commitments on Taipei, the Biden administration offered “a bottom baseline of where it stands on U.S.-Taiwan relations,” while also preserving “greater flexibility” in dealing with Taiwan and China. “Following Trump, the Biden administration will have to figure out how much latitude it wants to give itself — and Taiwan and China — in ensuring security and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” he said.81
Since Biden’s January 20 inauguration, Chinese officials have appeared to seek an understanding with the new administration in the security sphere, including in a speech Monday by Chinese President Xi Jinping that appeared to target Biden. Speaking at a virtual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Xi said the world “should reject the outdated Cold War and zero-sum game mentality, adhere to mutual respect and accommodation, and enhance political trust through strategic communication.” It is crucial to stay committed to international law and international rules “instead of staying committed to supremacy,” Xi said, in his first address since Biden entered the White House. “Confrontation will lead us to a dead end,” he added. But while espousing familiar talking points highlighting multilateralism and “win-win” outcomes, Chinese officials have also hinted that a change course in the face of U.S. pressure is not in the cards. Beijing hopes Biden “will draw lessons from consequences of the wrong policies of the previous administration, look at China and China-U.S. relations in an objective and rational light, and take positive and constructive policies towards China,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said.82
His comments came after press secretary Psaki said that Xi’s remarks “don’t change anything” in terms of how the Biden administration is approaching its relations with China. Biden, mindful of criticism that Beijing attempted to take advantage of the U.S. during his time as vice president in the administration of Barack Obama, will also be seeking to demonstrate that he will hold China’s feet to the fire. But he will be doing so at a very crucial period for Xi.83
This year marks the centenary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s founding — which comes with the concomitant goal of building “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” — and next year will see a National Party Congress, at which Xi is widely expected to seek a third term as the party’s general secretary. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Glaser said Xi will be “especially vigilant” on protecting core issues as he seeks “to shore up bonafides as a staunch protector” of Chinese sovereignty, including on Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Sino-Indian border and the Senkaku Islands. “Will tensions continue to ratchet up? I expect that they will,” she said.84
It is noteworthy tha Taiwan has deployed the sophisticated Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system as far back as 2017 and has also signed agreement with the US to purchase another set of sophisticated combat aircrafts (indeed one of the most sophisticated in the US airforce arsenal): the stealth F-35 Lightning II fighter jets.
But Taiwan’s problem still goes deeper. While it is contemporaneously with China it also has to do with its dichotomized relationship with the United States which can be traced back to 1979.
United States ambivalence or ambiguity with Taiwan started in 1979, [when] the United States established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing by concluding a joint communique stating that “the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” At that time, U.S. President Jimmy Carter terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC government in Taiwan. But months after, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), affirming important unofficial ties with the island. The legislation allows for arms sales to Taiwan for self-defense and does not rule out the possibility of the United States defending Taiwan from Chinese attack—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.85 Since then, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, totaling more than $25 billion between 2007 and 2018, have led to U.S.-China friction and an upsurge in bellicose rhetoric across the strait. Political transitions in the United States have also prompted tensions between Beijing and Washington.85
Beijing has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve disputes over the island’s status. The PRC’s introduction of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, intended to strengthen Beijing’s approach to “peaceful national reunification,” included language stating that in the event secessionist forces seek independence, Beijing would “employ non-peaceful means” to protect its national sovereignty. In a 2019 speech, Xi reiterated this and added that Beijing would consider the use of force to prevent “intervention by external forces” on the island.86
In response, Taiwan continues to purchase weapons, primarily from the United States. Between 1979 and 2018, Taiwan ranked as the ninth largest recipient of arms globally. During the same period, the United States supplied more than three-quarters of Taiwan’s imported weapons, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s ars transfers database.87
Taiwan’s strategic security rests heavily on guarantees offered by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act. Yet in recent years, security analysts have cited concern over the emerging military imbalance between Beijing and Taipei. “Given the pace of PLA(N) [People’s Liberation Army Navy] modernization, the gap in military capability between the mainland and Taiwan will continue to widen in China’s favor over the coming years,” writes the Congressional Research Services’ naval affairs specialist Ronald O’Rourke.88
In 2019, Taiwan’s defense budget stood at $11.3 billion and accounted for 2.16 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). President Tsai and the DPP have emphasized plans to raise annual defence spending incrementally, with the aim of an increase of 20 percent, or $2.1 billion, by 2025. Part of this expanded military budget will be dedicated to investment in advanced weapons systems, training, and new equipment, including missiles, electronic warfare technology, and missile defense systems.89
Speaking in a virtual meeting with a panel of experts from Center for Strategic and International Studies in April 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen said that “since 2016, part of my primary goals is to strengthen our defense capabilities. Already we have increased our defense budget over the past two years in a row. These funds will go into strategies, techniques, and capabilities that make our fighting force more nimble, agile, and survivable. These ideas are encompassed by the overall defense concept, which has my support 100 percent. We are making these investments not because we pursue compensation. Quite the opposite: Our intention is to uphold the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act and provide for lasting peace across the Taiwan Strait. But we can’t do this when we don’t have the ability to deter coercion and aggression.90
Jacques deLisle (2021), a Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and of Political Science, and director of the Centre for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. DeLisle wrote: “As the Biden administration takes office, expectations—and, in many quarters, hopes—are high that much will change in American foreign policy. U.S. policy on Taiwan-related issues, however, is not likely to shift fundamentally. That is an outcome that should be – and generally will be -welcome in Taiwan. The relationship’s foundations may be strengthened, and apparent post-Trump setbacks are likely illusory. For Taiwan, reasons for concern mostly lie elsewhere, in the fraught U.S.-China relationship, the mounting challenges posed by Beijing, and questions about how the U.S. will respond.91
During the Obama administration, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou proclaimed—with assent from Washington—that bilateral relations were the best they had been since before the termination of diplomatic ties in 1979. During the Trump and Tsai Ing-wen presidencies, U.S. support for Taiwan grew stronger still. The U.S. has blamed Beijing for the deterioration in cross-Strait relations and credited Tsai for her commitment to peace and stability. Much legislation—annual National Defense Authorization Acts, the Taiwan Travel Act, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act, and the Taiwan Assurance Act—has affirmed long-standing U.S. commitments to Taiwan, pressed for higher-level official visits, closer defense cooperation, and support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and the global community, and enhanced cooperative efforts such as the Global Cooperation and Training Framework. The U.S. included Taiwan in its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Offers of arms sales under the Taiwan Relations Act and visits by high-level U.S. officials saw significant upticks.92
DeLisle was of the view that [u]nder the Biden administration, much of this is very likely to continue. As the torrent of Taiwan-supporting legislation reflects, support for current policies is strongly bipartisan. Statements from Biden and his incoming team have signaled robust support, pledging to deepen ties with Taiwan, along with other friends and allies—and especially democratic states—in the Indo-Pacific.93
As has long been the case, U.S. Taiwan policy under Biden will be deeply affected by U.S.-China relations. Wariness about Biden in Taiwan stems largely from positions on China policy and cross-Strait issues previously espoused by Biden and his advisors. Nevertheless, China’s behavior and, with it, assessments by the Biden team have changed. The now-entrenched consensus view in Washington is that China is, at best, a competitor, pursuing policies harmful to U.S. interests and inimical to U.S. values. The policy of “constructive engagement” is over. There is very little appetite in U.S. policy circles for once-common arguments that Washington should make concessions on Taiwan or pressure Taipei to be more accommodating toward Beijing because it would benefit U.S. relations with China.94
DeLisle noted that [t]he Biden critique of Trump’s China policy has been not that it was too tough, but that it was not smart—as well as, at times too soft: overly focused on trade deficits, insufficiently concerned with human rights, too often praising Xi Jinping, and lacking coordination with allies. Biden’s principal post-election statement on China policy characterized China as a competitor and a source of strategic challenges that needed to be held accountable.95
Some in Taiwan are wary that the Biden administration will backslide from the extraordinary levels of support seen under Trump. However, much of the Trump-era boon was fool’s gold. The phone call between Tsai and President-elect Trump and Trump’s musings about abandoning the one-China policy was more than offset by Trump’s post-phone call reassurance to Xi. Not to mention his intermittent high praise for China’s leader, and anxiety in Taiwan that Trumpian transactional foreign policy put Taiwan’s interests in peril in a possible U.S.-China deal. The Trump administration’s highly provocative, and at times racist rhetoric about China, its disdain for allies and liberal values in an “America first” foreign policy, and the extraordinary volatility of its policies were bad for Taiwan’s security. The latter remaining dependent on the existence—and Beijing’s perception—of stable U.S. commitments. The outgoing administration’s parting shot brought more of the same: further lifting restrictions on high-level contacts, which offered Taiwan a win that was more apparent than real, roiled U.S.-Taiwan-China relations and sowed frustration for its successor. The embrace of Trump in Taiwan also had become problematic as Trump turned against democracy in the United States. The alignment chafed against Taiwan’s long-standing self-presentation as an exemplar of democracy, and it discomfited a growing swath of the broad political spectrum of support Taiwan has enjoyed in U.S. policy circles.96
More substantial dangers for Taiwan during a Biden administration come from more fundamental and less tractable sources. First, Taiwan remains at risk of becoming collateral damage in increasingly securitized U.S.-China economic conflicts. Although Taiwan may benefit from the improved prospects for a U.S.-Taiwan bilateral trade agreement and efforts to build more secure supply chains, U.S. policies on technology access – along with Chinese policies that anticipate further movement toward decoupling – are challenges for Taiwan, with its tech-heavy economy and deep integration into global value chains.97
Second, the security threat from China has grown along with Beijing’s military prowess and its shift to gray zone tactics (including military moves that intimidate but stop short of imminent threats of force) and political warfare (for example, disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan’s elections). These developments increase the cost to the U.S. of intervention to protect Taiwan and create ambiguity about when U.S. policy would and should contemplate intervention. Such concerns have led to more serious arguments that the U.S.’s goal of deterring both Beijing and Taipei from a cross-Strait conflict now requires replacing the venerable doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” with greater “strategic clarity,” articulating—and perhaps expanding—the scope of Washington’s red lines. That shift, however, is not certain to become policy.98
Finally, it will, at best, take the Biden administration some time to reassure Taiwan and other friends and allies in the region—and to convince Beijing—that U.S. commitments and reengagement robust and reliable. The shift in relative power in China’s favor has raised long-term doubts, the amelioration of which depends on strong bonds among the U.S., its allies, and like-minded states. The Trump years provided a disconcerting proof of concept that the U.S. might abruptly abandon its long-standing roles. The Biden administration thus has some daunting repair work to do for U.S. credibility in the region. And it must do so when much of its attention will be focused on domestic issues, including immediate crises in public health, the economy, and democracy, and the longer-term task of rebuilding the domestic material and moral foundations of U.S. power abroad.99
The Economic Status of Taiwan
Another sensitive factor is the economic status of Taiwan. Comparatively, Taiwan is not Afghanistan, Syria or Iraq. Taiwan’s economy is classified by Wikipedia as a developed/advanced, high-income economy. To seek to destroy such an economy is unimaginable. It is an invitation to Armaggedon. Taipei, the capital, and other cities are highly built up with skyscrappers dotting the skylines. Taiwan as a whole is like New York City or Los Angeles or Chicago. It would be sheer madness to seek to destroy such metropolitan enclaves.
Taiwan’s economy is export-oriented. Exports account for around 70 percent of total GDP and its composition have changed from predominantly agricultural commodities to industrial goods (now 98%) during the past 40 years. Main exports products are: electronics (33.1% of total), information, communication and audio-video products (10.8%), base metals (8.8%), plastics & rubber (7.1%), machinery (7.5 percent). Main exports partners are Mainland China & Hong Kong (40% of total), ASEAN countries (18.3%), USA (12%), Europe (9%) and Japan (7%).100 Exports from Taiwan jumped 36.8% year-on-year to a new record high of USD 34.27 billion in January of 2021, mainly boosted by electronic product (47.5%); information, communication and audio-video products (42.9%); base metals and articles of base metal (27.2%); plastics & rubber and articles thereof (51.1%) and machinery (26.9%). Sales to China jumped 57%, ASEAN countries 40.7% and 21.5% to Japan. 

[T]he island of Taiwan is surrounded by major trading partners in the People’s Republic of China to its west, Japan to its east and the Philippines to its south. Taiwan exported US$329.5 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2019. That dollar amount reflects a 17.7% gain since 2015 but a -1.9% dip from 2018 to 2019. Applying a continental lens, 72.1% of Taiwan’s exports by value were delivered to fellow Asian trade partners while 15.7% were sold to importers in North America. Taiwan shipped another 9.1% worth of goods to Europe. Smaller percentages went to Oceania led by Australia (1.2%), Latin America excluding Mexico but including the Caribbean (0.9%) then Africa (0.6%).101
⦁ China: US$91.9 billion (27.9% of Taiwan’s total exports)
⦁ United States: $46.3 billion (14.1%)
⦁ Hong Kong: $40.4 billion (12.3%)
⦁ Japan: $23.3 billion (7.1%)
⦁ Singapore: $18.2 billion (5.5%)
⦁ South Korea: $16.9 billion (5.1%)
⦁ Vietnam: $10.8 billion (3.3%)
⦁ Malaysia: $9.4 billion (2.9%)
⦁ Germany: $6.5 billion (2%)
⦁ Philippines: $6.2 billion (1.9%)
⦁ Netherlands: $5.9 billion (1.8%)
⦁ Thailand: $5.5 billion (1.7%)
⦁ United Kingdom: $3.6 billion (1.1%)
⦁ India: $3.3 billion (1%)
⦁ Australia: $3.2 billion (1%)
Almost nine-tenths (88.4%) of Taiwanese exports in 2019 were delivered to the above 15 trade partners. Four top trade partners increased purchases of Taiwan’s exports from 2018 to 2019 namely the United States (up 16.6%), South Korea (up 6%), Singapore (up 4.9%) then Japan (up 1%). Leading decliners were Philippines (down -31.1%) and India (down -13.3%).102
Foreign trade has been the engine of Taiwan’s rapid growth during the past 40 years. Taiwan is very open to international trade, which represented over 62.7% of GDP in Taiwan from 2015 to 2018 (WTO, 2020). Main exports include electrical equipment, machinery, computers, plastics, medical apparatus, mineral fuels and vehicles;  while imports include electrical equipment, mineral fuels, machinery and computers. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is forecasting a rebound of 2.8% in the volume of exports of goods and services of the country in 2021, after a fall of 4.9% in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic, and an increase of 2.7% of its imports, after a fall of 3.2% in 2020.103
Taiwan’s main export partners in 2019 were China (24.3% of all export in 2019), the United States (13.2%), the E.U. and Japan. Imports were predominantly acquired from China (20.1% of all imports in 2019), Japan, the U.S.(12.2%), the E.U., and the Republic of Korea. Since Taiwan’s economy is highly export-oriented, it depends on a regime open to international trade and remains vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy. Political tensions between separatist and reunificationists in Taiwan made reaching policy consensus difficult. President Trump’s commercial battle against China increases risk in Asian economies, although said dispute it at a standstill as of February 2019 (NPR). Lack of international recognition from other countries also complicates Taiwan’s international position.104

Taiwan exported USD 330.6 billion of goods and USD 51.4 billion of services in 2019, and imported USD 287.1 billion of goods and USD 56.3 billion of services (WTO, 2020). Electronics industry is the largest industrial export sector and it receives the most US investment. Taiwan’s membership in the WTO as an independent economy has also supported its commerce since 2002. The island has also a free trade agreement with New Zealand.105
The phenomenal growth of Taiwan’s economy can be credited to its brisk foreign trade. From 1970 until 1990, the country amassed huge surpluses from its earnings in international trade, which peaked in 1987 when the trade surplus reached US$18.7 billion. However, several other countries became alarmed at Taiwan’s huge surpluses and the corresponding economic power it might exert on other economies. The United States demanded that Taiwan remove trade restrictions and allow more foreign products into the country. Since then, Taiwan has reduced or removed a significant number of trade barriers, thus allowing foreign products to compete with local products in the domestic market. From 1992 to 1996, Taiwan’s trade surplus declined by nearly 30 percent. However, from 1998, trade figures have once more shown a steady rise and, according to the Central Bank of China, Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserves in 1999 amounted to US$106.2 billion, one of the highest in the world. In 2000, Taiwanese exports reached US$148.38 billion against imports of US$140.01 billion, producing a trade surplus of US$8.37 billion.106
Taiwan is a major exporter of industrial products ranging from mechanical appliances and accessories, electronics, electrical appliances, personal computers and peripherals, metal products and transport equipment, to furniture and clothing. The United States has been Taiwan’s most important trading partner over decades. However, as Taiwan pursued the expansion of its economy, it began seeking out other trading partners, which resulted in a decrease in trade with the United States. In the 1980s, 40 percent of Taiwan’s total exports were U.S.-bound; by 2000 only 23.5 percent of the island’s total exports were destined for the American market.107
Until 1999, Japan was Taiwan’s biggest export destination after the United States. However, since 1999, Hong Kong has replaced Japan as the second leading export partner, since Taiwan uses it as an indirect link to send goods to mainland China. Major items exported to Hong Kong include electrical and electronic equipment and peripherals, machinery, accessories, raw plastic materials, and textiles. In 2000, exports to Hong Kong amounted to 21.1 percent of Taiwan’s total exports, while those to Japan, due also to the slowdown of the Japanese economy, only accounted for 11.2 percent.108
With huge exports fueling the economy, the spending capacity of the government and the population has multiplied. In the past, the government aggressively discouraged the entrance of imported products to the island by trade barriers and restrictive laws. However, with the new economy, the government has liberalized the situation and, in 2000, Taiwan’s total imports amounted to roughly US$110 billion. More than a quarter, or 27.5 percent, of these imports came from Japan. Taiwan’s industries, especially the information and automobile industries, rely heavily on the supply of parts and the transfer of technology from Japan. Most of the items imported from Japan are machinery, auto parts, electrical appliances, electronics, chemicals, and metal products. Other imports come from the United States (17.9 percent) and Europe (13.6 percent).109
Despite the absence of direct transport links to mainland China, Taiwan’s economic ties with the country are strengthening through the substantial Taiwanese investment being poured into China. Taiwanese businesses are eager to invest in mainland China, one of the most sought-after markets in the world. With a population approximately a billion strong, China is not only a huge market for any country’s products, but also has one of the biggest manpower resources in the whole world. Trade relations between the 2 economies are so intertwined that breaking them off would bring major repercussions. Mainland China is a big contributor to Taiwan’s overall trade surplus. In 1987, Taiwan had a trade surplus of just over US$1 billion with mainland China, and by 1998, this had grown to US$15.7 billion.110
Based on data from Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the value of 2-way trade between Taiwan and mainland China amounted to US$23.95 billion in 1998. More than 82 percent of the indirect trade consisted of exports from Taiwan, which totaled US$19.84 billion. Some major items exported to mainland China are industrial machinery and equipment, electronic parts, plastics, man-made fibers, and industrial textiles. Meanwhile, imports from China climbed to 4.1 percent in 1999 from 3.9 percent in 1998. Agricultural and industrial raw materials accounted for a huge percentage of these imported goods. However, in view of the uneasy political relations that prevail between the 2 territories, Taiwan does not concentrate too great a part of its investments in China. Taiwan is mindful that political upheaval in its dealings with China would jeopardize its own economic development.111
Taiwan is gearing itself for membership in the WTO and is setting the proper economic policies in motion to ensure its acceptance. One of the long-standing trade issues for which Taiwan is criticized is its violation of agreements on the protection of intellectual property. Piracy in different forms—such as copying and reselling the contents of entertainment and software CDs—remains a serious matter. To its credit, Taiwan’s government is addressing the problem through a combination of rules and regulations to control piracy, and efforts to raise awareness of the issues involved with it.112
The Sum of all Fears
According to President Tsai: All of this has taken place at a time our international space is under unprecedented challenge. China has engaged in a relentless campaign to deny our right to participate in international affairs. They don’t do this because it is a DPP administration or because we don’t recognize the 1992 Consensus. They do it because they genuinely believe that the people of Taiwan don’t have an independent right to participate in global affairs. That is troubling and destabilizing for the healthy development of cross-strait relations.113
The sum of all fears is what China would do if the US upgrades its relations with Taiwan to a full diplomatic status, i.e. return to pre-1979 era when the US had full diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. These fears are, of course, legitimate to the extent of the limitations of such fears which are tied to the myths about Chinese military prowess and the perceived declining power of the US in world affairs especially what is regarded as the blunted edge of its military power.
Would China invade Taiwan consequent upon restoration of full diplomatic relations by the US or formal declaration of independence by Taiwan? Would this be the best strategic option for China in trying to solve the problem posed by Taiwan once and for all? Would China really invade Taiwan against all possibility of US military intervention? These questions must be answered before conclusions can be drawn about whether or not China would invade Taiwan?
Looking at the scenario, there may not be doubt about the high possibility of China going for the guns because for a long time now, it can be argued that it has cancelled out peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan. China has completely retreated from the option of peaceful resolution of the cross-Taiwan Strait conflict. China has not been making any visible effort at winning hearts and minds of Taiwan either by propaganda or other means. It has been talking loudly, even for the dumb to hear, about using military force to subdue Taiwan if the latter dared to declare independence.
In this regard, China’s intentions need to be properly disambiguated by close examination of what these intentions might have been or would be in coming years. For instance, it has been argued and agreed, based upon the facts on ground, that China has not really tested its military firepower in foreign military adventures – unlike the war-experienced and battle-hardened United States for the past several decades. This is undoubtedly true. But would Taiwan now be the target of such military adventurism? Would Taiwan be a cherry pick for the China’s PLA? Would Taiwan as a target be a good idea for the Chinese aggressive revisionist powers given the strategic status/importance of Taiwan to the United States? Would United States really fold its arms while Chinese PLA overrun Taiwan? If it comes to exchange of blows between Chinese PLA and the Taiwanese Armed Forces, would China get away without a bloody nose? Again, these are some of the questions that have to be tackled and answered by analysts especially on the part of the United States strategists and policy makers in order to make proper contingency plans for any invasion that might be embarked upon by China against Taiwan – and not to jump into speculations or conclusions that are not backed up by objective facts.
But more dangerous is to leave Taiwan in the limbo of status quo ante, i.e. pre-Trump or Trump era status. Such a situation exposes Taiwan to a precarious status which is a position of Thucydidean weakness which in the present circumstance is a direct invitation to invasion of Taiwan by China. This status or position of Thucydidean weakness present a veritable Trap for the US over Taiwan. Whatever is the current position of the US even with President Joe Biden now in the Oval Office and with the host of domestic challenges confronting the United States, an invasion of Taiwan by the revisionist powers in Beijing would dramatically change the entire strategic scenario and dynamics not only in the cross-Taiwan Strait but also in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific region in general. In short, we would be looking directly at military intervention by the US on behalf of Taiwan and a direct military head-on collision with China. This is because China would only be seeing a golden opportunity to solve the Taiwan problem once and for all, an opportunity created by complacent or ambivalent behaviour and position of the US in face of a very combustible situation.
The regional security environment in Indo-Pacific has been deliberated heated up by China’s aggressive ambitions to be the regional supremo. It is also laying Thucydides Trap everywhere for its neighbours in an inverted manner, looking to triggering off conflicts or major wars in order to test the firepower of PLA military machine. The maritime zone has been turned to s hotly contested zone with disputes being ignited here and there. China is, of course, a regional supremo – there is no doubt about that. But no matter how supreme, Lord of the Rings, China think it has become, there is bound to be resistance either from indvidual or coalition of countries to this aggressive hegemonic posturings or ambitions for total supremacy. More so when this is placed in broader context of global security environment where China can no longer claim supremacy.
Both the regional and international security environment is made less friendly towards China as a result of the outbreak of coronavirus pandemic and the role allegedly played by China in spreading the pandemic worldwide in which nearly 100 million got infected and over a million death. China is yet to convincingly absolve itself of moral blameworthiness despite massive propaganda trying to evade all responsibilities.
While China and other major world powers are grappling with the effects and reeling from the fallouts of the pandemic, the Mekong-Pacific countries have since conquered and halted the spread of the pandemic in their respective countries as far back as April 2020. As have been stated earlier, Taiwan led the Mekong-Pacific Knights including South Korea, Japan, with one of the lowest mortality rate in the world at 7 deaths only.
With restoration of full diplomatic relations with Taiwan by the US, rather than invite China to invade Taiwan would on the contrary push back China from contemplating and taking that dangerous option. Of course, China would scream, bark like a bulldog, kick and make all sorts of threatening noises to invade Taiwan, even take a step forward to conduct military exercise to intimidate Taiwan. But eventually, China would simmer down and would not dare to embark on invasion of Taiwan because of the rock-solid support from the US and balance of terror provided by the US military behemoth.
Conclusion
The election and inauguration of Joe Biden as the 47th President of the United States open a new vista in the American foreign policy especially its much expected global leadership roles which have come under immense pressure in the last few years. The year 2020 witnessed the erosion of American global leadership position by coming under immense transfinite challenge from China such as the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and crisis in the South China Sea. Curiously while the United States under Trump Administration literally abandoned the much expected American global leadership to beat back the coronavirus pandemic, it went on a gunboat diplomacy to South China Sea that in the final analysis did nothing to burnish American global leadership except to show off muscles to the China’s political leadership and the PLA. It is also doubtful whether this showing off of muscles actually enhance American leadership in the Indo-Pacific region in any fundamental way or sense.
This is the onerous but unwholesome legacy inherited by the new Biden Administration which directly calls for total re-examination in its fundamental elements. Apart from the basic foreign policy issues that Joe Biden has promised to look into and make the focal point of his Administration’s foreign policy thrusts, there has emerged in the last couple of months a consensus that not all of Trump Administration’s foreign policy “babies” can be thrown away with the dirty bathwater simply because of what is perceived as the “bad politics” of Trump Administration. There have been overlapping understanding of certain issues which serve as bridge from the past to the present, i.e. from Trump to Biden. Thus, whatever deserves to be salvaged, however, will have to undergo critical assessment in order to find it worthy of being incorporated into the new foreign policy themes or thrusts that will form the cornerstones of American foreign policy under Biden Administration.
Given the pronouncements of Joe Biden and his campaign team during the last November election and also the pronouncements after the Inauguration, there is every indication that there will be a nuanced but fundamental policy shift from the previous Trump Administration pugilist approach, the latter which has been adjudged in some quarters as having not served any useful purpose than to escalate the existing conflicts especially between the two main rivals on global arena: US and China. President Biden has promised enactment of smart policies or moves but which are no less tough than some actions already taken by previous Trump Administration especially against China in the last four years.
President Biden is no less aware of the sensitivity of the strategic issues at stake especially in relation to Taiwan in the context of the relations with China. Taiwan was pursued out of the United Nations as far back as 1971 followed eight years later by the severance of diplomatic relations with the US by Carter Presidency. Even though Taiwan has been able to survive the thunderstorms mostly orchestrated by China against it and mainly through the backyard supports from the same US, it has not been able to achieve its main goal of declaration of independence which would have confered upon it a juridical sovereignty and suzerainty.
President Biden is not unaware of the gushing water that has passed under the bridge with Taiwan for decades. He is not unaware of the dynamics of the US relationship with Taiwan both as long-serving Senator involved in many legislative actions seeking to protect Taiwan from the rapacity of China and also as a Vice President for two consecutive terms of eight years under Obama Administration which saw a major milestone in the overarching US relationship with Indo-Pacific region under the carved-stone of Asia Pivot Strategy.
Referring to the bedrock of US-Taiwan relationship (the Taiwan Relations Act) President Tsai said: “With the benefit of hindsight from 40 years of experience, I trust that everyone here today agrees that the TRA has helped create a force for good and laid the foundation for Taiwan to become a beacon of democracy in the world. Taiwan survived the challenges posed to us by history. We were not defeated. We are an island of resilience, and we have been working tirelessly to contribute to a brighter tomorrow for our region and the world as well.”114
President Joe Biden was part of this historic act.
Biden Administration at this early stage has the necessary task of reviewing the entire Indo-Pacific Strategy in view of changes in the regional configuration of power which has preponderantly shifted in favour of China in the last two decades in terms of economic and military power. China’s weight has increased undoubtedly due to combination of many factors.
But any Indo-Pacific Strategy that does not involve or embrace the national security interests of Taiwan is a great disservice to the people of Taiwan who have stood up to China and its hegemonic ambitions to be the Asia-Pacific supremo since 1949. Taiwan has been a beacon of democracy in that region that has not necessarily enjoy a smooth path to democratic governance in the last decades due to the chicaneries and pressures from China and internal dynamics. Thus the reviewed Indo-Pacific Strategy must embrace and accomodate Taiwan’s national security interests in all ramifications.
In carrying out this unavoidable review, the entire Chinese foreign policy in the last two decades must also be included. In the last two decades, China’s foreign policy has hovered between homilies of peace and cooperation on the one hand and philippics of war, threats of war and/or confrontation with its neighbours and even the American behemoth. But there is the gray zone in which its real intentions may have been craftily hidden. Over the last two decades there is no doubt that the real Chinese intentions have gradually come to the fore for all to see: the Manichean quest for global supremacy with whatever instruments are required to achieve this hegemonic ambitions of establishing its global supremacy.
Much work has been left undone on the part of American strategic thinkers and policy makers in the last two decades under the absurd notion that China is a friend that business can be done with. Since 1972 when Dr Henry Kissingger opened up China to the United States and the West in general, the driving mechanism has been a transactional relationship of mutual benefit assurance. This has been the unbroken chain of events. However, this notion must be acknowledged to have gone through its own evolution, from a friend status to become a “frenemy” and now to a strategic rival or competitor on global stage. For instance, China came with the strategic Belt and Road and/or Silk Road Initiative since 2013 with which it has been able to capture many weak countries around the world especially in Asia, Africa and Central Europe – which in turn is an acknowledgment of the collosal failure of American neoliberal-driven foreign policy and dead-end economic diplomacy in the last two decades or thereabout. Thus, the Americans missed the fundamental point that China was and has never been a friend at any point in time and space. China however succeeded in passing off that notion as the dominant perception for many years, unsuspected by many.
Part of this review is to have a holistic understanding of the precise worldview, mindset and/or brainwaves of the Chinese policy makers, their ambitions or goals. Credit must be given the fact that the Chinese have been very artful in recent years in hiding their real intentions behind flurries of homilies and diplomatese. Of course, no keen observer is fooled by these (sometimes clumsy) attempts as their actual sinister motives come to the fore from time to time in the course of navigating difficult situations presented by objective reality beyond their control.